Britcher, M. v. Erie Insurance Company

J-A20039-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

MICHAEL BRITCHER AND KIMBERLY : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

BRITCHER : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

v. :

:

:

ERIE INSURANCE COMPANY :

: No. 672 EDA 2025

Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered February 5, 2025

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Civil Division at No(s): 230100761

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 9, 2025

Defendant Erie Insurance Company (“Erie”) appeals from the judgment

entered in favor of the plaintiffs, Michael Britcher and Kimberly Britcher

(collectively, “Britchers”), in the amount of $186,251.78 contemporaneous

with the trial court’s denial of Erie’s post-trial motion. 1 Erie dually contends

that the court should have granted its motion for a new trial and motion for

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See Taxin v. Shoemaker, 799 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding

that “where a trial court denies a party’s post-trial motion[] and unequivocally

enters judgment in the same order, that order is immediately appealable”).

We also note that, although the appealed-from judgment is dated February 4,

2025, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 108(b), the

judgment’s proper date is February 5, 2025, which is “the date on which the

clerk ma[de] the notion in the docket that written notice of entry of the order

ha[d] been given as required by Pa.R.Civ.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b). We

have amended the caption accordingly.

J-A20039-25

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). In particular, Erie asserts that

the court improperly admitted an estimate offered by the Britchers, warranting

a new trial, and that Erie’s unrebutted evidence demonstrating that the at-

issue property was undamaged established its right to JNOV. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:

This is a breach of contract action arising from a claim by [the

Britchers] under their homeowner’s insurance policy issued by

[Erie]. On or about January 25, 2022, [the Britchers’] home

experienced an electrical surge which caused thermal damage to

electrical wiring in the home. Pursuant to the homeowner policy,

Erie issued [the Britchers] a “replacement cost value payment” of

$2,960.91 on February 10, 2022. Thereafter, [the Britchers]

continued to experience electrical difficulties from the power

surge. Approximately one year later, [the Britchers] submitted a

claim for additional electrical damages which Erie denied. [The

Britchers] instituted this action for breach of contract by way of

writ of summons filed January 9, 2023, followed by a complaint

filed on July 7, 2023.

The crux of [the Britchers’] claim is contained in an estimate for

additional damages from Larry Weaver [] of Weaver Adjustment

Group in the amount of $186,251.78 ([“]Estimate[”]). This

Estimate was admitted into evidence through Weaver’s testimony.

[Weaver] testified that the nature of the damage sustained by [the

Britchers’] home was an electrical surge that necessitated that

electrical wiring be replaced. In formulating his opinion, Weaver

relied in part on the work of his colleague, Bill Reynolds, who

inspected the property. Weaver also relied on two estimates

authored by electrician Rashawn Woods from Light It Up Electric

for replacement of electrical wiring, replacement of a generator,

and replacement of an [air conditioning] unit. Weaver testified

that the overhead and profit pertaining to [] Woods’[s] estimates

were for hiring a general contractor who would be required to

oversee the repair.

Erie retained the services of an engineer, Vixar Patel of Rimkus

Consulting Group. [] Patel is a professional engineer who is

licensed in Pennsylvania as well as other states. Since 2019[,]

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Patel has been [performing] forensic investigations for insurance

companies and attorneys. [] Patel testified that all the electrical

circuits were functioning properly, and [the Britchers’] report was

flawed. Specifically, [] Patel opined that: (1) electrician Woods

conducted the testing incorrectly, (2) the claimed damage to the

electrical wiring was impossible based upon the event, (3) and the

results submitted in Wood’s report did not align with the

conditions at the property.

This matter was tried on August 19-21, 2024, resulting in a jury

verdict in favor of [the Britchers] in the amount of $186,251.78.

[Thereafter,] Erie filed [its] post-trial motion[, which the court

subsequently denied, and the court thereafter entered judgment

consistent with the jury’s verdict. Erie timely appealed.]

Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/25, at 1-3 (record citations omitted).

