Nelson v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAMARIA NELSON, as

Administrator of the Estate of

Shaka Nelson, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-1030

Plaintiff, (SAPORITO, J.)

v.

JOHN WETZEL, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

The civil action before the Court stems from the death of Shaka

Nelson (the “decedent”) during his imprisonment with the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections. The decedent’s sister, Kamaria Nelson (the

“plaintiff”), has alleged that the Department and several of its employees

are responsible for the conditions that contributed to the decedent’s

mental deterioration, and eventual suicide, during his incarceration at

the State Correctional Institutions, SCI Huntingdon and SCI Phoenix.

The plaintiff brings the following claims against all defendants: (1)

deliberate indifference to the deprivation of decedent’s basic human

needs; (2) deliberate indifference to decedent’s serious medical needs; and

(3) vulnerability to suicide claim in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

She seeks monetary damages as the administrator of the decedent’s

estate under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania law. Three

defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: (1) John Wetzel, the Secretary of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“PDOC”); (2) Joel Kohler, the

Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management at SCI Huntingdon;

and (3) Jill Spyker, the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services

at SCI Huntingdon. The parties have briefed the motion (Doc. 63; Doc.

64; Doc. 65; Doc. 66; Doc. 71) and it is now ripe for review.

I. Background

The facts offered by the defendants in consideration of their motion

for summary judgment are limited (Doc. 63), and the facts contested by

the plaintiff are far fewer. (Doc. 66). The parties agree that the decedent,

Shaka Nelson, was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Huntingdon from September 10, 2019, to September 25, 2020. (Doc. 63,

¶ 13). Moreover, the parties do not dispute that on September 25, 2020,

the decedent was found hanging in the back of his cell and was later

pronounced dead. ( , ¶¶ 14, 21). However, the parties have failed to

provide the necessary information within these documents for the Court

to make a comprehensive assessment of the record. We have therefore

added the relevant information as pertinent to this action below.1

A. The Decedent’s Mental Health Treatment

Before the decedent’s incarceration at SCI Huntington, the

decedent was previously incarcerated at the State Correctional

Institution at Phoenix (“SCI Phoenix”). An initial assessment at SCI

Phoenix revealed that the decedent had been previously diagnosed with

bipolar disorder and had used the medication Seroquel for several years

for anxiety and depression. Moreover, the decedent reported that he had

been hospitalized on at least one occasion for two suicide attempts. As a

result, the decedent was continued on his Seroquel treatment and placed

on the mental health roster as a C stability code at SCI Phoenix.

The decedent was then transferred to SCI Huntingdon on

1 Upon consideration of the record, the internal report compiled by

the Bureau of Investigations and Intelligence in response to the

decedent’s death at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon

reflects the most comprehensive compilation of facts at issue in this

action. (Doc. 72). Therefore, we will rely on this document to fill in all

factual gaps in the record that are unaddressed by both parties in this

action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (“The court need consider only the cited

materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.”).

September 9, 2019. The staff at SCI Huntingdon placed the decedent on

the mental health roster as a D stability code2 and diagnosed the

decedent with the following diagnoses: (1) bipolar 1 disorder, current or

most recent episode manic, with psychotic features; (2) antisocial

personality disorder; and (3) alcohol use disorder, severe. While

classification records noted a history of mental health treatment, the

decedent refused to provide additional details or information regarding

his previous mental health experiences, and further denied staff access

to community records to substantiate his report of mental health

treatment.

On or around September 11, 2019, the decedent was informed by a

regional psychiatrist that he would begin to be tapered off from the use

of Seroquel in the next thirty days due to the decedent’s prior admission

of abuse of the medication. The decedent subsequently refused to take

doses of Seroquel for the next eighteen days, and October 4, 2019, the

drug was discontinued by the psychiatry.

2 A “D stability code” refers to an individual that is currently

diagnosed with a serious mental illness, intellectual disability, credible

functional impairment, or found guilty but mentally ill. DC-ADM 13.8.1,

Access to Mental Health Care Manual, at § 2(A)(1)(c)(4).

