STRINGER v. COUNTY OF BUCKS

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MARTHA STRINGER and PAUL

CIVIL ACTION

STRINGER, Attorneys in Fact for

NO. 22-1525

Kimberly Stringer.,

Plaintiff,

v.

ANDREW KOVACH, COUNTY OF

BUCKS, et al.,

Defendants.

Baylson, J. October 6, 2025

MEMORANDUM RE: MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

Defendants County of Bucks, Cueto, Forman, Kovach, Styers, Torres, Wylie, Danyell

Himes, Robert Devlin, Christine Pagan, William Miles, Andrew Lynn, C.O. Canterman, Julian

Duprey, Craig Geibert, Selena Heilman, Lt. Brett Morris, Lt. Niall Mander, C.O. Murdoch,

Thomaleya Sherrod, Kevin South, Anthony Cruz, Jacquelyn Gill, C.O. Mimes, Chelsea MacIntyre,

Sgt. Langston Mason, Crystal Biemuller, C.O. Hughes, C.O. G. Williams, and Zachary Nester

(collectively “Defendants”) bring a Motion for a Protective Order (“Mot.,” ECF 78) pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) to designate certain video recordings as confidential. Plaintiffs Martha

Stringer and Paul Stringer (“Plaintiffs”), parents and Attorneys in Fact of Kimberly Stringer, filed

an Opposition to the Motion (“Opp’n,” ECF 79). Defendants filed a Response in Support of the

Motion (“Reply,” ECF 83). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED in part, and

DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of their daughter, Kimberly Stringer. Compl. ¶ 2,

ECF 1. According to the Complaint, Ms. Stringer is a mentally ill woman who was housed at

Bucks County Correctional Facility (“BCCF”) from April 14, 2020, until June 17, 2020. Id. ¶ 1.

Plaintiffs allege Defendants used excessive force against Ms. Stringer while she was housed at

BCCF by repeatedly pepper spraying her for not complying with instructions despite her inability

to comply due to mental illness. Id. Plaintiffs have asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

excessive force in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against the correctional

officer defendants (Count I) and their participating supervisors (Count II), as well as a section 1983

municipal liability claim against Bucks County based on an unconstitutional custom or policy and

failure to train (Count III). See Compl. ¶¶ 56–84.

During Discovery, Defendants produced seven BCCF video recordings depicting “use of

force” incidents involving Ms. Stringer. Mot. at 1, ECF 78. BCCF defines use of force events as

instances where staff members “employ physical force to address the actions and behaviors of its

inmates to maintain security, prevent harm, including an inmate’s self-inflicted harm, and protect

themselves and others.” Declaration of David Kratz1 (“Kratz Decl.”) ¶ 8, ECF 78-1. BCCF uses

an electronic surveillance system to record uses of force. Id. ¶ 9. The surveillance system records

use of force events with stationary mounted cameras as well as hand-held cameras called “Go

Pros,” which are operated by corrections officers. Id. Specifically, Defendants have produced

seven videos: (1) Video 4; (2) Video 11; (3) Video 39; (4) Video 63; (5) Video 252; (6) Video

253; and (7) Video 240 (collectively, “Subject Videos”) involving Ms. Stringer.2 Id. at 2. The

videos depict heightened BCCF security measures implemented to combat the COVID-19

pandemic. The videos are summarized as follows:

1 David Kratz has worked at Bucks County Department of Correction for twenty-two years and currently serves as

the Director of Corrections for Bucks County. Kratz Decl. ¶ 1. Director Kratz oversees the custody and supervision

of inmates and the implementation and enforcement of standard policies and procedures for security and safety of

inmates, staff, correctional officers, and the facility. Id. ¶ 2.

2 Defendants have provided these seven Subject Videos to the Court for in camera review. In their Motion,

Defendants list nine videos. Mot. at 2–3. However, Plaintiffs note that videos 63 and 238 are duplicates of each

other and videos 4 and 183 are duplicates of each other. See Opp’n at 3 n.1.

• (1) Video 4: This video is two minutes and 29 seconds long. It is taken from a hand-held

GoPro camera. It begins with an officer out of frame stating the date as May 20, 2020. It

depicts multiple BCCF officers in riot gear surrounding Ms. Stringer who is bound to a

restraining chair. One officer pushing the chair is wearing a helmet with a clear face shield,

but no face mask. Other officers are wearing the same head gear and a surgical mask

covering the lower face. Another officer is in a plain uniform with a surgical mask and a

baseball cap. The officers remove Ms. Stringer from the chair and put her into a cell. No

other inmates appear.

• (2) Video 11: This video is 19 seconds long and depicts multiple officers in a secured

hallway from the vantage point of a hand-held GoPro camera. The officers identify

themselves by name. Plaintiffs do not object to the Motion as to Video 11. Opp’n at 6 n.3.

• (3) Video 39: This video is 26 seconds long. The video is shot from a hand-held GoPro

camera in Ms. Stringer’s cell. It depicts three uniformed officers wearing surgical masks

that cover the lower-half of the face and two medical staff members also wearing surgical

masks. At the end, Ms. Stringer can be seen facing away from the camera in a restraining

chair. No other inmates appear.

• (4) Video 63: This video is two minutes and 53 seconds long. It is shot from a hand-held

GoPro camera in the common area of the cell block. Ms. Stringer is bound in a restraining

chair surrounded by four officers in riot gear, wearing gas masks and helmets, as well as

one officer wearing a uniform, a baseball cap, and a black surgical mask covering his lower

face. In the background are two medical staff members wearing surgical masks,

stethoscopes, and scrubs. At the end of the video, officers wheel Ms. Stringer into a cell.

No other inmates appear.

• (5) Video 252: This video is 17 minutes and 41 seconds long. It is shot with a hand-held

GoPro camera. The video begins in the common area. The officer holding the camera is

coughing and another officer appears to be coughing and drinking water by a trash can.

The other officer’s mask is off while she drinks water. Ms. Stringer is in her cell. The

officer can be heard directing other officers to report to certain locations in the BCCF. At

one point, Ms. Stringer bangs her body against the cell door and the wall. Around the nine-

minute mark, officers arrive in riot gear with gas masks and helmets obscuring most of

their faces. They bring Ms. Stringer, wrapped in a blanket, to shower and then bind her to

a restraint chair. In the last minute of the video two medical staff members walk over to

Ms. Stringer. They are wearing surgical masks and scrubs. They check on her and then

the video ends. No other inmates appear.

• (6) Video 253: This video is 15 minutes and 12 seconds long. It is shot with a hand-held

GoPro camera. In the first three seconds, a woman who appears to be a non-party inmate

can be seen exiting a shower in a towel. Starting at the 1:24 mark, another non-party inmate

appears sitting in an adjacent cell to Ms. Stringer’s cell, but this person’s facial features are

out of focus due to distance from the camera and backlighting. Most of the video portrays

Ms. Stringer’s cell, the common area between cells, and a shower area. At the beginning,

the video depicts two officers wearing lower-face coverings and baseball caps, as well as

Ms. Stringer in her cell, without any clothing. The officers repeatedly warn Ms. Stringer

not to black out her window and then spray a substance into her cell causing her to cough

and eventually causing the officers outside the cell to cough as well. Later in the video

multiple officers appear in riot gear, with gas masks and helmets obscuring all facial

features but their eyes. They restrain Ms. Stringer and bring her into the common area with

a garment covering her torso. They force her into a shower then wrap her in two towels.

Around the ten-minute mark, another staff member appears holding a stethoscope and

wearing a lower-face surgical mask. She appears to check Ms. Stringer’s heartbeat while

the officers in riot gear hold Ms. Stringer with her hands behind her back. At the end of

the video, the officers leave Ms. Stringer locked in the new cell and then leave the common

area into a secured hallway. There, the officers identify themselves and briefly review the

encounter.