Erie raises two issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err by denying its motion for a new trial

where Weaver’s Estimate was improperly admitted into the

record as Weaver, himself, did not provide expert testimony,

did not have knowledge of the claim in which he based his

testimony, and he did not provide scientific evidence or

methodology to support the Estimate’s findings?

2. Did the trial court err by denying its motion for JNOV where the

undisputed evidence showed that Erie’s electrician had tested

the electrical system after the Britchers’ inspection and

determined that it was working properly?

See Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Initially raised via motion for a new trial, Erie’s first claim on appeal

challenges the court’s decision to admit the Estimate. Such a contention

requires us to employ the following standard of review:

The Superior Court’s standard for reviewing the trial court’s denial

of a motion for a new trial is whether the trial court clearly and

palpably abused its discretion or committed an error of law which

affected the outcome of the case. We will reverse the trial court’s

denial of a new trial only where there is a clear abuse of discretion

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or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. The

trial court abuses its discretion when it misapplies the law or when

it reaches a manifestly unreasonable, biased[,] or prejudiced

result. Abuse of discretion may occur through an honest, but

erroneous use of discretion. A new trial may not be granted merely

because the evidence conflicts and the jury could have decided for

either party. The grant of a new trial is appropriate, however,

where the jury verdict may have been based on improperly

admitted evidence.

Rohe v. Vinson, 158 A.3d 88, 95 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Even

in cases where there has been some sort of incorrect determination made by

the court, the concept of harmless error “underlies every decision to grant or

deny a new trial. A new trial is not warranted merely because some irregularity

occurred during the trial or another trial judge would have ruled differently;

the moving party must demonstrate to the trial court that he or she has

suffered prejudice from the mistake.” Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah,

756 A.2d 1116, 1122 (Pa. 2000).

As to the admissibility of evidence, such determinations lie within the

sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse the court’s decision

absent a clear abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth Fin. Sys., Inc. v.

Smith, 15 A.3d 492, 496 (Pa. Super. 2011). An abuse of discretion in the

context is defined similarly to our new trial standard. See Keystone

Dedicated Logistics, LLC v. JGB Enters., Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super.

2013). In addition, “to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must

not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining

party.” Winschel v. Jain, 925 A.2d 782, 794 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation,

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quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Erie challenges the admission of the Weaver Estimate, which rendered

a proposed price that was identical to the ultimate jury award of $186,251.78.

Erie underpins its assertion with several points: (1) Weaver’s testimony, 2

supporting the Estimate’s admission, “did not offer any scientific or specialized

information that was useful to the jury[]”; and (2) “Weaver could not swear

that he had examined the [at-issue property], and he offered no documentary

or physical evidence that he had conducted an inspection of any sort[.]”

Appellant’s Brief at 22. Instead, Weaver’s employee, and not Weaver himself,

went to the property, took measurements, and plugged that information into

a piece of estimation software, Xactimate. See id.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert

testimony as follows:

Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an

opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average

layperson;

(b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized

knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the

evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

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2 Weaver was admitted as an expert in damages.

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(c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the

relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702. Nevertheless,

the minimal threshold that expert testimony must meet to qualify

as an expert opinion rather than merely an opinion expressed by

an expert, is this: the proffered expert testimony must point to,

rely on[,] or cite some scientific authority—whether facts,

empirical studies, or the expert’s own research—that the expert

has applied to the facts at hand and which supports the expert’s

ultimate conclusion. When an expert opinion fails to include such

authority, the trial court has no choice but to conclude that the

expert opinion reflects nothing more than mere personal belief.

Snizavich v. Rohm and Haas Co., 83 A.3d 191, 197 (Pa. Super. 2013).3

Erie avers that Weaver’s testimony “strayed into matters of common

knowledge[,]” and was therefore distinctly not an “expert opinion” within the

meaning of our evidentiary rules and prior caselaw. Appellant’s Brief at 28.

Instead, Weaver merely opined personally based on a printed “estimate that

he did not create from software that he did not create[.]” Id. Erie suggests

that “[a]ny competent adult could have done the same thing.” Id. Erie then

highlights apparent omissions in Weaver’s testimony:

[Weaver’s E]stimate is simply a line-item detailing [] various

proposed repairs. [Weaver] does not offer any analysis of the loss,

photos of the loss, or details of an inspection. He does not offer

any opinion as to causation on the various items detailed in his

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3 While Snizavich speaks to “scientific authority,” 83 A.3d at 197, as it was a

case directly requiring scientific knowledge, here, as discussed more fully

infra, Weaver was relying on technical or other specialized knowledge to

ascertain the Estimate. See Pa.R.E. 702. Accordingly, under the

circumstances, Weaver was required to employ technical or other specialized

authority, consistent with Snizavich.

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estimate[;] he is simply offering a dollar amount based on

estimate data that he [did not] generate[], collect[,] []or

analyze[]. He did [not] present any analysis, photos, or details of

the loss[] because he did not perform an inspection.

Id. at 28 (record citation omitted). Instead of relying on any discrete scientific

authority, Erie maintains that Weaver merely utilized the Xactimate software.

To the extent that Weaver relied on the site information, and data obtained

therefrom, collected by one of his employees, the record reflects ambiguity on

that point. See Appellant’s Brief at 31 (highlighting a compound question

asked of Weaver at trial, answered with a singular yes, in relation to whether

he relied on the employee’s work and whether the employee was “involved in

that process”); N.T. Jury Trial, 8/20/24, at 107 (the question, as posed).

The court disposed of Erie’s evidentiary challenge, contesting Weaver’s

status as an expert and the admissibility of the Estimate, as follows:

Weaver testified that in formulating his Estimate[,] he relied on

two estimates from electrician Woods at Light It Up Electric[] for

the costs of replacing electrical wiring, a generator, and an [air

conditioning] unit. The other line items in the Estimate came from

a software called Xactimate which is commonly used by public

adjustors in the insurance industry and insurance carriers. Weaver

also included overhead and profit into the Estimate as he testified

that generally in Pennsylvania[,] it is ten percent for overhead and

ten percent for profit.

Additionally, Weaver believed he was present for an inspection of

the property. Even if he wasn’t, [] Reynolds, one of [] Weaver’s

employees, was present for an inspection of the property. Weaver

described [] Reynolds[’s] role as a claims manager who would go

out and help inspect and assist the adjusters in putting together

packages, estimates, scoping, and evaluating. Weaver testified

that it was “his” [(Weavers’s)] Estimate, and he stood by

everything that was in it. [] Woods addressed the causation issue

when he testified that the damage to the [Britcher’s] electrical

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system was caused by the power surge.

Erie challenges the credibility, methods[,] and conclusions of

Weaver’s testimony regarding the Estimate and argues that [Rule]

702 should preclude this testimony. However, these arguments

go to the weight of his testimony rather than admissibility. See

Thorson v. EDDW, LLC, 309 A.3d 141, 151 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(“To the extent that Appellants took issue with his credibility,

methods, and conclusions, those arguments would go to the

weight of [the expert’s] testimony and not its admissibility as an

expert opinion.”).

Weaver’s testimony regarding the Estimate met the requirements

of [Rule] 702. His technical, or other specialized knowledge[,] is

beyond that possessed by the average layperson. His knowledge

was needed to help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or

to determine the fact in issue, and his methodology is generally

accepted in the relevant field. He relied on a computer program

that is generally accepted in the insurance field and relied on

[Woods’s] and [] Reynolds[’s findings], as experts in his field

would do customarily. . . .

. . . Weaver reasonably relied on the kinds of facts and data an

expert in his field would rely on in forming an opinion in this

matter[,] and the Estimate and his testimony were properly

admitted into evidence for the jury to consider.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/25, at 5-7 (record citations omitted).

As the court correctly noted, Weaver was qualified as an expert in

damages. See Jury Trial N.T., 8/20/24, at 92 (Erie indicating that it had “[n]o

objection” to this designation).

Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must only possess

more expertise than is within the ordinary range of training,

knowledge, intelligence, or experience. In determining whether to

admit expert testimony, the usual test to be applied is whether

the witness has a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge

on the subject matter in question.

Thorson, 309 A.3d at 151 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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After our review, we observe that Weaver indicated that he had

“credentialing from [his] family [construction] business [] that help[ed him] .

. . make an estimate[,] to use the software[,] and figure out exactly what

need[ed] to be done and how to price it[.]” N.T. Jury Trial, 8/20/24, at 100-

01; see also id. at 90-91 (Weaver maintaining that he has created thousands

of estimates over the last ten years); id. at 91 (Weaver establishing that he

has a contractor’s license and a public adjusting license). Weaver repeatedly

stated that he believed he visited the at-issue property. See id. at 101-03.

Nevertheless, he unequivocally testified that his employee visited and

inspected the property, acquiring the data that was used to create the

Estimate. See id. at 103-04. To the extent Weaver utilized the computer

program Xactimate, he conveyed that it was the “industry standard software

for the insurance field.” Id. at 95. The Estimate included “a line-by-line

breakdown of what needs to be repaired[.]” Id. at 105. Weaver referred to

the Estimate as his own, a reflection of the application of his expertise. See

id. at 107.

Given that Weaver’s testimony was limited to damages, there is no

daylight between the thrust of Thorson and the present matter. Although

Weaver could have been clearer as to the processes employed in his data

collection, we conclude that he “testified at trial about his professional

background and the approach he took to produce a valuation of [the damage

to the at-issue property.]” Thorson, 309 A.3d at 151. To the extent that Erie

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is attacking the data Weaver relied upon or his approach insofar as it allegedly

did not involve any knowledge beyond that of a layperson, Erie has pointed to

no alternative as to how damages could or should have been calculated—aside

from arguing that there were no damages at all. We again highlight that Erie

failed to challenge Weaver’s qualifications as a damages expert, implicitly

acquiescing to the fact that he possessed technical or other specialized

knowledge in that domain. We also emphasize that Erie “had the opportunity

to cross-examine Weaver. [It was] also free to refute his testimony with [its]

own evidence of [damages4 (other than its assertion that there was no

damage whatsoever)].” Id. As cogently stated in Thorson, and as here,

[t]o the extent that [Erie] took issue with [Weaver’s] credibility,

methods, and conclusions, those arguments would go to the

weight of his testimony and not its admissibility as an expert

opinion. See Gunn v. Grossman, 748 A.2d 1235, 1240 (Pa.

Super. 2000) (“The weight to be assigned to expert testimony lies

within the province of the [finder of fact].”).

Id.

Accordingly, as Erie’s motion for a new trial was predicated on attacking

the Estimate’s admissibility and Weaver’s status as an expert, there was no

abuse of discretion committed by the trial court in denying Erie relief.

Therefore, Erie is not entitled to appellate relief on its first issue.

In Erie’s second claim on appeal, it argues that the court should have

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4 Indeed, Erie pursued this path by introducing Patel’s expert testimony.

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awarded it JNOV “both as a matter of law[] and because the evidence showed

that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the verdict should have been

rendered for the movant.” Appellant’s Brief at 34.5

“When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for [JNOV], we must

consider all of the evidence admitted to decide if there was sufficient

competent evidence to sustain the verdict[.]” Garced v. United Cerebral

Palsy of Philadelphia and Vicinity, 307 A.3d 103, 113 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(citation omitted). This Court reviews the denial of a request for JNOV for an

error of law that controlled the outcome of the case or an abuse of discretion.

See Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 984 (Pa.

Super. 2005). An abuse of discretion is defined similarly as noted above. See

id. When reviewing the denial of a request for JNOV, we examine the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Thomas Jefferson

Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted).

As such, “the grant of [JNOV] should only be entered in a clear case[.]” Id.

(citation omitted).

