Moumen v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AZIZ MOUMEN, : No. 3:28-CV-1343

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

Vv. :

FRANK BISIGNANQO,}! :

Commissioner of Social :

Security Administration, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is the appeal by Plaintiff Aziz Moumen

of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security Administration

(‘the Commissioner”) to deny his application for disability benefits.

Moumen seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision to

deny his application for disability benefits under Titles II and XVI of

the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42,

United States Code, Section 405(g).

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g),

Bisignano is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi, a former Commissioner, as the

Defendant in this suit.

Moumen raises two alleged errors that Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”) Theodore Burock committed when determining that Moumen

was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Namely, Moumen

claims that the ALJ failed to account for: (1) severe impairments when

defining the limitations on his residual functional capacity; and (2) non-

severe impairments when defining the limitations on his residual

functional capacity. Doc. 8 at 1-2. The matter is fully briefed and ripe

for decision.

As explained below, ALJ Burock’s conclusion on each of the

challenged issues was supported by substantial evidence in the record,

coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial review.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision to deny

Moumen’s claim for social security disability benefits.

II. Background

On September 30, 2020, Moumen applied for social security

disability benefits, alleging complete disability from right shoulder

pain, neck pain, low back pain, depression, anxiety, and inguinal hernia

pain post repair. Tr.268—69. The Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) denied Moumen’s application on February 9, 2021. Id. at 152—

55, 160-63. Moumen requested reconsideration, id. at 168, but his

application was denied again on July 9, 2021. Jd. at 170—76, 180-83.

Moumen accordingly requested a hearing on July 19, 2021. Jd. at 190-

91. The SSA granted the request and held an administrative hearing.

Id. at 15.

The hearing, held on November 8, 2021, id., concerned whether

Moumen was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act

from April 1, 2019, through December 31, 2025—the last date Moumen

is eligible to receive social security disability insurance. Id. at 16. ALJ

Burock evaluated clinical records, medical history, medical expert

reports, vocational expert testimony, and Moumen’s own testimony. Id.

at 37-67. At the beginning of the hearing, Moumen observed that he, “a

younger individual,” had attempted to go back to work and was working

at the time of the hearing. Id. at 39-40.

2 The administrative record, referred to herein as “Tr.,” encompasses Docs. 7, 7-1,

7-2, 7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8.

Toward the end of the hearing, ALJ Burock asked Heili Randall, a

vocational expert, to assess whether alternative employment options in

the national economy exist for Moumen. Id. at 58-66. After a series of

hypotheticals, Randall concluded that an applicant who fits the

limitations provided would be able to work as a marker, a photocopying

machine operator, or an order caller, and that his testimony was

consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Id. at 58-63.

Based on the evidence, the ALJ denied Moumen’s disability claim

on May 27, 2022, id. at 12, finding that he was not disabled during the

period at issue. Jd. at 15-27. ALJ Burock reached that conclusion by

employing a five-step analytical process required under the Social

Security Act to evaluate disability insurance and supplement security

income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical

severity of the claimant’s impairments; (8) whether the impairment

meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between

the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, 1e.,

the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or his

limitations, see id. § 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the

claimant’s residual functional capacity and his or his age, education,

and work experience. Id. § □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ Should a claimant

proceed past the first three steps, the Commissioner will not find the

claimant disabled when he or he can perform past relevant work under

the third step or adjust to other work under the fourth step. Id.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)Gv)-(v), (f), (g).

Applying that analysis, the ALJ first determined that Moumen

met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see id.

§ 404.130, through December 31, 2025. Tr. 18. ALJ Burock also found

that Moumen engaged in substantial gainful activity from April 2021 to

the date of his decision. Jd. at 18-19. As that recent work history,

however, did not date back to April 2019, and thus did not encompass

the entire period of claimed disability, the ALJ “proceed[ed] with the

sequential evaluation process for the entire period since the alleged

onset date.” Id. at 19.

