Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

Present: The Honorable Jacqueline Chooljian, United States Magistrate Judge

Kerri Hays None None

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorneys Present for Plaintiff: Attorneys Present for Defendant:

none present none present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD NOT BE

DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION/OBJECTIONS TO THE

CHARACTERIZATION OF HIS COMPLAINT (DOCKET NO. 19)

On August 5, 2022, in United States District Court for the Central District of California Case No.

2:22-cv-05640-CJC-JC (“Williams I’), Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and other provisions, against the City of Los Angeles (“City”), the

City’s Board of Fire and Police Pension Commissioners (“LAFPP”), former Mayor Eric Garcetti, former

City Attorney Mike Feuer, and LAFPP staff members Raymond Ciranna, Lis Burog (erroneously sued as

Lisa Burog), and Kevin Davis (collectively “Williams I Defendants”). (Williams I Docket (“Dkt.”) No.

1). The Williams I Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Williams I, Dkt. No. 14), and

on March 14, 2023, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Williams I be

dismissed. (Williams I Dkt. No. 26). In particular, the Report and Recommendation concluded that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine! barred Plaintiff's Complaint, explaining:

Here, plaintiff's Complaint amounts to a de facto appeal of the California Court of

Appeal’s [May] 1991 decision in [Williams v. City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal. App. 3d

1627 (1991)]. As noted above, the Court of Appeal’s decision reversed the Superior

Court’s mandate for the City to reinstate plaintiff as a [Los Angeles Police Department

(“LAPD”)] lieutenant, concluding instead that plaintiff had retired from the LAPD in

1987 by electing to take his retirement pension, which “effectively convert[ed] his

property right of continued employment into a property right to a pension” and precluded

'See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

him from returning to active duty, pursuant to [former] City Charter Section 190.111.[7]

Williams, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1629-30. Plaintiff here directly challenges that decision,

contending that he did not retire; that he did not convert his property right to employment

into a property right to a pension; and that he was legally entitled to reinstatement of his

employment pursuant to the Superior Court’s 1988 writ of mandate because City Charter

Section 190.111 is not applicable to him. Plaintiff further contends, repeatedly, that the

City’s continued reliance on the Court of Appeal’s decision — including defendants’

reference to plaintiff's 1987 retirement as a basis to reject his reinstatement and deny his

current[] spouse’s eligibility to receive a survivorship pension and health benefits —

violates his right to enforce the Superior Court’s writ of mandate restoring his

employment. Moreover, the relief plaintiff seeks in this case necessarily would require

reversal of the Court of Appeal’s decision. Plaintiff specifically seeks an order requiring

defendants to comply with the Superior Court’s 1988 writ of mandate by reinstating his

employment, despite the fact that the Court of Appeal expressly reversed the Superior

Court’s decision on that issue. See Williams, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1636. Plaintiff also

seeks compensatory and punitive damages against defendants, including back-payment of

wages, assertedly for their violation [of] plaintiffs right to enforce the Superior Court’s

1988 mandate reinstating his employment — a right plaintiff does not have unless the

Court of Appeal’s 1991 decision were reversed.

Even to the extent that some of plaintiffs claims do not directly seek relief from

the Court of Appeal’s decision, Rooker-Feldman nonetheless bars such claims because

the issues raised therein are “inextricably intertwined’ with such Court of Appeal’s

decision. This is because plaintiff's claims all hinge on his contentions that he did not

retire from the LAPD and that he instead has a legal right to continued LAPD

employment, along with the wages and benefits that entails, pursuant to the Superior

Court’s 1988 writ of mandate. For example, although the Court of Appeal’s 1991

decision did not address whether plaintiffs current spouse of sixteen years is entitled to a

survivorship pension, any claim for such entitlement would require establishing, in effect,

that plaintiff was still employed by the City, and was not yet retired, when plaintiff

[Under [former] section 190.111 of the Los Angeles City Charter, a member of the police

pension system who has retired at a rank higher than sergeant cannot return to active duty.” Williams,

229 Cal. App. 3d at 1629. Former City Charter Section 190.111 has since been repealed and reenacted

at Section 1410, and remains largely unchanged: “A retired member .. . may file, with the Chief of the

department from which he retired, a written application to be returned to active duty therein only upon

the conditions . . . [t]hat his original retirement ... had been. . . from the Police Department while

a rank no hisher than Sergeant! 1’ Citv Charter § 1410f(aV1 VAY].

