Ankney v. Paradise Township

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHAWN ANKNEY, et al., : Civil No. 1:24-CV-01654

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. :

:

PARADISE TOWNSHIP, et al., :

:

Defendants. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson

MEMORANDUM

Before the court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendants the

Northern York County Regional Police Department, Jeremy J. Neidigh, Neal

Doyle, the Nashville Volunteer Fire Department,1 and Bradley R. Dunham

(collectively, “Defendants”). (Docs. 42, 45.) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs

Shawn Ankney and Ankney’s Towing, Recovery & Auto Repair Service

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in

their second amended complaint. (Doc. 40.) Plaintiffs allege that, by removing

and excluding Shawn Ankney and his towing company from a tow list program

because of his disabilities, Defendants violated the Equal Protection clause of the

1 Defendants previously stated that Plaintiffs incorrectly identified Nashville Volunteer Fire

Company as Nashville Volunteer Fire Department in their first amended complaint, so the court

referred to that entity as the Nashville Volunteer Fire Company in its previous memorandum

opinion denying in part and granting in part several motions to dismiss. (Doc. 34, p. 2 n.1.)

However, both Plaintiffs and Defendants refer to that entity as the Nashville Volunteer Fire

Department in the second amended complaint, motions to dismiss, and a response to the motions

to dismiss. (Doc. 40, p. 1; Doc. 45, p. 1; Doc. 48, p. 1.) Therefore, the court will do the same in

this memorandum opinion.

Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134 (“Title II of the

ADA”). For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied

in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Shawn Ankney, Ankney’s Towing, and the Tow List

Shawn Ankney (“Ankney”) has operated his towing company, Ankney’s

Towing, Recovery & Auto Repair Service (“Ankney’s Towing”), in Spring Grove,

Pennsylvania, since 1996. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 2, 10–12.) Ankney suffers from cerebral

atrophy and late cortical cerebellar atrophy. (Id. ¶ 14.) Due to these conditions,

Ankney has a severe speech impediment and experiences aphasia, cognitive

impairment, and memory loss. (Id.) Ankney is a trained mechanic, but his

disabilities prevent him from possessing a driver’s license. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.) Thus,

he cannot operate Ankney’s towing on his own. (Id. ¶ 20.) Two employees help

Ankney run the business, and among other responsibilities, they are tasked with

driving tow trucks and operating vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 20–21.)

From 1972 to 2023, the Northern York County Regional Police Department

(“Northern Regional Police Department”) included Ankney’s Towing on the tow

list. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 48.) The tow list is a list of towing companies that the Northern

Regional Police Department calls when it needs towing services. (Id. ¶ 29.) The

Northern Regional Police Department rotates which company has priority on the

list, so when the Northern Regional Police Department needs towing services,

York County 911 Dispatch contacts the company that has priority at that time.

(Id.) The list is updated annually. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Jeremy J. Neidigh,

who is an administrative lieutenant and employee of the Northern Regional Police

Department, maintains the tow list on behalf of the department. (Id. ¶ 4, 33.)

B. 2023 Tow List Removal

In November 2023, Ankney’s Towing was the priority tow company on the

tow list. (Doc. 40, ¶ 34.) On November 13, 2023, the Northern Regional Police

Department contacted Ankney’s Towing through York County 911 Dispatch and

requested that a tow truck be sent to the scene of an accident in Jackson Township,

Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 35.) Ankney directed Mr. Corbin, an Ankney’s Towing

employee, to go to the accident site and begin moving vehicles out of traffic on

behalf of Ankney’s Towing. (Id. ¶¶ 36–37.)

Bradley R. Dunham (“Dunham”) was, at the time of the accident,2 the Fire

Chief of the Nashville Volunteer Fire Department (“Nashville Fire Department”).

(Id. ¶ 38.) When Mr. Corbin arrived on the scene of the accident, Dunham

approached him and “began yelling in Mr. Corbin’s face” about Ankney’s absence.

2 Dunham was elected as a township supervisor for Jackson Township prior to this accident.

(Doc. 40, ¶ 39.) But at the time of the accident, his term had not yet started. (Id.)

(Id. ¶ 40.) Dunham then spoke to Ankney over the phone and told Ankney that he

would “write up” Ankney’s Towing because Mr. Corbin did not have oil-dry at the

scene of the accident. (Id. ¶ 41.) Mr. Corbin told Dunham that Ankney was on his

way with the oil-dry. (Id.) Dunham told Ankney that he would “write up”

Ankney’s towing, and said: “I’ll think of something, but there will be a complaint.”

(Id. ¶ 42.) The exchange ended when a Northern Regional Police Department

officer intervened and forced Dunham to direct traffic. (Id. ¶ 43.) Instead of

directing traffic, Dunham left the scene. (Id. ¶ 44.)

Dunham did not “write up” Ankney’s Towing, and neither Ankney, nor Mr.

