Bowman v. Dixon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

DUSTY LEE BOWMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-188-MMH-LLL

RICKY D. DIXON, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Dusty Lee Bowman, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDOC), is proceeding on a pro se Second Amended Complaint for

Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 29; SAC), with exhibits

(Docs. 29-1 through 29-19, 33). Bowman alleges violations of his First, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights during his incarceration at Union

Correctional Institution (Union C.I.), between June 16, 2024 and July 16, 2025.

Doc. 29 at 4, 49. He names the following individuals as Defendants: (1) Ricky

D. Dixon, Superintendent/Secretary of the FDOC, in his individual and official

capacity; (2) B.V. Reddish, Warden at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (3)

K. Tomlinson, Assistant Warden at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (4)

A. Llorens, Medical Director at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (5)

Jessica Putney, Mental Health Department at Reception Medical Center, in

her individual capacity; (6) Gloria Walden, Registered Nurse at Union C.I., in

her official capacity; (7) S. Bias, Assistant Health Service Administrator at

Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (8) Marcia G. Miller, Classification Law

Officer at Union C.I., in her individual capacity; (9) Emily Thurman,

Classification Law Officer at Union C.I., in her individual capacity; (10) Naomi

Jones, Classification Law Officer at Union C.I., in her individual capacity; (11)

R. Weems, Corrections Security Lieutenant at Union C.I., in his individual

capacity; (12) A. Smith, Corrections Security Officer in Charge at Union C.I.,

in his individual capacity; (13) C. Randall, Corrections Security Officer in

Charge at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (14) W. Manning, Corrections

Security Sergeant at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (15) C. Mauldin,

Corrections Security Officer at Union C.I., in his individual capacity; (16) C.

Prescott, Corrections Security Officer at Union C.I., in his individual capacity;

(17) S. Cotton, Corrections Security Sergeant at Union C.I., in his individual

capacity; (18) Ashley Moody, (former) Attorney General of the State of Florida,

in her individual and official capacity; (19) John or Jane Doe, Supervisor at

Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), in his/her individual and

official capacity; (20) D. Bass, Secretary’s Consultant at FDOC, in his/her

individual capacity; and (21) Michelle Nipper, Colonel Chief of Security at

Union C.I., in her individual capacity. Id. at 2–10.

2

Bowman’s predominant claim in the sixty-four-page SAC appears to be

his claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in which only

Putney and Mauldin appear to have been personally involved. See id. Bowman

alleges that Putney provided only “minimal treatment” for the pain in his left

thumb and right elbow. Id. at 20, 25–28. The treatment included “sporadic”

ninety-day prescriptions for Ibuprofen, thirty pills of 600 mg, and a tube of

analgesic balm that did not help with the pain. Id. Bowman asserts that the

treatment was based only on “visual assessment,” but also admits that Putney

had previously ordered an X-ray of his left thumb as well as lab work to rule

out rheumatoid arthritis. Id. at 26. According to Bowman, Putney saw him four

times—on October 10, 2024; November 21, 2024; December 5, 2024; and

January 23, 2025. On October 10, 2024, Bowman had a routine follow-up for

his chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) at which he asked Putney

for a front handcuff pass. Id. at 25–26. Her response was that it was not

Centurion’s policy to “provide inmates who have emergency inhalers with front

handcuff passes.” Id. At the next two visits, Bowman complained that his right

elbow pain felt like nerve damage, and again requested a front handcuff pass

to both alleviate the pain and allow for “ready access” to his COPD inhaler. Id.

at 26–27, 43. Putney responded: “For security reasons[,] [Centurion] won’t let

me give you a front handcuff pass[] or an elbow brace,” “surgery we can’t do,”

3

and “the only pain med[ication]s [we] give are psych[iatric] med[ication]s.”1 Id.

at 27. On January 23, 2025, Bowman once again requested a front handcuff

pass, an elbow brace, pain medications, and an MRI of his right elbow and left

thumb/hands. Id. Bowman alleges that Putney failed “to provide essential

adequate medical treatment,” causing him unnecessary long-term pain and

suffering. Id. at 20, 25, 28.

