The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
Present: The Honorable CHRISTINA A. SNYDER
Catherine Jeang Not Present N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Not Present Not Present
Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) - DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
DAVID TORRES-SIEGRIST AS COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS
DUE TO CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Dkt. 231, filed on September
11, 2025)
I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2023, plaintiffs DJCBP Corporation d/b/a Tier One Consulting and
David Ju (collectively, “plaintiffs”) initiated this action against defendants City of
Baldwin Park (the “City”); Robert Nacionales Tafoya, former Baldwin Park City
Attorney, Anthony Willoughby II, former Baldwin Park Deputy City Attorney; Ricardo
Pacheco, former Baldwin Park City Council member; Isaac Galvan, former Mayor of the
City of Compton; Lourdes Morales, former Baldwin Park Deputy City Clerk; Manuel
Lozano, former Baldwin Park Mayor, and Does 1 through 50, inclusive. Dkt. 1.
On March 28, 2024, defendant City of Baldwin Park (“the City”) filed a cross-
complaint against plaintiffs. Dkt. 97. Following voluntary dismissal of one individual
defendant, dkt. 141, and motion practice that disposed of several of plaintiff's claims and
one of the City’s counterclaims, see e.g., dkts. 66, 91, 121, the Court held a jury trial on
plaintiffs’ and the City’s remaining claims and counterclaims beginning on September 9,
2025. See dkt. 223.
On September 11, 2025, at the end of the third day of trial, the City and remaining
individual defendants (collectively, “defendants”) filed the instant motion for the Court to
disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel, David Torres-Siegrist, due to conflict of interest. Dkt. 231
(“Mot.”). On September 12, 2025, plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendants’ motion.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
Dkt. 232 (“Opp.”). On September 18, 2025, defendants filed a reply in support of the
motion. Dkt. 243 (“Reply”).
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and submissions, the Court
finds and concludes as follows.
Il. LEGAL STANDARD
“Whether an attorney should be disqualified is a matter addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In exercising that discretion, the trial court is required to
make a reasoned judgment which complies with the legal principles and policies
applicable to the issue at hand.” Henriksen v. Great Am. Sav. & Loan, 11 Cal. App. 4th
109, 113 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir.
1980) (“The primary responsibility for controlling the conduct of lawyers practicing
before the district court rests with that court.”). “Because we apply state law in
determining matters of disqualification, we must follow the reasoned view of the state
supreme court when it has spoken on the issue.” Cty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990,
995 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
In the Central District, “California law governs questions of conflicts of interest
and disqualification.” Radcliffe v. Hernandez, 818 F.3d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 2016). The
Central District has adopted California’s State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct
(“RPC”) and requires attorneys practicing in the Central District to be familiar with these
applicable standards of professional conduct. See Local Rule 83-3.1.2.
“Because motions to disqualify are often tactically motivated, they are strongly
disfavored and are subjected to ‘particularly strict judicial scrutiny.”” S.E.C. v. King
Chuen Tang, 831 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1142 (N_D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Optyl Eyewear
Fashion Intern. Corp. v. Style Companies, Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir.1985)).
“Depending on the circumstances, a disqualification motion may involve such
considerations as a client’s right to chosen counsel, an attorney’s interest in representing
a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and the
possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion.” People ex rel. Dep’t
of Corps. v. SpeeDee Oil Change Sys., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1145 (1999). “Ultimately,
disqualification motions involve a conflict between the clients’ right to counsel of their
choice and the need to maintain ethical standards of professional responsibility. The
paramount concern, though, must be the preservation of public trust in the scrupulous
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘0’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
administration of justice and the integrity of the bar. The recognized and important nght
to counsel of one’s choosing must yield to considerations of ethics that run to the very
integrity of our judicial process.” Id. (citations omitted).
California RPC 1.9 addresses the ongoing duty of confidentiality and loyalty that
an attorney owes his former clients. It provides that:
(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the
interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed
written consent.
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a
substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer
formerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by
Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (e) and
rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
unless the former client gives-informed written consent.