Corbin, nor the business received a notice of violation, complaint, or concern after

the November 13, 2023 accident. (Id. ¶¶ 45–46.) But over the next several days,

the Northern Regional Police Department needed towing services, and it did not

contact Ankney’s Towing, even though Ankney’s Towing occupied the priority

position on the tow list. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 47.) Ankney called York County 911 Dispatch

and left a voicemail. (Id. ¶ 48.) Several days later, York County 911 Dispatch

called back and told Ankney that his business was removed from the tow list

because Paradise Township and Jackson Township “no longer want[ed] [Ankney

and Ankney’s Towing] on the list.” (Id.) York County 911 Dispatch assured

Ankney that the Northern Regional Police Department would still contact Ankney

should it receive individual requests for Ankney’s Towing. (Id. ¶ 49.)

Plaintiffs allege that this was an empty assurance. On June 23, 2024,

Brandy Anderson (“Anderson”), a long-standing Ankney’s Towing customer, was

involved in a vehicle accident and asked a Northern Regional Police Department

officer to have Ankney’s Towing tow her vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 49a–b.) The officer told

Anderson that Rebound Towing purchased Ankney’s Towing, and that Ankney’s

Towing closed. (Id. ¶ 49c.) Anderson went to Ankney’s Towing’s business

address to retrieve her car, where she discovered that Ankney’s Towing was still

open and that her vehicle had been towed somewhere else. (Id. ¶ 49d.)

Even if Ankney’s Towing had received a “write up” or formal violation

notice following the November 13, 2023 accident, Plaintiffs allege that such a

violation would not justify Ankney’s Towing’s removal from the tow list. (Id.

¶ 53.) Plaintiffs aver that another towing business and its operator, Mr. Lamar of

Lamar Express Towing, received approximately ten formal violation notices before

the business was removed from the tow list. (Id.) Ankney’s Towing lost

significant revenue and profits because it was removed from the tow list. (Id.

¶ 54.)

C. 2024 Tow List Exclusion

Before the November 2023 accident and Ankney’s Towing’s removal from

the tow list, Neidigh sent an email to Ankney’s Towing and other towing

businesses on October 11, 2023. (Doc. 40, ¶ 55.) The email explained the criteria

for inclusion on the 2024 tow list and requested information from the towing

companies. (Id. ¶¶ 55–56.) Ankney provided all the information the email

requested to Neidigh on time, but Ankney’s Towing was absent from the 2024 tow

list. (Id. ¶¶ 56–57.) Ankney’s towing was, however, returned to the tow list in

2025, and Plaintiffs allege that Ankney’s towing was qualified to be on the tow list

at all material times. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59.)

D. Mocking Incidents

Plaintiffs allege that Dunham and Neal Doyle (“Doyle”), a deputy fire chief

for the Nashville Fire Department, observed Northern Regional Police Department

and Nashville Fire Department members mocking Ankney due to his speech

impediment on multiple occasions while he performed his towing duties. (Doc. 40,

¶¶ 23–24.) They allege that Dunham joined in the mocking several times, and that

Doyle participated in laughter directed at Ankney. (Id.)

On one occasion, while Ankney spoke to a customer at the scene of an

accident, Dunham mocked Ankney by telling him to repeat himself and that no one

could understand him. (Id. ¶¶ 25–27.) A Northern Regional Police Department

officer approached Dunham and told him to “knock it off.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs

allege that Doyle was also present at the scene of that accident. (Id. ¶ 25.)

E. Claims in the Amended Complaint and Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on May 12, 2025, raising

one constitutional violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants

and one violation of Title II of the ADA against the Nashville Fire Department and

Northern Regional Police Department. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 60–70.)

In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally treated Plaintiffs

differently from similarly situated individuals and towing companies without

reasonable justification in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 60–65.) They further aver that Defendants

intentionally treated Ankney differently because of Doyle and Dunham’s disdain

for his disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64.) In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that the Nashville

Fire Department and the Northern Regional Police Department violated Title II of

the ADA by acting in concert to remove them from, and prevent them from

rejoining, the tow list due to Ankney’s speech impediment.3 (Id. ¶¶ 66–70.)

3 In two separate responses in opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs cite the

legal standard for an employment discrimination claim raised pursuant to Title I of the ADA.

(Doc. 47, p. 9; Doc. 48, p. 8 (citing Hodson v. Alpine Manor, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 2d 373, 388–89

(W.D. Pa. 2007).) But because Plaintiffs allege that several public entities denied them access to

a tow list program because of Ankney’s disabilities, and because Ankney does not allege that

Defendants employed him, the court construes Count II to raise a claim pursuant to Title II of the

ADA, not Title I. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 66–70); see Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018)

(“To successfully state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a person ‘must demonstrate: (1) he is a

qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) [who] was excluded from participation in or denied

the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to

discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.’”) (quoting Bowers v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n.32 (3d Cir. 2007)).

On May 27, 2025, Neidigh and the Northern Regional Police Department

filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim

and a brief in support. (Docs. 42, 43.) On May 29, 2025, the Nashville Fire

Department, alongside Dunham and Doyle in their official capacities as fire chief

and deputy fire chief, respectively, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ second amended

complaint for failure to state a claim and filed a brief in support. (Docs. 45, 46.)