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5 The court considered whether Erie’s JNOV contention was adequately

preserved and, thereafter, reached the conclusion in the affirmative. See Trial

Court Opinion, 2/5/25, at 7-8 (ascertaining that “Erie did request a directed

verdict and [the court] found where it occurred[]”) (citing record of Erie

making such a request). We, too, do not find waiver of this issue on this same

basis. See Mazzie v. Lehigh Valley Hospital – Muhlenberg, 257 A.3d 80,

87 (Pa. Super. 2021) (establishing that a litigant “must first request a binding

charge to the jury or move for a directed verdict or a compulsory non-suit at

trial” and that “[f]ailure to do so may result in waiver[]”) (citations omitted).

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There are two bases upon which a movant is entitled to JNOV: “one, the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence

was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome

should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Rohm and Haas Co. v.

Continental Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).

When an appellant challenges a jury’s verdict on the “reasonable minds” basis,

we will grant relief only “when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence

as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 69th St. Retail

Mall, L.P., 126 A.3d 959, 967 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Erie begins by first conceding that the Britchers experienced a power

surge. Nevertheless, while, in its capacity as insurer, it originally covered “the

affected appliances[, which] were rated for 120 volts, the wiring of the

[p]roperty itself[, the subject of the at-issue damages,] is rated for 600 volts,

meaning that more electrical current is required to damage the wiring than

would be required to damage an attached appliance.” Appellant’s Brief at 42.

Erie relies on the fact that its experts6 performed an inspection of the

property “approximately three months after [the Britchers’] expert.” Id. at

43. Those experts opined that “all of the wiring was working appropriately” at

the time of this latter inspection. Id. (“At the time of [Erie’s] inspection, all of

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6 Erie’s expert testimony was comprised of Patel, a professional engineer, and

Scott Plesce, an expert electrician.

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the outlets passed the megohmmeter test.”). Erie suggests that the Britchers

“did not present any evidence to contradict this fact[.]” Id. Even assuming

there was damage uncovered by the Britchers’ expert’s inspection, “the

uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that those issues had either resolved

themselves or been repaired by the time of [Erie’s] inspection.” Id. at 44.

Accordingly, Erie contends that “there is no provable damage to the subject

[p]roperty and no provable loss.” Id. at 45.

To further emphasize its point, Erie relies upon the testimonies admitted

at trial. First, it highlights Mr. Britcher’s testimony wherein he stated that “[h]e

was told by the power company that a surge of around 185 volts had gone

through his [p]roperty.” Id. at 47; see also N.T. Jury Trial, 8/19/24, at 84-

85. Erie then describes Mr. Britcher’s testified-to electrical problems, such as

problems with his ice maker and oven, as not “linked either definitively or

suggestively to a power surge that occurred months before.” Appellant’s Brief

at 48.

Next, Erie delves into, and performs a comparative analysis on, both the

trial and depositional testimony of one of the Britchers’ experts, Woods.

Woods’s testimony provided insight into the megohmmeter testing that was

performed on the property, a crucial part of the Britchers’ evidence. Reflected

in a report admitted at trial, Woods’s megohmmeter testing resulted in the

assignment of numerous failing grades to various outlets around the property.

See Britchers’ Trial Exhibit 4. A failing grade was explained to be that the

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tested system did not reach 500 megohms. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/20/24, at

57. Consistent with that report, Woods was concerned about the inhabitability

of the property. See id. at 125.

Erie challenges, inter alia, Woods’s testing on the property because his

report generated in connection therewith has a misleading “Reading” column,

which was only fully uncovered at trial. As explained by Woods in his trial

testimony, that column only reflects a binary level of either “0” in the case of

the outlet “failing” the test or “1000” in the case of the tested area “passing,”

notwithstanding Woods’s subsequent concession that a failing grade meant

that the tested component did not reach 500 megohms. See id. at 57;

Britchers’ Trial Exhibit 4. Erie indicates that Woods’s testimony implies that

the tested outlets could, and likely did, have some unreported level of

electrical activity, which has been overlooked given the report’s assignment

of a “0” reading to the failing outlets. See N.T. Jury Trial, 8/20/24, at 57

(Woods testifying that he does not document the actual readings, in

megaohms, when the system “fails”). As the Britchers’ continued living in the

subject property while they allege extensive problems with its wiring, Erie also

questions Woods’s conclusion, located in his report, that the property was

deemed to be uninhabitable, posing a fire hazard. See Britchers’ Trial Exhibit

4.

