The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IN RE: DONALD MACK GLAUDE Case No. 25-cv-07606-RFL
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
STAY PENDING APPEAL
Re: Dkt. No. 4
Donald Glaude resides at a property in Newark, California. On May 7, 2025, and June
25, 2025, the Superior Court of Alameda County, in two separate unlawful detainer actions,
awarded Jessica Ardell-Smith, individually and as trustee of the VMM Irrevocable Trust (the
“Trust”), possession of the subject property. (See In re Glaude, No. 25-bk-41253, Dkt. No. 12-1
at 8-13, 20-24, 30-39 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 29, 2025).)1 Glaude subsequently commenced
Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. (See id., Dkt. No. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 18, 2025).)
Upon Ardell-Smith’s motion, the bankruptcy court terminated the automatic stay applicable in
bankruptcy proceedings with respect to the subject property. (See id., Dkt. No. 28 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Aug. 14, 2025).) Glaude then filed a notice of appeal and moved to stay enforcement of the
bankruptcy court’s order pending appeal. (See id., Dkt. Nos. 36, 39 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2025).) The bankruptcy court denied that stay request because Glaude “ha[d] not demonstrated
any likelihood of success on the merits of his appeal.” (See id., Dkt. No. 50 at 2 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Aug. 27, 2025).)
Now on appeal to this Court, Glaude again requests a stay pending appeal of enforcement
of the bankruptcy court’s order terminating the automatic stay. (See Dkt. No. 4.) To obtain a
stay pending appeal, Glaude must demonstrate, among other things, “that he is likely to succeed
on the merits” of his appeal. See Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem, 145 F.4th 972, 985-86 (9th
1 All citations to page numbers in filings on dockets refer to ECF page numbers.
Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). He fails to make that showing.
Glaude’s arguments primarily concern the propriety of the Trust’s ownership of the
subject property. The Superior Court concluded in two separate unlawful detainer actions that
the Trust owns the property and accordingly awarded ownership to the Trust. Those decisions
“extinguishe[d] all other legal and equitable possessory interests in the” property, including any
interests that Glaude may have had. See In re Perl, 811 F.3d 1120, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2016).
Neither the bankruptcy court nor (by extension) this Court have jurisdiction to review those
decisions. See, e.g., In re Jones, No. 18-1008, 2018 WL 4925214, at *3-4 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct.
10, 2018). Therefore, the bankruptcy court properly terminated the automatic stay with respect
to the subject property. See, e.g., Brown v. Lion Share Invs., LLC, No. 17-cv-05531-EMC, 2017
WL 6502804, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2017) (bankruptcy court did not err in lifting automatic
stay where petitioner commenced bankruptcy proceedings after “Lion Share obtained an
unlawful detainer judgment and writ of possession” in Superior Court). Glaude also argues that
the Superior Court “did not adjudicate title” to the subject property. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 4.) But in
its June 25, 2025 order, the Superior Court explicitly found that the Trust had perfected its title to
the subject property in October 2023 and that Glaude had not presented evidence sufficient to
create a triable issue of material fact on that point. (See Jn re Glaude, No. 25-bk-41253, Dkt. No.
12-1 at 38 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 29, 2025).)
Accordingly, Glaude is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his appeal, so the motion to
stay is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 29, 2025
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge