Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Segal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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WILMINGTON TRUST, N.A.,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against - 21-CV-1540 (PKC) (TAM)

HERMAN SEGAL and JOHN HANCOCK

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW

YORK,

Defendants.

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PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

Presently before the Court is Defendant John Hancock Life Insurance Company of New

York’s (“Defendant” or “John Hancock”) motion in limine, filed on August 18, 2025. (Dkt. 114.)

At issue are (1) two of Defendant’s anticipated trial witnesses, and (2) certain ancient documents

Plaintiff Wilmington Trust, N.A. (“Plaintiff” or “Wilmington Trust”) seeks to introduce at the

bench trial that began on September 9, 2025.1 For the reasons explained below, Defendant’s two

challenged witnesses may testify at trial, and the Court reserves judgment until trial as to the

admissibility of the challenged ancient documents.

BACKGROUND

The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history

of this case, and therefore recites only those facts necessary to explain the Court’s decision on

Defendant’s motion in limine. This case relates to the payment of death benefits due on two life

1 As discussed infra, trial in this matter has been bifurcated with respect to the claims

against the two Defendants, with the claim against John Hancock being tried first. Defendant

Herman Segal, therefore, is not participating as a party in the present trial, though Plaintiff expects

to call him as a witness. (Joint Pre-Trial Order (“JPTO”), Dkt. 111, at 8.)

insurance policies (the “Policies”) issued by John Hancock in 2008 to insure the life of Lilly Segal,

who died in 2018. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”), Dkt. 72, ¶ 12.) Plaintiff Wilmington Trust is

“the Securities Intermediary for the benefit of Geonta Funding, a Delaware statutory Trust,”

(id. ¶ 12 n.1), which acquired the Policies in 2016 and is now “the owner and beneficiary of the

Policies,” (id. ¶ 14). While John Hancock has paid Plaintiff $16,943,803.47 as death benefits for

the Policies, Plaintiff claims it is still owed an additional $2,943,168.00 plus interest. (Joint Pre-

Trial Order (“JPTO”), Dkt. 111, ¶ 5.)

In its defense, John Hancock claims that although the Policies “were issued based on

representations in the policy applications stating that Lilly Segal was born in 1926,” (id.), and

premium obligations were calculated based on this 1926 birth year, (Def.’s 1/17/2025 Letter, Dkt.

102, at 1), Lilly Segal was actually born in 1924 and that John Hancock was therefore permitted,

“pursuant to contractual provisions in the Policies and applicable New York law, [to] adjust[] the

face amount owed based on [her] correct birthdate in 1924.” (JPTO, Dkt. 111, ¶ 5 (citing N.Y.

Ins. Law § 3203).) Thus, “John Hancock asserts that it has performed and satisfied all of its

contractual obligations under the Policies at issue and that Plaintiff is not entitled to any additional

payment under the Policies.” (Id.)

The present bench trial seeks to resolve the question of when Lilly Segal was born and the

total amount of death benefits due under the Policies.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In May 2024, John Hancock was joined as a Defendant, (5/3/2024 Dkt. Order), and in

January 2025, both Plaintiff and John Hancock requested a pre-motion conference (“PMC”) to

discuss their anticipated motions for summary judgment, (Dkts. 102–04). The Court held a PMC

on March 21, 2025, after which Plaintiff and John Hancock consented to a bench trial solely to

resolve Count II (against John Hancock) of the Second Amended Complaint. (3/21/2025 Min.

Entry; Dkt. 110.) In Count II, “Plaintiff . . . seeks a declaration that” “John Hancock is obligated

to pay the full death benefits, plus interest, under the Policy,” and that “Lilly Segal was born on

March 26, 1926.”2 (SAC, Dkt. 72, ¶ 74.) The parties filed their JPTO on August 8, 2025, John

Hancock filed its motion in limine on August 25, 2025, and Plaintiff responded in opposition on

August 25, 2025. (Dkts. 111, 114, 115.)

DISCUSSION

I. Plaintiff’s Two Proffered Witnesses

Defendant first seeks to preclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s anticipated witnesses June

Munford and Michael Waas, whom Defendant characterizes as expert witnesses and who were

untimely disclosed by Plaintiff. (Def.’s Mot. In Limine (“MIL”) Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 1.)