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

married his current spouse less than twenty years ago’ — contrary to the Court of Appeal’s

finding that plaintiff retired in 1987 and could not be reinstated.

Plaintiff's other challenges to the administrative proceedings in 2020-2022 are

likewise intertwined with the Court of Appeal’s 1991 decision. For example, plaintiff

appears to assert that defendants violated due process in 2022 by denying plaintiffs claim

for reinstatement and related compensation and benefits without having provided him

with a hearing and an opportunity to respond, along with other procedural safeguards.

However, a procedural due process violation here would require at least that plaintiff had

a protected property interest in LAPD employment, which would contradict the Court of

Appeal’s determination that plaintiff gave up that right by electing to take his retirement

pension, “effectively converting his property right of continued employment into a

property right to a pension,” see Williams, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1629-30. Similarly,

plaintiff's claims of racial discrimination and retaliatory conduct rest on plaintiffs related

contentions that the denial of plaintiff's legal right to reinstatement was based on

improper motives such as racial animus or retaliation for plaintiff's protected conduct,

respectively. Such claims would require this Court to reassess the Court of Appeal’s

conclusion that plaintiff's reinstatement was precluded by City Charter Section 190.111

and thus correctly denied by the City. See Williams, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 1630-32.

Because these claims are all “inextricably intertwined” with the state court decision from

which plaintiffs forbidden de facto appeal is brought, Rooker-Feldman deprives this

Court of jurisdiction to hear them.

In addition, plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations of “fraud” do not

overcome the Rooker-Feldman bar here. Claims based on allegations of extrinsic fraud

generally are not barred by Rooker-Feldman because they are predicated on an alleged

wrongful act by the adverse party, rather than a legal error by the state court. However,

extrinsic fraud is conduct that is not merely deceptive, but which also effectively

“prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.” Here, plaintiff asserts that the

Court of Appeal’s decision itself was “fraudulent[]”, but he offers no facts to support this

and gives no plausible indication that any extrinsic fraud occurred to prevent him from

adequately litigating the issues in the case. As such, no exception is warranted here.

/I/

°As noted in defendants’ letters in 2020-2022, a “Qualified Surviving Spouse” for survivorship

benefits eligibility, under City Charter Section 1406, is defined as “a person who is the widow or

widower of a deceased System Member or Retired Member who had been married to the Retired

Member for at least one year prior to the effective date of his or her retirement upon a service pension

or a nonservice-connected disabilitv nension ._—.””

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

(Williams I Dkt. No. 26 at 13-17 (footnote and some citations omitted; footnote added; italics in

original)). Additionally, the Report and Recommendation determined that issue preclusion barred

Plaintiff's complaint. (Id. at 18-21).

On April 10, 2023, the assigned District Judge accepted the Report and Recommendation and

entered Judgment granting the Williams I Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and dismissing Williams I

without leave to amend. (Williams I Dkt. Nos. 30-31).

On April 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Amend Judgment

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60(b)(3), 60(b)(4) and 60(b)(6). (Williams I Dkt. No. 33). On May 1,

2023, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. (Williams I Dkt. No. 34).

Plaintiff appealed the Williams I judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed

the judgment on April 30, 2024, stating “[t]he district court properly dismissed Williams’s action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Williams’s claims are a

‘de facto appeal’ of a prior state court judgment or are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with that judgment.”

Williams v. City of Los Angeles, 2024 WL 1877847, *1 (9th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted).