On November 26, 2019, the decedent was downgraded to a C

stability code.3 The decedent, according to the records, had not shown any

signs of mania, anxiety, psychosis, or depression since his arrival at SCI

Huntingdon. Upon learning of his new stability code, the decedent stated

he was suicidal due to that change. The decedent was then placed in a

psychiatric observation where he was seen by psychiatry and psychology

staff. The decedent was discharged the following day after showing no

further signs of suicidal intentions. On June 23, 2020, the decedent was

reviewed by the Psychiatric Review Team and downgraded to a B

stability code,4 thus removing him from the mental health roster. The

team noted that the decedent had reported no mental health symptoms,

even in the absence of psychotropic medications, and the decedent was

3 A “C stability code” refers to an individual that is currently

receiving psychological treatment, but may or may not be receiving

psychiatric (psychotropic medications) treatment, and is not currently

diagnosed with a serious mental illness or functional impairment and

does not have an intellectual disability or is not guilty but mentally ill.

DC-ADM 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care Manual, at § 2(A)(1)(c)(3).

4 A “B stability code” refers to an individual that has an identified

history of psychiatric treatment (other than a serious mental illness or

intellectual disability history), but no current need for psychiatric

treatment and does not require follow-up/support from Psychology on a

regular basis. DC-ADM 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care Manual, at

§ 2(A)(1)(c)(2).

neither benefiting from nor participating in therapeutic opportunities.5

On September 25, 2020, the decedent was found hanging from a bed sheet

in his rear window and later pronounced dead.

The internal report states the following conclusions:

[The decedent] was offered mental health services

consistent with Department of Corrections policy for the

entirety of his time on the mental health roster…

Mental health contacts were conducted more than

required by policy (19 contacts from September –

December, 2019 and 21 from January – September,

2020) and additionally per his requests. Psychology

Department staff continued to maintain mental health

contacts consistent with his self-identified needs and

policy once he was removed from the mental health

roster on June 23, 2020 due to a lack of mental health

symptoms and his refusal to participate in psychiatric

and psychological services. There were a total of 40

mental health contacts made until the time of death of

which … he was removed from the Mental Health

Roster.

The record reflects that whenever treatment staff would

routinely and directly ask [the decedent] about thoughts

of depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, self harm, or

homicidal ideation; [the decedent] consistently denied

such except when in furtherance of a Z code for housing

purposes. Further, at each mental health contact, he

was reminded as to how to request contact with

psychological and/or psychiatric services. Last, a

complete review of ICAR and Sapphire documentation

5 The internal report states that the decedent had refused any

psychotropic medications after being taken off Seroquel and had been

medication free for approximately eleven months at the time of his death.

indicates that [the decedent] did not report any sudden

change in mental health status, nor any overt

indications of distress sufficient to warrant increased

monitoring of suicide.

B. Misconduct and Housing Assignments

During the decedent’s incarceration, he was issued numerous

misconducts affecting his housing assignments. On June 10, 2019, the

decedent was issued a misconduct for using abusive, obscene, or

inappropriate language to staff when he refused to be tested for

tuberculosis per Department of Corrections policy. The decedent was

placed on the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) for fifteen days. On June

24, 2019, he was released to the general population by the Program

Review Committee. On June 29, 2020, the decedent was placed back on

the RHU for misconduct, where he stayed until he was returned to the

general population on July 1, 2020.

On July 6, 2020, the decedent was issued a misconduct for using

abusive, obscene, or inappropriate language to an employee and was

sanctioned to 30 days of disciplinary confinement for the misconduct and

placed in the RHU. On July 29, 2020, he was sanctioned to an additional

thirty days of disciplinary confinement for refusing to obey an order to

return to the general population. On August 26, 2020, the Program

Review Committee released the decedent back to the general population,

but the decedent again refused to obey the order. For that reason, the

decedent was sanctioned to another thirty days of disciplinary

confinement for the misconduct. On September 24, 2020, the decedent

expressed his desire to be released back to the general population and

staff was notified to interview the decedent for a possible return to the

general population. The decedent was found hanging from a bed sheet in

his rear window the following day and later pronounced dead.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”

, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion,”

and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.

, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes

such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported

by the record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to the jury.” , 477 U.S. at

251–52.

In evaluation a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a prima facie showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477

U.S. at 331.

Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for the

purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “An affidavit or declaration used to

support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or

declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c)(4). “Although evidence may be considered in a form which is

inadmissible at trial, the content of the evidence must be capable of

admission at trial.” , 994 F. Supp. 2d 593, 599

(M.D. Pa. 2014); , 192 F.3d

378, 387 n.13 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it is not proper, on summary

judgment, to consider evidence that is not admissible at trial).

