Buggs, Williams v. Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-24518-BLOOM

WILLIAM AVERY BUGGS,

Plaintiff,

v.

LIEUTENANT J. DURANT and FDC

MIAMI,

Defendants.

/

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

THIS CAUSE came before this Court on Plaintiff William Avery Buggs’ pro se Complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee who is currently incarcerated

in Georgia, sues corrections officials for violating his constitutional rights while he was housed at

the Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida. Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant who seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. [3], the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

apply. Upon application of the screening provisions, the Court finds that the Complaint must be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state

a claim for relief.

1 It is not clear from Plaintiff’s Complaint whether he seeks to sue state officials or federal officials. Plaintiff

lists “Miami FDC” as one of the Defendants and indicates that he was housed at the Federal Detention

Center in Miami when the relevant events took place. ECF No. [1] at 1–2. If Plaintiff is suing federal

officials for violating his constitutional rights, his claims arise under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics

Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), rather than section 1983. See Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir.

1995) (“A § 1983 suit challenges the constitutionality of the actions of state officials; a Bivens suit

challenges the constitutionality of the actions of federal officials.”). Nonetheless, for the purposes of this

analysis, the distinction is immaterial because “courts generally apply § 1983 law to Bivens cases.” Id. If

Plaintiff files an Amended Complaint, he must specify whether he is suing state or federal officials.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(ii), the Court shall dismiss an action if it determines that the

action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” To state a claim for relief, “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir.

2008) (“The standards governing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) apply to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”).

The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon

which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration adopted; citation and quotation marks

omitted). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he was

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. Griffin v. City of Opa Locka,

261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).

Courts must “construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard

than those drafted by attorneys.” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797 (11th Cir. 2018)

(citing Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). Still, a pro se party must abide by

“the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v.

Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).

II. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following facts. On the afternoon of June 29, 2025,

while Plaintiff was housed at the Federal Detention Center in Miami (“FDC Miami”), staff

members came to his unit and asked him to submit to hand restraints. ECF No. [1] at 2. Plaintiff

did as he was told and placed his hands against the wall. Id. A staff member then snatched

Plaintiff’s right hand off the wall, causing him to turn towards other staff members. Id. Plaintiff

was then sprayed in the mouth and face with a chemical spray. Id. He was then handcuffed and

escorted to the elevator, where his head was pushed into a wall. Id. Plaintiff was taken to the

Special Housing Unit—and specifically to the “strip cell area”—and while he was still in

handcuffs, he was punched in the head “over and over.” Id. Plaintiff was then left in a cell without

medical attention for about two or three hours, and his right handcuff was applied too tightly. Id.

A week later, Plaintiff asked for an x-ray to his shoulder and neck, but jail staff refused to provide

one. Id. Plaintiff is still suffering from pain. Id.

These allegations do suggest possible violations of Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

rights to be free from excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.2

See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015) (to prevail on an excessive force claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or

knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable”); Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251,

1255–56, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (to prevail on a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs, the plaintiff must show an “objectively serious medical need” and that “the defendant was

actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the

plaintiff”); see also Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Fourteenth

Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment, governs pretrial detainees”). In particular, the use of substantial force on a handcuffed

or otherwise compliant pretrial detainee who poses no threat violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Piazza v. Jefferson Cty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 953 (11th Cir. 2019); Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d

2 If Plaintiff is suing federal officials under Bivens, these claims would arise under the Fifth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Johnson v. Terry,

119 F.4th 840, 852 (11th Cir. 2024). The Court declines to address at this juncture whether a Bivens remedy

exists for these claims. Cf. id. at 846–62 (holding that Bivens did not extend to a federal pretrial detainee’s

claims for deliberate indifference to safety and to serious medical needs).

1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). And the failure to provide medical attention to a pretrial detainee who

was beaten or doused with a chemical spray can constitute deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. See Danley, 540 F.3d at 1312 (holding that the failure to decontaminate a pretrial

detainee following “the prolonged exposure to pepper spray” constituted deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs).