As to Mauldin, Bowman alleges that Mauldin maliciously withheld over-

the-counter Ibuprofen and Tylenol “many times,” and vindictively lied about

not having access to or a supply of these medications. Id. at 35. According to

Bowman, Mauldin was retaliating against him for using the grievance

procedure against Mauldin and other officers. Id. at 34, 45. Bowman also

alleges that the audio/video evidence documenting Mauldin’s retaliatory

conduct is unavailable for judicial review because of an unconstitutional

departmental procedure allowing FDOC staff to block access to this evidence.

Id. at 35.

To the extent Plaintiff alleges deliberate medical indifference claims

against other Defendants, he premises his claims on Defendants’ supervisory

roles. See id. at 20–22 (Dixon); id. at 22–23, 44 (Reddish); id. at 23–24, 44

1 It appears that at least as of June 30, 2025, Bowman has been taking

psychotropic medications. See Doc. 29 at 43.

4

(Tomlinson); id. at 21–25 (Llorens); id. at 28–29, 44 (Bias); id. at 38–40, 45

(Moody); id. at 40, 45 (John/Jane Doe); id. at 41, 45 (Bass); id. at 42, 45 (Nipper).

As a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to his serious medical need,

Bowman alleges he suffered “permanent damage in [his] left thumb joint area

with restrictive movement”; nerve damage in his right elbow joint area;

excruciating pain with heavy lifting and/or twisting of his arm behind his back;

bouts of nausea, dizziness, and fatigue when the pain is extreme; and mental

and emotional distress. Id. at 43.

After the Court directed Bowman to amend his original Complaint so he

could “set forth his [deliberate medical indifference] claims sufficiently,” Doc.

12 at 3, Bowman added new conditions of confinement claims pertaining to

food and toiletries based on recent events. These new claims involve

Defendants Prescott, Miller, Thurman, Jones, Weems, Smith, Randall,

Manning, and Cotton. See Doc. 29. Specifically, Bowman alleges that during a

wing cell shakedown in the early morning hours of May 28, 2025, Prescott

intentionally removed Bowman’s toiletries from the tier hand-rail and threw

them on the tier floor by the back side of his cell door. Id. at 36. The same day,

while Prescott was serving lunch in Bowman’s wing, he gave Bowman his food

tray and drink, but closed the food flap intentionally, leaving Bowman’s

toiletries on the floor outside the cell door. Id. Prescott refused to return the

toiletries and told Bowman to stop creating a disturbance. Id. As Bowman

5

turned to his lunch, he “discovered a large wad of ‘spit’ (saliva) in his green

beans and on part of his spork.” Id. A few minutes later, when Prescott

returned to collect the food trays, Bowman refused to return his tray and asked

to speak with Weems about his food. Id. at 37. Prescott threatened Bowman

that if he did not return his food tray by dinner time, Prescott “would put

[Bowman] on ‘loaf’ for (14) days.” Id. Later that day, after it became obvious

that Weems was not going to see Bowman, he returned his food tray to another

officer. Id. According to Bowman, Prescott had a “personal vendetta” over

Bowman’s criminal convictions, which led him to conspire with Manning to

deprive Bowman of his rights. Id. at 35–36, 45.

As part of their “private conspiracy,” Prescott and his superior Manning

allegedly agreed to not feed Bowman dinner on May 28, 2025, when Prescott

was serving the top tier and Manning was serving the bottom range. Id. at 33,

37, 44. Although Bowman informed Manning that Prescott had spit in his

lunch earlier that day, Manning nevertheless allowed Prescott to serve dinner

in his wing. Id. at 33. Manning also ignored Bowman when he kicked his cell

door violently several times to alert the dorm security supervisors of Prescott’s

misconduct. Id. Manning again allowed Prescott to serve food in Bowman’s

wing on June 11, 12, and 18, 2025, “as a form of intimidation, harassment and

oppression.” Id. at 34.

6

Bowman alleges that Weems, Smith, and Randall applied a policy or

custom of “turning a blind eye” to their subordinates Manning and Prescott’s

conspiracy, and reassigned Manning and Prescott to work around Bowman

without first completing a thorough investigation. Id. at 31–33, 44. Similarly,

Cotton applied a policy or custom of facilitating and condoning Prescott’s

conspiracy to serve dinner in Bowman’s wing on July 4, 2025. Id. at 38, 45.

While Bowman’s allegations against Miller, Thurman, and Jones are not

entirely clear, it appears that he contends the three of them conspired to block

Bowman from retaining audio/video evidence to ensure it evaded court review.

Id. at 29–31, 44.

As relief, Bowman requests: (1) a declaration that all Defendants

violated his constitutional rights; (2) actual damages against Dixon, Reddish,

Tomlinson, Llorens, Putney, Bias, Miller, Thurman, Jones, Weems, Mauldin,

Bass, and Nipper; (3) punitive damages against Llorens, Putney, Bias, Miller,

Thurman, Jones, Weems, Smith, Randall, Manning, Mauldin, Prescott,

Cotton, Moody, John/Jane Doe, Bass, and Nipper; (4) a verbal admonishment

to Moody and John/Jane Doe to uphold their oath of office; (5) a preliminary

injunction for a front handcuff pass and a right elbow brace; and (6) a federal

investigation and prosecution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2), (3) and 18

U.S.C. § 241. See Doc. 29 at 20, 43, 45–48.

7

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.2 See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted,” the language of the PLRA mirrors the language

of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore courts apply

the same standard in both contexts.3 Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490

(11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted);

Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)

2 The Court granted Bowman’s request to proceed as a pauper. See Order (Doc.

16).

3 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

8

(citation omitted). Moreover, under Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a

§ 1983 action, a plaintiff must show “an affirmative causal connection between

the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted);

Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are

not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what

the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551

U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a

9

complaint must allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alternation and internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at

1262 (explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts

or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”)

(internal citation and quotations omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must

accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to

legal conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 679. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the SAC, the Court must read Bowman’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And, while “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the

court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Alford v. Consol. Gov’t of

10

Columbus, Ga., 438 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2011)4 (quoting GJR Invs., Inc.

v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal

citation omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall,

610 F.3d at 709).

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must

provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

11

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has

instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and

emphasis omitted);5 see also Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir.

2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff

must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the

5 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere

negligence” or “more than gross negligence standard” in determining whether an

official acted with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade,

106 F.4th at 1255. In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards

conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in

this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the

criminal law.” Id. at 1253. The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan

wrote a concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior

Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they

should continue to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

12

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the

defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective

recklessness” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted))

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical

treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973

F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well

settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).

Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1176

(quotations and citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also noted that

“[n]othing in our case law would derive a constitutional deprivation from a

prison physician’s failure to subordinate his own professional judgment to that

13

of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference

in medical opinion’ does not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v.

Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871

F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)). Similarly, “the question of whether

governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or

forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and

therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth

Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation

omitted).

Pursuant to the Court’s screening obligation under the PLRA, the Court

will dismiss Bowman’s SAC for failure to state a claim. Construed liberally,

the allegations against Putney are insufficient to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. Plaintiff alleges that Putney provided

only “minimal treatment” for the pain in his left thumb and right elbow, which

included prescriptions for Ibuprofen and analgesic balm.6 Doc. 29 at 20, 25–28.

Although he alleges that the treatment was based solely on “visual

assessment” and did not include an MRI or CT scan, he admits that an X-ray

of his left thumb was taken and lab work was done to rule out rheumatoid

6 It appears that Bowman also received psychotropic medications and over-the-

counter medications from other providers. See Doc. 29 at 35, 43.

14

arthritis. Id. at 26. Essentially, Bowman’s deliberate indifference claim stems

from his disagreement with Putney’s course of treatment. But such

disagreement is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Adams, 61

F.3d at 1545.

When an inmate has received medical care in prison, the inmate must

do more than allege the care provided was “subpar or different from what [he]

want[ed].” Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1266. Moreover, alleging “a simple difference

in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the inmate as to the

latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment” does not support a constitutional

claim under § 1983. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991).

Indeed, “federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess [prison

physicians’] medical judgments.” Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575

(11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit has instructed that “[m]edical treatment

violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent,

inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to

fundamental fairness.’” Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Thus, allegations of medical

negligence do not satisfy the stringent deliberate indifference standard.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Accordingly, even if Putney’s conduct could be

considered negligent, the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts

of prison officials. See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31; Davidson, 474 U.S. at 348.

As Bowman has not sufficiently alleged that he suffered a deprivation that was

15

objectively, sufficiently serious, or that Putney acted with subjective

recklessness, his deliberate indifference claim against Putney will be

dismissed.

For the same reasons, any claim of deliberate indifference against

Mauldin for withholding over-the-counter Ibuprofen and Tylenol must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. To the extent Bowman attempts to bring

a retaliation claim against Mauldin, this claim also fails. “The core of [a

retaliation claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983] is that the prisoner is

being retaliated against for exercising his right to free speech.” O’Bryant v.

Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citation omitted). It

is firmly established that “an inmate is considered to be exercising his First

Amendment right of freedom of speech when he complains to the prison’s

administrators about the conditions of his confinement.” Smith v. Mosley, 532

F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, it is firmly established that an

inmate may pursue a cause of action against a prison official who retaliated

against him for engaging in that protected speech. Id.

To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must

demonstrate “that the prison official’s actions were the

result of his having filed a grievance concerning the

conditions of his imprisonment.” Farrow v. West, 320

F.3d 1235, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). [A plaintiff] can prevail

on a retaliation claim if “(1) his speech was

constitutionally protected; (2) [he] suffered adverse

action such that the administrator’s allegedly

16

retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of

ordinary firmness from engaging in such speech; and

(3) there is a causal relationship between the

retaliatory action and the protected speech.” Smith,

532 F.3d at 1276.

Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal citation

modified). As to the third prong, a plaintiff must do more than make “general

attacks” upon a defendant’s motivations and must articulate “affirmative

evidence” of retaliation to establish the requisite motive. Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998) (citations omitted). “In other words, the

prisoner must show that, as a subjective matter, a motivation for the

defendant’s adverse action was the prisoner’s grievance or lawsuit.” Jemison

v. Wise, 386 F. App’x 961, 965 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Bowman does not include any well-pled allegations of fact to suggest that

Mauldin’s actions constitute retaliation for his constitutionally-protected

speech. His assertions that Mauldin withheld over-the-counter medications

from him “many times” in retaliation for his use of the grievance procedure are

insufficient to state a retaliation claim.

Further, to the extent Bowman attempts to hold Dixon, Reddish,

Tomlinson, Llorens, Bias, Moody, John/Jane Doe, Bass, and Nipper liable for

the actions or omissions of their subordinates, liability under § 1983 may not

be premised on a theory of vicarious liability. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall, 610 F.3d

17

at 709; see also Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is

axiomatic, in [§] 1983 actions, that liability must be based on something more

than a theory of respondeat superior.”). To establish individual liability for

supervisory conduct, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly

participated in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists

between the supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.”

Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).

Causation “may be established and supervisory

liability imposed where the supervisor’s improper

custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights.” Id.[7] (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff can

also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation

of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[8] 923 F.3d at 957.

“Either way, though, to prove that a policy or its

absence caused a constitutional harm, a plaintiff must

point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior

misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation

omitted). And allegations of a single incident of

unconstitutional conduct cannot state a claim for

supervisory liability, even when the conduct involves

several subordinates. Id. at 957-58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).