According to their CVs, which Defendant submitted, by profession, Munford is a freelance

“Researcher / Expert Witness” with a background in various positions in libraries, and Waas is

law student with a background in genealogy. (Def.’s MIL Ex. A, Dkt. 114-3 (Munford’s CV);

Def.’s MIL Ex. B, Dkt. 114-4 (Waas’s CV).) Plaintiff counters that neither will be serving as an

expert witness, and both would be “called as witnesses solely for the purpose of authenticating

certain ancient documents” that Plaintiff intends to offer at trial. (Id. at 2–3.) Plaintiff represents

that:

Mr. Waas and/or Ms. Munford will only be testifying regarding their personal

knowledge as to the location of those ancient documents in archives where those

documents would likely be. Specifically, they will testify that the documents are

located and accessible in either (a) the Arolsen Archives – International Center for

Nazi persecution or (b) the National Archives and Records Administration.

2 Count II also seeks declaratory relief as it relates to pro se Defendant Herman Segal,

(SAC, Dkt. 72, ¶¶ 70–74), who is Lilly Segal’s son, but, as previously discussed, the bench trial

“will proceed against Defendant John Hancock only,” (3/21/2025 Min. Entry).

(Id. (footnotes omitted).)3 Notably, these documents were obtained by Defendant from the

Arolsen Archives and the National Archives, and produced to Plaintiff by Defendant during

discovery. (Id. at 2.)

Defendant argues that Waas and Munford’s “credentials and lack of personal knowledge

of the facts of this case make clear that they are in fact being offered as experts,” that Munford

“has offered expert witness services in dozens of lawsuits,” and that Waas “was appointed as a

scholar in residence at the New York Genealogical and Biographical Society.” (Def.’s MIL Mem.,

Dkt. 114-1, at 2.) Plaintiff counters that their credentials are “only relevant to demonstrate that

they are familiar with the archives at issue such that their confirmation as to the documents’

existence in those archives is not called into question.” (Pl.’s MIL Opp’n, Dkt. 115, at 5 n.10.)

Rule 901(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows evidence to be authenticated by

the testimony of a witness with knowledge “that an item is what it is claimed to be.” Fed. R. Evid.

901(b)(1). Furthermore, an ancient document may be authenticated with evidence that it (A) “is

in a condition that creates no suspicion about its authenticity,” (B) “was in a place where, if

authentic, it would likely be,” and (C) “is at least 20 years old when offered.” Fed. R. Evid.

901(b)(8)(A–C). Munford and Waas, Plaintiff represents, will testify as to subsection (B), i.e. that,

based on “their personal knowledge regarding the documents’ location,” (Pl.’s MIL Opp’n, Dkt.

115, at 5), the ancient documents were located “in a place where, if authentic, [they] would likely

3 According to their websites, “[t]he Arolsen Archives is the international center on Nazi

persecution that maintains the world’s most comprehensive archive on the victims and survivors

of National Socialism,” About Us: Profile, Arolsen Archives, https://arolsen-archives.org/en/

about-us/profile/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2025); and “[t]he National Archives and Records

Administration . . . preserves U.S. government records, manages the Presidential Libraries system,

and publishes laws, regulations, Presidential, and other public documents,” National Archives and

Records Administration (NARA), USAGov, https://www.usa.gov/agencies/national-archives-and-

records-administration (last visited Aug. 27, 2025).

be,” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8)(B). Expert witnesses are not the only witnesses who can accomplish

this; as Defendant points out, “a lay witness is capable of” authenticating documents. (See Def.’s

MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 4 (citing United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)));

see also Martha Graham Sch. and Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Gram Ctr. of Contemp. Dance,

Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 643 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the district court had not erred during a bench

trial by admitting ancient document letters when a non-expert “witness with relevant knowledge[]

testified that the letters were what they purported to be” (citing Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1))).

Here, the Court finds that Munford’s and Waas’s testimony about where the alleged ancient

documents were in fact located, i.e., in the Arolsen Archives and National Archives, is plainly not

expert testimony and could be testified to by any layperson, e.g., a paralegal. However, their

testimony about those two archives being “likely places” for those documents to be found is not

“well known or commonly understood.” Mulder, 273 F.3d at 101. For example, a paralegal who

could testify about locating an ancient document in the Arolsen Archives or National Archives

would not necessarily be qualified to testify about either archive being a “likely place” to find such

documents. That sort of testimony requires the specialized knowledge of an expert, such as a

research librarian or genealogist. Indeed, as Defendant contends, the fact that Munford and Waas

have such credentials suggests that Plaintiff, too, believes this to be true. The Court therefore finds

that a portion of Munford’s and Waas’s testimony constitutes expert opinion.

