Prince v. State Of Ohio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION (CINCINNATI)

DAVONTE PRINCE, : Case No. 1:25-cv-567

:

Plaintiff, : District Judge Jeffery P. Hopkins

: Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

vs. :

:

STATE OF OHIO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Warren Correctional Institution, filed this pro se civil

rights lawsuit against Defendants State of Ohio and Annette Chambers-Smith.

(Complaint, Doc. 4). By separate Order, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in

forma pauperis. This matter is before the Court for an initial screen of the Complaint to

determine whether it, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform

Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A. Legal Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992). However, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs

are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain

from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included the

following provision in the statute:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). Thus, the Court must sua sponte

dismiss this lawsuit if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon

determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Plaintiff must satisfy the basic

federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes

legal and factual demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship

v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although a complaint need not include “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of

a cause of action’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on a host of

considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978,

2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to

guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975,

976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

The allegations in the Complaint are extremely sparse. Plaintiff describes his claim

as follows:

Notice claiming civil negligence for failure to maintain and convey personal

medical files involving injuries . . .

(Doc. 4 at PageID 26). Plaintiff seeks punitive damages “for failure to cure back and neck

including my ankle having 6 pins-rods also a dislocated shoulder” and for medical

negligence, based on “not properly conferring my injuries on file by appropriate records

and maintaining such notices as a caution and red flag.” (Id. at PageID 27). Plaintiff also

states that he was assaulted while having his injuries and was not provided with medical

attention. (Id.).

C. Analysis

The Court should dismiss all claims against the State of Ohio because it is

immune from suit. Absent an express waiver, the Eleventh Amendment to the United

States Constitution bars suit against a State or one of its agencies or departments in

federal court regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Seminole Tribe of Florida v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 663 (1974). Congress has not “explicitly and by clear language” expressed its

intent to “abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States” when enacting

Section 1983. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43, 345 (1979). The State of

Ohio has neither constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment rights.

See Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); State of Ohio v.

Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982); Ohio Inns, Inc. v.

Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 681 (6th Cir. 1976). And Plaintiff has not sued a state official to

obtain injunctive relief against future constitutional violations. Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908). Therefore, the State of Ohio is immune from suit in this case and the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against it be DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

In addition, the Court should dismiss all claims against Defendant Chambers-

Smith because she is not alleged to have had any involvement with the events at issue.

Plaintiff refers to a failure to cure his back and neck, states that he was assaulted, and

asserts “medical negligence” based on an asserted failure to maintain his medical

records. (Doc. 4, PageID 27). But Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that

Chambers-Smith was aware of his medical condition, denied him medical care, or was

involved in any act or omission that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights. “[N]aked

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” fail to meet the basic pleading

standard under Twombly. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miller v. Ohio Dep’t. Rehab. & Corr., Case

No. 1:20-cv-597, 2020 WL 5369059, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 5, 2020) (“Without any

allegations of wrongdoing on the part of the named defendants the complaint is subject

to dismissal.”) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2020 WL 5230886 (S.D. Ohio

Sept. 2, 2020). Because Plaintiff’s Complaint, as it is currently pled, fails to state a

claim against Defendant Chambers-Smith upon which relief can be granted, the

undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against this Defendant be

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Finally, the undersigned notes that if Plaintiff wishes to hold Defendants liable

for negligence, he cannot do so in a federal civil rights lawsuit. Mere negligence is

insufficient to state a claim of constitutional dimension in federal court under Section

1983. See, e.g., Warren v. Doe, 28 F. App’x 463, 464 (6th Cir. 2002) (district court

properly dismissed case because the “allegations involved mere negligence that is not

actionable under § 1983”). And because all parties are citizens of Ohio, this Court

would lack diversity jurisdiction over a negligence action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to state an actionable claim against the

named Defendants, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court dismiss the

Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Court DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE all claims against Defendant State of

Ohio.

2. The Court DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE all claims against Defendant

Chambers-Smith.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons

an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be

taken in good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Date: October 2, 2025 /s/ Caroline H. Gentry

Caroline H. Gentry

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

after being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court

on timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the

portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in

support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within

FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).