At the second step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Moumen

suffered from two severe impairments: degenerative disc disease in the

cervical and lumbar spine, and osteoarthritis in the right shoulder. Id.

kK

ALJ Burock also acknowledged that Moumen suffered from anxiety and

depression. But the medical evidence indicated that neither was severe

enough to rise to the level of animpairment. Id. at 19-21.

Moving to the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that

Moumen’s impairments failed to meet or medically equal one of the

impairments listed in the SSA’s regulations. Id. Regarding Moumen’s

degenerative disc disease and osteoarthritis, ALJ Burock found that:

The claimant does not meet Listings 1.17, 1.18, or 14.09A

because there is little evidence of record the claimant has

medical documentation of at least one of the following: a

documented medical need for a walker, bilateral canes, or

bilateral crutches or a wheeled and seated mobility device

involving the use of both hands; an inability to use one upper

extremity, and a documented medical need for a one-handed,

hand-held assistive device that requires the use of the other

upper extremity or a wheeled and seated mobility device □

involving the use of one hand; or an inability to use both upper

extremities. He does not meet Listings 14.09B and 14.09D

because there is little evidence the claimant has at least two

of the following conditions: severe fatigue; fever; malaise; or

involuntary weight loss. The claimant does not meet Listing

14.09C because there is minimal evidence he has ankylosing

spondylitis or other spondyloarthropathies.

Id. at 21. In sum, Moumen did not automatically qualify as disabled.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (Git).

Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to determine Moumen’s residual

functional capacity before addressing the final two steps in the

re

sequential analysis. Using the two-step analysis as provided by the

regulatory framework, ALJ Burock considered the administrative

record and hearing testimony. In doing so, the ALJ noted that

Moumen’s conditions were “manageable,” Tr. 23, and that the claimant

resumed working as a machinist “attending to a grinder machine.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Moumen also submitted his own evidence about

his spine pain, which “was largely already exhibited at Exhibit 12F,”

and failed to “submit any additional evidence of treatment for the

claimant’s spinal condition.” Id.

Meanwhile, other parts of the administrative record indicated

impairments and symptoms that were inconsistent with the claimant’s

statements about the severity of his impairments:

Longitudinal treatment notes generally show the claimant is

in no acute distress with normal gait, good strength, intact

sensation, normal muscle tone, normal muscle bulk, capillary

refill in less than two seconds, and no focal deficit .... In July

2019, the claimant's primary care provider stated the

claimant “still has right shoulder pain, [b]ut it is greatly

improved” and “was given [medication] for [h]is left groin

pain. He declined to take the [medication]. The [claimant]

states the pain in the left groin is manageable” (5F/46). While

the claimant alleges he cannot work, in October 2020, the

claimant’s primary care provider noted “is working as

machinist again about 20 days ago” (5F/82). A June 2020

cervical spine MRI showed multilevel uncovertebral

hypertrophy causing mild neural foraminal stenosis, with no

significant interval worsening compared to 2016 (8F/20). In

December 2020, the claimant’s primary care provider

indicated the claimant had “[s]ome improvement” (5F/104).

In July 2021, the claimant’s primary care provider remarked

the claimant “went to work attending to a grinder machine”

(14F/7). Although the claimant alleges he has trouble

standing, in October 2021, the claimant’s orthopedist

observed the claimant “does endorse a work-related incident

last year in October of 2020, when he was lifting a granite

slab” and “is now doing a different job, standing with

requirements to stand for 10 hours” (16F/5).

In November 2021, the claimant’s orthopedist reported the

claimant “did undergo an MRI at Good Samaritan Hospital.

The [claimant] was to return to our clinic today with a copy of

his MIR but unfortunately, he does not have tie dise with him”

(17F/7). ... Additionally, the claimant’s treatment has largely

been conservative, as there is minimal medical evidence of

surgical treatment or narcotic pain medication. Moreover,

there is minimal medical evidence of record of significant

treatment—except for two orthopedic visits—since the

claimant returned to full time work in April 2021. For

example, there is no medical evidence of record the claimant

received physical therapy or epidural steroid injections in or

since April 2021. Indeed, in October 2021, the claimant’s

medication noted “has recently been seen by his primary care

provider and prescribed Flexeril. He is also routinely taking

ibuprofen” (16F/5).

The claimant's allegations that he has pain are also

inconsistent with his activities of daily living, which shows he

can prepare simple meals, do light cleaning, drive, shop in

stores, and manage money. The claimant notes he reads|| and

has no problems with family, friends, neighbors, authority

figures, and others. He testified he started working where he

lifts 25 to 50 pounds (Hearing Testimony; 5E). ...

Id. at 22-23.

The ALJ’s evaluation of Moumen also included a comparison

of his reported activities to several state agency medical and

psychological consultants’ opinions, finding them consistent with

one another:

The record includes a February 2021 statement from a state

agency medical consultant, Roman Oleh Bilynsky, MD. Dr.

Bilynsky stated the claimant could perform medium work;

frequently balance, stoop, climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

and occasionally crawl (1A/10-18; 2A/10-14). The record also

contains a July 2021 statement from a state agency medical

consultant, Angela Teresa Walker, MD. Dr. Walker noted the

claimant could perform medium work; occasionally crawl;

never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; frequently reach

overhead with his right upper extremity; avoid concentrated

exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and hazards (5A/12-17;

6A/12-17). Insofar as they state the claimant can occasionally

crawl; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally

reach overhead bilaterally; and should avoid concentrated

exposure to extreme cold or vibration and no exposure to

hazards; these statements are persuasive as they are

supported by the longitudinal treatment notes, which

generally show the claimant is in no acute distress with

normal gait, good strength, intact sensation, normal muscle

tone, normal muscle bulk, capillary refill in less than two

seconds, and no focal deficit (1F; 4F; 5F; 7F; 8F; 9F; 12F; 14F;

16F; 17F; 18F). This statement is also consistent with the

claimant’s activities of daily living, which shows he works and

can prepare simple meals, drive, and shop in stores (Hearing

Testimony; 5K). ...

The record includes a January 2021 statement from a state

agency psychological consultant, Molly Haas Cowan, PsyD,

and a June 2021 statement from a state agency psychological

consultant, John David Gavazzi, PsyD. They stated the

claimant has no limitations understanding, remembering, or

applying information; no limitations interacting with others;

mild limitations concentrating, persisting, or maintaining

pace; and mild limitations adapting or managing himself

(1A/7-8; 2A/7-8; 5A/9; 6A/10). Insofar as they state the

claimant has mild limitations interacting with others and

concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and no

limitations understanding, remembering, or applying

information and adapting or managing himself; these

statements are persuasive as they are supported by the

progress notes, which mostly show the claimant is fully

oriented and cooperative with normal mood, normal affect,

normal speech, normal memory, normal cognition, normal

behavior, normal thought content, and normal judgment (1F;

4F; 5F; 7F; 8F; 9F; 12F; 14F; 16F; 17F; 18F). These

statements are also consistent with the claimant’s lack of

recent ongoing treatment by any mental health provider.

Id. at 24-25.

Such “numerous inconsistences between testimony and the

evidence of record” led ALJ Burock to conclude that “the claimant’s

complaints not fully persuasive.” Id. at 25. Consequently, based on the

medical evidence of record, the ALJ concluded that:

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)

and he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,

and climb ramps and stairs; and never climb ladders, ropes,

or scaffolds. He can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally.

He should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold or

vibration and no exposure to hazards.

Id. at 21.

10

Having determined Moumen’s residual functional capacity and

rejected several grounds for further limitation, ALJ Burock proceeded

to the fourth step of the analysis to determine whether he was disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Jd. at 25. Here, the ALJ

compared Moumen’s past relevant work and residual functional

capacity, finding that he was unable to perform his prior employment as

a machine operator.’ Id.

Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ

Burock considered Moumen’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity to perform light work, concluding that

there were other “jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy.” Jd. Here, the ALJ leveraged testimony provided by Randall

that a person fitting Moumen’s parameters could meet the

3 Although Moumen had previously worked as a machine operator and a forklift

operator, Tr. 25, 81, and continued to work as a machinist at the time of the

hearing, id. at 42-45, ALJ Burock found that the claimant was unable to perform

any past relevant work. Id. at 25. This potential conflict seems to be a product of

the fourth-step analysis, where ALJ Burock was required to provide the residual

functional capacity that he formulated to Randall, who in turn responded that

Moumen would be precluded from any past relevant work. Id. at 25, 58-61; see also

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). In any event, to the extent that potential inconsistency is

relevant, it was not raised on appeal.

17

requirements of “representative occupations” such as a folder, a marker,

or a routing clerk. Id. at 26-27.

As a result of this analysis, ALJ Burock determined that Moumen

was not disabled and denied his application for disability benefits on

May 27, 2022. Id. at 12-14. Moumen unsuccessfully appealed the

denial to the SSA’s Appeals Council. Jd. at 1-3. The instant appeal to

the Court followed.

Moumen initiated this action with the Court on August 14, 2023.

Doc. 1. The Commissioner provided the requisite transcripts from the

disability proceedings on October 12, 2023. Doc. 7. The parties then

filed their respective briefs. Docs. 8, 10. The parties also consented to

magistrate jurisdiction on August 22, 2023. Docs. 5, 11.

Moumen alleges two errors warranting reversal or remand. Doc. 8

at 1-2. Specifically, Moumen alleges that the ALJ: (1) improperly

considered severe impairments in defining the limitations of his

residual functional capacity; and (2) improperly considered non-severe

impairments in defining the limitations of his residual functional

capacity. Id.

19

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s

application for social security disability benefits is limited to

determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).

Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence

but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d

1211, 12138 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NERB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an

adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [ALJ Burock’s decision]

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).

192

Under this deferential standard, “[f|actual findings which are

supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,

901 F. Supp. 2d 5338, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). This court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make

factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that

the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of

reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial

review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)

(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by

stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is

relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,

181 F.3d 429, 438 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when

there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for

discounting the evidence he rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,

429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,

1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that substantial evidence standard is

unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing

evidence).

1A

Here, ALJ Burock’s factual findings were supported by substantial

evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those conclusions

was sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review.

B. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity Finding

Moumen first contends that ALJ Burock did not provide sufficient

limitations in Moumen’s residual functional capacity to account for his

severe impairments. Doc. 8 at 11-20. Specifically, he avers that, in

addition to his current limitations, his severe impairments require

limitations for being off task for more than ten percent of the workday,

unscheduled breaks, absences, and occasional use of his right upper

extremity for all purposes. Jd. at 20. Moumen contends that these

limitations are supported by the weight of the evidence and are needed

to account for future deficits caused by severe impairments, and are

necessary to address issues not covered by the ALJ. Jd. at 18-19. A

review of the record, however, reveals that ALJ Burock explicitly

addressed the issues Moumen alleges he did not, that the included

limitations are supported by substantial evidence, and that the ALJ’s

residual functional capacity determination fully complied with

applicable regulations.

15

In determining Moumen’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ

concluded that the claimant was limited to “light work as defined in

20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)....” Tr. 21. ALJ Burock then

proceeded to list further limitations on Moumen’s ability to perform

certain activities. Jd. Specifically, the ALJ provided that Moumen may:

“occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and

stairs; and never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally

reach overhead bilaterally. He should avoid concentrated exposure to

extreme cold or vibration and no exposure to hazards.” Jd. ALJ Burock □

fashioned these limitations to accommodate Moumen’s alleged

symptoms, at least to the extent that those alleged symptoms were

supported by the evidence of record. Id. at 25.

As noted above, Moumen contends that these limitations are

inadequate, and advances two arguments in support. First, he argues

that the weight of the evidence supports more extensive limitations

than those included by ALJ Burock. Doc. 8 at 18, 19-20. Second, he

posits that, by virtue of having pain in his right upper extremity, neck,

and back; depression; vertigo; and dizziness, his ability to concentrate

1¢

and focus will be compromised, thus making it difficult, uf not

impossible, to perform work on a sustained basis. Id. at 13.