Bowman’s allegations do not establish that Dixon, Reddish, Tomlinson,

Llorens, Bias, Moody, John/Jane Doe, Bass, and Nipper personally

7 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

8 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).

18

participated in the alleged constitutional violations or that there was a causal

connection between their actions and the alleged constitutional deprivations.

Simply put, Bowman’s allegations with respect to these Defendants are too

general and conclusory to state a § 1983 claim based on their supervisory

conduct. See Doc. 29 at 12–25, 28–29, 38–42, 44–45. To the extent Bowman

alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent because they were

involved in his grievances, “filing a grievance with a supervisory person does

not automatically make the supervisor liable for the allegedly unconstitutional

conduct brought to light by the grievance, even when the grievance is denied.”

Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D.

Fla. Dec. 2, 2013)9 (collecting cases).

Additionally, to the extent Bowman sues Dixon, Moody, and John/Jane

Doe in their official capacities, the official-capacity claims against these

Defendants must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Official-capacity

suits “‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165–66 (1985) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S

9 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,

371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would

not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would

have significant persuasive effects.”).

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658, 690 n.55 (1978)); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir.

1991). Thus, a suit against Dixon in his official capacity is equivalent to suing

the FDOC itself, but the FDOC is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Gardner v. Riska, 444 F. App’x 353, 355 (11th Cir. 2011). Moreover, the FDOC

is immune from § 1983 liability for damages. Zatler, 802 F.2d at 400. Although

injunctive relief may be available against the FDOC, Gamble v. Fla. Dep’t of

Health & Rehab. Servs., 779 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir. 1986), Bowman does

not plausibly allege that any policy, custom, or practice of the FDOC was the

moving force behind his alleged constitutional violations. See Graham, 473

U.S. at 166 (“[A] governmental entity is liable under § 1983 only when the

entity itself is a moving force behind the deprivation; thus, in an official-

capacity suit the entity’s policy or custom must have played a part in the

violation of federal law.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted));

Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–94 (concluding that municipal liability under § 1983

occurs “when execution of a government’s policy or custom” is “the moving

force” behind the constitutional violation). Rather, Bowman’s “policy or

custom” allegations are nothing more than legal conclusions which “are not

entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.10

10 For similar reasons, Bowman’s official-capacity claim against Walden must

also be dismissed. Walden is employed by Centurion, LLC, which contracts with the

FDOC to provide medical services to inmates. See Doc. 29 at 5. Where a claim of

deliberate medical indifference is brought against a private contractor based on its

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Similarly, to the extent Bowman sues Moody and John/Jane Doe in their

official capacities, the suit is equivalent to suing the State of Florida. The

Eleventh Amendment bars an action for monetary damages against a state

under § 1983 unless waived by the state or Congress. See Pennhurst State Sch.

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97–103 (1984), superseded by statute on

other grounds; see also Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 731 (11th Cir.

2016) (per curiam) (“Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits by private

individuals in federal court against a state unless the state has consented to

be sued or has waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the states’

immunity. This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). The State of Florida has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, nor has Congress abrogated that

immunity in § 1983 cases. See Wusiya v. Miami Beach, 614 F. App’x 389, 393

(11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Congress has not abrogated the states’

sovereign immunity for purposes of section 1983 suits for damages, and Florida

functional equivalence to a government entity, liability under § 1983 cannot be based

on a theory of respondeat superior. Craig v. Floyd Cnty., 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Instead, the plaintiff must show that the entity “had a

‘policy or custom’ of deliberate indifference that led to the violation of his

constitutional right.” Id. (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Here, Bowman does not

plausibly allege that any constitutionally inadequate medical care was attributable

to a Centurion policy or custom. Thus, the official-capacity claim against Walden

must be dismissed. Notably, Bowman does not sue Walden in her individual capacity,

stating that she “provided ethical treatment” on September 13, 2024, and seeks no

damages against her. Doc. 29 at 28, 44, 46.

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has not waived its immunity with regard to such suits.” (citing Gamble, 779

F.2d at 1512, 1520)). Therefore, Bowman’s official-capacity claims for

monetary damages against these Defendants must be dismissed as barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Siskos v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 817 F. App’x

760, 766 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding “the Florida AG, the State, and FDOC are

all entities of the State of Florida,” which “are immune from suit for money

damages under the Eleventh Amendment”); Tennant v. Florida, 111 F. Supp.

2d 1326, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (“The Florida Department of Law Enforcement

is an agency of the state of Florida. The FDLE is therefore covered by the

Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.” (internal citation omitted)). In

addition, to the extent Bowman seeks injunctive relief against Moody and

John/Jane Doe, the “policy or custom” allegations in the SAC are nothing more

than legal conclusions that “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678–79. Therefore, the official-capacity claims against Dixon,

Moody, and John/Jane Doe will be dismissed.

The unrelated conditions of confinement claims pertaining to Bowman’s

food and toiletries against Prescott, Miller, Thurman, Jones, Weems, Smith,

Randall, Manning, and Cotton will also be dismissed for failure to state a

claim. To state a plausible claim that his conditions of confinement violated

the Eighth Amendment, an inmate must allege the named defendant was

deliberately indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” See

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Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004). Conditions of

confinement are sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment only if

they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to “an unreasonable risk of

serious damage to his future health or safety.” Id. at 1289. Allegations of

merely harsh conditions or verbal threats do not state a plausible claim under

the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see also Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F.

App’x 862, 866 (11th Cir. 2008).

Here, Bowman alleges that in one day, Prescott deprived him of his

toiletries, spat in his lunch, and threatened him that if he did not return his

food tray by dinner time, Prescott “would put Plaintiff on ‘loaf’ for (14) days.”

See Doc. 29 at 35–37, 45; Doc. 29-5 at 3–4. These allegations are insufficient to

state an Eighth Amendment claim. To the extent Bowman alleges he was

temporarily deprived of his toiletries,11 his allegations indicate mere

discomfort and fail to suggest that the conditions of his confinement posed an

unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety. See Woodson

v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Confinement without

clothing (other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials for 72 hours during

the months of April and August in Florida is not the type of extreme prison

11 In a declaration attached to the SAC, Bowman states that another officer

provided him with toiletries (a roll of toilet paper and a bar of soap) that same day.

Doc. 29-5 at 4.

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conditions that create a substantial risk of serious harm.”); O’Connor v. Kelley,

644 F. App’x 928, 932 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding that the prisoner did not allege

sufficient facts to suggest that the conditions of his confinement were cruel and

unusual when he was placed on strip status for weeks).

To the extent Bowman alleges that he was deprived of his lunch and/or

dinner12 once, such deprivation is not a constitutional violation, “especially

where there is no suggestion that [the inmate] suffered any adverse physical

effects or that his health was jeopardized as a result of the single deprivation.”

Solomon v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., No. 5:11cv208/MCR/CJK, 2012 WL 1700838, at

*2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (collecting cases), rep. & recommendation adopted

by, 2012 WL 1700710, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 15, 2012); see also Hoever v. Belleis,

703 F. App’x 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiff did not state

a plausible Eighth Amendment claim because he “did not assert that missing

one meal worsened his health”). Indeed, “[u]nder the Eighth Amendment, a

prisoner [is] only [] entitled to reasonably adequate food.” Hernandez, 281 F.

App’x at 865 (citing Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1575). “[F]eeding a prisoner a minimal

amount of food for a limited number of days” does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. Id. (citing Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1971)

12 In his declaration, Bowman states that Manning deprived him of dinner on

the same day. Doc. 29-5 at 4.

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(finding no Eighth Amendment violation when a prisoner in solitary

confinement was on a 15-day restrictive diet, consisting of 2 slices of bread per

day, unlimited water, and a full meal every 3 days)).

Likewise, to the extent Bowman premises any claim on Prescott’s threat

to put him on “loaf,” such allegations do not state a constitutional violation.

See Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that

“verbal taunts . . . [h]owever distressing” cannot establish a claim under the

Eighth Amendment); Hernandez, 281 F. App’x at 866 (finding “allegations of

verbal abuse and threats by the prison officers did not state a claim because

the defendants never carried out these threats and verbal abuse alone is

insufficient to state a constitutional claim”); Pete’s Towing Co. v. City of

Tampa, Fla., 648 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (“[V]erbal threats

and harassment are generally not actionable under § 1983.” (citation omitted));

Barfield v. Hetzel, No. 2:11-cv-1114-WHA, 2015 WL 758490, at *4 (M.D. Ala.

Feb. 23, 2015) (“Derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening or abusive

comments made by an officer to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or

unprofessional, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” (citations

omitted)); Russell v. Walton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:11-CV-5 (CAR), 2011

WL 794146, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2011) (“Threats, cursing, name-calling,

and verbal abuse, while unprofessional and reprehensible, do not amount to

the violation of a federal constitutional right.” (citations omitted)). Thus, the

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conditions Bowman describes do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual

punishment.

Further, Bowman’s allegations of a conspiracy between Prescott and

Manning do not state a plausible claim for relief. To state a claim for conspiracy

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that defendants “reached an

understanding” to violate his constitutional rights. Grider v. City of Auburn,

Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he linchpin for conspiracy is

agreement, which presupposes communication.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992). “It is not

enough to simply aver in the complaint that a conspiracy existed.” Allen v.

Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 578 F. App’x 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984)). Here, Bowman offers

no more than conclusory allegations that Defendants formed a conspiracy not

to feed him dinner on the same day that Prescott allegedly spat in his lunch.

But accepting Bowman’s allegations as true, Manning was about to serve

Bowman his dinner tray when Bowman started complaining that Prescott

should not be there because of the incident earlier that day. See Doc. 29 at 33–

34, 37, 44; Doc. 29-5 at 4. Thus, Bowman does not state a plausible § 1983 claim

against Prescott and Manning.

To the extent Bowman alleges that Weems, Smith, Randall, and Cotton

applied a policy or custom of condoning or “turning a blind eye” to their

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subordinates Manning and Prescott’s conspiracy of serving food in Bowman’s

wing, as the Court stated earlier, liability under § 1983 may not be premised

on a theory of vicarious liability. Bowman’s allegations do not support even an

inference that Weems, Smith, Randall, and Cotton personally participated in

the alleged constitutional violations or that there was a causal connection

between their actions and the alleged constitutional deprivations. See Doc. 29

at 14–16, 31–33, 38. Thus, Bowman’s allegations with respect to Weems,

Smith, Randall, and Cotton are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim based on

their supervisory conduct.

Similarly, Bowman’s conclusory allegations of a conspiracy among

Miller, Thurman, and Jones to block Bowman from retaining audio/video

evidence are not only conclusory, but also seemingly unrelated to Bowman’s

other claims. See Doc. 29 at 29–31, 44. Therefore, these claims will be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. Finally, insofar as Bowman requests a

federal investigation and prosecution against Defendants pertaining to the

claims in the SAC, as a private citizen, Bowman does not have “a judicially

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda

R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973); see also Williams v. Univ. of

Alabama Hosp. at Birmingham, 353 F. App’x 397, 398 (11th Cir. 2009)

(affirming a district court’s dismissal of a patient’s claim against a hospital for

27

assault and bribery, and recognizing that “[t]he government, not private

citizens, prosecutes crimes’).

Based on the foregoing, in his SAC, Bowman fails to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face,” and, as such, the SAC will be dismissed

under the PLRA. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Bowman may refile his claims with

factual allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief, but he should not join

multiple, unrelated claims if he chooses to refile his claims. His filings must be

made in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s

Local Rules. Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of

court that govern other litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v.

Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment dismissing this case

without prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 8th day of

October, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

Chief United States District Judge

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Jax-11 9/24

c: Dusty Lee Bowman, #130457

29