Ruiz v. Suffolk County Police Officers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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MICHAEL RUIZ,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 25-CV-2844 (NRM) (AYS)

SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE OFFICERS;

S.C.P.D. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK; P.O. ZR

PROCTOR, #PO/7048; P.O. RATHJEN,

#PO/7305,

Defendants.

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NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:

On May 21, 2025, pro se plaintiff Michael Ruiz, incarcerated at Riverhead

Correctional Facility, commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, alleging violations

of his constitutional rights related to his arrest on December 5, 2024 at 800

Montauk Highway in Shirley, New York. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff’s claims against Suffolk

County Police Officers and the Suffolk County Police Department1 are dismissed

but the Complaint may proceed against the individual defendants as set forth

below.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint, the allegations of

which are assumed to be true for purposes of this Memorandum and Order. See

1 These defendants are named in the caption, but not the body, of the

complaint.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (at the

pleading stage of the proceeding, a court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded,

nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint).

Plaintiff was pulled over in the town of Shirley, New York by Suffolk County

Police Officers Proctor and Rathjen at 800 Montauk Highway in Shirley, New York

at approximately 2:30 PM on December 5, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges

that he was ordered out of the car, and when he stated to Officer Proctor that his

left arm was broken and could not put his hands on the car as directed, he was

forced to the ground and placed in handcuffs. Id. Officer Proctor then removed

Plaintiff’s boots and pants and left him sitting on the curb in the cold with a

sweater, briefs, and socks. Id. Plaintiff seeks twenty million dollars in damages.

Id. at 5.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a district court to screen

a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents

and dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint is

“frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999)

(noting that under PLRA, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is

not only permitted, but mandatory). Similarly, pursuant to the in forma pauperis

statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that it “(i) is frivolous or

malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

The Court construes Plaintiff’s pro se pleadings liberally, particularly

because they allege civil rights violations. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still,

while courts must read pro se complaints with “special solicitude” and interpret

them to raise the “strongest arguments that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (citations omitted), a complaint must plead enough facts, “accepted as true,

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki &

Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

Ruiz brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To sustain a claim

under Section 1983, he must allege that (1) “the conduct complained of

[was] . . . committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) the conduct

“deprived [him] of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States.” Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)

(citations omitted). Moreover, he must allege the direct or personal involvement of

each of the named defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Farid

v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d

Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional

deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal

quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).

DISCUSSION

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to bring a claim against the Suffolk County

Police Department (SCPD) or against all of its police officers, his claim fails because

they are not proper parties to this section 1983 action. “Under New York law,

departments that are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a

legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and, therefore, cannot sue or

be sued.” Rose v. Cnty. of Nassau, 904 F. Supp. 2d 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations

omitted); Brown v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 23-CV-6636 (JMA) (AYS), 2024 WL

472837, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2024) (“The SCPD, as administrative arm of the

municipality, Suffolk County, is a non-suable entity.”). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims

against the Suffolk County Police Department and the Suffolk County Police Officers

(as a distinct entity) are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted.2

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the action is sua sponte dismissed against Defendants Suffolk

County Police Officers and the Suffolk County Police Department for failure to state

2 Even if the Court were to liberally construe the complaint as asserting a claim

against Suffolk County, Plaintiff has not alleged, and nothing in his Complaint

suggests, that any of the allegedly wrongful acts were attributable to a municipal

policy or custom necessary to section 1983 municipal liability, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Missel v. Cnty. of Monroe, 351 F. App’x 543, 545 (2d

Cir. 2009) (Monell claim requires “factual allegations that would support a plausible

inference that the [county’s] ‘policies’ or ‘customs’ caused . . . violations . . . of

rights.”).

a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of Court is

respectfully requested to amend the caption to reflect their dismissal.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim may proceed against Defendants Suffolk County Police

Officers ZR Proctor #7048 and Rathjen #7305. The Clerk of Court is directed to issue

a summons to these defendants and the United States Marshals Service is directed

to serve the Complaint and the summons on these defendants, without prepayment

of fees. The Clerk of the Court is further directed to serve a copy of the Complaint

together with this Order on the Suffolk County Attorney.

The Court refers this matter to the Honorable Anne Y. Shields, United States

Magistrate Judge, for pretrial supervision.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from

this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is

denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

444–45 (1962).

The Clerk of the Court is further directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum

and Order to the pro se plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Nina R. Morrison

NINA R. MORRISON

United States District Judge

Dated: October 7, 2025

Brooklyn, New York