Mutter v. Salem

Mutter v . SalemUNITED STATES DISTRICT CCOVU-R9T4-F2O9R9-TSHDE 11/14/96 P

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Carl Mutter

v. Civil N o . 94-299-SD

Town of Salem;

James Ross, individually and in his

official capacity as Police Chief for the

Town of Salem, New Hampshire;

Fred A . Rheault, Jr., individually and in

his official capacity as an Officer of the

Salem Police Department;

Mark Cavanaugh, individually and in his

official capacity as an Officer of the

Salem Police Department

O R D E R

In this civil rights action, plaintiff Carl Mutter brings

various claims arising out of his arrest and prosecution for

felonious sexual assault. The complaint brings claims pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law.

Presently before the court is defendants' motion for summary

judgment, in which all the named defendants have moved for

summary judgment on essentially two grounds: (1) Mutter's arrest

was based on probable cause; and (2) assuming, arguendo, that

probable cause was absent, defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. Plaintiff objects. As explained below, all defendants

are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

Background

In 1990, a fifteen year-old girl (J.K.) told her boyfriend

that at various times between the ages of five and ten she was

forced to engage in sexual acts with three adult males, including

plaintiff Mutter, her next-door neighbor. See Exhibits G and H

(attached to motion for summary judgment). J.K.’s boyfriend

related the information to J.K.'s brother and then to her mother,

who notified the Raymond Police Department. As the alleged

offenses had occurred in Salem, the matter was referred to the

Salem Police Department, which responded by initiating an

investigation.

Detective Fred Rheault, Jr., investigated the complaint in

consultation with his colleague, Detective Mark Cavanaugh. On

August 2 0 , 1990, Rheault and Cavanaugh took a report from J.K.’s

mother, who relayed what her daughter had told her about the

assaults. See Defendants' Exhibit C . Cavanaugh then conducted a

videotaped interview with J.K., in which J.K. claimed Mutter had

sexually assaulted her multiple times over a period of

approximately one year when she was seven or eight years old,

sometime after her stepfather had allegedly raped her. During

the interview, J.K. described several sexual acts that were

2

allegedly perpetrated upon her by Mutter, her stepfather, and a

third unknown male. J.K. also stated that Mutter was in a

wheelchair at the time.1 Defendants' Exhibit G at 9.

During the course of the investigation, the police also

received a written statement from J.K.’s boyfriend in which he

told the police what J.K. had said to him about the assaults. In

addition, the officers visited the neighborhood in which the

crimes occurred and interviewed former neighbors of plaintiff.

On August 2 7 , 1990, Officer Rheault prepared an affidavit

for Mutter's arrest based on J.K.'s descriptions of the assaults

allegedly perpetrated on her by Mutter. Plaintiff's disability

was not included in the affidavit. Based on the affidavit, a

warrant was issued for Mutter’s arrest.

On November 1 1 , 1990, Mutter voluntarily traveled to the

Salem police department, where he was read his Miranda rights,

arrested on charges of felonious sexual assault, and released on

personal recognizance. Mutter was indicted on March 5 , 1991, by

the Rockingham County grand jury on three counts of sexual

As it may be relevant to Mutter's claims, a brief review of

additional information regarding Mutter's disability is

warranted. In 1951, Mutter sustained serious injuries in an

accident that left him wheelchair-bound and in a permanent state

of paraplegia. As a result, Mutter suffered from impotency and

incontinence, which required his using a condom urinary device.

See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment at 2 .

3

assault, including a charge of forcible penile penetration, which

was later dropped. At trial, he was acquitted by a jury of all

charges.

Discussion

1. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be ordered when "there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed. R.

Civ. P. Since the purpose of summary judgment is issue finding,

not issue determination, the court's function at this stage "'is

not [ ] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.'" Stone & Michaud Ins., Inc. v . Bank Five for Savings,

785 F. Supp. 1065, 1068 (D.N.H. 1992) (quoting Anderson v .

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 2 4 2 , 249 (1986)).

When the non-moving party bears the burden of persuasion at

trial, to avoid summary judgment he must make a "showing

sufficient to establish the existence of [the] element[s]

essential to [his] case." Celotex Corp. v . Catrett,, 477 U.S.

317, 322-23 (1986). It is not sufficient to "'rest upon mere

allegation[s] or denials of his pleading.'" LeBlanc v . Great Am.

Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson,

4

supra, 477 U.S. at 2 5 6 ) , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S . C t .

1398 (1994). Rather, to establish a trial-worthy issue, there

must be enough competent evidence "to enable a finding favorable

to the non-moving party." Id. at 842 (citations omitted).

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the

court construes the evidence and draws all justifiable inferences

in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at

255.

2. Plaintiff's Civil Rights Claims

a. Officers Rheault and Cavanaugh

Plaintiff claims that Officers Rheault and Cavanaugh

violated his Fourth Amendment rights2 because they did not have

probable cause to believe he had committed a crime when they

applied for a warrant for his arrest on sexual assault charges.

The officers raise the defense of qualified immunity, arguing

that they reasonably could have believed they had probable cause

to arrest.

2

To the extent the complaint refers to rights secured by

other amendments to the Constitution, the court finds plaintiff’s

claims are more properly brought pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment. C f . Albright v . Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, ___, 114 S . C t .

807, 813 (1994) (indicating that section 1983 claims arising from

alleged unconstitutional arrests are properly brought under the

Fourth Amendment, rather than under the rubric of substantive due

process recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment).

5

The doctrine of qualified immunity protects "government

officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known." Harlow v . Fitzgerald, 457

U.S. 8 0 0 , 818 (1982). The qualified immunity analysis in this

circuit is two-pronged: (1) "the constitutional right asserted

by the plaintiff [must be] clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation," and (2) "a reasonable official situated in

the same circumstances should have understood that the challenged

conduct violated that established right." S t . Hilaire v . City of

Laconia, 71 F.3d 2 0 , 22 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S . C t .

2548 (1996). The court should ordinarily decide the question of

qualified immunity, particularly where, as here, the relevant

facts are undisputed. See id. at 2 4 , 24 n.1; accord Wood v .

Clemons, 89 F.3d 9 2 2 , 927 (1st Cir. 1996).

In order to obtain qualified immunity, a police officer need

not show that an arrest was supported by probable cause. See

Ricci v . Urso, 974 F.2d 5 , 6-7 (1st Cir. 1992). “Rather, [he]

must show [he] had objectively reasonable grounds for obtaining

an arrest warrant--that a reasonably competent police officer

could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id.

Probable cause is shown “if 'the facts and circumstances within a

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[police officer's] knowledge and of which [the officer] had

reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves

to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution' to believe that a

crime has been committed or is being committed." Alexis v .

McDonald's Restaurants of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 3 4 1 , 351 (1st Cir.

1995) (quoting Carroll v . United States, 267 U.S. 1 3 2 , 162

(1925)).

The doctrine of qualified immunity extends to reasonable,

although mistaken, conclusions about the lawfulness of one's

conduct. See Lowinger v . Broderick, 50 F.3d 6 1 , 65 (1st Cir.

1995). The doctrine "'gives ample room for mistaken judgments'

by protecting 'all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.'" Rivera v . Murphy, 979 F.2d 259, 263

(1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Hunter v . Bryant, 502 U.S. 2 2 4 , 229

(1991)); c f . Lowinger, supra, 50 F.3d at 65 ("even erroneous

decisions by officials may be entitled to qualified immunity").

Therefore, "[a]n officer will be held liable for seeking an

arrest warrant later found to be without probable cause only if

there clearly was no probable cause at the time the warrant was

requested." Floyd v . Farrell, 765 F.2d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 1985).

Given the facts and circumstances known to defendants, they

reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed when

Rheault prepared the application for Mutter's arrest. The

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application essentially relied on the statements the victim,

J.K., made in her videotaped interview. Rheault included a

rather detailed description of three types of sexual acts that

J.K. claimed Mutter had forced her to perform, including

penetrating her vagina with his finger and forcing her to perform

fellatio on him. In her interview, J.K. not only described the

incidents in detail, but she also identified Mutter by name and

described him as a neighbor in the trailer park. In addition,

although not included in the application, the officers had taken

a signed statement from J.K.'s boyfriend, who said that J.K. had

told him that Mutter had slapped her and "raped" her when he

babysat her as a child. Rheault also had spoken earlier to

J.K.'s mother, who said that J.K. told her that Mutter was one of

the men who had previously assaulted her. Finally, Rheault

stated in his deposition that after taking J.K.'s statement he

visited the trailer park and spoke to Mutter's neighbors, who

confirmed that Mutter had previously lived there and had a

"physical ailment." Deposition of Fred Rheault at 14-18.

From the court's review of the information available to

defendants, it appears to be sufficiently trustworthy so as to

support their belief that they had probable cause to arrest

Mutter for aggravated felonious sexual assault, as defined by New

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Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 632-A:2 (1986). 3

Accordingly, the court finds that both Rheault and Cavanaugh have

qualified immunity because probable cause to arrest was at least

arguable.4

Mutter makes a series of arguments to support his claim that

the police officers do not have qualified immunity. He contends

that his arrest lacked probable cause because the police officers

placed too much reliance on the victim's statement and did not

conduct a sufficient investigation. A similar contention was

raised by the plaintiff in Lallemand v . University of Rhode

Island, 9 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1993). There, in the face of a

plaintiff's claim that the police did not conduct a proper

investigation before arresting him for rape, the court held that

the victim's positive identification of the plaintiff established

3

Under RSA 632-A:2, a person is guilty of the crime of

aggravated felonious sexual assault i f , inter alia,

he engages in sexual penetration with another

person under any of the following circumstances:

I . When the actor overcomes the victim through

the actual application of physical force, physical

violence or superior physical strength.

4

In so ruling, the court implicitly has drawn plaintiff's

"clearly established" right broadly; that i s , the court has found

that plaintiff's clearly established rights included the right to

be free from arrest unless such arrest is supported by probable

cause. However, even if the right is drawn more narrowly,

defendants are still entitled to qualified immunity.

9

probable cause for his arrest. Id. at 216. Thus, although

plaintiff is correct that a victim's statement does not

automatically establish probable cause to arrest, see, e.g.,

Lewis v . Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949, 952 (1st Cir. 1991); B.C.R.

Transp. C o . v . Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7 , 10 (1st Cir. 1984), a police

officer's reliance on a victim's statement can be enough to

establish probable cause, depending on the other facts and

circumstances within the knowledge of the police of which they

had reasonably trustworthy information. In particular, a police

officer may rely on a victim's statement absent "some indication

that the information is not reasonably trustworthy or reliable."

Clay v . Conlee, 815 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1987).

In this case, before seeking the arrest warrant, the

defendants took a videotaped statement from the victim, in which

she described in detail what the plaintiff did to her and

identified the plaintiff by name and physical description. There

was no evidence that J.K. was "incoherent, irrational, confused,

or intoxicated" when she made her statements to the officers.

See id. Moreover, J.K. provided a detailed account of the facts

and circumstances surrounding what she claimed Mutter had done to

her. The defendants also took a written statement from the

victim's boyfriend, spoke to the victim's mother, and spoke to

the victim's neighbors, who confirmed that Mutter had previously

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lived in the trailer park and that he was physically disabled.

It should be further noted that the alleged crime had occurred

many years earlier and there thus was no crime scene to

investigate or other witnesses to the event. For all of the

above reasons, the level of subsequent investigation was

objectively reasonable, and it was objectively reasonable for the

police to have relied primarily on the victim's statement. Cf.

Franco-de Jerez v . Burgos, 876 F.2d 1038, 1042 (1st Cir. 1989)

(immigration inspector had no duty to investigate after a

determination of probable cause before testifying at grand jury

proceeding).

Mutter also asserts that Officer Rheault "willfully,

ignore[d], omit[ted], fabricate[d] and misrepresent[ed] material

facts in his investigation report and in his affidavit;" and that

the affidavit contained "other information [that] was

deliberately distorted so that the affidavit could appear to

present sufficient proof that probable cause existed." See

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment. Particularly, plaintiff contends that Officer Rheault

possessed information, undisclosed to the magistrate, which

negated probable cause. One of the undisclosed "facts" that the

plaintiff points to as known to Rheault is plaintiff's disability

and confinement to a wheelchair.

