“the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- “the inquiry is whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction”
- describing elements of specific personal jurisdiction test
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
I-D Foods Corporation et al.
v. Case No. 14-cv-269-PB
Opinion No. 2014 DNH 219
David Deaver Brown, et al.
O R D E R
I-D Foods Corporation and Fools Gold Investments
Corporation have sued David Deaver Brown, Simply Magazine, Inc.,
and ID Foods USA Corporation. Brown, acting pro se, filed a
motion to dismiss on behalf of all of the defendants contending
that the court lacks personal jurisdiction.
As a preliminary matter, I note that Brown may not
represent the corporate defendants in this action. See Rowland
v. Cal. Men’s Colony, Unit II Men’s Advisory Council, 506 U.S.
194, 201-02 (1991); In re Victor Publishers, Inc., 545 F.2d 285,
286 (1st Cir. 1976); LR 83.6(c). Accordingly, Brown’s motion to
dismiss plaintiffs’ claims against the corporate defendants is
denied without prejudice.
Brown’s arguments for dismissal of the claims against him
are also unpersuasive. I review his personal jurisdiction
arguments under the prima facie standard. See Phillips v.
Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)(“the inquiry
is whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence which, if
credited, is sufficient to support findings of all facts
essential to personal jurisdiction”). If the allegations in
plaintiffs’ complaint are true, Brown intentionally undertook
action in New Hampshire to violate plaintiffs’ trademark rights.
All of plaintiffs’ claims against Brown stem at least in part
from these allegedly improper actions, and Brown cannot avoid
personal jurisdiction here merely by later engaging in
additional misconduct in a different state. These allegations,
if true, are more than sufficient to establish both that the
claims relate to Brown’s actions in New Hampshire and that he
personally availed himself of the privilege of conducting
business in this state. Brown has also failed to present an
argument to rebut the plaintiffs’ contention that the exercise
of jurisdiction here is reasonable. The court thus has specific
personal jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs’ claims against
Brown. See, e.g., Astro-Med, Inc. v. Nihon Kohden Am. Inc., 591
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing elements of specific
personal jurisdiction test).
Brown is also not entitled to dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds because he has not met his burden to show
that “the compendium of factors relevant to the private and
public interests implicated by the case strongly favors
dismissal.” Interface Partners Int’l. Ltd. V. Hananel, 575 F.3d
97, 101 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Iragorri v. Int’l Elevator,
Inc., 203 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2000)). A conclusory statement
that Brown would be inconvenienced by having to litigate a claim
here, which is all that Brown supplies, is not sufficient to
warrant the relief he seeks.
The motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 15) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/Paul Barbadoro
Paul Barbadoro
United States District Judge
October 10, 2014
cc: Nicholas Casolaro, Esq.
Michael Delaney, Esq.
David Deaver Brown, pro se