Plaintiffs filed responses in opposition to both motions to dismiss on June 9, 2025.

(Docs. 47, 48.) Defendants did not file reply briefs, so both motions are ripe for

disposition.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343 because Plaintiffs allege a violation of a constitutional right under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and a violation of Title II of the ADA, a federal statute. Venue is

appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all parties are located within the

Middle District of Pennsylvania and all acts or omissions alleged in the amended

complaint occurred within the Middle District.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to

survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir.

2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint

survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead

to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than

conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines

whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to

relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) abrogated on other

grounds as recognized in Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311, 319 n.7 (3rd Cir. 2020).

DISCUSSION

Before the court considers the arguments Defendants present in their

motions to dismiss, it will address the parties’ apparent uncertainty regarding

which Defendants Plaintiffs intend to assert an Equal Protection claim against in

the second amended complaint. (See Doc. 40, ¶¶ 60–65.) Then, the court will

consider the Equal Protection and Title II of the ADA claims by addressing the

arguments raised by each individual Defendant in turn.

A. Count I – Equal Protection Claim

The second amended complaint raises an Equal Protection claim against

“All Defendants” based on Ankney’s Towing’s removal and exclusion from the

tow list. (Doc. 40, p. 9.)4 The second amended complaint names the following

defendants: Northern York County Regional Police Department; Jeremy J.

Neidigh, individually and in his official capacity as an administrative lieutenant for

the Northern York County Regional Police Department; the Nashville Volunteer

Fire Department; Bradley R. Dunham, individually and in his official capacity as

fire chief for the Nashville Volunteer Fire Department; and Neal Doyle,

individually and in his official capacity as a deputy fire chief for the Nashville

Volunteer Fire Department. (Doc. 40, p. 1–2.) Therefore, the second amended

complaint appears to raise an Equal Protection claim against each of those

Defendants.

However, it is not clear whether Plaintiffs intend to assert an Equal

Protection claim under Section 1983 against the Nashville Fire Department, the

Northern Regional Police Department, and Dunham, Doyle, and Neidigh in both

their official and individual capacities. The court addresses each category of

defendant in turn.

4 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.

1. The Northern Regional Police Department and Nashville Fire

Department

A governmental entity “cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat

superior or vicarious liability.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr.,

372 F.3d 572, 580 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Monell v. New York Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978)). Instead, “the plaintiff must identify a policy

or custom of the [governmental] entity that caused the constitutional violation” for

the governmental entity to be liable pursuant to Section 1983. Id. (citing Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).

In its motion to dismiss, the Nashville Fire Department argues that Plaintiffs

fail to state a Monell Equal Protection claim against it. (Doc. 46, pp. 8–9.) In their

response in opposition, Plaintiffs aver that they “did not re-assert an independent

Monell claim for violations of the Equal Protection Clause with regards to the Tow

List.” (Doc. 48, p. 7 n.2.) Moreover, Neidigh and the Northern Regional Police

Department read the second amended complaint to raise an Equal Protection claim

against Neidigh, only, and not the Northern Regional Police Department. (Doc.

43, p. 2.) In their response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs do not

dispute this interpretation of the second amended complaint. (See Doc. 47, pp. 1–

11.) Therefore, the Court will dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection

claim against the Nashville Fire Department and the Northern Regional Police

Department and will presume that Plaintiffs intended to raise an Equal Protection

claim against individual defendants Doyle, Dunham, and Neidigh only.

2. Doyle, Dunham, and Neidigh in Their Official Capacities

Plaintiffs’ potential Equal Protection claim against the Nashville Fire

Department and Northern Regional Police Department impacts their Equal

Protection claims against Neidigh, Doyle, and Dunham in their official capacities.

When a plaintiff sues a public official in his or her official capacity for damages

pursuant to Section 1983, the suit is treated as if it were brought directly against

the governmental entity of which the official is part. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413

F.3d 359, 369 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Mitros v. Borough of Glenolden, 170 F.

Supp. 2d 504, 506 (E.D. Pa. 2001)); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–

72 (1985); Rivera v. Sch. Dist. of City of York, No. 1:22-CV-00914, 2023 WL

12087107, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 4, 2023), report and recommendation adopted,

No. 1:22-CV-914, 2024 WL 5694667 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2024) (“There is no longer

a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for

under Monell . . . local government units can be sued directly for damages and

injunctive or declaratory relief.”) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167

n.14 (1985).)

Dunham and Doyle both move to dismiss the second amended complaint in

their official capacities while Neidigh does not state whether he moves to dismiss

the second amended complaint in his official or unofficial capacity. (Doc. 43, p. 1,

Doc. 46, p. 1.) Again, because Plaintiffs aver that they did not intend to “re-assert

an independent Monell claim for violations of the Equal Protection Clause with

regards to the Tow List,”5 the court gathers that they meant to raise Count I against

the individual Defendants in their individual capacities, only. (Doc. 48, p. 7 n.2.)