• (7) Video 240: This video is more than 30 minutes long and depicts multiple officers and

inmates from a stationary, mounted vantage point. Plaintiffs do not object to the Motion

as to Video 240. See Opp’n at 6 n.3.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 20, 2022, Plaintiffs commenced this action. Compl., ECF 1. On July 22, 2022,

the parties exchanged initial disclosures. Opp’n at 3. Defendants declined to provide the Subject

Videos to Plaintiffs without an agreement to keep them confidential. Id. In response to the

Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. ECF 44. On

February 22, 2023, that motion was denied.3 ECF 47. Defendants appealed the decision to the

Third Circuit. On June 18, 2025, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial. ECF 60. This Court held

a status conference on July 24, 2025, where the undersigned sought in camera review of the videos.

ECF 70. Following this review, the Court issued an order denying qualified immunity as to the

BCCF officers involved in the incident depicted in Video 253. ECF 71 ¶ 4. Defendants produced

3 This case was initially assigned to the Honorable Berle M. Schiller, who issued the ruling on the Motion to

Dismiss. Sadly, Judge Schiller passed away while the decision was on appeal. The case was reassigned to the

undersigned.

the videos to Plaintiffs subject to a stipulation that they would seek to file a Motion for a Protective

Order to keep them confidential. ECF 74. Defendants then filed the instant motion.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 26 requires a litigant to demonstrate “good cause” to justify sealing documents from

public view. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect

a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”). To

issue a protective order, the Court must balance public and private interests. Pansy v. Borough of

Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994). The movant must demonstrate good cause by

showing “that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury to the party seeking [to

prevent] disclosure.” Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984). “The

injury must be shown with specificity.” Id. “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by

specific examples or articulated reasoning” are insufficient. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785

F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986).

The Third Circuit has identified seven factors to consider in evaluating whether good cause

exists under Rule 26:

1. whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests;

2. whether the information is being sought for a legitimate purpose or for an

improper purpose;

3. whether disclosure of the information will cause a party embarrassment;

4. whether confidentiality is being sought over information important to public

health and safety;

5. whether the sharing of information among litigants will promote fairness

and efficiency;

6. whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public

entity or official; and

7. whether the case involves issues important to the public.

In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., 924 F.3d 662, 671 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing

Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)). This list of factors is neither

mandatory nor exhaustive. Glenmede Trust, 56 F.3d at 483.

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue there is good cause for confidentiality because releasing the videos

would compromise BCCF’s security protocols and violate the privacy of those depicted. Mot. at

4–5, 6–7. Defendants assert that the videos could compromise sensitive operational information,

including procedures, ingress and egress points, and potential vulnerabilities in the facility’s

layout. Id. at 4–5. Disclosure could allow detainees or outsiders to exploit these details. Id. In

addition, Defendants contend that the release of the videos would violate Ms. Stringer’s privacy,

and the privacy of nonparty inmates and staff who appear in the videos. Id. at 6–7.

As a preliminary matter, the Court finds that the information being sought from the videos

is for the legitimate purpose of gathering a credible account of use of force events involving Ms.

Stringer. Neither party argues that the videos—which are squarely material to Plaintiffs’ claims—

are being sought for an improper purpose. Thus, the second Glenmede factor does not support

sealing the videos. Additionally, because the movants are public entities or officials, the sixth

Glenmede factor weighs against sealing. See In re Avandia, 924 F.3d at 671–72 (explaining that

the sixth factor looks to “whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality is a public

entity or official”); see also Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (“The public's interest is particularly legitimate

and important where, as in this case, at least one of the parties to the action is a public entity or

official.”). In analyzing the remaining factors, the Court will address specific depictions in each

video.