Generally, “the outcome of [a disability] c[laim] depends on the

demonstration of the functional limitations of the disease or

impairment... [instead of] the mere diagnosis of the disease or name of

the impairment.” McKean v. Colvin, 150 F. Supp. 3d 406, 417 (M.D. Pa.

2015) (citing Alexander v. Shalala, 927 F. Supp. 785, 792 (D.N.J. 1995),

sub nom., Alexander v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 85 F.3d 611 (8d Cir.

1996)). Thus, “[a] diagnosis of impairment, by itself, does not establish

entitlement to benefits ....” Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780

(8d Cir. 2004). Rather, the Social Security Act requires “objective

medical evidence showing the existence of an impairment which could

reasonably be expected to produce the claimed pain.” Id. at 781.

In assessing whether the objective medical evidence shows the

existence of an impairment which could reasonably be expected to

produce a claimant’s alleged pain, the ALJ “may properly accept some

parts of the . . . evidence and reject other parts, but he must consider all

the [probative] evidence and give some reason for discounting the

evidence he rejects.” Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 48 (8d Cir. 1994).

17

Notably, this does not mean that the ALJ must undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli v.

Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 42 (8d Cir. 2001); Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x

130, 133 (8d Cir. 2004) (“There is no requirement that the ALJ discuss

in his opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”); Beety-

Monticelli v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec. 348 F. App’x 748, 747 (8d Cir. 2009)

(“[The ALJ] need not mention every piece of evidence in the record.”).

Consistent with these principles, a claimant’s “[a]llegations of

pain and other subjective symptoms must be supported by objective

medical evidence.” Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (8d Cir. 1999)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). As such, when a claimant’s statements

about the severity of their impairment are not well-grounded in the

objective medical evidence, but the underlying impairment “could

reasonably be expected to produce” the complained of pain or symptoms,

the “ALJ must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s

statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.” McKean,

150 F. Supp. 3d at 415-16.

This mandate to anchor both statements and credibility

determinations in the evidence of record overlaps with the regulatory

12

framework governing an ALJ’s assessment of alleged symptoms. The

regulations require consideration of all symptoms and the extent to

which such symptoms are reasonably consistent with the objective

medical and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). This

includes the claimant’s statements and descriptions from medical and

non-medical sources regarding how the symptoms affect the claimant’s

activities of daily living and ability to work. Id. At bottom, the

regulations require objective medical evidence from an acceptable

medical source showing the presence of an impairment that could

reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged and that, when

considered with all the other evidence, would lead to a disability

determination. Id.

When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must follow a

two-step process, where he: (1) ascertains whether the claimant has a

medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be expected

to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms; and (2) evaluates the

intensity and persistence of the claimant’s symptoms such as pain, and

determines the extent to which they limit his or his ability to perform

work-related activities. SSR 16—8p, 82 Fed. Reg. 49462, 49462-63 (Oct.

10

25, 2017). To assist in the evaluation of a claimant's subjective

symptoms, the regulatory framework identifies several factors that may

be relevant to the assessment of the severity or limiting effects of a

claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(c)(8), 404.1529(c)(8).

These factors include: activities of daily living; the location, duration,

frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s symptoms; precipitating and

aggravating factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of

any medication the claimant takes or has taken to alleviate his or his

symptoms; treatment, other than medication that a claimant has

received for relief; any measures the claimant has used to relieve his or

his symptoms; and any other factors concerning the claimant’s

functional limitations and restrictions. Id.

Here, ALJ Burock properly weighed the objective medical evidence

and followed the two-step process for assessing Moumen’s credibility.

At the first step, the ALJ found that Moumen’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms.” Tr. 22. In reaching this conclusion, he found that the

record corroborated Moumen’s hearing testimony that he

is unable to work as he has constant pain in his neck,

shoulder, and lower back; pain limits his ability to dress and

on

bathe; he has disrupted sleep; and has occasional blackout

spells. He claims he has difficulty lifting, squatting, bending,

standing, reaching, walking, sitting, kneeling, climbing

stairs, completing tasks, concentrating, and using his hands.