Erie further posits that Woods contradicted himself at several junctures

between his deposition and trial testimony, specifically “pivoting” on the cause

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of the surge and the results of the megohmmeter testing. See Appellant’s

Brief at 53. In particular, Erie notes that Woods originally explained that the

power company described the electrical surge’s cause as an “open neutral,” 7

id. at 54 (citing Woods’s deposition), which, according to Erie, “does not, and

cannot, involve voltages higher than 240,” id., yet at trial, Woods disclaimed

it being an open neutral that caused damage to the property. See N.T. Jury

Trial, 8/20/24, at 67 (“[T]he open neutral would be a different issue [Mr.

Britcher] was dealing with beyond the surge itself.”). As to the testing, Erie

assumed, based on what Erie has described as Woods’s ambiguous

depositional testimony given prior to trial, that the readings of “0” meant there

was no electrical activity coming through those outlets. See Appellant’s Brief

at 54-55. Instead, at trial, Woods indicated that a reading of “0” simply meant

that the outlet failed the test, rather than providing a reading of whether, and

to what extent, electricity was flowing through the outlet. See N.T. Jury Trial,

8/20/24, at 57.

As to Erie’s own experts, Erie notes that Patel’s testimony discussed the

“substantially flawed” nature of Woods’s testing. Appellant’s Brief at 59.

Moreover, Erie argues that, based on Patel’s reading of Woods’s report, Patel

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7 Erie defines an open neutral as occurring “when the wire that stabilizes the

electrical current and distributes it evenly throughout the [p]roperty becomes

disconnected. As a result, circuits and outlets that are accustomed to receiving

120 volts of current would receive up to twice that amount – 240 volts.”

Appellant’s Brief at 65.

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was surprised that people were still living at the property and that the property

was still electrified. All of the outlets that Woods had tested that had registered

“0” were able to pass Patel’s subsequent testing. Patel also testified that the

surge experienced by the property was caused by an open neutral, which,

given that such a circumstance “would result in an increase of voltage running

through the wiring of the residence, up to 240 volts[,]” such an event was

incapable of damaging the property’s wiring “which is rated for 600 volts[.]”

Id. at 60 (record citations omitted).

Erie concludes by highlighting the various testing done, pointing to

Patel’s megohmmeter testing, which showed all tested outlets as passing. See

id. at 62. Erie stresses that the Britchers did not challenge or contradict Patel’s

testimony or report. Erie also avers that the open neutral condition was

incapable of damaging wiring to a property that was rated for 600 volts. See

id. at 65-66.

The trial court determined that, on this issue of JNOV, Erie’s challenge

was actually directed towards “the weight of the evidence supporting the jury’s

verdict.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/25, at 10. The court noted that Erie’s

argument was primarily based on the Britchers having not “seriously”

challenged Erie’s experts, who, inter alia, concluded that the property, as of

the date of their later testing, showed no signs of electrical damage. See id.

at 12. Nevertheless, it quoted this Court’s oft-repeated statement regarding

the jury’s purview as to witnesses—that factfinders are not required to accept

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a witness’s testimony, even if uncontradicted. See id. at 13 (quoting Wright

v. Eastman, 63 A.3d 281, 291 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

The court then summarized Erie’s arguments as to its JNOV claim:

(1) [] Patel cited “specific errors and inconsistencies” in [Woods’s]

findings[] and [opined] that Woods conducted the testing

improperly. (2) The claimed damages were impossible because []

Patel testified that Woods conducted the meter readings

improperly, and [the Britchers] did not present any evidence

contradicting Patel. (3) Patel took issue with Woods’[s]

megohmmeter readings and opined they were inaccurate. (4)

Woods did not opine on or contradict the testing performed by

Patel and [] Piesce.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/5/25, at 13-14.

