the authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution is inherent power governed “by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”
How later courts described this case
- the authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution is inherent power governed “by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases”
- a district court has the power to dismiss an action for the plaintiffs failure to comply with any court order
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHEASTERN DIVISION
CHERYL BULLOCK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-00118-ACL
)
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN AFFAIRS )
JOHN J. PERSHING VA MEDICAL )
CENTER, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a motion for transfer filed by Plaintiff Cheryl
Bullock. (ECF No. 17). The Court will deny the motion and dismiss the case for failure to
comply with a Court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
Background
Plaintiff initiated this complaint on July 3, 2025, alleging that her employer failed to
accommodate her disability and retaliated against her for filing a workers’ compensations claim,
among other issues. (ECF No. 1). She requested monetary sanctions and injunctive relief. (Id.).
On August 12, 2025, the Court identified several issues with Plaintiff’s complaint as it was
written, including: Plaintiff had not signed the complaint, the complaint was not on a Court form,
Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Plaintiff failed to articulate
the jurisdictional basis for bringing her claim in district court, and Plaintiff attempted to bring
suit against unknown and unidentifiable agents. (ECF No. 15). In addition, the Order denied
Plaintiff’s request to proceed without paying the filing fee, as the request did not include any
financial information that would be relevant in determining whether Plaintiff qualified for in
forma pauperis status. (Id.). The Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the full filing fee or submit
an amended request within 30 days. (Id.). The Court further found the complaint defective and
directed Plaintiff to file an amended complaint within 30 days. (Id.). The Court cautioned
Plaintiff that her failure to timely comply with the Order would result in the dismissal of the case
without further notice. (Id.). Plaintiff’s response was due by September 11, 2025.
Motion to Transfer
While Plaintiff ignored the Court’s August 12, 2025, Order and failed to correct any of
the deficiencies of her complaint and her request to proceed without payment of the filing fee,
she instead filed a motion to transfer the case. (ECF No. 17). Plaintiff claims this is “due to
demonstrated bias and procedural irregularities.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff complains that this case was
assigned to Judge Crites-Leoni, and Judge Limbaugh “unilaterally intervened and issued orders
in this matter, despite lacking proper assignment or authority.” (Id.). Plaintiff also complains that
the summons has not yet been issued. (Id.).
Plaintiff is mistaken in several ways. First, Judge Crites-Leoni is a Magistrate Judge. As
such, she is authorized to issue a number of orders, which she has done in this case already.
However, a Magistrate Judge’s authority is limited. For example, a Magistrate Judge may not
rule on a motion for injunctive relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Because Plaintiff filed two motions in
this case which requested injunctive relief (ECF Nos. 5 and 14), Judge Crites-Leoni could not
issue rulings on those motions. Therefore, a District Court Judge was required to sign off on the
Order which ruled on those motions. Because Judge Limbaugh is a Senior District Judge and sits
in Cape Girardeau with Judge Crites-Leoni, it is not uncommon or improper for him to sign
orders which are beyond Judge Crites-Leoni’s authority. Plaintiff’s contention that Judge
Limbaugh’s intervention in this case is improper is without merit.
Second, the signing of an Order by a Senior District Judge does not alone indicate any
judicial bias. In light of her pro se status, Plaintiff was given an opportunity to correct the many
errors in her complaint identified by the Court. This does not suggest a bias against Plaintiff.
Third, Plaintiff is mistaken that the Court is obligated to issue a summons in this case. A
party instituting any civil action in district court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914. A
district court may request advance payment of fees. Id. This Court’s local rule 2.01(B) requires
that a filing fee shall be collected in advance, with few exceptions. One exception is where filing
in forma pauperis is permitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Filing in forma pauperis was denied
in this case, though Plaintiff was given another opportunity to file a new request under the
August 12, 2025, Order. Plaintiff has not made a new request to file her complaint without
paying the filing fee, nor has she paid the filing fee. The docket sheet indicated to Plaintiff that
the reason the summons was not executed was due to the pending in forma pauperis motion,
which has since been denied. Rather than this showing impropriety by the Court, the summons
was not executed due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Court’s local rule on paying the
filing fee in advance or qualifying for in forma pauperis. Therefore, Plaintiff’s contention that the
failure to issue a summons is improper is also without merit.
Plaintiff’s request to transfer this case is based on misunderstandings of the Court’s rules
and the role of District Court Judges. Because the basis of the request is without merit, the
motion to transfer will be denied.
Failure to Comply with a Court Order
The Court gave Plaintiff a number of directives in the August 12, 2025, Order. Plaintiff’s
amended complaint was due by September 11, 2025. Plaintiff was also required to pay the full
filing fee or submit an amended request for in forma pauperis status by September 11, 2025.
Plaintiff has neither complied with the Court’s Order, nor sought additional time to do so.
Plaintiff was given meaningful notice of what was expected, she was cautioned that her case
would be dismissed if she failed to timely comply, and she was given ample time to comply. The
Court will therefore dismiss this action, without prejudice, due to Plaintiff's failure to comply
with the Court’s August 12, 2025, Order and her failure to prosecute her case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (the authority of a court to
dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution is inherent power governed “by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases”); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 803 (8th Cir. 1986) (a district court has the
power to dismiss an action for the plaintiffs failure to comply with any court order).
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED the Plaintiffs motion to transfer is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to cease clerk misconduct and seek
protective order is DENIED as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in
good faith.
An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.
Dated this 8" day of October, 2025.
STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE