Daniels v. Hofstra University

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIMOTHY DANIELS,

21-CV-2920 (ARR) (LGD)

Plaintiff,

NOT FOR ELECTRONIC

-against- OR PRINT PUBLICATION

HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, HERMAN BERLINER, OPINION & ORDER

BENJAMIN RIFKIN, and JOHN and JANE DOES 1 –

5,

Defendants.

ROSS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, Timothy Daniels, brings this action against his employer, Hofstra

University (“Hofstra”), and various individuals employed by Hofstra (collectively

“Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that, in the wake of an ill-fated student research trip that

he led, Defendants rushed to judgment and subjected him to differential treatment based

on his race, color, and/or religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”); Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42

U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec.

Law § 296, et seq. (“NYSHRL”). Plaintiff also alleges that he faced unlawful retaliation

for complaining about discrimination, and for preparing to file this lawsuit. Before me is

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56. (Defs.’ Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“MSJ”), ECF No. 95-1; see also Pl.’s Mem. L.

Opp’n Mot. Summ. J (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 96; Def.’s Reply Supp. Mot. Summ. J.

(“Defs.’ Reply”), ECF No. 98.) For the reasons that follow, the motion for summary

judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from defendant’s Rule 56.1 Statement, plaintiff’s

Rule 56.1 counterstatement, and the evidentiary materials cited therein. (See Defs.’

Revised Local Rule 56.1 Statement Material Facts Supp. of Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 95-4

(“DSOF”); Pl.’s Revised Local Rule 56.1 Statement Material Facts, ECF No. 96-1

(“PSOF”).) Unless otherwise noted, each fact is either undisputed or the opposing party

has not pointed to any evidence to contradict it.

The Parties

Plaintiff is a tenured Professor in the Department of Anthropology at Hofstra who

identifies as male, African American, and Muslim. (DSOF ¶ 1; PSOF ¶¶ 105, 107.) Plaintiff

joined the Hofstra faculty in 2005, was reappointed twice before he was promoted to the

rank of Assistant Professor, and was awarded tenure in 2011. (DSOF ¶¶ 2–4.) At the time

plaintiff was awarded tenure, less than 4% of Hofstra’s faculty identified as Black and

more than 80% identified as white. (PSOF ¶ 106.) In or around June 2020, plaintiff and

others formed the Black Faculty Council (“BFC”) with the stated goal of addressing

“systemic racism and anti-Black bias at Hofstra.” (DSOF ¶ 75; PSOF ¶ 148; see Rosenberg

Decl. Ex. 14, ECF 95-19.)

The following individuals held relevant decision-making roles at Hofstra during

the relevant period, between 2019 and 2022. At the start of the relevant period, defendant

Benjamin Rifkin was the Dean of Hofstra’s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences (“CLAS”),

defendant Herman Berliner was the Provost and Senior Vice President for Academic

Affairs, and Sharryn Kasmir was the Chair of the Anthropology Department. (DSOF ¶¶

13, 23, 34; see Compl. ¶¶ 31, 34 ECF No. 1.) Rifkin stepped down from his role as CLAS

Dean on January 1, 2021, and was replaced on an interim basis by Daniel Seabold as

Acting Dean. (DSOF ¶ 57.) Berliner stepped down from his role as Provost on or about

July 31, 2021 and was replaced on an interim basis by Janet Lenaghan. (Id. ¶¶ 58, 76.)

Charles Riordan was ultimately appointed Provost. (Id. ¶ 69.) Kasmir’s three-year term

as Chair of the Anthropology Department ended in Summer 2021. (Id. ¶ 59.) The

Department was temporarily led by an external chair for one academic year, after which

plaintiff was appointed Chair of the Anthropology Department. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 67–70.)

The Malaysia Trip & Grievance Process

In 2019, plaintiff received grant funding to take several Hofstra students on a field

research trip to Malaysia to conduct ethnographic field research on the art of shadow

puppetry. (PSOF ¶¶ 112–13.) While Hofstra administrators were aware of the trip,

plaintiff took responsibility for planning the trip and selecting the students who would

accompany him. (Id. ¶¶ 116; DSOF ¶ 9.) Plaintiff ultimately selected four female students

(the “Students”) to go on the trip. (DSOF ¶ 11.) Prior to departing, plaintiff communicated

over email with the Students about the proposed itinerary, transportation, and

accommodations. (PSOF ¶ 121.) The group departed on June 30, 2019 with the plan to

spend four weeks conducting research in Malaysia. (Id. ¶ 125.) Once in Malaysia, at least

two of the Students expressed concern to plaintiff about various aspects of the trip,

including the security of their lodging, their interactions with men in rural villages, and

the safety of their transportation in a rented van that was at times driven by a Student.

(DSOF ¶¶ 12, 22; PSOF ¶ 127.) On July 15, 2019, the mother of one Student contacted

Rifkin and requested that the students return home due to safety concerns. (DSOF ¶ 13.)

On July 17, 2019, the Students parted ways with plaintiff and requested that Hofstra

administrators make arrangements for them to return home early. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 19.) One of

the Students emailed Rifkin indicating that the Students did not intend to respond to

further communication from plaintiff because they were “not . . . comfortable being in

contact with him.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Hofstra administrators, including Rifkin, spoke separately

with plaintiff by phone and subsequently instructed plaintiff over email on July 18, 2019

to cease interactions with the Students. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 20.)

The Students returned to the United States on July 22, 2019. (Id. ¶ 21.) The next

day, the Students met with Hofstra administrators to relay their experiences and discuss

their concerns about the Malaysia trip. (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff returned to the United States

on July 23, 2019, but did not meet with Hofstra administrators, including Rifkin, until

August 26, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiff repeatedly expressed a desire to meet with

administrators sooner but was told that doing so was impossible due to planned

vacations. (PSOF ¶ 17; see Maduegbuna Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 96-6.) During the

intervening period, plaintiff was informed that, while the Malaysia Trip was under review,

he would not be permitted to carry out his appointments as Mentor in the Honors College

or as Acting Chair of the Department of Anthropology during a one-week vacation of then-

Chair Sharryn Kasmir, from August 26 to September 1, 2019. (DSOF ¶¶ 23, 26–27; see

Rifkin Decl. Ex. 9, ECF No. 95-66; Berliner Decl. Ex. 12, ECF No. 95-38.) Plaintiff had

previously served as an Honors College Mentor and had been slated to serve as Acting

Chair during Kasmir’s vacation. (DSOF ¶¶ 23; 71–73.) On August 15, 2019, after plaintiff

learned that both appointments had been terminated, he submitted a “brief memo” to

Hofstra administrators, including Berliner and Rifkin, in which he stated that he was

making a “formal complaint” about the conduct of the Students and invoked Hofstra’s

“Freedom from Discrimination Policy.” (PSOF ¶ 29; see Berliner Decl. Ex. 13, ECF No.

95-39.)

On August 26, 2019, plaintiff met with multiple Hofstra administrators, including

Berliner and Rifkin, and a faculty union representative, to discuss the Malaysia Trip.

(DSOF ¶ 30.) During that meeting, plaintiff disagreed with the Students’ account of the

Trip in many respects. (Id. ¶ 31.) After the meeting, Berliner referred the matter to the

Hofstra University Faculty Grievance Committee (“Grievance Committee”) by filing a

“statement of charges” outlining potential grounds for discipline. (See PSOF ¶¶ 32, 37;

Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 9 (statement of charges), ECF No. 95-14). The Grievance Committee

process was governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between Hofstra

and the faculty union and the Bylaws of the Hofstra University Senate. (DSOF ¶¶ 35–36;

see Berliner Decl. Ex. 14., ECF No. 95-40 (CBA); Berliner Decl. Ex. 15, 95-41 (bylaws).)

In his statement of charges, Berliner specifically charged plaintiff with violating Hofstra’s

Faculty Policy Series #99—which is titled “A Code of Professional Responsibility for

Faculty”—by “placing the students in harms’ way and at risk” during the Malaysia Trip.

(DSOF ¶¶ 37–38; see Berliner Decl. Ex. 16 (Faculty Policy Series #99), ECF No. 95-42.)

The Grievance Committee convened several times for preliminary matters and

held hearings on January 13, 2020 and February 18, 2020. (DSOF ¶ 42.) During the

hearings, the Grievance Committee reviewed documentation and heard testimony from

two of the Students, Berliner, and plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 43–45.) Plaintiff was present with

counsel for the entirety of the hearings. (Id. ¶ 43.) On March 16, 2020, the Grievance

Committee issued its “Report of Findings & Recommendation” (the “Report”). (Id. ¶ 48;

Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 10, ECF No. 95-15 (copy of the Report).) The Report set forth the

following conclusions:

Based on all evidence before the Grievance Committee, we find that the

Provost has met his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that

Professor Daniels engaged in unprofessional conduct by displaying poor

judgment in connection with the planning and oversight of the Malaysia

trip, although we also find that there were some events which occurred that

were out of his control.

(DSOF ¶ 48.) The Report recommended, inter alia, that plaintiff apologize to the

Students and that Hofstra issue a written warning to plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 49.) After receiving

the Report, Berliner sent an email on April 30, 2020 informing plaintiff that a copy would

be placed in his personnel file, and stating that Berliner was “prepared to take no further

action if there [was] an appropriate apology in writing to the students[.]” (PSOF ¶¶ 50–

51; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 11., ECF No. 95-16.) On June 5, 2020, plaintiff sent Berliner

a memo stating that he had written an apology to the Students “under duress” and was

“presenting it as a result of [] coercion[.]” (PSOF ¶ 51; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 12, ECF

No. 95-17.)

Post-Grievance Committee Events

Around the time the Grievance Committee process finished, plaintiff and other

faculty members formed the Hofstra University Black Faculty Council (“BFC”) with the

goal of addressing “systemic racism and anti-Black bias” at Hofstra. (DSOF ¶ 75; PSOF ¶

148; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 14, ECF No. 95-19.) On June 26, 2020, the BFC sent a list

of recommendations to Hofstra administrators, including the recommendation that

members of the BFC participate in “search committees” for “upper level” administrative

posts. (Id.) Hofstra administrators, including Berliner, met with members of the BFC to

discuss their recommendations two times during 2020. (DSOF ¶ 75.) The administrators

agreed to some of the requests and rejected others. (See PSOF ¶¶ 75; 148–49.)

On April 27, 2021, Berliner circulated an email announcing the creation of a search

committee (the “Search Committee”) tasked with selecting Hofstra’s next provost. (DSOF

¶ 76.) Berliner’s announcement instructed that the Executive Committees for each school

would be responsible for selecting a representative. (Id.) Nine individuals, including

plaintiff, were nominated to serve on the Search Committee on behalf of the CLAS. (Id. ¶

77.) Email evidence adduced in discovery shows that Hofstra President, Susan Poser,

sought input from Vice Provost Margaret Abraham regarding plaintiff’s fitness to serve

on the Search Committee in or around May 2021. (See PSOF ¶¶ 77, 160.) In deposition

testimony, Abraham stated that, when consulted by Poser about plaintiff, she mentioned

the Students’ complaints about the Malaysia Trip and this lawsuit, which was filed around

the same time. (See Maduegbuna Ex. R, ECF No. 96-20; Compl. (filed May 24, 2021).)