11

When assessing whether a police officer has acted

objectively unreasonably in leaving information out of an arrest

warrant, the court must assess whether, in light of the material

that has been recklessly disregarded, there remains "sufficient

content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable

cause." Franks v . Delaware, 438 U.S. 1 5 4 , 171-72 (discussing

when a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to

challenge a search warrant); see also Lallemand, supra, 9 F.3d at

215-16.

While Rheault would have been more prudent had he stated in

the affidavit that the plaintiff was disabled and confined to a

wheelchair, the court cannot find that he acted objectively

unreasonably. J.K. named Mutter as one of her attackers,

described what particular acts Mutter had allegedly done, and

stated that he had been in a wheelchair at the time. The court

finds that, on these facts, full disclosure of the plaintiff's

disability, as known by Officer Rheault at the time of the

affidavit, could still have led a reasonable person to believe

that probable cause existed to arrest Mutter.5 See Lallemand,

5

Plaintiff further emphasizes that he was incapable of

achieving an erection or ejaculating, and one of the charges

involved use of his penis. However, as the court noted above,

the extent of his disability was unknown to Officer Rheault at

the time the affidavit was drafted. Also, plaintiff was charged

with committing other sexual acts on J.K., such as digital

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supra, 9 F.3d at 215-17 (police officer entitled to qualified

immunity where affidavit for arrest warrant in rape case was

based on victim's statement and her identification but did not

include any statements from other witnesses regarding other

possible suspects or that victim was drunk at time alleged rape

occurred).

Plaintiff next argues that defendants knowingly falsified

and recklessly disregarded material facts when they prepared the

warrant application because there were discrepancies between the

account given by the victim and the accounts given by the

victim's mother and boyfriend as to the victim's prior

statements. While such discrepancies may cast doubt on the

reliability of the statements of the mother and boyfriend, such

is to be expected when a statement is purely hearsay in nature.

The discrepancies do not undermine the objective reasonableness

of the defendant's decision that J.K. was reasonably reliable,

particularly as both individuals confirmed that J.K. had

penetration of J.K.'s vagina. Based on J.K.'s statement, and

because Mutter was capable of using his hands and other body

parts, it would be reasonable for a police officer to believe

that probable cause existed to arrest Mutter for sexual assault.

See Barna v . City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994)

("Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be

charged under the circumstances."); accord Gassner v . City of

Garland, 864 F.2d 3 9 4 , 398 (5th Cir. 1989).

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disclosed to them that she had been abused by Mutter. Although,

again, defendants would have demonstrated more prudence had they

included the inconsistent statements in the affidavit, inclusion

of the discrepancies would not have undercut the existence of

probable cause.6

Plaintiff also points to statements in the affidavit that

the allegations against Mutter came to light after J.K. "received

professional counseling for an incident that happened recently."

Mutter correctly asserts that this statement is inconsistent with

Officer Rheault's investigative report and J.K.'s deposition,

both of which stated that the allegations came to light when J.K.

attempted her first sexual experience with her boyfriend.

However, "[a] factual error in an affidavit that has no material

bearing on probable cause does not raise Fourth Amendment

concerns." Tomczak v . Town of Barnstable, 901 F. Supp. 3 9 7 , 400

n.11 ( D . Mass. 1995). When J.K. remembered the assaults is not a

material fact as to whether there was probable cause to believe

Mutter sexually assaulted J.K. Therefore, the error regarding

6

Plaintiff also states that Officer Rheault failed to

include information in the arrest warrant affidavit about a child

support payment dispute between J.K.'s mother and former

stepfather. This argument has no merit. The omission of this

information has no bearing on probable cause with respect to

Mutter.

14

J.K.'s counseling session does not undermine probable cause.

Lastly, plaintiff argues that the affidavit contains

inconsistencies regarding the time frame when the assaults were

allegedly committed by Mutter. Having reviewed the affidavit,

the court does not find these inconsistencies to be material.