III. Discussion6

6 We must briefly address an argument that the defendants made

in their motion for summary judgment regarding standing. The

defendants argue that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action

in her individual capacity due to her failure to obtain any letters of

administration deeming her qualified to represent the interests of the

decedent’s estate. However, the plaintiff has since informed that court

that she has obtained the necessary letters of administration, and we

have held that the letters of administration are now part of the record.

(Doc. 73; Doc. 76). Therefore, upon review of the updated record, the

defendants’ argument concerning the plaintiff’s standing is rendered

moot.

The plaintiff brings three constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against defendants Wetzel, Spyker, and Kohler under the theory of

supervisory liability for policies and practices that the plaintiff claims

contributed to the alleged constitutional harms in this action: (1)

deliberate indifference to the deprivation of the decedent’s basic human

needs; (2) deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious medical needs;

and (3) vulnerability to suicide claim in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress….

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but

instead provides remedies for rights established elsewhere.

, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To establish a § 1983

claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants, acting under color

of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States

Constitution. , 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir.

1995). To avoid dismissal, a civil rights complaint must state the conduct,

time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged civil rights violations.

, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “there are two theories of supervisory

liability, one under which supervisors can be liable if they established

and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused the

constitutional harm, and another under which they can be liable if they

participated in violating plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them,

or, as the persons in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in their

subordinates’ violations.” , No. 1:20-CV-1242, 2021 WL

5759033, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2021) (quoting

, 629 F.3d 121, 129 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)) (quotation and alteration

marks omitted). The plaintiff attempts to hold defendant Wetzel liable

under the first theory of supervisory liability, arguing that defendant

Wetzel was “responsible for authorizing and implementing policies and

practices that were deliberately indifferent to prisoners who were in

serious need of mental health care” and “prisoners who were vulnerable

to suicide.” (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 91, 94). The plaintiff attempts to hold defendants

Spyker and Kohler liable under the second theory of supervisory liability,

contending that they were “aware of the policies and practices causing

harm to those with serious mental illness” and those with a

“vulnerab[ility] to suicide[,]” but “failed to take any measures to alter

these policies and practices.” ( , ¶¶ 92, 95).

A. The Alleged Policy Deficiencies

Upon review of the plaintiff’s complaint, many of the allegations

against the defendants concern the correctness and adequacy of the

decedent’s treatment and stability designation, rather than the lack of

mental health treatment. (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 90, 91, 94, 95) (listing policy

issues such as “severely limiting or refusing to provide drug and alcohol

counseling, psychological counseling,” “inadequate monitoring of the

effectiveness of medications,” and “use of medication as a substitute for

more effective treatments.”). At the time of the decedent’s incarceration

at SCI Huntington, defendant Wetzel was the Secretary of Corrections.

(Doc. 63, ¶ 35). His job duties included working with the governor’s office

to determine policy and acting as a liaison on criminal justice policy,

community, and education. ( , at ¶ 35(a)). Defendant Kohler was the

Deputy Superintendent for Facilities Management at SCI Huntingdon,

and his duties consisted of managing the operations of security,

maintenance, and the facility. (Doc. 63, ¶¶ 37, 37(a)). Defendant Spyker

was the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services, and her duties

entailed overseeing the operations of the kitchen, education, medical, and

correctional industries departments. ( , ¶¶ 39, 39(a)). Therefore, the

defendants in this action are all non-medical officials.

For Eighth Amendment claims, non-medical prisoner officials

typically cannot be found deliberately indifferent if they fail to respond

to the medical needs of an inmate already being treated by prison medical

authorities, or if, as non-physicians, they defer to the medical judgment

of the inmate’s treating medical staff. , 991 F.2d 64,

69 (3d Cir. 1993). The Third Circuit has held:

Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical

treatment, it is difficult to establish deliberate

indifference, because prison officials are afforded

considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of

prisoners. , 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d

Cir. 1993). Allegations of mere negligent treatment or

even medical malpractice do not trigger the protections

of the Eighth Amendment. , 429 U.S. at 105–06,

97 S.Ct. 285. “Where a prisoner has received some

medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy

of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant

to second guess medical judgments and to

constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”

, 599

F.2d 575, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Deference is given to prison medical

authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients,

and courts “disavow any attempt to second-guess the

propriety or adequacy of a particular course of

treatment … [which] remains a question of sound

professional judgment.”

, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting

, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977))

(alterations in original).

, 854 F.3d 209, 227–28 (3d Cir. 2017). Here, the record

shows that SCI Huntingdon had policies and practices in place for

prisoners with mental illnesses, and the plaintiff does not dispute that

the decedent received medical treatment for his condition.