But Plaintiff’s allegations are too vague and conclusory state claims for excessive force

and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556–

57 (11th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations are insufficient in civil rights actions under § 1983);

GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Some factual

detail in the pleadings is necessary to the adjudication of § 1983 claims.”). Crucially, Plaintiff does

not specify who used excessive force and deprived him of medical attention. A claim under section

1983 “requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular

person under color of state law and the constitutional deprivation.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d

1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff must

specify “which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions” that form the basis

of his claims. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015);

see also Brown v. Tallahassee Police Dep’t, 205 F. App’x 802, 802 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming

dismissal of pro se section 1983 complaint because the plaintiff “failed to name individual

defendants and failed to articulate specific claims against those defendants.”).

Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the excessive use of force do not provide

enough detail about the “facts and circumstances” surrounding the use of force. Kingsley, 576 U.S.

at 397. Court consider the following factors in determining whether the force used on a pretrial

detainee was excessive: (1) the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount

of force used; (2) the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; (3) any effort made by the officer to temper

or to limit the amount of force; (4) the severity of the security problem at issue; (5) the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and (6) whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Patel v.

Lanier Cnty. Ga., 969 F.3d 1173, 1182 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397). Plaintiff

provides few details about the amount of force used, the circumstances that prompted the use of

force, or the extent of the injuries he sustained. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)

(“[D]e minimis uses of physical force” do not constitute excessive force because “[n]ot every push

or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a

prisoner’s constitutional rights” (quotation omitted)). Likewise, Plaintiff’s allegations do not

provide enough detail to show that his injuries constituted a serious medical need or that any

individual defendant acted with criminal recklessness towards those injuries. See Farrow v. West,

320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (a serious medical need is “one that, if left unattended, poses

a substantial risk of serious harm”); Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (to show deliberate indifference, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal

law”).

III. LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff shall be given an opportunity to amend his complaint. See Silberman v. Miami

Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123, 1132 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that a pro se plaintiff must be given

at least one chance to amend his Complaint where an amended complaint might state a claim upon

which relief can be granted). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must comply with the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the Southern District of Florida. See Moon, 863 F.2d at

837. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading which states a claim

for relief must contain:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the

claim needs no new jurisdictional support;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

While Rule 8 allows a plaintiff considerable leeway in framing a complaint, the Eleventh

Circuit has tightened the application of Rule 8 with respect to section 1983 cases in an effort to

identify meritless claims. See GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1367. Accordingly, a section 1983 plaintiff

must allege with specificity the facts which make out his claim. See Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d

1131, 1134 (11th Cir.1998) (“[T]he contours of an asserted constitutional right ‘must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.’”). In addition, Plaintiff must separate each cause of action against each Defendant into a

different count. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b), the Amended Complaint must state its claims

“in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” To

promote clarity, “each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in

a separate count[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Plaintiff must clearly specify which Defendant is

responsible for each act or omission that forms the basis of his claims. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at

1320.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. [1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim for relief.

Case No. 25-cv-24518-BLOOM

2. On or before November 3, 2025, Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint, labeled

“Amended Complaint,” that cures the deficiencies identified above. The Amended

Complaint shall:

a. Contain a short and plain statement of Plaintiff's claims against each named

Defendant, a basis for federal jurisdiction, and a demand for judgment.

b. Be either typed in 12-point font or larger and double-spaced or handwritten

legibly.

c. Be written on the § 1983 complaint form attached to this order.

3. The Amended Complaint must show Case No. 25-cv-24518-BLOOM so that it will be

filed in this case.

4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail Plaintiff a copy of the civil rights complaint

form, together with this Order, at the address listed below.

5. This case is CLOSED for administrative purposes only pending the filing of an amended

complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on October 6, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:

William Avery Buggs, PRO SE

34506

Ware County Jail

3487 Harris Rd

Waycross, GA 31503