Plaintiff was ultimately not appointed to the Search Committee, though at least two other

faculty members of color were. (See PSOF ¶¶ 81, 160.) Berliner stepped down as Provost

on July 31, 2021 and was replaced by Janet Lenaghan as Interim Provost. (DSOF ¶ 58.)

Also during spring of 2021, Hofstra administrators were considering who would

become the new Chair of Anthropology when Kasmir’s three-year term came to an end

that summer. (Id. ¶ 59; see Compl. ¶ 97.) Before Kasmir’s term officially ended, plaintiff

served as Acting Chair from August 2 to August 27, 2021. (DSOF ¶ 56.) The Anthropology

Department had only three full-time faculty members and was the smallest Department

at Hofstra. (Id. ¶ 59.) As the end of Kasmir’s term approached, Hofstra administrators

began discussing the possibility of merging Anthropology with another department, such

as Sociology. (Id. ¶ 60.) The rationale for considering such a merger is contested. (See

PSOF ¶¶ 61–66). Despite opposition from the Anthropology faculty, Acting Dean Seabold

appointed an “external chair” from the Sociology Department for the 2021–22 school

year. (Id. ¶ 67.) Ultimately, Hofstra administrators decided not to merge Anthropology

with another department because the Sociology Department objected. (Id. ¶ 68.) Plaintiff

was appointed Chair of the Anthropology Department in September 2022. (Id. ¶ 69.)

Plaintiff was reappointed Chair for another one-year term for the 2023–24 school year

and, as of the date the instant motion was filed, remained in the position. (DSOF ¶ 70;

MSJ at 5.)

Other Instances of Alleged Faculty

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims turn on the assertion that Hofstra responded

differently to alleged instances of misconduct by white faculty. (See Compl. ¶¶ 106–17.)

The parties Rule 56.1 Statements address twenty-one potential faculty comparators, each

of whom is identified by the pseudonym “Prof.” followed by a number (e.g. “Prof. 1”).

(DSOF ¶¶ 82–101; PSOF ¶¶ 82–101, 163–172.) In recounting the relevant facts, I have

grouped the potential comparators based on the nature of their alleged misconduct and

the University’s response.

Two of the potential comparators are faculty who encountered challenges while

supervising students during study abroad trips. The first is a white female professor (Prof.

13) who accompanied students on numerous trips through a Hofstra study abroad

program that she directed for many years. (PSOF ¶¶ 82, 33; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 19,

ECF 95-24.) During one such trip, several students were involved in a physical altercation

that left at least one with an injury. (Id.) There is no evidence that Hofstra received any

student or parent complaints about Prof. 13. (DSOF ¶ 82.) The second is a white female

professor (Prof. 15) who also led study abroad trips for many years. (PSOF ¶¶ 33, 83; see

Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 20, ECF 95-25.) During one such trip, Prof. 15 had to send a student

home due to excessive drinking and other inappropriate behavior. (Id.) The student’s

parent initially complained that her son was sent home but, after learning more, agreed

with Prof. 15’s decision. (Id.) There is no evidence that Hofstra received any other

student or parent complaints about Prof. 15 regarding student safety. (DSOF ¶ 83.)

Neither Prof. 13 nor Prof. 15 were formally investigated or referred for discipline in

connection with their roles as trip leaders.

Three potential comparators were accused of inappropriate conduct of a sexual or

romantic nature. The first, Prof. 3, is a white male professor who sent a love letter to a

student. (DSOF ¶ 95; PSOF ¶ 163.) When the letter came to the attention of the Provost’s

Office, and after pressure from students, Berliner met with Prof. 3. (Id.) Prof. 3 agreed

that he would not be promoted to chair of his department while the student was still

enrolled, but did not face formal charges or discipline. (Id.) The second is Prof. 7, a white

male professor who allegedly touched students inappropriately during one-on-one

interactions. (DSOF ¶ 96.) After the allegations were reported, they were referred to the

Title IX office and Prof. 7 was placed on leave. (Id.; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 6, ECF No.

95-11.) Prof. 7 left Hofstra before the Title IX investigation was complete. (Id.) The third

is Prof. 12, a white male professor who made inappropriate comments regarding a

student’s appearance and allegedly referred to a student by his race, rather than his name.

(DSOF ¶ 95; PSOF ¶ 164.) Prof. 12 received a verbal reprimand but no formal discipline.

(Id.)

Three other potential comparators allegedly acted in a manner that compromised

student safety. Prof. 5, a white male, was accused of yelling at a Black student in an

intimidating manner during a private meeting after that student published an op-ed about

the culture of the Honors College in the Hofstra newspaper. (DSOF ¶ 97; PSOF ¶ 166; see

Maduegbuna Decl. Ex. WW.) Prof. 5 published a response to the op-ed and did not face

any formal consequences. (PSOF ¶ 97.) The substance of the disagreement between the

student and Prof. 5 is unclear from the materials before me. Prof. 16, a white female,

failed to follow lab safety protocols for mixing chemicals (DSOF ¶ 97; PSOF ¶ 167.) There

were serious discussions about denying Prof. 16 tenure as a result of the incident, but the

faculty union ultimately negotiated a resolution by which Prof. 16 took responsibility for

the incident and agreed to abide by safety protocols going forward. (Id.) Prof. 31 was

allegedly present on a hunting trip during which someone was shot. (See PSOF ¶ 33.)

There is no evidence in the record regarding Prof. 31’s role in the incident, Defendants’

awareness of the incident, or Defendants’ response.

Nine of the potential comparators are faculty whose conduct was reported by

students as racist, inappropriate, or insensitive. Prof. 1, a white male, was reported for

talking inappropriately about his personal life during class, including the death of his son

by suicide. (DSOF ¶ 97.) Prof. 1 did not face any discipline. (Id.) Prof. 9, a white male,

was accused in a student’s social media post of using a racial slur. (DSOF ¶ 98.) The

student did not report the incident, but Defendants became aware of it when another

student emailed Prof. 9 about the student’s post. (See Rifkin Decl., Ex. 11., ECF No. 95-

68.) Prof. 9 filed a complaint against the student, who was ultimately cleared of violations

of the student code of conduct. (See Maduegbuna Decl., Ex. QQQ (decl. of student).) Prof.

10, a white male, was reported by students for showing disturbing historical images of

sexual abuse from the Soviet Union in class. (DSOF ¶ 97; see Rosenberg Decl. Ex. 4, ECF

No. 95-9.) Prof. 10 did not face any discipline, but did implement new procedures for

alerting students before showing disturbing images. (Id.) Prof. 11, a white woman and

Honors College dean, was accused of using a racist caricature voice while reading works

by Black authors. (DSOF ¶ 97.) After the Provost’s Office received student complaints, a

dean spoke with Prof. 11 and no further complaints were filed. (PSOF ¶ 97.) Prof. 14, a

black male, was reported for breaching the confidential process for submitting student

evaluations and, separately, for misgendering certain students. (Id.) As a result, Prof.

14’s tenure probationary period was extended by one year. (Id.) Prof. 20, a white Jewish

male, was reported to telling a student that she should not observe a Jewish holiday.

(DSOF ¶ 97.) The student transferred to another class and Prof. 20 did not face formal

discipline (PSOF ¶ 97.) Finally, according to plaintiff, Profs. 6, 8, and 17 were accused of

racist conduct (i.e. using racial slurs and singling out a Black student to opine on racial

stereotypes in class), but there is no evidence that the incidents were ever reported to any

of the named Defendants. (PSOF ¶¶ 99–101.)

Finally, there four potential comparators were disciplined for conduct that did not

involve interactions with students. Prof. 2, a white female, was accused of seriously

bullying another faculty member. (DSOF ¶ 85.) Berliner referred the faculty member’s

complaint to the Greivance Committee and the faculty union negotiated a resolution. (Id.

¶¶ 86–87.) Prof. 4, a white female, was accused of plagiarizing a student’s work. (Id. ¶

88.) Prof. 4 was referred by Berliner to the Grievance Committee, which concluded that

there was not “clear and convincing evidence” that plagiarism had occurred. (Id. ¶ 90;

see Berliner Decl. Ex. 24, ECF 95-50.) Prof. 18, a white male, was accused of

inappropriate and hostile behavior toward a Black female faculty member. (DSOF ¶ 91.)

Berliner submitted written charges to the Grievance Committee, which resolved that Prof.

18 could not stand tenure for an additional two years. (Id. ¶¶ 93–94.) Prof. 19, a white

female, was accused of violating copyright law and the Actors’ Equity guild while staging

a musical. (PSOF ¶ 95.) After a meeting with Rifkin to discuss the incident, Prof. 19 was

prohibited from directing a production at Hofstra for several semesters. (Id.)

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on May 24, 2021 and the case was initially

assigned to the Honorable Gary R. Brown. (See Compl.; Dkt. Entry 5/26/21.) The case

was reassigned to the Honorable Hector Gonzales on June 21, 2022, and again

reassigned to the Honorable Nusrat Choudhury on October 13, 2023. (Dkt. Entries

6/21/22 & 10/13/23.) Defendants requested a pre-motion conference regarding an

anticipated motion for summary judgment on January 9, 2024. (ECF No. 72.) Judge

Choudhury concluded that a pre-motion conference was not necessary and set a briefing

schedule. (Elec. Order 3/14/24; Elec. Order 5/28/24.) Defendants filed the fully

briefed motion, which includes more than 1,300 pages of documents, on September 13,

2024. (ECF Nos. 95, 96, 97, 98.) Several days later, Magistrate Judge Dunst ordered

the parties to file sworn declarations addressing “whether the parties have a good faith

basis to belief that their submissions in connection with the summary judgment motion

comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(3).” (Elec. Order 9/16/24.) Both parties filed such

declarations and explained that discovery was extensive because, inter alia, there were

so many potential comparator faculty members. (ECF Nos. 104 & 105.) On September

17, 2024, plaintiff filed a letter motion seeking to file a 10-page sur-reply and several

new declarations in response to Defendants’ Reply. (ECF No. 100.) Judge Choudhury

denied plaintiff’s motion as moot based on her conclusion that the proposed filing would

not comply with Local Civil Rule 7.1(a)(3). (See Elec. Order 9/18/24; Elec. Order

3/31/25.) On August 25, 2025, the case was reassigned to me. (Elec. Order 8/25/25.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a court must grant

summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). In addressing the merits of a summary judgment motion, the court’s role is not to

resolve issues of fact, but to “determine whether there are issues of fact to be tried.”