Claims challenging the weight of the evidence, as opposed to challenges

to the sufficiency of the evidence, are not cognizable when seeking JNOV. See

Morin v. Brassington, 871 A.2d 844, 851 (Pa. Super. 2005) (establishing

that the proper vehicle for a weight-of-the-evidence claim is a motion for a

new trial, not a motion for JNOV, with the latter challenging the sufficiency of

the evidence). The court, therefore, found that, given the discordant nature

between Erie’s request, i.e. JNOV, which necessarily invokes a sufficiency

challenge, and the support underpinning its argument, i.e. attacking the

Britchers’ expert and lay testimony and bolstering its own expert testimony,

a weight-based challenge, Erie waived review of its claim. See Trial Court

Opinion, 2/5/25, at 14 (quoting Fanning v. Davne, 795 A.2d 388, 393 (Pa.

Super. 2002) and Estate of Hicks v. Dana Companies LLC, 984 A.2d 943,

960-61 (Pa. Super. 2009)). We agree.

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As succinctly summarized by the Britchers, in essence, all of Erie’s

arguments amount to the jury being “simply wrong” to believe Woods over

Patel. See Appellees’ Brief at 39. In effect, Erie is asking this Court to reweigh

the respective testimonies of these two experts who reached opposite

conclusions, which, notwithstanding our inability to do that generally, is not

germane to a JNOV claim. Cf. Koller Concrete, Inc. v. Tube City IMS, LLC,

115 A.3d 312, 321 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“[Appellant’s] argument does not attack

the sufficiency of [appellee’s] evidence, but rather the weight the jury should

have ascribed to [appellee’s] evidence. [Appellant] is asking this Court to

‘invade the province of the jury,’ and that is not a basis for JNOV.”). Instead,

JNOV, inter alia, requires viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict winner. See Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 890

(Pa. Super. 2011). However, Erie ignores this rule; its arguments effectively

call for the discounting of all testimony proffered by Woods, given various

apparent contradictions or uncertainties that he offered, while maintaining

that its own expert testimonies are unassailable. 8 As the court properly found

Erie’s claim to be a weight-based challenge brought via a JNOV request, we

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8 Although it is unrefuted that Erie’s experts tested the property after Woods,

Erie fails to identify any authority establishing that this later testing provides

the “final say,” as a matter of law, as to the issue of whether damages were

ultimately established at trial. Instead, we are left with what can only be

described as dueling expert opinions on the issue of damages, thereby

requiring a factfinder’s credibility assessment for resolution.

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find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court finding this

contention waived on that basis.

Nevertheless, even if Erie properly sought JNOV, it would still not be

entitled to relief. Woods unequivocally testified that, after testing the property

and analyzing the results, he was certain “as to the failure and the damage

caused to [the Britchers’] property as a result of [the] surge[.]” N.T. Jury Trial,

8/20/24, at 66. Conversely, Patel testified that, based on his own analysis,

there was no damage to the property at that juncture. The jury then resolved

this testimonial discrepancy by implicitly believing Woods over Patel.

After our thorough review of the record, and in viewing all evidence in

favor of the Britchers as verdict winners, we conclude that there was sufficient

competent evidence adduced to sustain the verdict. See, e.g., N.T. Jury Trial,

8/20/24, at 53-60 (Woods’s discussion on how he collected the data leading

to his report and elaboration on the report’s contents), 60-61 (Woods

connecting the surge to the property damage), 74-75 (Woods highlighting

various issues with Patel’s testing), 82-87 (Woods stating why Patel’s concerns

with his testing were unfounded). With evidentiary support to establish that

the property was damaged—resulting from a surge—Erie failed to

demonstrate a “clear case” that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law

or that no two reasonable minds could disagree that a verdict in its favor was

warranted. See Rohm and Haas Co., supra. Therefore, we find that the

court did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in its denial of

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Erie’s request for JNOV. Accordingly, we affirm judgment in favor of the

Britchers.

Judgment affirmed.

Date: 10/9/2025

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