Dissatisfied with these decisions, on September 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the pending action

against the City. In particular, Plaintiff filed a “Motion as an Independent Action for Permanent

Injunction, Enjoining [Defendant] From Enforcing Judgment Dismissing the Movant’s Civil Complaint

Brought Under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2202... and [Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §] 1094.5.” (Dkt.

No. 1 (“Complaint’”)). Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (Complaint at

1), which preserves a court’s power to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a

judgment, order, or proceeding[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1)."°

Plaintiff's Complaint requests a permanent injunction enjoining the City “from enforcing the

Judgment rendered by” the California Court of Appeal in Williams v, City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal.

December 19, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Clerk of Court complaining that his

“Motion as an Independent Action” was improperly construed as a Complaint rather than “a

miscellaneous action” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. (Dkt. No. 19). Plaintiffs letter is procedurally

improper. See Local Rule 83-2.5 (“Attorneys or parties to any action or proceeding shall refrain from

writing letters to the judge. All matters must be called to a judge’s attention by appropriate

application or motion filed in compliance with these Local Rules.”). Nevertheless, out of an abundance

of caution, the Court has construed the letter as a Motion/Objections to the characterization of Dkt. No.

1. So construed, the Motion/Objections are DENIED. Plaintiff does not dispute that his Complaint —

what he characterizes as a “Motion” — is a new civil action, and a “civil action is commenced by filing a

complaint with the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 3. Therefore, the Clerk of Court did not mischaracterize Dkt.

1.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

App. 3d 1627 (1991). (Complaint at 1). Plaintiff argues the state court judgment is: void for want of

personal and subject matter jurisdiction; preempted by the Supremacy and Full Faith and Credit Clauses

and by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and judicial estoppel; based on fraudulent

misrepresentation; and violates 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 and 1503. Ud. at 2). Plaintiff also states he

“sought the same relief in the previous federal litigation” — Williams I and the appeal therefrom, and he

“seeks relief from the [Ninth Circuit’s] decision denying Plaintiff's appeal. (Id. at 3, 8). Specifically,

among other relief, Plaintiff requests the Court: (1) enjoin the City “from enforcing Los Angeles City

Charter, Article XVIII, section 190.111, despite the opinion reduced to judgment under [Williams v.

City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1627 (1991)] after finding said judgment as void for want of

person and subject matter jurisdiction, based on fraudulent misrepresentation therefore enforcement of

charter provision 190.111 and 190.11;” (2) grant “[d]eclaratory relief from said judgment purportedly

enforcing the municipal provisions, after finding the enforcement constituting a fraudulent

misrepresentation of the terms and conditions of 190.111 and 190.11;” and (3) award Plaintiff restitution

for lost wages “as if his removal nullified under mandamus, had not taken place.” (Id. at 9).

Federal courts, which “‘are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute[,]’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)); Home Depot U.S.A.., Inc. v. Jackson, 587

USS. 435, 437 (2019), “are under an independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction... .”

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (citation omitted); Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006); see also Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 657 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2011)

(A federal court “is obligated to determine sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction.”), cert.

denied, 567 U.S. 919 (2012). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

Jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“* Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any

cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining

to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’” (citation omitted)).

“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction

over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “‘Direct federal appellate

review of state court decisions must occur, if at all, in the Supreme Court.’” Gouveia v. Espinda, 926

F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Gruntz v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 202 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.

2000) (en banc)), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 814 (2020), and 140 S. Ct. 886 (2020). Thus, “pursuant to the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction to hear direct or ‘de facto’ appeals

from the judgments of state courts.” Fowler v. Guerin, 899 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018), cert.

denied, 140 S. Ct. 390 (2019); Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012).