Nonetheless, Plaintiffs do not explicitly state that they intend to leave out a claim

against the individual Defendants in their official capacities. Therefore, the court

will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim against Dunham, Doyle, and

Neidigh in their official capacities without prejudice.

The arguments Doyle, Dunham, and Neidigh offer in support of dismissal of

Count I apply to their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations

and the legal sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim. (See Doc. 43, p. 7;

Doc. 46, p. 8.) Therefore, the court will consider these arguments as they relate to

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim against Doyle, Dunham, and Neidigh in their

individual capacities. The court addresses each Defendant’s arguments against

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim in turn.

5 Although Plaintiffs request “any further relief [the court] deems necessary and just, including

injunctive relief,” Doc. 40, p. 11, the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek is not apparent, especially

since they aver that Ankney’s Towing returned to the tow list in 2025. (Id. ¶ 58.)

3. Neidigh in his Individual Capacity

Neidigh argues that Plaintiffs fail to state an Equal Protection claim against

him because they do not allege that he made the decision to remove Ankney’s

Towing from the tow list. (Doc. 43, pp. 7–9.) Neidigh claims that the second

amended complaint alleges that he acted as a mere administrator of the tow list

with no authority to decide which businesses it would include. (Id. at 8–9.) Thus,

he was not “personally responsible” for removing Plaintiffs from the list, and not

sufficiently involved in the alleged constitutional violation to be named as a

defendant to Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiffs respond by

noting that personal involvement in an alleged constitutional violation may be

shown through “personal direction or . . . actual knowledge and acquiescence,” so

they need not show that Neidigh possessed decision-making authority regarding

the tow list to sustain their Equal Protection claim against him. (Doc. 47, p. 7

(quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).) They also

allege that, based on the allegations presented in the second amended complaint,

Neidigh “knew and acquiesce[d] to the removal of Ankney[’s] Towing” from the

tow list. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiffs attempt to state a “class of one” Equal Protection claim. Hill v.

Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Village of

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). (See Doc. 48, p.

7.) To properly plead a class of one Equal Protection claim, a plaintiff must allege

that “(1) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2)

the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Hill, 455 F.3d at 239. In any suit brought pursuant to

Section 1983, a defendant must have “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”

because “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat

superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir.

2020). Personal involvement may be shown through actual knowledge of or

acquiescence to the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374.

Neidigh cites Rode in support of his argument that, because he lacked

authority to decide which businesses would be included on the tow list, he was not

personally involved with the alleged Equal Protection violation that occurred when

Ankney’s Towing was removed and excluded from the list. (Doc. 43, p. 7 (citing

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).) But Rode does not require that a defendant make the

affirmative decision to engage in, or order a colleague to commit, the allegedly

unconstitutional conduct to be named a defendant in a Section 1983 action. 845

F.2d at 1207–09. In Rode, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to state a

retaliatory harassment claim against the Governor of Pennsylvania in his

supervisory capacity because she did not sufficiently allege that the Governor

knew of or acquiesced to the alleged harassment. Id. at 1208. That case examined

supervisory liability in the context of a Section 1983 claim; it did not evaluate

whether an official acting in a purely “ministerial” role is liable for

unconstitutional conduct they carry out pursuant to the alleged directions of higher-

ranking decision makers. Id.; (Doc. 43, pp. 8–9 (asserting that Neidigh operated

the tow list in a “ministerial” role and was not involved in making decisions

regarding its membership).)

Rode does not support Neidigh’s argument, and Plaintiffs sufficiently allege

his involvement because they claim that the constitutional wrong occurred when

they were removed from the tow list in 2023. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 60–65.) Their

allegations lead to the reasonable inference that Neidigh, as the manager of the tow

list, participated in removing Ankney’s Towing from the tow list. (See id. ¶¶ 33,

55–59 (alleging that Neidigh manages the tow list on behalf of the Northern

Regional Police Department and explaining how Neidigh emailed Ankney and

other towing business owners regarding the criteria for inclusion on the 2024 tow

list).) Even if another individual ordered Neidigh to remove Ankney’s Towing

from the tow list, Neidigh’s maintenance of the tow list, as described in the

complaint, leads to the reasonable inference that he personally participated in the

removal of Ankney’s Towing from the tow list. (See id. ¶ 33.) Therefore, Rode’s

personal involvement requirement does not preclude Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection

claim against Neidigh.

Neidigh makes a second argument: that Plaintiffs fail to state an Equal

Protection claim against him because they fail to allege that he intended to treat

them differently from other similarly situated individuals by removing them from

the tow list. (Doc. 43, p. 7.) In Joyce Outdoor Advertising Wallscapes, LLC v.

City of Scranton, No. 3:24-CV-00791, 2024 WL 4900015, at *12 (M.D. Pa. Nov.