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby finds and rules

that Officers Rheault and Cavanaugh acted objectively reasonably

and are entitled to qualified immunity.

b. Malicious Prosecution

Mutter claims he was maliciously prosecuted by the

defendants in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.7 The

general elements of malicious prosecution are: (1) defendant

commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against plaintiff;

(2) the proceedings terminated in the accused's favor; (3)

probable cause was absent for the criminal proceeding; and (4)

defendant acted with actual malice. See Calero-Colon, supra note

7 , 68 F.3d at 3 n.5.

7

Plaintiff makes clear in his objection that his malicious

prosecution claim is brought pursuant to the Fourth Amendment,

and not under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of procedural

or substantive due process. See Calero-Colon v . Betancourt-

Lebron, 68 F.3d 1 , 3 n.7 (1st Cir. 1995) (noting that a malicious

prosecution claim may be actionable under the Fourth Amendment in

a § 1983 action).

15

In support of his claim that defendant police officers

maliciously prosecuted him in violation of the Fourth Amendment,

plaintiff asserts that the defendants initiated criminal

proceedings against him knowing they lacked probable cause and

that they misrepresented material facts in order "to get

permission to initiate criminal proceedings against him," meaning

(presumably) the application for the arrest warrant. Plaintiff

has not submitted evidence that defendants withheld exculpatory

evidence from the prosecution after securing the arrest warrant.

Plaintiff's theory of malicious prosecution fails for the same

reasons his false arrest theory failed: The individual

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in that probable

cause for the arrest was at least arguable. Thus, the defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's malicious

prosecution claims brought under section 1983.

c. Municipal Liability

Under section 1983, a municipality can be found liable

"'only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional

violation at issue.'" Collins v . City of Hacker Heights, 503

U.S. 115, 123 (1992) (quoting Canton v . Harris, 489 U.S. 3 7 8 , 385

(1989)). Liability depends on whether "there is a direct causal

link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged

16

constitutional deprivation." Canton, supra at 385.

Where, as here, a city employee such as a police officer has

allegedly violated another's constitutional rights, the city may

be liable "if it had a policy or custom of failing to train its

employees and that failure to train caused the constitutional

violation." Collins, supra at 123. Inadequate training of a

police officer is considered the "cause" of a constitutional tort

"if--and only if--the failure to train amounted to 'deliberate'

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come

into contact." Id. at 123-24.

In support of his claim that his rights were violated

pursuant to a custom or policy of the town of Salem, plaintiff

submits evidence to support that the Salem police department had

no policy requiring accuracy in police reports and no procedure

to reconcile inconsistent reports.8 Plaintiff's evidence also

suggests that defendant James Ross, the police chief, was

ignorant of New Hampshire case law requiring that an affidavit in

support of an arrest warrant be consistent with the underlying

police reports. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence of prior

incidents whereby inconsistent police reports led to a

8

The other evidence submitted by Mutter on this issue is

irrelevant because the causal link between the conduct and his

constitutional deprivation is too attenuated.

17

constitutional violation, nor has he otherwise shown that the

existent procedures were inadequate. Instead, plaintiff's

evidence supports that the town and its policy makers were, at

most, negligent. See Canton, supra, 489 U.S. at 392 ("In

virtually every instance where a person has had his or her

constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a § 1983

plaintiff will be able to point to something the city 'could have

done' to prevent the unfortunate incident."); see generally

Walker v . City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 299-300 (2d Cir. 1992)

(absent countervailing evidence, city policy makers can

reasonably assume that their employees possess common sense and

"do not display deliberate indifference by doing s o " ) . Given the

absence of evidence of deliberate indifference, both the town and

the individual defendants in their official capacities are

entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled to

summary judgment on all federal claims asserted by plaintiffs.

The court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over

the plaintiff's state claims, and those claims are dismissed

18

without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The clerk shall

enter judgment in this case.

SO ORDERED.

Shane Devine, Senior Judge

United States District Court

November 1 4 , 1996

cc: Robert E . McDaniel, Esq.

Andrew L . Isaac, Esq.

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