The Motion is uncontested as to Videos 11 and 240. The Court agrees these two videos

warrant confidentiality. Video 11 does not depict a use of force event against Ms. Stringer or any

interactions between an inmate and an officer. It instead depicts a 19-second conversation among

officers briefly taking roll call in a secured hallway. Each officer identifies him or herself by name,

heightening privacy concerns of the non-party officers in their individual capacities. Accordingly,

the Court finds the individual officers’ privacy interest under the first factor outweighs the minimal

public interest value (under the fourth and seventh factors) of observing the interaction of public

officials. Video 240 is recorded from a mounted stationary camera, which risks exposing blind

spots in BCCF’s stationary surveillance system and the location of the stationary camera. See,

e.g., Sampel v. Livingston Cty., 17-cv-06584, 2019 WL 6695916, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2019)

(granting a protective order because stationary surveillance footage “provide[s] information …

that could be used to exploit potential gaps in surveillance”). Furthermore, Video 240 does not

involve a use of force incident and over its 30-minute span it depicts multiple non-party inmates.

“[P]rivacy interests of innocent third parties … should weigh heavily in [the Court’s] balancing

equation[.]” Purcell v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 569, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2019). The security

harm of exposing blind spots in BCCF’s surveillance system and the privacy interests of non-party

inmates, weighed against the minimal public interest in the content of the video, amount to a

sufficient showing of good cause as to Video 240. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion

as to Videos 11 and 240.

The harms Defendants identify from disclosure of the remaining videos are not sufficient

to justify sealing the entirety of the videos as opposed to redacting portions of them. See Dobson

v. Milton Hershey Sch., 434 F. Supp. 3d 224, 237 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (finding redaction preferable

to wholesale disclosure or sealing under the good cause standard). Defendants argue releasing the

Subject Videos would endanger BCCF’s security and violate the privacy of those depicted,

including Ms. Stringer herself.4 The security interests at issue here are not as strong as security

concerns in comparable cases. Videos 4, 39, 63, 252, and 253 are all shot from hand-held GoPro

cameras and therefore do not carry the same risk of exposing blind spots or camera locations as

footage from a fixed surveillance system would. Defendants cite several cases where district

courts have upheld confidentiality of similar material to safeguard correctional facilities’

institutional security. Defendants’ cases are distinguishable.

In Corbin, the facts at issue involved the smuggling of drugs into the correctional facility.

Corbin v. Bucks County, No. 23-2738, 2024 WL 2980218, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2024). The

court determined there was a strong public interest, implicating factors four and seven, to keep the

surveillance videos concealed to maintain security against future attempts to smuggle drugs. Id.

at *4. In addition, there was a strong institutional interest in avoiding public release of intake

search procedure. Id. Here, the security interest in depictions of a common area is weaker than

the security interest in search procedures at an ingress and egress point. Further, the instant case

involves a strong public interest in transparency about the treatment of mentally ill inmates.

Alexander v. Bucks Cnty., No. 21-CV-4633-KSM, 2023 WL 5208506, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14,

2023) (finding the fourth and seventh factors weigh against confidentiality where “videos show …

public officials using force to restrain an inmate with a mental illness, an issue that is likely of

4 Defendants argue disclosure of the videos, where Ms. Stringer is at times naked, would subject her to

embarrassment and therefore factor three should weigh in favor of confidentiality. Mot. at 7. Plaintiffs, who are

Ms. Stringer’s parents, oppose confidentiality and argue that BCCF does not have Ms. Stringer’s best interest in

mind and BCCF’s resistance to disclosing the videos before the litigation began is what prevented her parents from

advocating for her best interest in the first place. Opp’n at 14. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants are “attempt[ing] to

utilize Kimberly Stringer’s privacy as a basis to conceal their abuse of her” when “it was only after the abuse of Ms.

Stringer was brough to public attention by other inmates that she was finally transferred to an appropriate mental

health facility.” Id. Ms. Stringer herself has not addressed the issue of embarrassment. The Court has no evidence

before it to support a finding that Defendants’ view of Ms. Stringer’s privacy interest is more accurate than

Plaintiffs’ view. Thus, the Court will treat factor three as neutral—neither weighing for or against disclosure.

great importance to the public”). The court in Alexander ultimately found, through an in camera

review of the videos, that security interests outweighed public disclosure interests because the

videos could be used to “determine areas within the prison that are vulnerable to breaches” and to

study “procedures for cell entries and cell extractions.” Id. at *2–*3. Here, Defendants suggest

“visitors could use [the Subject Videos] to uncover new methods to pass contraband into the

facility.” Kratz Decl. ¶ 27. However, the videos do not depict visitors interacting with inmates or

inmates passing though ingress or egress points where they could smuggle contraband. Defendants

also anticipate “knowledge of the specific procedures … would enable inmates to create diversions

and countermeasures to subvert the objectives of BCCF.” Kratz Decl. ¶ 25. Though there is some

risk in inmates studying these procedures, the processes portrayed are not kept secret from

surrounding inmates. The events depicted occur largely in the common area and in view of

surrounding inmates. This Court’s in camera review of the depiction of uniforms, tools,

equipment, procedures, cells and the common area does not support a finding of such significant

risk that outsiders or inmates will use the information to breach BCCF security to outweigh the

public interest in transparency regarding correctional procedures for mentally ill detainees.

Defendants also rely on Palmer, which involved over 100 hours of fixed surveillance

videos. Palmer v. York County, 2022 WL 4120261, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2022). The court

reasoned that the “wholesale dissemination” of over 100 hours of videos was too great a security

risk. Id. at *5. Here, the videos are limited to use of force instances against a single defendant

and filmed with handheld cameras that do not “reveal the location and capabilities of prison

surveillance cameras.” Id. at *4. Finally, Defendants invoke Kearny, where the videos at issue

were surveillance videos that could show blind spots, unlike the handheld cameras at issue here.

Kearney v. Bayside State Prison Admin., No. 17-06269, 2023 WL 2207392, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 23,

2023). There, the court noted no alteration of the videos would be sufficient to prevent disclosure

of highly sensitive information. Id. Further, the plaintiff withdrew his objection to the sealing

request. Id. Here, the videos could be altered to redact footage filmed in a secured hallway, for

example. Video 253 is the only remaining video with footage filmed in a secured hallway. To the

extent that hallway exposes methods of ingress and egress as well as BCCF security protocol, the

Court finds good cause to redact that portion without concealing the remaining 14 minutes of

footage of the interactions in Ms. Stringer’s cell and the common area.

Similarly, the privacy concerns Defendants raise are insufficient to establish good cause to

seal the videos wholesale. Taken together, Videos 4, 39, 63, 252, and 253 only contain three

seconds of footage of an identifiable non-party inmate. That person’s privacy interest can be

protected by simply redacting that portion of the footage from Video 253. Furthermore, all staff

and employees, except one officer in Video 4 and one officer in Video 252 wear face coverings,

due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which obscure their identities. The privacy interest of any non-

party officers whose faces are exposed can be protected by blurring or redacting their faces for the

duration of exposure. Finally, in Videos 4 and 253, officers are identified by name. The privacy

interest of the non-party officers who are named can be protected by muting the sound when any

non-party officer is identified.

In sum, Defendants have not met their burden to show good cause for a blanket ruling of

confidentiality. The security risks Defendants invoke are broad and do not engage with the specific

events depicted in each video. Further, the cases they rely upon involve fact patterns where there

is a lesser public interest and a greater privacy and security concern. The Subject Videos here do

not risk exposing private or critical areas of the BCCF because the footage occurs in a common

area to which inmates have access for hours each day and cells visible from the common area.

Granting a protective order based on Defendant’s assertions would amount to a blanket restriction

that would cover nearly any footage captured in a correctional facility.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order is DENIED in

part and GRANTED in part. An appropriate order follows.