26, 2024), the court held that a plaintiff adequately stated a class of one Equal

Protection claim by simply alleging that the defendants intentionally treated it

differently from other similarly situated individuals. Here, Plaintiffs directly allege

that “Defendants intentionally treated Plaintiffs differently without any rational

basis for the difference in treatment,” and that Defendants “intentionally treated

Plaintiffs differently due to Mr. Doyle’s and Mr. Dunham’s disdain for Mr.

Ankney’s disabilities and/or the manifestations thereof.” (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 63–64.)

Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants, including Neidigh,

intentionally treated them differently from other similarly situated individuals.

Moreover, Plaintiffs aver that Neidigh sent Ankney and other towing

business operators an email explaining the criteria for inclusion on the 2024 tow

list. (Id. ¶ 55.) Even though Ankney satisfied these criteria and replied to

Neidigh’s email with the requested information, he was excluded from the 2024

tow list. (Id. ¶¶ 56–59.) These allegations support a reasonable inference that

Neidigh intentionally omitted Ankney’s Towing from the tow list. See Wolfe v.

City of Sunbury, No. 4:24-CV-00251, 2024 WL 4989323, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 5,

2024) (finding that plaintiff sufficiently alleged intentional differential treatment

by city officials by outlining interactions with law enforcement that “support a

plausible inference of spite among city officials which may have been

communicated to the officers . . .”). Therefore, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that

Neidigh intentionally removed, and later excluded, Ankney’s Towing from the tow

list, and the motion to dismiss the Equal Protection claim against Neidigh in his

individual capacity will be denied.

4. Dunham and Doyle in Their Individual Capacities

Defendants Dunham and Doyle argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a class of

one Equal Protection claim because Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants treated

Ankney’s Towing differently from other, similarly situated towing businesses.

(Doc. 46, pp. 7–8). In the second amended complaint, Plaintiffs compare

themselves to Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express Towing, who received approximately

ten formal violation notices before Lamar Express Towing was removed from the

tow list. (Doc. 40, ¶ 53.) Dunham and Doyle argue that Mr. Lamar and Lamar

Express Towing are insufficient comparators because Plaintiffs “assume[] that the

only reason for removal from the Tow List is by accumulation of violations” and

fail to account for “other possible reasons for such removal.” (Doc. 46, pp. 7–8.)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that the court, in ruling on Defendants’ previous

motions to dismiss, already found that Plaintiffs adequately alleged that they are

similarly situated to Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express Towing. (Doc. 48, p. 8.) They

also argue that, at the motion to dismiss stage, they need only prove that they are

alike, not identical to, Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express Towing in all relevant

aspects. (Id.)

To state a class of one Equal Protection claim, Plaintiffs must plead “facts

sufficient to make plausible the existence of . . . similarly situated parties.” Perano

v. Twp. of Tilden, 423 F. App’x 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2011); Borell v. Bloomsburg

Univ., 955 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 (M.D. Pa. 2013). Comparators must be alike, but

not identical, in all relevant aspects to be similarly situated. Borrell, 955 F. Supp.

2d at 405 (quoting Mun. Revenue Servs., Inc. v. McBlain, 347 F. App’x 817, 825

(3d Cir. 2009); Southersby Dev. Corp. v. Borough of Jefferson Hills, 852 F. Supp.

2d 616, 628 (W.D. Pa. 2012)). For example, in Borrell, the court found that the

plaintiff sufficiently alleged the existence of a similarly situated individual by

averring that the plaintiff and her comparator were students in the same nursing

program, that they both had known or perceived substance abuse problems, and

that she was expelled from the program while her comparator was provided

counseling and ultimately allowed to return to the program. 955 F. Supp. 2d at

405.

The second amended complaint indicates that Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express

Towing are, like Plaintiffs, a towing company operator and his business, that

Lamar Express Towing was placed on the same tow list as Plaintiffs, and that

Lamar Express Towing was removed from the tow list after accumulating

approximately ten formal violation notices while Plaintiff was removed without

receiving a formal violation notice. (Doc. 40, ¶ 53.) These allegations “make

plausible the existence of . . . similarly situated parties,” so Plaintiffs sufficiently

allege that they are like Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express Towing in all relevant

aspects and are therefore similarly situated. Perano, 423 F. App’x at 238.

“Determining whether an individual is ‘similarly situated’ to another individual is a

case-by-case fact-intensive inquiry,” and Defendants may explore other reasons for

Plaintiffs’ removal from the tow list apart from the accumulation of violation

notices through discovery. Borrell, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (quoting Chan v. Cnty.

of Lancaster, No. 10-CV-03424, 2011 WL 4478283, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26,

2011)). But because Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they are similarly situated to

Mr. Lamar and Lamar Express Towing, this argument does not warrant dismissal

of Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim against Dunham and Doyle at this stage.

Next, Dunham and Doyle argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege that they

participated in Ankney’s Towing’s removal from the tow list. (Doc. 46, p. 8.)

They claim that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting Dunham and Doyle’s

“personal involvement in the maintenance of the Tow List. Nothing is pled to

support that there was any relationship between Northern Regional Police and

Dunham and Doyle showing they gave personal direction, in any way, had

knowledge of, or acquiesced to Ankney’s removal.” (Id.) Like Neidigh, they cite

Rode in support of their argument that Plaintiffs failed to plead with appropriate

particularity that they were personally involved in Ankney’s Towing’s removal

from the tow list. (Id. at 7 (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).) In response, Plaintiffs

argue that the court has already determined that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged, in

their first amended complaint, that Dunham and Doyle participated in Ankney’s

Towing’s removal from the tow list. (Doc. 48, p. 7.)

Plaintiffs must plead facts sufficient to allege that Dunham and Doyle “had

personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” that gave rise to their Section 1983

claim. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. Plaintiffs allege that “[u]pon information and

belief, Mr. Dunham and Mr. Doyle caused Ankney[’s] Towing to be removed from

the Tow List” and “[i]t is believed and therefore averred that Ankney[’s] Towing

was not included on the Tow List for 2024 as a result of Mr. Du[n]ham’s and Mr.

Doyle’s actions.” (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 52, 57.)

Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that they were removed from the tow list soon

after Dunham confronted Mr. Corbin at the scene of the November 13, 2023

vehicle accident, told Ankney first that he would “write up” Ankney’s Towing, and

then said “I’ll think of something, but there will be a complaint.” (Id. ¶¶ 40–49.)

Plaintiffs also allege that both Dunham and Doyle previously witnessed or

participated alongside others mocking Ankney for his speech impediment. (Id.

¶¶ 23–24.) These allegations, especially Ankney’s Towing’s removal from the

2023 tow list soon after Dunham confronted Mr. Corbin and Ankney at the scene

of the November 13, 2023 accident, lead to the reasonable inference that Dunham

and Doyle participated in the alleged Equal Protection violation.

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that they are similarly situated to Mr. Lamar and

Lamar Express Towing, and that Dunham and Doyle participated in their removal

and exclusion from the tow list at this pleading stage. Therefore, the court will

deny the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim against Defendants

Dunham and Doyle in their individual capacities.

B. Count II – Title II of the ADA Claim

Both the Nashville Fire Department and the Northern Regional Police

Department move to dismiss the claim Plaintiffs bring pursuant to Title II of the

ADA. (Doc. 43, pp. 9–12; Doc. 46, pp. 9–10.) The court addresses each

Defendant’s argument in turn.

1. Northern Regional Police Department

The Northern Regional Police Department argues that it “is not a proper

defendant to the ADA claim.” (Doc. 43, p. 10.) It argues that municipal police

departments “have no distinct legal identity” apart from the municipality they

serve. (Id. (citing Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir.

1997); Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep’t, 146 Fed App’x 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir.

2005) (per curiam).) Courts frequently dismiss Section 1983 claims raised against

municipal departments instead of municipalities, and Defendants argue that the

same framework should apply under Title II of the ADA. (Id.) They cite several

cases in support of this argument. (Id. at 10–11 (citing Alvarez v. City of Phila.,

No. 23-CV-3570, 2023 WL 6520507, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2023); Walling v.

City of Newport, No. 2:14-cv-43, 2015 WL 5304271, at *4 (E.D. KY Sept. 9,

2015); Coleman v. Syracuse Pol. Dep’t, 5:16-CV-00836, 2016 WL 4411339, *6

(N.D. N.Y. July 22, 2016)).) In Alvarez, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s

employment discrimination claims against the Philadelphia Water Department

because the water department does not “have a separate legal existence from the

city of Philadelphia.” 2023 WL 6520507, at *1 n.1. The Northern Regional Police

Department does not explain its legal status in relation to the municipalities within

its jurisdiction; it only argues that, as a police department, it lacks a unique legal

identity and cannot be sued pursuant to Title II of the ADA. (Doc. 43, pp. 10–11.)6

6 In a separate section of its brief in support of its motion to dismiss, however, it does note that

“[a]s a matter of law, the Northern York County Regional Police Department is overseen by a

regional police commission created pursuant to an intergovernmental cooperation agreement

under Pennsylvania’s Intergovernmental Cooperation Law.” (Doc. 43, p. 8 (citing 53 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 2303–304).)

In response, Plaintiffs argue that no separate municipality governs the

Northern Regional Police Department. (Doc. 47, p. 9.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue

that the Northern York County Regional Police Commission governs the Northern

York County Regional Police Department. (Id.) Nonetheless, Plaintiffs request

leave to amend their complaint to name the proper defendant to their Title II claim

if the court finds that they have incorrectly named the Northern Regional Police

Department. (Id.)

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must plead that “(1) he

is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason

of his disability.” Haberle v. Troxel, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 n. 32 (3d Cir. 2007)).

The statute defines the term “public entity” as “(A) any state or local government;

(B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a

State or States or local government; and (C) the National Railroad Passenger

Corporation, and any commuter authority . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A)–(C).

In Haberle, the Third Circuit held that “police departments fall squarely

within the statutory definition of a ‘public entity.’” 885 F.3d at 179–80 (quoting

Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The plaintiff in that case sued individual defendants, such as police

officers, members of the local borough council, and the chief of police, as well as

the borough itself, but not the police department. Id. at 174. Nonetheless, the

Court’s holding in Haberle led at least one district court in the Third Circuit to

conclude that, because police departments qualify as “public entit[ies]”under Title

II of the ADA, they may be sued for violations of that statute. Powell v. Borough

of Bergenfield, No. 23-CV-21399, 2025 WL 798810, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 13, 2025)

(citing Haberle, 885 F.3d at 179–80) (recognizing that municipalities and their

police departments are treated as a single legal entity in the context of Section

1983 liability, but finding that “[p]olice departments may be sued under the

ADA”); see also Beckler v. City of Fort Wayne, No. 1:24-CV-00467, 2025 WL

1308924, at *6 n.9 (N.D. Ind. May 6, 2025) (citing Powell, 2025 WL 798810, at

*2) (“Whether Plaintiffs can file a Title II ADA claim against the [Fort Wayne

Police Department] does not appear to have been clarified by the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals, though other federal courts’ rulings have either implied a

municipal police department could possibly be sued or have directly ruled in the

affirmative.”)

However, allowing Title II plaintiffs to sue police departments instead of

their managing municipalities contradicts the longstanding recognition that, in

Pennsylvania, a police department has no separate legal identity from the

municipality it serves, and therefore cannot be sued as a “person” subject to

Section 1983 liability. See Martin, 146 F. App’x at 562 n.3; Bush v. City of Phila.

Pol. Dep’t, 684 F. Supp. 2d 634, 636 (E.D. Pa. 2010). State law governs an

entity’s capacity to either sue or be sued when the entity is neither an individual

nor a corporation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). In Shilling v. Brush, No. 4:05 CV 871,

2005 WL 2100707, at *3–*4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2005), the court held that under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), a municipal police department in

Pennsylvania did not qualify as an “individual, corporation, partnership, or

unincorporated association,” and thus did not have the capacity to “sue or be sued

either as a plaintiff or as a defendant.” The same analysis applies to county

sheriff’s departments, which are not separate legal entities from their

corresponding counties. Bernard v. Washington Cnty., 465 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470

(W.D. Pa. 2006); Rivera v. Lebanon Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:22-CV-01272,

2023 WL 11983862, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2023), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 1:22-CV-01272, 2023 WL 11983684 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2023).

The court finds that, although police departments qualify as “public entities”

under Title II of the ADA, Haberle, 885 F.3d at 179–80, they are improper

defendants to name in a Title II action, and improper defendants generally, if they

have no separate legal identity from their corresponding municipality. See

Schilling, 2005 WL 2100707, at *3.7

Plaintiffs do not plead facts sufficient to establish that the Northern Regional

Police Department is a unique legal entity capable of being sued. In fact, the

second amended complaint states that the Northern Regional Police Department is

“a department of a county government existing under the laws of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . .” (Doc. 40, ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs’ brief in

opposition provides no clarification on this point, and only argues that the Northern

Regional Department serves a region, not a county. (Doc. 47, p. 9.) To be clear,

the court is not concluding that Defendants are correct in their assertion that the

Northern Regional Police Department cannot be sued pursuant to Title II of the

ADA. (Doc. 43, p. 9–11.) It merely concludes that Plaintiffs have not, at the

pleading stage, provided sufficient information to determine that the Northern

Regional Police Department is a unique legal entity capable of being sued.

7 This does not mean that, when members of a police department violate Title II of the ADA,

plaintiffs are left without legal recourse. Plaintiffs may sue the municipality that controls the

police department. See Haberle, 885 F.3d at 174 (explaining that Plaintiff sued, among other

defendants, the Borough of Nazareth, Pennsylvania, when police officers allegedly violated Title

II of the ADA.) In Montanez v. Price, No. 23-2669, 2025 WL 2846695, at *7 (3d Cir. Oct. 8,

2025), the Third Circuit held that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections qualifies as “a

public entity and it receives federal funds, so it is a proper defendant under . . . Title II . . . .”

This holding suggests that any government entity that qualifies as a public entity under Title II is

a proper defendant to a Title II claim. See id. However, in Montanez, the Court considered

neither Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 nor Section 1983 precedent applicable to police

departments. See Shilling, 2005 WL 2100707, at *3–*4; Martin, 146 F. App’x at 562 n.3.

Therefore, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title II

claim against the Northern Regional Police Department without prejudice as

amendment is not futile.8 See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete

Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007).

2. Nashville Fire Department

The Nashville Fire Department first argues that Ankney is not a qualified

individual under the ADA because he does not have a driver’s license, and

therefore cannot legally drive a tow truck. (Doc. 46, pp. 9–10.) Because Ankney

cannot drive a tow truck, the Nashville Fire Department argues that he is not a

qualified individual because he cannot “perform the essential functions of the

employment position” either with or without reasonable accommodation. (Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).) Plaintiffs argue that “there is no factual basis for

Moving Defendants’ assertion that the owner of the towing company must have a

driver’s license to maintain the entity on the Tow List,” and note that Ankney’s

Towing had been included on the tow list for decades before it was removed in

2023. (Doc. 48, p. 8.)