The claimant alleges he must rest after walking a minute, had

trouble paying attention, and takes awhile to finish what he

starts. He insists he has muscle spasms; must stand after

sitting 20 minutes; can stand only 20 minutes; must alternate

between standing and sitting; must lean on a table; has pain,

dizziness, and fatigue after working just four to five hours;

gets vertigo and dizziness episodes weekly, and more often if

active; has numbness in his left leg; and has daily pain from

his neck down radiating into his right hand....

Id. That is, Moumen’s severe impairments, coupled with his allegations

concerning his symptoms impeding his ability to work, care for his

personal needs, sleep, move, concentrate, and work at a consistent pace

led ALJ Burock to find that the former could reasonably cause the

latter. Id.

At the second step, however, ALJ Burock found that Moumen’s

“statements concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects

of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence

and other evidence in the record....” Jd. In support of that

determination, the ALJ evaluated the location, duration, frequency, and

intensity of Moumen’s symptoms, activities of daily living, medications,

and treatments he used to alleviate his symptoms.

91

First, ALJ Burock first evaluated longitudinal records concerning

Moumen’s symptoms, treatments, and medications, and found that “the

claimant is in no acute distress with normal gait, good strength, intact

sensation, normal muscle tone, normal muscle bulk, capillary refill in

less than two seconds, and no focal deficit.” Id. Relevant to that finding

were the observations that Moumen’s right shoulder pain was “greatly

improved”; and that the claimant, stating that his left groin pain was

“manageable,” declined medication. Id. at 22-23. Indeed, “the

claimant’s treatment has largely been conservative, as there is minimal

medical evidence of surgical treatment or narcotic pain medication.

Moreover, there is minimal medical evidence of record of significant

treatment....” Jd. at 23. Further supporting the finding was the fact

that Moumen had worked as a machinist during the course of his

treatments on at least two separate occasions and in “a different job,

standing with requirements to stand for 10 hours.” Jd. (citation and

quotation omitted).

Second, ALJ Burock separately assessed Moumen’s activities of

daily living, and found that they tended to show his symptoms were less

99

debilitating than he alleged. More specifically, the ALJ concluded that

Moumen’s statements were

inconsistent with his activities of daily living, which shows he

can prepare simple meals, do light cleaning, drive, shop in

stores, and manage money. The claimant notes he reads[] and

has no problems with family, friends, neighbors, authority

figures, and others. He testified he started working where he

lifts 25 to 50 pounds (Hearing Testimony; 5E).

Id. at 23-24. Therefore,

the undersigned finds the claimant can perform light work

and he can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl,

and climb ramps and stairs; and never climb ladders, ropes,

or scaffolds. He can occasionally reach overhead bilaterally;

can have no concentrated exposure to extreme cold or

vibration; and no exposure to hazards. □

Id.

Having found Moumen’s statements concerning the limiting

effects of his symptoms inconsistent with the relevant evidence of

record, ALJ Burock deemed his statements non-credible. Id. at 25.

This, in part, informed the ALJ’s finding that Moumen can perform

light work subject to a host of other personally tailored limitations. Id.

at 22. As ALJ Burock recognized, though the record indicated the

presence of some severe impairments, “numerous inconsistencies” led

him to find that Moumen “retains the ability to perform work activity

92

within the limitations set forth” in his decision. Id. at 28-25. Overall,

that thorough reasoning readily permits meaningful judicial review.

Moumen’s overarching argument that the limitations in his

residual functional capacity are inadequate to account for his

impairments is unavailing because, as outlined above, the method ALJ

Burock used to assess the limiting effects of his symptoms was sound.

Preliminarily, to the extent Moumen speculates that some of his

impairments may lead to an increase in symptoms based on the nature

of the impairments, and that he therefore requires greater limitations

than those found by ALJ Burock, Doc. 8 at 13-14, 16, that argument

fails. A claimant must provide credible evidence showing “that the

impairment resulted in disabling limitations.” Phillips, 91 F. App’x at

780. Moumen failed to meet his burden—though the ALJ requested

additional evidence, Moumen “did not submit any additional evidence of

treatment for the claimant’s spinal condition.” Tr. 23. Absent credible

evidence, mere speculation, as offered here, falls short of meeting that

burden.