However, the Court finds that neither witness should be precluded from testifying at the

upcoming trial. First, based on the credentials and experience of each witness, they are qualified

to serve as experts on the issue of whether the two archives are likely places for the ancient

documents at issue in this case to be found. Second, the belated disclosure of these witnesses as

experts, given the circumstances of this litigation, does not warrant preclusion. As previously

noted, John Hancock was not added as a Defendant in this case until May 2024, over three years

after the case was initiated. As Plaintiff points out, as a result, “neither party exchanged initial

disclosures containing any proposed witnesses or discussed trial witnesses at any time prior to the

filing of the Joint Pretrial Order. [Plaintiff] disclosed the identity of its witnesses precisely when

it was first required to do so—and at the same time that [Defendant] first disclosed its witnesses

to [Plaintiff].” (Pl.’s MIL Opp’n, Dkt. 115, at 4 (emphasis in original).) While Rule 26 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure imposes affirmative obligations to disclose certain information,

including the names of individuals “likely to have discoverable information” and the identities of

experts who might be used at trial, neither side complied with those requirements in this case.

Furthermore, having obtained and produced the ancient documents at issue, Defendant can hardly

claim surprise or prejudice from Plaintiff seeking to call witnesses to establish the authenticity of

those documents, especially when Defendant refuses to stipulate to authenticity and given that

there does not appear to be any genuine dispute as to authenticity. The Court therefore does not

find that Plaintiff’s failure to identify Munford and Waas as witnesses earlier or to provide expert

disclosures regarding these two witnesses warrants preclusion of their testimony.

Defendant also argues that Munford and Waas cannot authenticate archival documents

because they are not representatives or officers from the Arolsen Archives or the National

Archives. (Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 9.) Defendant relies on Specht v. Google Inc., 758

F. Supp. 2d 570, 580 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d 747 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2014), where the district court

found that “screen shots from the Internet Archive” can only be properly authenticated “by an

officer or employee of the Internet Archive.” 758 F. Supp. 2d at 580 (collecting cases specific to

the Internet Archive). Specht, though, concerned an attempt to authenticate internet screenshots

by “the creators of the sites assert[ing] from memory that the screenshots reflected how those sites

appeared in” the past. 747 F.3d at 933. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out while affirming the

district court’s evidentiary ruling, memory “is fallible,” and authentication instead requires

“someone with personal knowledge of the reliability of the archival service from which the

screenshots were retrieved.” Id. (citing United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 667–68 (3d Cir.

2011)). While Defendant claims that Munford and Waas lack “any apparent first-hand knowledge

of the documents in this case” and do not “serve as custodians of record where the documents were

located,” (Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 4), Defendant does not claim that they lack personal

knowledge of the ancient documents being located at the Arolsen Archives and the National

Archives. See Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(8) (providing that ancient documents can be authenticated

with evidence, inter alia, that the document “was in a place where, if authentic, it would likely

be”). The Court therefore does not find that the fact that Munford and Waas are not officers or

employees of either archive precludes their testimony authenticating these documents.

Thus, the Court finds that Munford and Waas may testify at trial, both in a lay and expert

capacity regarding where the ancient documents at issue were located and whether these locations

are likely places for these documents to be found. And, of course, on cross-examination,

Defendant will have the opportunity to challenge Munford’s and Waas’s personal knowledge and

relevant expertise, which will go to the weight that their testimony deserves and whether their

testimony is sufficient to authenticate the ancient documents at issue.

II. Admissibility of Plaintiff’s Ancient Documents

Defendant also asks the Court to exclude certain ancient documents Plaintiff seeks to

introduce at trial.4 (Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 7.) Defendant argues that they cannot be

4 “These include Plaintiff’s exhibits PX-A; PX-B; PX-C; PX-D; PX-E; PX-F; PX-G;

PX-H; PX-I; PX-J; PX-N; PX-P; PX-Q; and PX-R.” (Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 7 n.2.)

authenticated. (Id. at 7, 10.) Some of these documents, as discussed in the previous section,

originated from the Arolsen Archives and the National Archives, while others “were initially

provided by” pro se Defendant Herman Segal, “who testified that he obtained the documents either

from his son or from a storage unit in Brooklyn.” (Id. at 8.)

Defendant presents several arguments in support of its claim that the challenged ancient

documents should not be admitted. First, Defendant claims that the ancient documents found by

Defendant Segal cannot be authenticated due to their “unknown original location.” (Id. at 8.) As

Plaintiff notes, though, courts have permitted family members to authenticate ancient documents

found at their homes. (Pl.’s MIL Opp’n, Dkt. 115, at 9 (citing United States v. Portrait of Wally,

663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).) The Court cannot determine whether the ancient

documents that Segal allegedly found are authentic without hearing his testimony. (JPTO,

Dkt. 111, at 8 (representing that Segal will testify that the documents were found “in a storage

unit” or given to him by his son, and were not found by Segal in his home)); see also In re Methyl

Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liability Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(“A district court will ‘exclude evidence on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly

inadmissible on all potential grounds.” (quoting United States v. Ozsusamlar, 428 F. Supp. 2d 161,

164 (S.D.N.Y. 2006))). Accordingly, the Court “reserve[s] judgment until trial” on the

admissibility of the ancient documents that originated with Defendant Segal “so that [Defendant’s]

motion is placed in the appropriate factual context.” Id. (quoting United States v. Chan, 184 F.

Supp. 2d 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).

Next, Defendant argues that chain of custody for the ancient documents in the Arolsen

Archives’ possession is not clear. (Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 9.) First, “[e]stablishing a

chain of custody is but one way of providing . . . authentication” under Rule 901 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence. United States v. Thomas, 54 F.3d 73, 83 (2d Cir. 1995). Second, “[b]reaks in

the chain of custody do not bear upon the admissibility of evidence, only the weight of the

evidence.” United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). Thus, it is not necessary

for Plaintiff to establish the chain of custody of these ancient documents in order to authenticate

them. Defendant also argues that “numerous Arolsen Archive documents” (though it does not

specify which) “contain widely varying birthdates for Lilly Segal” and thus should be rejected.5

(Def.’s MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 9–10.) Again, these alleged discrepancies go to the weight to

be given the documents, not their admissibility. The Court also reserves ruling until trial on the

admissibility of the ancient documents that originated with the Arolsen Archives. In re MTBE,

643 F. Supp. 2d at 475.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the two challenged witnesses may testify at trial, and the

Court reserves judgment until trial as to the admissibility of the challenged ancient documents.

5 Defendant also focuses on the purportedly fraudulent driver’s license for Lilly Segal,

which Plaintiff filed on the docket in March 2022. (Dkt. 20-2.) While the Court notes that

Defendant has presented persuasive grounds for its claim that the license is fraudulent, (Def.’s

MIL Mem., Dkt. 114-1, at 8 n.3), and that Plaintiff has yet to explain the origins of this document,

(JPTO, Dkt. 111, at 10), the Court questions the relevance of this document, which Plaintiff does

not intend to introduce at trial. For the same reason, the Court questions the purpose and utility of

of Defendant calling one of Plaintiff’s trial counsel, Katherine Skeele, and an “[u]nidentified

Holland & Knight [a]ttorney,” to testify at trial regarding the allegedly fake driver’s license.

(JPTO, Dkt. 111, at 10.) Notably, however, despite objecting to these witnesses being called in

the JPTO, Plaintiff has not moved in limine to preclude those examinations. Lastly, the Court

notes that Defendant appears to have misgendered Attorney Skeele, whose Holland & Knight

biography states that their pronouns are “they/them,” see Kate Skeele, Holland & Knight,

https://www.hklaw.com/en/professionals/s/skeele-katherine-a (last accessed Aug. 27, 2025), and

so the Court reminds “[a]ll parties and counsel” of its instruction that they use correct pronouns

when “address[ing] each other in all written documents and court proceedings,” see the Court’s

Individual Rule 7.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Pamela K. Chen

Pamela K. Chen

United States District Judge

Dated: September 9, 2025

Brooklyn, New York