8 Because the court dismisses the ADA claim for this reason, it does not reach the Northern

Regional Police Department’s additional argument that Plaintiffs fail to allege that the police

department intentionally removed Ankney’s Towing from the tow list in violation of Title II of

the ADA. (Doc. 43, pp. 11–12.)

Title II of the ADA defines the term “qualified individual with a disability”

as:

[A]n individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable

modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of

architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the

provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility

requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs

or activities provided by a public entity.

42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); see Haberle, 885 F.3d at 179 n.9. The Nashville Fire

Department, however, relies on the definition of qualified individual set forth in

Title I of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in an

employment context. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145

F.3d 601, 605 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Thus, an individual eligible to sue under Title I of

the ADA must be disabled but still be able to perform his or her job duties with or

without a reasonable accommodation by the employer.”)

Plaintiffs allege that the Nashville Fire Department and Northern Regional

Police Department unlawfully excluded Ankney from a program, offered by a

public entity or entities, because of his disability, and they do not allege that

Defendants employed Ankney. (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 66–70.) Therefore, Plaintiffs appear

to bring a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, even though, in their responses to

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, they also cite the standard for an employment

discrimination claim relevant to claims brought pursuant to Title I of the ADA.

(Doc. 47, p. 9; Doc. 48, p. 8.) The Nashville Fire Department fails to explain how

Title I of the ADA’s definition of qualified individual applies to Plaintiffs’ Title II

claim, and therefore, the Title II of the ADA claim will not be dismissed on this

basis.

The Nashville Fire Department also argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead facts

sufficient to establish that it had “involvement, knowledge or authority to

determine the participants of the Tow List” or “took any action to have [Plaintiffs]

removed from the list.” (Doc. 46, p. 10.) Plaintiffs argue that “actual control of

the Tow List is not a requirement to state a claim for ADA violations,” and that,

because they allege that the Nashville Fire and Northern Regional Police

Departments “act[ed] in concert,” the second amended complaint states a claim

under Title II of the ADA. (Doc. 48, pp. 8–9.)

In sum, the Nashville Fire Department argues that it is not the public entity

that provided a service, program, or activity from which Ankney was excluded

because it does not influence which businesses are placed on the tow list. (See

Doc. 46, p. 10.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, although Plaintiffs

allege that the Northern Regional Police Department maintained the tow list, Doc.

40, ¶ 33, they also plead facts sufficient to support the inference that other entities

also exercised control over the tow list. That is, when Ankney called York County

911 Dispatch and asked why his business had been removed from the tow list, the

dispatcher told him that “the Townships” sought Ankney’s Towing’s removal. (Id.

¶ 48.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that the Nashville Fire Department and the

Northern Regional Police Department “act[ed] in concert” to remove and exclude

Plaintiffs from the tow list. (Id. ¶ 69.) These allegations support the reasonable

inference that multiple government entities beyond the Northern Regional Police

Department exercise control over the tow list “program.” (Id. ¶¶ 68–69.)

Therefore, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the Nashville Fire Department

exercised some control over the tow list program and participated in Plaintiffs’

exclusion from the list.

Second, Plaintiffs allege that Dunham and Doyle—a Nashville Fire

Department fire chief and deputy fire chief, respectively—caused Ankney’s

Towing’s removal and exclusion from the tow list because of their “disdain for Mr.

Ankney’s disabilities and/or the manifestations thereof.” (Doc. 40, ¶¶ 6–7, 64.)

And again, they allege that “[d]efendants, acting in concert, precluded Plaintiffs

from continued involvement in the tow list program operated by the Northern

Regional Police due to Mr. Ankney’s speech impediment.” (Id. ¶ 69.) Under Title

II of the ADA, public entities are vicariously liable for the actions of their

employees. Cappel v. Aston Twp. Fire Dep’t, 693 F. Supp. 3d 467, 489 (E.D. Pa.

2023) (quoting Waters v. Amtrak, 456 F. Supp. 3d 666, 671 (E.D. Pa. 2020)).

Therefore, because Plaintiffs allege that Dunham and Doyle discriminated against

them and limited their access to the tow list program, and because Dunham and

Doyle’s alleged status as fire chief and deputy fire chief lead to the reasonable

inference that they are employed by the Nashville Fire Department, Plaintiffs

sufficiently allege that the Nashville Fire Department participated in their removal

and exclusion from the tow list program. And so, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’

Title II of the ADA claim against the Nashville Fire Department will be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the motions to dismiss, Docs. 42 & 45, will be

granted in part and denied in part. An order follows.

s/Jennifer P. Wilson

JENNIFER P. WILSON

United States District Court Judge

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: October 9, 2025