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose
present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(1) use information protected by Business and Professions Code
section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 acquired by virtue of the
representation of the former client to the disadvantage of the
former client except as these rules or the State Bar Act would
permit with respect to a current client, or when the information has
become generally known; or
reveal information protected by Business and Professions Code
section 6068, subdivision (e) and rule 1.6 acquired by virtue of the
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
representation of the former client except as these rules or the State
Bar Act permit with respect to a current client.
Cal. RPC 1.9 Duties to Former Clients (effective November 1, 2018).
DISCUSSION
Defendants assert that Torres-Siegrist should be disqualified from representing
plaintiffs because he violated his duties of loyalty and confidentiality to current and
former clients and a duty of candor to the Court. Mot. at 3. However, defendants’
motion and reply do not allege any violations of Torres-Siegrist’s duties of loyalty and
confidentiality to his current clients or Torres-Siegrist’s duty of candor to the Court. See
generally Mot. and Reply. Instead, defendants only argue that Torres-Siegrist violated
his duties of confidentiality and loyalty to a former client, the City. Id.
As an initial matter, there is no basis to find that Torres-Siegrist violated any
duties of loyalty or confidentiality to his current clients or any duty of candor to the
Court. Therefore, the Court first addresses whether Torres-Siegrist violated any duty to
the City as a former client. Second, the Court addresses whether it can be deemed that
the City waived its objection to Torres-Siegrist’s representation of plaintiffs.
A. Whether Torres-Siegrist Violated a Duty to a Former Client
Torres-Siegrist formerly represented the City, as a partner of the firm Carpenter,
Rothans and Dumont (the “firm”’), which represented the City in various lawsuits while
Torres-Siegrist was at the firm. Mot at 4. Defendants argue that Torres-Siegrist’s
representation of plaintiffs in the instant litigation violates his ongoing duties of
confidentiality and loyalty to the City pursuant to California RPC 1.9. Id. When
defendants first raised this issue before the Court, on September 11, 2025, Torres-Siegrist
asserted that he represented the City in unrelated police litigation defense matters. Id.
Defendants argue that Torres-Siegrist’s former representation of the City is related to the
issues in this case because: “(1) the police department is part of the City, not a distinct
entity; (2) the police department was one of many City departments involved in the City's
commercial cannabis program, including reviewing the development agreements at the
core of this matter, and (3) in the capacity as litigation defense counsel,
Mr. Torres-Siegrist obtained confidential information and became intimately familiar
with the innerworkings of [the City] related to liability insurance coverage for [the City],
its policies, procedures, rules, regulations and insurance defense matters; he learned how
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
and when City Council Agendas are posted, he attended Closed Session Meetings to
update the City Council on the status of litigation, and he learned how City Council
meeting minutes are maintained at the [City] and how the City Council monitors
litigation matters.” Id.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that Torres-Siegrist did not violate any of his duties
to the City because Torres-Siegrist’s representation of plaintiffs in this negligence and
fraud case arising out of the City’s commercial cannabis program and the private sale of
Tier One Consulting is not “substantially related” to the police officer excessive force
cases that Torres-Siegrist participated in as counsel for the City. Opp. at 5. Plaintiffs
argue that Torres-Siegrist’s prior representation of the City “was focused on defending
the police department and its peace officers relating to fourth amendment violations
involving Civil Rights.” Id. at 6. According to plaintiffs, nothing in Torres-Siegrist’s
prior representation of the City is at issue in the instant litigation dealing with the City’s
commercial cannabis program, which did not exist in the City until 2017. Id. at 6-7.
Plaintiffs also dispute defendants’ contention that Torres-Siegrist obtained confidential
information because the City, as a public entity, is governed by the Brown Act for
purposes of transparency, and Torres-Siegrist “never had access to confidential matter,
particularly any that would be at issue in this case.” Id. at 4.