(Doc. 72) (finding that the decedent was put on a treatment plan

including the discontinuance of the use of Seroquel and was offered

mental health services consistent with the Department of Corrections

policy for the entirety of his time on the mental health roster). But the

Third Circuit has held that “there are some circumstances in which some

care is provided yet it is insufficient to satisfy constitutional

requirements.” 854 F.3d at 228 (citing , 571 F.2d

158, 162 (3d Cir. 1978) and

, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)). Prisoners that are subjected

to the repeated confines of solitary confinement with a serious mental

health illness and a vulnerability to suicide serve as one of those

circumstances, at 229, and here, the plaintiff makes that same claim.

The plaintiff alleges that SCI Huntingdon had a policy of subjecting

“prisoners like [the decedent] with serious mental illness … to prolonged

periods of solitary confinement under conditions that exacerbate their

mental illness, leading to severe psychological and physiological harms.”

(Doc. 65, at 9). (Doc. 65, at 5, 6) (listing the policies directly

precipitating the constitutional violations as: (1) prolonged and

unjustifiable use of solitary confinement; (2) systemic deficiencies in

mental health care leading to an overreliance on solitary confinement;

and (3) discriminatory practices of placing prisoners with mental illness

in solitary confinement). Although the defendants have correctly noted

that the decedent received some medical treatment and the sufficiency of

that treatment requires deference to medical officials, the plaintiff’s

allegation that the decedent was placed in solitary confinement falls

outside the scope of that deference, and thus, summary judgment cannot

be granted on that ground. 854 F.3d at 228. The plaintiff’s

allegation that SCI Huntington placed prisoners with mental health

illnesses and a vulnerability to suicide in extended solitary confinement

provides a sufficient basis for the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims

and requires further analysis in this action.7

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Constitutional Claims

All three of the plaintiff’s claims are brought under the Eighth

Amendment. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment including “the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” , 503 1,

5 (1992). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must

show two elements: (1) a deprivation that is objectively, sufficiently

7 The plaintiff also identifies other allegedly deficient policies for

the basis of her claims, none of which are substantiated. The plaintiff’s

complaint lists a “failure to ensure staffing levels that were medically

necessary to ensure that mental health staff could meet the needs of

prisoners with serious mental illness and those who were vulnerable to

suicide” and a “failure to comply with the [Department of Justice] decree”

as policies and practices that contributed to the alleged constitutional

violations. (Doc. 48, ¶¶ 91, 92, 94, 95). However, there is no evidence in

the record about staffing levels at SCI Huntingdon generally and the

plaintiff has failed to indicate how the alleged deficiency contributed to

the alleged constitutional violations. Moreover, the plaintiff has failed to

expand upon the defendants’ alleged failure to comply with the DOJ’s

decree beyond placing prisoners with serious mental illnesses in solitary

confinement. Finally, we note that the plaintiff argues that prison

officials failed to carry a J-tool, an item used to cut inmates down from

rope or cloth in suicide attempts, during the night of the decedent’s death.

But the plaintiff does not dispute that the prison implemented policy

concerning the availability and necessity of the J-tool, (Doc. 63, ¶

36(a)(ii), and it is unclear what involvement, if any, that defendants

Wetzel, Kohler, and Spyker had in that matter.

serious; and (2) “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” of the defendant

official. , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). While there are

different standards for Eighth Amendment violations depending on the

type of claim, under the second prong in this action, an Eighth

Amendment challenge to prison conditions is subject to the deliberate

indifference standard. at 835–36.

I. Objective Prong

The plaintiff must first show a deprivation that is objectively and

sufficiently serious. As noted above, the plaintiff argues that SCI

Huntington’s placement of the decedent in solitary confinement for a

prolonged period of time constitutes a sufficient deprivation for Eighth

Amendment purposes. Therefore, under the objective prong in this

action, the plaintiff must show two elements: (1) placing individuals with

mental illnesses and a vulnerability to suicide in solitary confinement

amounts to a sufficient deprivation for Eighth Amendment violations;

and (2) the decedent fit that classification.8 We turn to the first element.

8 The plaintiff brings two different deliberate indifference claims in

this action. (Doc. 48, at 17, 18) (“Count I – Deliberate Indifference to

the Deprivation of Mr. Nelson’s Basic Human Needs” and “Count II –

Deliberate Indifference to Mr. Nelson’s Serious Medical Needs.”).