/I/

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

Here, Plaintiffs Complaint again seeks to overturn the California Court of Appeal’s May 1991

decision in Williams v. City of Los Angeles, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1627 (1991). Thus, it appears that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars the pending action.'' See, e.g., Fowler, 899 F.3d at 1119 (“It is a

forbidden de facto appeal under Rooker—Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains

of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that

court.’” (citation omitted)); Scheer v. Kelly, 817 F.3d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir.) (Plaintiff's “challenge to the

... decision in her own case is a de facto appeal of the [state court’s decision], ‘brought by [a]

state-court loser[] . . . inviting district court review and rejection of [the state court’s] judgments.’”

(citation omitted)), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 874 (2016); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“Ifa federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks

relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker—Feldman bars subject matter

Jurisdiction in federal district court.”).

Additionally, Plaintiff seeks to overturn the Ninth Circuit decision affirming this Court’s

dismissal of Williams I. But “[s]uch collateral attacks on the judgments, orders, decrees or decisions of

federal courts are improper[,]” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385,

1393 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988), and this Court “has no... authority to ‘review’

any ruling of a court of appeals.” Id. at 1393 n.19; see also Briggs v. Spacey, 793 F. App’x 634, 635

(9th Cir. 2020) (“To the extent that Briggs contends that the previous federal judgment should be set

aside, this constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on that judgment. Contrary to Briggs’s

contention, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 is not applicable here.” (citation omitted)); Stafne v.

Zilly, 337 F. Supp. 3d 1079, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (“[T]his Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

(and all other authority) to overturn a decision of the Ninth Circuit or any district court entered in a

separate lawsuit.”), affirmed by, 820 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2515 (2021).

Moreover, “[uJnder the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment forecloses ‘successive

litigation of the very same claim, whether or not relitigation of the claim raises the same issues as the

‘Furthermore, Rule 60 “does not provide a basis for subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for

relief from a state court judgment.” Holder v. Simon, 384 F. App’x 669, 669 (9th Cir. 2010); see also

Burnett v. Amrein, 243 F, App’x 393, 395 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) ‘does not authorize a

federal district court to relieve the Burnetts of a judgment entered in state court,’ because any such action

would violate the Rooker—Feldman doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Kleidman v. Lui, 2024 WL 4338356,

*A (C.D. Cal.) (“Rule 60(b) and (d) have no application here. Rule 60 applies to final judgments or

orders entered by federal courts and does not allow a district court to vacate a state court Judgment...

[Rather,] the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to ‘cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” (citations omitted)), report and

recommendation accepted by, 2024 WL 4341543 (C.D. Cal. 2024), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL

(CTD. Cal. 2094). anneal filed. No. 24-7274 (9th Cir. Dec. 3. 202A).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. 2:24-cv-08458-TJH-JC Date September 25, 2025

Title Ronald Williams v. City of Los Angeles

earlier suit[,]”” while issue preclusion “bars ‘successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually

litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue

recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (citations

omitted). Here, it appears that Plaintiff's prior federal and state litigation precludes the pending action.

(See, e.g., Williams I, Dkt. No. 26 at 18-20 (discussing preclusive effect of California Court of Appeal’s

May 1991 decision as well as prior federal court cases rejecting on preclusion grounds prior challenges

to the City’s refusal to reinstate Plaintiff in the LAPD and concluding the action was precluded because

it was “no more than another futile attempt to litigate the same issues plaintiff already fully litigated and

lost in the state court more than thirty years ago”); see also Seismic Reservoir 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson,

785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015) (A “‘trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).’” (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987))).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion/Objections to the characterization of his Complaint (Dkt. No. 19)

are DENIED. Additionally, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show good cause in writing, within

twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, why this action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman and collateral attack doctrines and for failure to state a

claim given the preclusive effect of prior federal and state decisions. Alternatively, if Plaintiff does not

wish to proceed with this action, he may instead date, sign and return the attached dismissal notice by the

foregoing deadline.

Plaintiff is cautioned that the failure timely to comply with this Order to Show Cause

and/or to show good cause may result in the dismissal of this action for lack of jurisdiction, lack of

prosecution, and/or failure to comply with a Court Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Attachment