In reply, defendants argue that the duty of confidentiality embodied in RPC 1.9(c)
does not have a “substantially related” requirement. Reply at 2. Defendants argue that
pursuant to RPC 1.9(c), an attorney is barred from using any confidential information
acquired by virtue of the representation of the former client to the disadvantage of the
former client. Id. Defendants contend that information that is publicly available can still
be subject to the duty of confidentiality. Id. at 3 (citing Elijah W. v. Superior Court, 216
Cal. App. 4th 140, 151 (2013)). Furthermore, defendants argue that Torres-Siegrist
attended closed meetings with City directors, staff, and council members where he
developed an understanding of the various functions, operations, and innerworkings of
the City, which defendants argue “doubtlessly guided his litigation strategy in this
matter.” Id. at 3,6. Defendants also argue that the instant litigation is “substantially
related” to the matters for which Torres-Siegrist formerly represented the City because
the confidential information that Torres-Siegrist obtained by virtue of his representation
of the City is material to the instant litigation. Id. at 3 (citing Cal. RPC 1.9, comment
[3]). Defendants point to Torres-Siegrist’s interactions and disputes with then-City
Attorney Tafoya during the time that Torres-Siegrist represented the City, as evidence of
the substantial relation between matters. Id. at 4.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
The Court finds that defendants have not demonstrated that Torres-Siegrist
violated his duties to the City pursuant to RPC 1.9. RPC 1.9 establishes two duties that a
lawyer owes to a former client:
The lawyer may not (1) do anything that will injuriously affect the former
client in any matter in which the lawyer represented the former client, or (11)
at any time use against the former client knowledge or information acquired
by virtue of the previous relationship.
Cal. RPC 1.9, comment [1] (citing Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51
Cal. 4th 811 (2011); Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey, 216 Cal. 564 (1932)).
Torres-Siegrist has not represented the City since he departed his former
firm in July 2015. Dkt. 232-1, Decl. of David G. Torres-Siegrist, Esq. §] 3-5. The
City’s commercial cannabis program and the Development Agreement at the
center of plaintiffs’ claims of fraud and negligence did not exist until 2017. Id. at §
18. Thus, it is indisputable that the police-related matters for which Torres-Siegrist
formerly represented the City are not the same as the instant litigation. Therefore,
the Court must determine whether there 1s a substantial relationship between the
instant litigation and Torres-Siegrist’s former representation of the City. See Storz
Memt. Co. v. Carey, 526 F. Supp. 3d 747, 755 (E.D. Cal. 2021) (“Courts utilize the
“substantial relationship’ test to determine whether disqualification 1s necessary
when ‘two cases involve different parties and/or different incidents.”’”’) (quoting In
re Cnty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d at 994).
Here, the Court is not persuaded by defendant’s arguments that the matters
are substantially related. A substantial relationship exists “when the evidence
before the trial court supports a rational conclusion that information material to the
evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the former representation
given its factual and legal issues is also material to the evaluation, prosecution,
settlement or accomplishment of the current representation given its factual and
legal issues.” Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4th 698, 713 (2003).
The factual and legal issues of Torres-Siegrist’s representation of the City in
matters related to the Baldwin Park Police Department appear to be wholly distinct
from the factual and legal issues of the instant litigation. The Court finds that the
police department’s involvement in the cannabis program is not related to any
factual or legal issues in plaintiffs’ fraud and negligence claims.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
While RPC 1.9(c) does not require a substantial relationship, it prohibits the
use or disclosure of confidential information against a former client, except “when
the information has become generally known.” Cal. RPC 1.9(c)(1). Even if the
Court assumes that Torres-Siegrist obtained some confidential information during
his representation of the City, defendants have not demonstrated that he used or
disclosed any non-public, confidential information against the City in the instant
litigation. The Court is not persuaded that Torres-Siegrist’s familiarity with the
publicly available procedures, rules, and regulations of the City can form the basis
of a violation of RPC 1.6 or 1.9(c). See generally Rest.3d Law Governing
Lawyers § 59 (2000) (“Confidential client information does not include
information that is generally known. Such information may be employed by [a]
lawyer who possesses it in permissibly representing other clients.”). Furthermore,
defendants have offered no evidence to show that Torres-Siegrist actually used or
disclosed any confidential information related to the City’s liability insurance
coverage or derived from conversations with then-City Attorney Tafoya against
defendants in the instant litigation.
Accordingly, the Court declines to disqualify Torres-Siegrist based on a
conflict of interest related to his prior representation of the City.
B. Whether the Circumstances and Timing of the City’s Motion Should be
Deemed a Waiver
Defendants argue that the City brought this motion as soon as it became aware of
the conflict. Mot. at 5. Defendants assert that the former Chief Executive Officer of the
City, Enrique Zaldivar, learned of the alleged conflict of interest in 2023 and terminated
the City’s relationship with Torres-Siegrist’s former firm as a result. Id, at 5; dkt. 231,
Decl. of Julia Sylva § 12. Defendants further assert that defendant Tafoya did not inform
his successor as City Attorney of the alleged conflict because Tafoya incorrectly assumed
that there was no conflict. Id. at 5. Defendants assert that their current counsel, Julia
Sylva, learned for the first ttme from Tafoya on September 10, 2025, of the
circumstances that constitute the alleged conflict. Dkt. 231, Decl. of Julia Sylva 4 3.
Defendants argue that the conflict was brought to the Court’s attention as soon as
someone knowledgeable knew “that the conflict exists, that it is not waived, and that it is
always timely to raise the conflict of interest.” Id. at 5.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
In opposition, plaintiffs argue that defendants’ decision to wait until the eve of
plaintiffs’ resting their case at trial to bring this motion to disqualify plaintiffs’ counsel is
indefensible, and that the delay should be deemed a waiver of the equitable remedy of
disqualification. Opp. at 7-8. Plaintiffs argue that defendants knew of the alleged
conflict “for over two years of litigation, through extensive discovery, pretrial motions,
and up to the brink of the case going to the jury.” Id. at 8. Furthermore, plaintiffs argue
that defense counsel’s claim of late discovery underscores a failure to communicate with
her clients rather than a legitimate basis for disqualification. Id. at 7.
In reply, defendants argue that the timing of the instant motion was driven by
circumstances, not gamesmanship. Reply at 4. Defendants argue that their counsel acted
expeditiously to raise the issue as soon as Tafoya informed her of Torres-Siegrist’s prior
representation of the City. Id. at 4-5. Defendants argue that it was the ethical duty of
Torres-Siegrist to bring this matter to the attention of the City. Id. at 5.
“Tt is well settled that a former client who is entitled to object to an attorney
representing an opposing party on the ground of conflict of interest but who knowingly
refrains from asserting it promptly is deemed to have waived that nght.” Tr. Corp. of
Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 701 F.2d 85, 87 (9th Cir. 1983). Ifthe party opposing
the motion can demonstrate unreasonable delay in bringing the motion and prejudice to
the present client, the “burden then shifts back to the party seeking disqualification to
justify the delay.” River W.. Inc. v. Nickel, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 1309 (1987)).
First, the Court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated unreasonable delay and
prejudice in bringing this motion more than two and a half years after the initial
complaint was filed and after the third day of the jury trial had concluded. See Gentry v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. CIVS090671LKKGGH, 2009 WL 10693206, at *5-6
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2009) (discussing findings of unreasonable delay in various cases).
Second, the Court finds that defendants have not justified the delay. The party
seeking disqualification should address: “(1) how long it has known of the potential
conflict; (2) whether it has been represented by counsel since it has known of the
potential conflict; (3) whether anyone prevented the moving party from making the
motion earlier, and if so, under what circumstances; and (4) whether an earlier motion to
disqualify would have been inappropriate or futile and why.” River W.., Inc. v. Nickel,
188 Cal. App. 3d 1297, 1309 (1987). Here, defendants admit that the City and Tafoya
knew of the potential conflict as early as 2023. See Opp. at 5; dkt. 243, Decl. of Robert
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL ‘Oo’
Case No. 2:23-cv-00384-CAS-PVCx Date September 22, 2025
Title DJCBP Corporation et al. v. City of Baldwin Park et al.
Tafoya § 14. It is immaterial that defendants’ counsel only learned from her clients of the
circumstances constituting a potential conflict during trial. Furthermore, it 1s not disputed
that the City and Tafoya were represented by counsel since the time that they have known
of the potential conflict. Defendants’ explanation for why this motion was not brought
earlier is “simply because no one at the City informed counsel of Mr. Torres-Siegrist’s
prior representation.” Reply at 4. This communication failure does not justify the
unreasonable delay.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that even if there was a conflict based on
Torres-Siegrist’s former representation of the City, defendants impliedly waived their
objections to such conflict because their delay in bringing the motion to disqualify 1s
unreasonable and prejudices plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court DENIES with prejudice defendants’
motion to disqualify Torres-Siegrist as counsel for plaintiffs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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