The Third Circuit has acknowledged “the robust body of legal and

scientific authority recognizing the devastating mental health

consequences caused by long-term isolation in solitary confinement.”

, 854 F.3d at 225. It has noted “a growing consensus―with roots

going back a century―that conditions like those … can cause severe and

traumatic psychological damage, including anxiety, panic, paranoia,

depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosis, and even a

disintegration of the basic sense of self identity.” (citing

, 848 F.3d 549,

566–67 (3d Cir. 2017)). Moreover, “[p]hysical harm can also result.

Studies have documented high rates of suicide and self-mutilation

amongst inmates who have been subject to solitary confinement.” ( , at

226) (citing , 848 F.3d at 567–68). But “it is undisputed that a

prisoner’s placement in solitary confinement does not, in itself violate the

Constitution” as isolation “may be a necessary tool of prison discipline.”

, 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 777, 780 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (citing

, 960 F.2d 351, 364 (3d Cir. 1992),

However, the plaintiff’s claims under each count are indistinguishable

and therefore will be scrutinized under the same analysis.

, Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, et

seq.). “In assessing whether solitary confinement violates the Eighth

Amendment, courts must look to the ‘duration and conditions of

segregated confinement’ and the ‘touchstone is the health of the inmate.’”

, No. CV 16-1584, 2019 WL 5068666, at *13 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 9, 2019) (citing , 960 F.2d at 364). In the context of prisoners

with mental illnesses, the Third Circuit has held that “‘officials’

deliberate indifference towards placing inmates with known mental

illnesses in conditions of extreme isolation for extended periods of time”

constitutes sufficient deprivation. , 55 F.4th 167, 180 (3d

Cir. 2022). Therefore, in light of this background, the plaintiff must show

that the decedent fits the classification of persons that courts have found

have been sufficiently deprived for Eighth Amendment purposes; the

decedent must have had a serious mental illness and a vulnerability to

suicide, and have been placed in solitary confinement for an extended

period of time.

To start, there remains at the very least a genuine dispute of

material fact about whether the defendant had a serious mental illness

that precludes summary judgment. It is undisputed that the decedent

was diagnosed with bipolar I disorder, current or most recent episode

manic with psychotic features. (Doc. 72, at 76). Not only was this

diagnosis enough for the decedent to be placed on the mental health

roster with a “D stability code9,” but the Department of Corrections also

explicitly lists bipolar I disorder, current or most recent episode manic

with psychotic features under their definitions of “serious mental illness.”

DC-ADM 13.8.1, Access to Mental Health Care Manual, at §

2(B)(1)(h). While the record shows that the decedent was designated with

a “B stability code10” at the time of his placement in solitary confinement,

there is no evidence in the record to suggest that the decedent’s “B

stability code” designation somehow nullifies his serious mental illness

diagnosis.

Moreover, there remains a genuine dispute of material fact about

whether the defendant had a vulnerability to suicide that precludes

summary judgment. A plaintiff must establish that “the inmate had a

“particular vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there was a strong

likelihood, rather than a mere possibility, that suicide would be

9 footnote 2.

10 footnote 4.

attempted.” , 854 F.3d at 223–24. Courts have found that prison

officials know of a particular vulnerability to suicide where “they have

had actual knowledge of an obviously serious suicide threat, a history of

suicide attempts, or a psychiatric diagnosis identifying suicidal

propensities.” at 222 (quoting , 946 F.2d

1017, 1025 (3d Cir. 1991)). The record shows that staff at SCI Huntingdon

were aware the decedent had a history of suicide attempts in the past

(Doc. 72, at 79), and the decedent had expressed suicidal thoughts after

being downgraded to a “C code stability.” ( , at 72). Therefore, the record

supports the assertion that the decedent qualified as someone with both

a serious mental health illness and a vulnerability to suicide, or at the

very least, creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to the issue.

In the context of whether the decedent was placed in in solitary

confinement for an extended period of time, it is undisputed that the

decedent was placed in solitary confinement. The record shows that the

decedent was subjected to isolation at least two times during his

incarceration at SCI Huntingdon. (Doc. 72, at 74) (noting the

decedent’s stay in restricted housing units from: (1) June 29, 2020 – July

1, 2020; and (2) July 6, 2020 ― September 25, 2020).11 However, there

remains a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the decedent’s

stay in isolation constituted a prolonged period of time.