Sutera v. Schering Corp., 73 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1995). To prevail on a motion for

summary judgment, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and the Court will resolve all ambiguities and draw

all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. See Nick’s

Garage, Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017). To defeat a

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rely on unsupported

assertions or “metaphysical doubt” and must instead come forward with “specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156,

160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986)).

In this district, parties briefing a motion for summary judgment must comply with

Local Civil Rule 56.1 (“Rule 56.1”), which requires each party to, inter alia, annex to their

moving papers a list of material facts, supported by citations to admissible evidence, that

the party contends are not in genuine dispute. See Local Civ. R. 56.1. As the Second

Circuit has explained, the purpose of Rule 56.1 is “to streamline the consideration of

summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to hunt through

voluminous records without guidance from the parties.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc.,

258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). Rule 56.1 statements are not “vehicle[s] for making factual

assertions that are otherwise unsupported in the record.” Id. The reviewing court must

disregard Rule 56.1 assertions that are not supported by the record or are based on

evidence that would not be admissible at trial. Ringel v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 18-CV-

1930, 2021 WL 4316715, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2021).

In an employment discrimination case, “the function of the court on a motion for

summary judgment . . . ‘is to determine whether the proffered admissible evidence shows

circumstances that would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a

discriminatory motive.’” Bonaffini v. City Univ. of New York, 751 F. Supp. 3d 67, 73–74

(E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 196, 204 (2d Cir. 1995)).

The Second Circuit has “repeatedly expressed the need for caution about granting

summary judgment to an employer in a discrimination case where . . . the merits turn on

a dispute as to the employer’s intent.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.

2008). “At the same time, [the Second Circuit has] also made it clear that the salutary

purposes of summary judgment—avoiding protracted and harassing trials—apply no less

to discrimination cases than to other areas of litigation.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427,

434 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).

DISCUSSION

I. Discrimination Claims

Plaintiff brings discrimination claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and the

NYSHRL. All three claims “are governed at the summary judgment stage by the burden-

shifting analysis first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802–04 (1973).” Tolbert, 790 F.3d at 434. Under that framework, the plaintiff bears the

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing “(1) he

belonged to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered

an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Brown v. City

of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the

plaintiff can establish a prima facie case, “a presumption arises that more likely than not

the adverse conduct was based on the consideration of impermissible factors” and “[t]he

burden then shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason’ for the disparate treatment.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d

72, 83 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If a defendant can

articulate a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the

proffered reason was pretextual. Id. A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of race

discrimination “by demonstrating that similarly situated employees of a different race

were treated more favorably.” Norville v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 196 F.3d 89, 95 (2d

Cir. 1999). To make such a showing, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he “was similarly

situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to compare

herself.” Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants do not appear to dispute the first two prongs of the McDonnell Douglas

framework: (1) that plaintiff is a member of a protected class as a Black, Muslim man and

(2) that plaintiff was qualified for his position as a tenured professor of Anthropology.

Defendants do, however, contest prongs three and four and contend that (3) the actions

complained of do not constitute “adverse employment actions” and (4) the surrounding

circumstances do not give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent. (MSJ at 8–9).

A. Adverse Employment Actions

In the context of a discrimination claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework,

an “adverse employment action” is defined as a “a materially adverse change in the terms

and conditions of employment.” Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). The Second Circuit has instructed that:

To be materially adverse, a change in working conditions must be more

disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job

responsibilities. Examples of such a change include termination of

employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less

distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished

material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a particular situation.

Id. (citation omitted). However, “the Second Circuit . . . [has] made clear that many

negative personnel actions taken by employers do not constitute adverse employment

actions sufficient to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination.”

Alvarado v. United Hospice, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 3d 89 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (collecting cases).

For example, reasonable enforcement of “preexisting disciplinary policies . . . without

more, does not constitute adverse employment action.” Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87,

91 (2d Cir. 2006).

Here, plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against him through the

following actions:

1. the revocation of plaintiff’s appointment and/or tentative designation to serve

as Acting Chair during the 2019-2020 school year (Compl. ¶¶ 71–73);

2. Berliner’s decision not to reappoint plaintiff as an Honors College Mentor for

the 2019-2020 school year (id. at ¶¶ 74–76);

3. the filing of Grievance Committee charges against plaintiff (id. at ¶¶ 87–90);

4. the Grievance Committee procedures and outcome (id. at ¶¶ 90–92);

5. the decision not to appoint plaintiff to the Search Committee (id. at ¶¶ 101–

104); and

6. the timeline and process by which plaintiff became department chair (id. at ¶¶

94–99).

(see id. ¶¶ 143; Pl.’s Opp’n at 7–22). Only half of these actions are cognizable as adverse

employment actions.

The first and second allegations concerning plaintiff’s role as Acting Chair and

Honors College Mentor do constitute adverse employment actions because they reflect

material changes in plaintiff’s title, workplace responsibilities and compensation. (Compl.

¶¶ 73 & 75.) See Beyer v. Cnty. of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.2008).

