Grimage v. Acevedo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MICHAEL EUGENE GRIMAGE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:24-cv-1119-MMH-MCR

DOCTOR ANGEL ACEVEDO, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Michael Eugene Grimage, an inmate of the Florida Department

of Corrections, initiated this action on October 25, 2024, by filing a pro se

Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

Court afforded Grimage an opportunity to amend his Complaint, see Doc. 8,

and he now proceeds on an Amended Complaint (AC; Doc. 9). In the AC,

Grimage names as Defendants: (1) Doctor Angel Acevedo; (2) Doctor Michael

Collins; (3) Michelle Hall; and (4) Gina Bennett. See AC at 2–3. He alleges that

Defendants Acevedo and Collins acted with deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs when they “refuse[d] to properly treat [the] evident

injuries” that Grimage sustained during uses of force on November 26, 2022,

and May 21, 2023. Id. at 4. According to Grimage, Defendants Hall and

Bennett’s “irrational responses” to and destruction of his grievances

concerning his medical care violated due process. See id. at 5.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

1 Grimage proceeds as a pauper. See Order (Doc. 4).

2

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

3

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

4

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the AC, the Court must read Grimage’s pro se allegations

in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And, while “[p]ro se

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by

attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give the

court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,

760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of

5

Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), overruled

in part on other grounds as recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709)).

With respect to Grimage’s deliberate indifference claim, the Eighth

Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane

conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy both an

objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s conduct. Swain v.

Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison officials

violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has

instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

6

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844-45.

Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1261 (11th Cir. 2024) (enumeration and

emphasis omitted);3 see Stalley v. Cumbie, 124 F.4th 1273, 1283 (11th Cir.

2024) (recognizing that to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff

must show that he suffered “an objectively serious medical need,” and that the

defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need, meaning that the

defendant “(1) had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm, (2)

3 For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has described a “more than mere

negligence” or “more than gross negligence” standard in determining whether an

official acted with deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need. Wade,

106 F.4th at 1255. In Wade, the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards

conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in

this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard “as used in the

criminal law.” Id. at 1253. The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan

wrote a concurrence to the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior

Eleventh Circuit deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they

should continue to be cited as binding precedent.” Id. at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

7

disregarded that risk, and (3) engaged in conduct that amounts to subjective

recklessness” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Importantly, medical

treatment gives rise to a constitutional violation “only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973

F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Indeed, the law is well

settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330-31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).

Thus, a complaint that a medical provider has been negligent “in diagnosing

or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical

mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d

1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotations and citation omitted).

Liberally read, Grimage’s AC fails to present allegations sufficient to

support a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation against Defendants

8

Acevedo and Collins. His claims are conclusory in nature and devoid of facts

that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that Defendants

violated Grimage’s constitutional rights. For example, Grimage alleges

Defendants Acevedo and Collins did not properly treat his injuries, but he fails

to specify when he sought medical care, which injuries he sought medical care

for, and what actions Defendants Acevedo and Collins took, if any, in response

to his complaints.

Notably, the Court afforded Grimage an opportunity to amend his

Complaint, and in doing so, explained the following:

[Grimage] must factually describe the actions or

omissions of each defendant that caused his injury.

Indeed, [Grimage’s] allegations in the Complaint

regarding his medical care, or lack thereof, are

conclusory. He cannot simply describe the events

without specifically discussing who did what. And he

cannot just generally allege that a defendant violated

his rights, as conclusory statements are insufficient to

state a claim.

Doc. 8 at 3. Nevertheless, Grimage still fails to specify what each Defendant

individually did or failed to do in delaying or denying medical care for his

injuries. In short, Grimage does not set forth a short and plain statement of

his entitlement to relief such that Defendants Acevedo and Collins have fair

9

notice of the claims against them and the facts underlying those

claims. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Insofar as Grimage asserts that Defendants Hall and Bennett violated

his constitutional rights by denying or destroying his grievances, he fails to

state a claim. Not addressing a grievance in the manner a prisoner would like,

without more, does not render an individual liable for the underlying

constitutional violation. See Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-FtM-29DNF,

2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013)4 (“[F]iling a grievance with a

supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the

allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even

when the grievance is denied.” (collecting cases)).

There are circumstances in which a defendant’s failure to act in response

to an inmate’s grievances may result in a constitutional violation. See Goebert

v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that a

defendant’s lack of action in response to an inmate’s written complaint

amounted to deliberate indifference and the delay attributable to the

4 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,

371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would

not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would

have significant persuasive effects.”).

10

defendant’s deliberate indifference may have caused the inmate’s injury). In

Goebert, a pregnant pretrial detainee submitted a medical complaint form,

wherein she requested to see an obstetrician or a doctor outside of the county

jail. 510 F.3d at 1318. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that she had

leaked amniotic fluid for approximately nine days, she had not felt any

movements from her baby, and she had a history of miscarriages. Id. The

defendant, a facility commander, responded that medical could arrange an

appointment at her expense, despite the plaintiff noting in her complaint that

medical staff had “ignored her daily requests for aid and had already failed to

set up an appointment for her with an outside obstetrician.” Id. at 1328. In

finding that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment, the

Eleventh Circuit noted that the inmate’s written complaint contained

sufficient information to provide the defendant with subjective knowledge of

her serious medical need, and his failure to take action in response to her

complaint because he did not believe her amounted to deliberate indifference.

Id. at 1327–28.

But the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in Goebert.

Whereas the defendant in Goebert completely disregarded his duty to

investigate the inmate’s time-sensitive serious medical complaints, prison

11

officials considered and addressed Grimage’s complaints. See Doc. 9-1. For

instance, in response to a grievance appeal, Defendant Hall noted that she had

reviewed records available to her and determined that medical had provided

treatment plans for Grimage’s medical concerns, but he had refused to adhere

to them. See id. at 11. These responses reflect that prison officials inquired into

the matter and did not “deliberately disregard, without any investigation or

inquiry,” Grimage’s complaints. Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1328.

Moreover, inmates have “no constitutionally protected liberty interest in

access to the prison’s grievance procedure.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x

656, 659 (11th Cir. 2014)5 (per curiam); see Mathews v. Moss, 506 F. App’x 981,

984 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a claim

because he merely “alleged that his prison grievances were either ignored or

wrongly decided or that prison officials did not properly follow the prison's own

grievance procedures”). Thus, to the extent Grimage alleges that Defendants

Hall and Bennett denied him due process in the grievance procedure, such

allegations fail to state a claim.

5 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61

(11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

12

Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 6th day of

October, 2025.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-9 9/25

C: Michael Eugene Grimage, #415545

18