“[N]o bright line exists to say when the duration of solitary

confinement contravenes the Eighth Amendment.” ,

431 F. Supp. 3d 666, 679 (W.D. Pa. 2019). But decisions by courts in this

Circuit are instructive on the matter. On one spectrum, courts have found

that exposure to years of solitary confinement serves as a sufficient

duration for an Eighth Amendment claim. (finding that seventeen

years in solitary serves as sufficient time for a viable Eighth Amendment

violation); , 848 F.3d at 554 (finding twenty-two years in solitary

confinement as a sufficient basis for an Eighth Amendment claim).

Moreover, courts in this Circuit have found that months in solitary

11 While neither party elaborates on the isolation conditions in

restricted housing units, a report cited by the plaintiff concerning an

investigation of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ use of

solitary confinement on prisoners with serious mental illness notes that

“[p]risoners in the RHUs are usually confined to their cells for roughly 23

hours a day.” (Doc. 48-1, at 6). According to that same report, this

isolation meets the definition of solitary confinement. ( , at 5)

(“‘Solitary confinement’ means the state of being confined to one’s cell for

approximately 23 hours per day or more.”). The Department of Justice’s

report will be discussed in further detail in later parts of this

memorandum.

confinement can serve as an extended period of time for Eighth

Amendment claims. , 55 F.4th at 180 (finding that seven

months of complete isolation is sufficient to allege requisite deprivation);

, 854 F.3d at 216–17 (holding that “multiple 30-day

stints in solitary confinement” over a period of thirteen months was

sufficient to allege requisite deprivation). On the other side of the

spectrum, courts have found that a period of weeks does not amount to

an extended period of time. , 2019 WL 5068666 at *13

(finding that four weeks in solitary confinement did not provide a

sufficient basis for an Eighth Amendment claim). Here, the record shows

that the decedent spent over seventy days in solitary confinement within

a three-month period leading to his death, a period of time that falls in

the middle that spectrum. (Doc. 72, at 74). We have not been directed to

any precedent that conclusively determines whether seventy days in

solitary confinement within a three-month period can serve as an

extended period of time for an Eighth Amendment violation. Therefore,

as there remains a genuine dispute of material fact, we conclude that a

reasonable jury could find that the decedent’s stay in solitary

confinement serves as a sufficient duration for an Eighth Amendment

claim.

In sum, the Third Circuit has held that placing “inmates with

known mental illnesses in conditions of extreme isolation for extended

periods of time” constitutes an objective deprivation for purposes of an

Eighth Amendment claim. , 55 F.4th at 180. Here, although not

conclusive, the record supports the contention that the decedent had a

known mental illness and a vulnerability to suicide, and was subjected to

solitary confinement for an extended period of time. At the very least,

there remains a genuine dispute of material facts to be determined by a

factfinder.

II. Subjective Prong

Once a party has sufficiently demonstrated a deprivation that is

objectively serious, or at the very least provided enough evidence to

support the contention, that party must prove that the defendants knew

of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to a prisoner. , 511

U.S. at 836.12 The Third Circuit has elaborated that under the subjective

12 This standard applies to both deliberate indifference to serious

medical need claims and vulnerability to suicide claims. ,

571 F.2d 158, 161 (3d Cir. 1978) (finding that a deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs involves “deliberate indifference on the part of

prong:

To be liable on a deliberate indifference claim, a

defendant prison official must both “know[] of and

disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”

The knowledge element of deliberate indifference is

subjective, not objective knowledge, meaning that the

official must actually be aware of the existence of the

excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should

have been aware. However, subjective knowledge on the

part of the official can be proved by circumstantial

evidence to the effect that the excessive risk was so

obvious that the official must have known of the risk.

Finally, a defendant can rebut a prima facie

demonstration of deliberate indifference either by

establishing that he did not have the requisite level of

knowledge or awareness of the risk, or that, although he

did know of the risk, he took reasonable steps to prevent

the harm from occurring.

, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting and

citing , 511 U.S. at 837–38, 842, 844) (citations omitted)

(alteration in original). Using this standard, to satisfy the subjective

prong in this action, the plaintiff must show that each defendant knew

that: (1) placing individuals with mental illnesses in solitary confinement

for an extended period of time constituted an Eighth Amendment

prison officials”); , 854 F.3d at 223–24 (stated that a

vulnerability to suicide claim involves the element: “(3) that the official

acted with reckless or deliberate indifference, meaning something beyond

mere negligence, to the individual’s particular vulnerability.”).

violation; and (2) that the decedent’s placement fit that criterion.