Alternatively, to the extent that Moumen argues that the weight

of the evidence supports greater limitations, that contention also yields

o4

no relief. If an ALJ’s factual findings are supported by substantial

evidence, the Court must uphold them. Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536;

see also Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620 (“something less than the weight of the

evidence, ... does not prevent [it] from being supported by substantial

evidence.”). Thus, assuming some evidence supports one of ALJ

Burock’s findings, all he need do to comply with the substantial

evidence standard is to state “which evidence he has rejected and which

he is relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at

433. That is precisely what ALJ Burock did here, when he laid out the

objective evidence relevant to assessing Moumen’s statements

concerning the limiting effects of his symptoms, and then assessed the

credibility of the statements by comparing the two. Tr. 21—25.

Although Moumen may disagree with the ALJ’s conclusions, his

assessment of his symptoms was supported by a large quantity of

evidence. Id. at 433-35, 617-58, 664—762, 994-1080, 1032-66, 1069—

95, 1120-1209, 1219-26, 1237-89, 1245-47, 1355. After surveying this

evidence, the ALJ thoroughly explained his reasons for rejecting

Moumen’s statements regarding the limiting effects of his symptoms in

favor of the relevant objective evidence in determining his limitations.

OK

Id. at 22-25. As such, ALJ Burock’s limitation findings, insofar as they

are based on this comprehensive credibility assessment, must be

upheld. Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 586; Schaudeck, 181 F.3d at 433;

Diaz, 577 F.3d at 506.

Accordingly, as a review of ALJ Burock’s opinion shows that his

limitation findings were based on substantial record evidence, and the

reasoning underlying those findings was sufficient to enable judicial

review, they will not be disturbed. Ficca, 901 F. Supp. 2d at 536; Diaz,

577 F.3d at 506.

C. Evaluation of Moumen’s Non-Severe Impairments

Moumen next argues that the ALJ erred in not finding that his

left shoulder pain, left groin pain with inguinal hernia, chronic fatigue,

severe hip pain, depression, heart palpitations, headaches, and vertigo

with dizziness with syncope episodes warranted additional limitations

on his residual functional capacity. Doc. 8 at 22. In the alternative, he

argues that these non-severe impairments were not sufficiently

discussed or addressed in the ALJ’s limitation findings. Jd. But these

arguments yield no relief where, as here, any potential error was

9A

harmless and the ALJ evaluated the record and articulated his findings

to a degree sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review.

The second step of the Social Security Act’s sequential disability

analysis requires an ALJ to determine whether a claimant has a

medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). An impairment is considered severe only if it

“significantly limits an individual’s physical or mental abilities to do

basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1520(c). Impairments are found non-

severe “when medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or

a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a

minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work... .” SSR 85-28,

1985 WL 56856, at *3 (1985).

At step two of the analysis, the burden lies on the claimant to

establish that he or she has a severe impairment. Bowen v. Yuckert,

482 U.S. 187, 146 (1987). The Court of Appeals has explained that the

evidentiary burden to show a “severe” impairment is relatively low,

because step two only functions as “a de minimis screening device to

dispose of groundless claims.” McCrea v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d

357, 360 (8d Cir. 2004) (quoting Newell v. Comm of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d

541, 546 (8d Cir. 2008)). This means that “[o]nly those claimants with

slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any ‘basic work

activity’ can be denied benefits at step two.” Newell, 347 F.3d at 546

(citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 158 (O'Conner, J., concurring)).

However small the evidentiary burden at step two may be, there

still must be sufficient objective medical evidence to support a finding of

severe impairment. Kirk v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 177 F. App’x 205, 207 ©

n.3 (8d Cir. 2006). Moreover, even if an ALJ errs at step two in finding

a condition is a non-severe impairment, that error is harmless where

the analysis nevertheless moved beyond step two on account of a finding

that the claimant had other severe impairments. See Orr v. Comm’r

Soc. Sec., 805 F. App’x 85, 88 (8d Cir. 2020) (“[Blecause the ALJ

progressed to a later step, any error at Step Two would not alter the

remainder of the five-step process, much less the overall outcome.”);

Salles v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 229 Fed. App’x 140, 145 n.2 (8d Cir. 2007)

(same).

Here, at the second step of the sequential evaluation process, ALJ

Burock found that Moumen was afflicted with two severe impairments:

shoulder osteoarthritis, and degenerative disc disease in the cervical

92

. lumbar spine. Tr. 19. He also considered evidence of several other

alleged impairments, including anxiety and depression, but found that

these conditions were not severe. Id.

Moumen’s argument that ALJ Burock erred in not finding that

several of his documented conditions were severe impairments provides

no tenable grounds for relief. Even assuming Moumen is correct, and

that ALJ Burock erred when he found that Moumen’s left shoulder

pain, left groin pain with inguinal hernia, chronic fatigue, severe hip

pain, depression, heart palpitations, headaches, and vertigo were non-

severe impairments, Doe. 8 at 21-23, it would have been harmless.

Despite finding that those eight issues were not severe impairments,

the ALJ still found that two of Moumen’s impairments (degenerative

disc disease in the cervical and lumbar spine, osteoarthritis in the

shoulder) were severe and continued beyond step two of the sequential

analysis on that basis. Tr. 19-27. This means that, irrespective of any

error at step two, Moumen would have suffered no harm “because the

ALJ progressed to a later step[.|” Orr, 805 F. App’x at 88.

Further, the eight issues Moumen argues should have been

deemed severe impairments are not even cognizable as impairments

99

under the relevant regulation. “[A]n individual’s symptoms, such as

pain, fatigue, shortness of breath, weakness, or nervousness, will not be

found to affect the individual’s ability to do basic work activities...

unless medical signs and laboratory findings show that there is a

medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) that could

reasonably be expected to produce the symptom(s) alleged.” SSR 96-4p,

1996 WL 374187, at *2 (1996). That is, unless there is sufficient

evidence of some associated diagnosed or diagnosable symptoms,

general maladies, mental deficits, and disturbances cannot be deemed

independently disabling. See id.

In the instant appeal, the non-severe impairments advanced by

Moumen hew much more closely to symptoms of underlying conditions,

rather than medically determinable impairments. See id.; Williams v.

Colvin, 2014 WL 4918469, at *g (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“[A]n anxiety attack is

a symptom, and not an impairment.”); Murphy v. Astrue, 2013 WL

3964910, at *2 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he ALJ also noted that [claimant]’s

symptoms of leg edema and chest pain were not ‘diagnostically related’

to his [condition].”); Neff v. Astrue, 875 F. Supp. 2d 411, 424 (D. Del.

280

2012) “Subjective symptoms]]... must be supported by objective

medical evidence.”).

Further, the administrative decision undermines Moumen’s

alternative argument, Doc. 8 at 22—23, that these eight issues were

insufficiently discussed in the ALJ’s limitation findings. As set forth

above, the ALJ considered the conditions and found them to be non-

severe impairments, due to the “numerous inconsistences between

testimony and the evidence of record” and the claimant’s failure to

provide additional materials. Tr. 22-25. Thus, they did not warrant

any further limitations beyond those already imposed by ALJ Burock in

his residual functional capacity determination.

In essence, Moumen asks the Court to reweigh the evidence in his

favor. But “[clourts are not permitted to re-weigh the evidence or

impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’ of Soc.

Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (8d Cir. 2011). Because any alleged error made

by ALJ Burock at step two would have been harmless, and because his

conclusions and accompanying findings concerning Moumen’s

impairments are supported by substantial evidence in the record and

QT

are sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review, they will be

upheld. Orr, 805 F. App’x at 88; Kirk, 177 F. App’x at 207 n.3.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. A

separate order shall be issued.

Date: October 9, 2025 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge

Q9