Notwithstanding the short duration of the restrictions (see MSJ at 12–14), these actions

cannot be described as “trivial,” Colon v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 983 F. Supp. 2d 277, 288

(S.D.N.Y. 2013), since they effectively reduced plaintiff’s salary and restricted him from

accessing certain professional opportunities for at least an entire school year. See Buon

v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 80 (2d Cir. 2023) (“[D]enial of a workplace opportunity that

materially affects the terms and conditions of employment, can constitute an adverse

employment action.”) The sixth allegation is also an adverse employment action insofar

as it concerns a denial of promotion to the position of Department Chair. Id. (“[I]t is well

settled that failing to promote an employee can constitute a significant change in

employment status that is tangible and thereby qualifies as an adverse employment action

under Title VII.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff’s third allegation concerning the filing of Grievance Committee charges

against him does not constitute an adverse employment action because it merely reflects

the initiation of a reasonable and preexisting conflict resolution procedure set forth in the

CBA. (See DSOF ¶¶ 35–39; Berliner Decl. 14.) Joseph, 465 F.3d at 91 (“[A]n employee

does not suffer a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment

where the employer merely enforces its preexisting disciplinary policies in a reasonable

manner.”). Under those procedures, the filing of charges triggers a review by an

independent committee of faculty to assess whether there is “adequate cause” for

discipline; the filing does not itself constitute disciplinary action. (Berliner Decl., Ex. 14.)

The initiation of such a review, without more, cannot be considered a material change in

the conditions of employment. See Cintron v. Atticus Bakery, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 94,

102 (D. Conn. 2017) (finding that employer’s “investigation of [employee’s conduct]” was

a “reasonable response to information that had been presented to the [employer]” and

did not constitute an adverse employment action); Ware v. Billington, 344 F. Supp. 2d

63, 76 (D.D.C. 2004) (“[T]he request for an investigation by an independent body (as

opposed to the disciplinary action that may follow) does not constitute an actionable

adverse employment action.”).

Likewise, plaintiff’s fourth allegation concerning the outcome of the Grievance

Committee investigation does not constitute an adverse employment action because there

is no evidence to support plaintiff’s assertions that the process was irregular, or the

outcome was unreasonable. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 19–20.) As to the process, it is undisputed

that plaintiff was represented by counsel, and was permitted to testify, submit written

documentation, and cross-examine the individual Students that testified. (PSOF ¶¶ 40–

47.) As to the outcome, the only disciplinary action recommended by the Grievance

Committee was (1) a written warning and (2) an apology. (Id. ¶ 49.) “Verbal and written

warnings generally do not constitute adverse employment actions unless they lead to

more substantial employment actions that are adverse.” Bader v. Special Metals Corp.,

985 F. Supp. 2d 291, 306 (N.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Chang v. Safe Horizons, 254 F. App’x

838 (2d Cir. 2007). Nor, in my view, can a mandatory private apology to the Students—

the only action that was required of plaintiff to resolve the Grievance Committee process—

be considered an adverse employment event. (See DSOF ¶¶ 50–51.)

Finally, plaintiff’s fifth allegation concerning the Search Committee does not

constitute an adverse employment action because there is no evidence that his exclusion

from the committee materially impacted the conditions of his employment. Courts in this

Circuit have routinely found that removal from a university committee, without more, is

not sufficiently significant to constitute an adverse employment action. See Hamada v.

State Univ. of New York at Farmingdale, No. 23-CV-6786, 2025 WL 916899, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2025) (collecting cases); Watkins v. City of Waterbury Bd. of Educ.,

No. 19-CV-00593, 2022 WL 3347218, at *16 (D. Conn. Aug. 12, 2022) (same). Here,

plaintiff was never appointed to the Search Committee in the first place, which means that

his allegation of adverse impact is even weaker. See Whaley v. City Univ. of New York,

555 F. Supp. 2d 381, 399-400 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that defendant’s failure to

“invite[] [plaintiff] to be a member of [a] Search Committee . . . do[es] not have the

hallmarks of adverse employment actions”). On the record before me, I simply cannot

conclude that the denial of the occasion to serve in a relatively minor role “to which [he]

was not absolutely entitled” had a materially adverse on his conditions of employment.

Ruggieri v. Harrington, 146 F. Supp. 2d 202, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).

B. Inference of Discrimination

Considering the three allegations that I have identified as potential adverse

employment actions, I next assess whether a reasonable jury could conclude that any of

them “occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.”

Tolbert, 790 F.3d at 435.

Turning first to the two temporary measures that were implemented during the

Grievance Committee process, I find that plaintiff has not met his prima facie burden to

demonstrate an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff’s argument, in sum, is that

Defendants denied him “the benefit of the doubt” and implemented restrictions more

hastily than they would have for a white professor accused of similarly serious

misconduct. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, 19.) In the absence of direct evidence of discriminatory

intent, plaintiff seeks establish an inference of discrimination by comparing his treatment

to that of other faculty accused of misconduct. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8–14.) See Levy v. Legal

Aid Soc’y, 408 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (explaining that “indirect evidence”

of discrimination may include “evidence that similarly situated comparators outside of

Plaintiff’s protected class were treated more favorably than Plaintiff”).

With respect to the temporary measures imposed prior to the completion of the

Grievance Committee, plaintiff draws comparisons between himself and seven other

faculty members who, he argues, were afforded greater leeway in the face of similar

accusations. (See Opp’n at 7–14.) For the following reasons, I find that none of plaintiff’s

proposed comparators were “similarly situated in all material respects[.]” Graham, 230

F.3d at 39 (citation omitted).

Profs. 13 and 15—both white women who supervised Hofstra students on study

abroad trips—are dissimilar because there is no evidence that either of them were accused

of acting in a manner that compromised student safety. (See DSOF ¶¶ 82–83.) The fact

that both Prof. 13 and Prof. 15 evidently supervised trips during which a student willfully

engaged in unsafe behavior does not render them comparable. In plaintiff’s case, he was

the one accused of creating an unsafe situation. (PSOF ¶¶ 82–83.) Similarly, Profs. 5

and 10 are not similarly situated because the conduct of which they were accused—yelling

at a student (Prof. 5) and presenting distressing historical images in the classroom

without sufficient warning (Prof. 10)—was indisputably less serious than the allegations

against plaintiff and did not implicate student safety. (See id. ¶ 97.) Insofar as Profs. 5,

10, 13, or 15 were accused of “misconduct,” it was not sufficiently similar to plaintiff’s case

to render them proper comparators. Bogle v. Connecticut Dep’t of Mental Health &

Addiction Servs., No. 3:23-CV-323, 2025 WL 1786072, at *6 (D. Conn. June 27, 2025)

(“In cases involving allegations of disparate treatment in workplace disciplinary

proceedings, a comparator’s underlying misconduct must be substantially similar to that

of the plaintiff in all material respects[.]”).

Profs. 6 and 9 are improper comparators because the accusations of racist speech

against them were uncorroborated and were not the subject of student complaints to

Defendants. (DSOF ¶¶ 8, 101.) Many of the facts surrounding plaintiff’s alleged

misconduct, by contrast, are undisputed. (See PSOF ¶¶ 12–22 (admitting, inter alia, that

Students expressed concern “about every aspect of the trip;” that a Student’s mother

emailed Hofstra to express concern about student safety; and that Students reported that

they did not feel comfortable communicating with plaintiff.) Regardless of whether

plaintiff was actually responsible for any misconduct, the fact that he was the subject of

student and parent complaints “clearly distinguishes [him] from other employees who

were not[.]” Ruiz v. Cnty. of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 495 (2d Cir. 2010).

The closest proposed comparator is Prof. 3, who was accused of conduct that I

would deem similarly serious that was also reported to Defendants. Nonetheless,

plaintiff’s comparison cannot establish an inference of discrimination because there is no

evidence that Prof. 3 faced less serious discipline. To the contrary, the record establishes

that Prof. 3 was prohibited from becoming the chair of his department—a role he was

presumed to fill imminently–for several years and was prohibited from teaching certain

courses.1 (DSOF ¶ 40.) While such restrictions are not identical to the temporary

measures imposed on plaintiff, they are certainly not less serious. The most significant

1 There is no evidence that Prof. 3 was allowed to retain other appointments or responsibilities

analogous to those from which Daniels was temporarily suspended. Plaintiff’s statement to the

contrary (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 9) is unsupported by the record.

differences that I can discern are the fact that the restrictions imposed on Prof. 3 were not

communicated in writing. (See PSOF ¶ 95.) Defendants have provided a credible non-

discriminatory explanation for that difference—namely that Prof. 3 voluntarily agreed to

the restrictions after admitting to his misconduct. (DSOF ¶ 95.) In sum, because Prof. 3

faced discipline that was similarly serious to the discipline faced by plaintiff, the

comparison between plaintiff and Prof. 3 does not support an inference of discrimination.

Turning next to plaintiff’s allegations about the delay in his appointment as

Department Chair (Compl. ¶¶ 96–97, 143), I find that plaintiff has not met his prima facie

burden to demonstrate an inference of discrimination. Plaintiff has not identified any

direct evidence of discrimination, such as verbal remarks from Hofstra administrators.

See Levy, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 214. Nor has he offered indirect evidence through

comparators.

In sum, because there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that

any of the challenged actions were animated by discriminatory intent, Defendants’

motion for summary judgment is granted as to the discrimination claims.

II. Retaliation Claims

A. Legal Standard

Plaintiff brings retaliation claims under Title VII, Section 1981, and NYSHRL.

(Compl. ¶¶ 147–49, 156–58; 163–65.) Retaliation claims under these three statues are

also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Littlejohn,

795 F.3d at 315-16 (standard for Title VII and Section 1981); Summa v. Hofstra Univ.,

708 F.3d 115, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (standard for NYHRL retaliation claims). “To make out

a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must make four showings: that (1) she engaged

in a protected activity; (2) her employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took

adverse employment action against her; and (4) a causal connection exists between the

alleged adverse action and the protected activity.” Id. (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The definition of “adverse employment action” is “more relaxed in the

retaliation context” than it is in the disparate treatment context, Henderson v. City of

New York, 818 F. Supp. 2d 573, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), and requires the plaintiff to show

that the action “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a

charge of discrimination.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11,

25 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68,

(2006)); see also Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Title VII’s anti-

discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions are not coterminous; anti-retaliation

protection is broader and extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related

retaliatory acts and harm.”) “In determining whether conduct amounts to an adverse

employment action, the alleged acts of retaliation need to be considered both separately

and in the aggregate, as even minor acts of retaliation can be sufficiently substantial in

gross as to be actionable.” Hicks, 593 F.3d at 165 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

B. Retaliation for August 15, 2019 Memo

Here, Defendants do not dispute that the submission of plaintiff’s August 15, 2019

memo alleging violations of Hofstra’s Freedom from Discrimination Policy by the

Students (see Berliner Decl. Ex. 13, ECF No. 95-39) constitutes a “protected activity.”

(Compl. ¶¶ 77, 80; see MSJ at 24.)