A. Defendant Wetzel

The plaintiff attempts to hold defendant Wetzel liable under the

first theory of supervisory liability, contending that defendant Wetzel was

responsible for authorizing and implementing the policy of placing

prisoners with mental illnesses in solitary confinement under conditions

exacerbating their mental illnesses. (Doc. 65, at 9). Therefore, to show

defendant Wetzel’s deliberate indifference in this matter, the plaintiff

must first show that defendant Wetzel had knowledge that placing

prisoners like the decedent in solitary confinement for an extended period

caused an excessive risk to those prisoners’ safety. Second, the plaintiff

must show that defendant Wetzel disregarded that risk by authorizing

and implementing the problematic policy despite that knowledge.

In December of 2011, the United States Department of Justice

(“DOJ”) initiated an investigation of the Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections (“PDOC”) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons

Act (CRIPA), which prohibits a pattern or practice of the deprivation of

constitutional rights of individuals confined to state or local government-

run correctional facilities. (Doc. 48-1). The investigation focused on,

among other areas, issues concerning prisoners with mental illness and

intellectual disabilities and their placement in solitary confinement

under conditions that violated their constitutional rights. On February

24, 2014, the DOJ issued a findings letter detailing the results of its

investigation into the use of solitary confinement on prisoners with

serious mental illnesses at PDOC. The findings included the following:

• The manner in which PDOC subjects prisoners with severe

mental illnesses to prolonged periods of solitary confinement

involves conditions that are often unjustifiably harsh and in

which these prisoners routinely have difficulty obtaining

adequate mental health care;

• The manner in which PDOC uses solitary confinement on

prisoners with severe mental illnesses results in serious

harm;

• Numerous systemic deficiencies contribute to PDOC’s

extensive use of solitary confinement on prisoners with severe

mental illnesses;

• The manner in which PDOC uses solitary confinement also

harms prisoners with intellectual disabilities; and

• The manner in which PDOC uses solitary confinement often

discriminates against prisoners with severe mental illnesses

and intellectual disabilities.

(Doc. 48-1, at 3–5). In summary, the DOJ concluded that “PDOC’s solitary

confinement practices violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” ( , at 4). Moreover, “PDOC’s

use of a harsh form of solitary confinement for extended periods of time

on hundreds of prisoners with [serious mental illnesses and intellectual

disabilities] constitutes precisely the type of indifference to excessive risk

of harm the Eighth Amendment prohibits.” ( , at 5).

The record shows that defendant Wetzel had full knowledge of the

DOJ’s report, and thus, full knowledge of its conclusions that “PDOC’s

use of a harsh form of solitary confinement for extended periods of time

on hundreds of prisoners with [serious mental illnesses and intellectual

disabilities] constitutes precisely the type of indifference to excessive risk

of harm the Eighth Amendment prohibits.” ( ); John

Wetzel Deposition transcript (Doc. 71-1) (acknowledging the DOJ’s report

in responses). Moreover, as one court in this Circuit has held, the

Secretary has been named as a defendant in numerous other lawsuits in

which courts recognized the negative impact of solitary confinement.

, 431 F. Supp. 3d. at 680 (listing: (1) , 854

F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017); (2) , 209 F. Supp. 3d 766,

777 (M.D. Pa. 2016); and (3) , No. 2:13-CV-0657, 2016 WL

595337 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2016)). Therefore, the plaintiff’s contention

that defendant Wetzel had knowledge that placing prisoners like the

decedent in solitary confinement for an extended period caused an

excessive risk to those prisoners’ safety is substantiated by record.

Moreover, the record supports the allegation that defendant Wetzel

disregarded that risk by authorizing and implementing a policy that

allowed staff to place prisoners with mental illnesses in solitary

confinement for extended periods of time. The defendants concede that

defendant Wetzel had personal involvement in implementing policy

statewide (Doc. 63, ¶ 36(a)(i)), and thus, presumably authorized and

implemented the policy at the heart of the alleged constitutional

violations.13 This concession creates a genuine dispute of material fact

about whether defendant Wetzel authorized and implemented a policy of

putting prisoners with mental illnesses in solitary confinement for

extended periods of time. The plaintiff has identified adequate support in

the record to substantiate her claim, and at the very least, a genuine

dispute of material fact as to defendant Wetzel’s deliberate indifference

exists which precludes summary judgment.