Plaintiff has not met his burden to establish a prima facie case that any of

Defendants’ subsequent actions were acts in retaliation for the memo. As a threshold

matter, I agree with Defendants that the termination of plaintiff’s appointments as

Honors College Mentor and Acting Chair in 2019 cannot serve as a basis for a retaliation

claim because both decisions predated the protected activity. (See MSJ at 24.) I also find

that Berliner’s filing of charges with the Grievance Committee approximately six weeks

later cannot constitute a basis for a retaliation claim because it merely triggered a third-

party investigation. “The Second Circuit . . . [has] generally held that the initiation of []

an internal investigation . . . may constitute a materially adverse action only ‘if it results

in a hostile work environment, constructive discharge, or other employment

consequences of a negative nature, or if conducted in such an egregious manner as to

dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”

Robinson v. De Niro, 739 F. Supp. 3d 33, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (quoting Tillery v. New York

State Off. of Alcoholism & Substance Abuse Servs., 739 F. App’x 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018));

see also Cox v. Onondaga Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 760 F.3d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 2014). As

previously discussed, there is no evidence that the Grievance Committee’s process was

particularly burdensome and there was no meaningful discipline imposed as a result.

Furthermore, Defendants’ subsequent actions related to the Search Committee and the

Department Chair occurred too far after August 15, 2019 to establish a causal connection

to plaintiff’s written complaint. See Ellis v. Century 21 Dep’t Stores, 975 F. Supp. 2d 244,

284 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (explaining that courts generally measure the outer temporal for

inferring causation “in months”) (collecting cases).

C. Retaliation for May 24, 2021 Initiation of Litigation

In his opposition papers, plaintiff argues that several of Defendants’ 2021 actions

were undertaken in retaliation for the initiation of this lawsuit, which was filed on May

24, 2021. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 23.) Defendants do not contest that the lawsuit was a protected

activity and seem to concede that actions that postdate May 24, 2021 could, in theory,

provide a basis for a retaliation claim. (See Def.’s Reply at 10.) While the Complaint does

not specifically address events that postdate its filing and plaintiff did not move to amend,

members of Hofstra’s administration could have anticipated the lawsuit before it was

officially filed due to, inter alia, plaintiff’s filing of an EEOC complaint. (Compl. ¶ 22.)

See Johnson v. J. Walter Thompson U.S.A., LLC, 224 F. Supp. 3d 296, 313-15 (S.D.N.Y.

2016) (finding sufficient causal connection between protected activity and alleged

retaliatory acts by analyzing acts leading up to the filing of a lawsuit, including letter sent

by plaintiff’s lawyer to defendant). Further, evidence adduced in discovery and discussed

below strongly suggests that Defendants were aware of the impending litigation when

they made several decisions that predated May 24, 2021. (See Compl. ¶¶ 97, 103.) I

therefore consider plaintiff’s retaliation claims to encompass actions allegedly taken in

response to the initiation of his lawsuit, insofar as they are “part and parcel of the other

claims contained in [the Complaint.]” Zawacki v. Realogy Corp., 628 F. Supp. 2d 274,

284 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing exception to exhaustion requirement where alleged

retaliation occurs because the employee files an administrative charge or lawsuit).

Plaintiff points to two actions that occurred in close temporal proximity to the

filing of his Complaint: his non-selection for the Search Committee and the decision to

appoint an external chair to lead the Anthropology Department for the 2021–22 school

year. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 23–24.) While I agree with Defendants that the non-selection for

the Search Committee alone would not amount to an adverse employment action, see

Ruggieri, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 217, I must consider it alongside plaintiff’s alleged

deprivation of the opportunity to serve as a department chair. See Hicks, 593 F.3d at 165.

Viewed through that lens, Defendants’ combined actions rise to the level of material

adversity as a reasonable worker may be dissuaded from making or supporting a similar

charge of discrimination. Id. Evidence adduced in discovery suggests plaintiff’s

anticipated filing of this lawsuit may have played a causal role in both decisions. (PSOF

¶¶ 77, 155; see Maduegbuna Decl. Exs. R & X, ECF Nos. 96-20, 96-26.) Drawing all

inferences in plaintiff’s favor as the nonmoving party, I find that plaintiff has established

a prima facie case of retaliation.

Defendants seek to overcome plaintiff’s prima facie showing by pointing to a

legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the decision to appoint an external chair—namely

that doing so was justified by concerns about budget and department size. (Def.’s Reply

at 10.) That explanation sounds persuasive at first blush but is not clearly supported by

admissible evidence concerning Hofstra’s sizeable budget or historical practices

surrounding small departments. (See PSOF ¶¶ 61–66; Maduegbuna Decl. Ex. X, ECF No.

96-26.) Reviewing the materials underlying the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements, I agree with

plaintiff that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find Defendants’ proffered rationale

unworthy of credence. See Siuzdak v. Sessions, 295 F. Supp. 3d 77, 105 (D. Conn. 2018)

(“Pretext may also be shown by way of weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or

contradictions in Defendant’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for

Defendant’s action . . . [F]rom such discrepancies, a reasonable juror could conclude that

the explanations were a pretext for a prohibited reason.”) (alterations adopted and

citation omitted)).

Therefore, I find that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

plaintiff’s initiation of litigation was the but-for cause of Defendants’ delay in appointing

him Department Chair.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED with respect to plaintiff’s discrimination claims. The motion is GRANTED

with respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claims as they concern the August 15, 2019 memo

and is DENIED with respect to plaintiff’s retaliation claims as they concern conduct that

occurred after Defendants became aware of plaintiff’s intent to file the instant lawsuit.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

Allyne R. Ross

United States District Judge

Dated: September 30, 2025

Brooklyn, New York