13 “[A] government official is liable only for his or her own conduct

and accordingly must have had some sort of personal involvement in the

alleged unconstitutional conduct.”

, 643 F.3d 60, 71 (3d Cir. 2011).

B. Defendants Spyker and Kohler

The plaintiff attempts to hold defendants Spyker and Kohler liable

under the second theory of supervisory liability, arguing that both

defendants were “aware of the policies and practices causing harm to

those with serious mental illness” and those with a “vulnerab[ility] to

suicide[,]” but “failed to take any measures to alter these policies and

practices.” ( , ¶¶ 92, 95). To show the defendants’ deliberate

indifference, the plaintiff must first show that both defendants were

aware that placing individuals with mental illnesses in solitary

confinement for an extended period of time constituted an Eighth

Amendment violation.

The plaintiff contends that defendants Kohler and Spyker “were

fully aware of the Department of Justice investigation and its findings …

which were disseminated to all prison officials in Pennsylvania,

condemning them for fostering conditions that escalated suicide rates

among the mentally ill prison population.” (Doc. 65, at 6). While the

record fails to show the extent to which Kohler and Spyker knew about

the conclusions within the investigation, it does reflect that defendants

Kohler and Spyker were aware of the investigation. Spyker

transcript (Doc. 65-5, at 2,3) (“I’m aware of the document … The title is

the Investigation of the Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections’ Use

of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners with Serious Mental Illness and/or

Intellectual Disabilities.”); Kohler transcript (Doc. 65-6, at 2) (“So

I’m partially familiar with the DOJ investigation… It was a DOJ

investigation that was on the department, oh, probably ten or twelve

years ago.”). Because there is evidence in the record concerning the

defendants’ knowledge of the report, there remains a dispute of material

fact regarding defendant Kohler’s and defendant Spyker’s awareness

that solitary confinement for extended periods of time concerning

prisoners with mental illnesses “constitutes precisely the type of

indifference to excessive risk of harm the Eighth Amendment prohibits.”

(Doc. 45-1, at 5).

Moreover, there remains a factual dispute about whether

defendants Spyker and Kohler knew that the decedent had a serious

mental illness and vulnerability to suicide, and showed deliberate

indifference by allowing him to remain in solitary confinement for an

extended period. At the time of the decedent’s incarceration, defendants

Kohler and Spyker both served on the Program Review Committee. (Doc.

63, ¶¶ 38(c)(i), 40(c)(i)) (“During the relevant time period, Kohler

participated in eight (8) Program Review Committee (“PRC”) reviews

with the Decedent” and “During the relevant time period, Spyker

participated in five (5) Program Review Committee (“PRC”) reviews with

the Decedent.”); (Doc. 63-6). The Administrative Custody

Procedures Manual dictates that “[a]t least every 30 days, the Program

Review Committee (PRC) shall ensure each such inmate is reviewed to

determine whether there is a continuing need for separation from the

general population.” DC-ADM 802, Administrative Custody Procedures

Manual at § 1(A)(7). Indeed, the record shows that the PRC played a

direct role in determining whether the decedent remained in solitary

confinement or returned to the general population. PRC Review

Notes (Doc. 63-6, at 3,11) (“Inmate was seen for an 802 review. Inmate

was continued on AC status pending a possible rewrite” and “[t]here are

no mental health concerns at this time to preclude continued

placement.”). But at this stage, it is unclear exactly which documents the

PRC reviews when determining whether an inmate should return to the

general population. Neither party has produced any evidence that

determines conclusively whether the PRC would have reviewed

documents consisting of the decedent’s history of mental health.

However, the PRC review notes imply that the Committee had some

awareness of the decedent’s mental health past, s PRC Review Notes

(Doc. 63-6, at 11) (“There are no mental health concerns at this time to

preclude continued placement.”), and as we noted above, there is

sufficient evidence in the record that the staff at SCI Huntington knew

that the decedent was diagnosed with a mental illness and had a

vulnerability to suicide. (Doc. 72, at 75). Therefore, while not conclusive,

there remains a genuine dispute as to the defendants’ knowledge of the

decedent’s serious mental illness and vulnerability to suicide. The

plaintiff has identified adequate support in the record to substantiate her

deliberate indifference claims against defendants Spyker and Kohler and

we find that a genuine dispute of material fact exists which precludes

summary judgment. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment

concerning claims against defendants Kohler and Spyker will be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment will be denied.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated: October 9, 2025

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge