Xu v. Todd

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LIRONG XU,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:25-CV-00439

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

CHIEF JUDGE DEBRA TODD, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court are the September 8, 2025, and September 17, 2025, reports

and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson (“the Reports”) (Doc. 75; Doc.

108) recommending the Court deny pro se Plaintiff Lirong Xu’s (“Xu”) motions for default

judgment (Doc. 52; Doc. 62; Doc. 68; Doc. 72) and grant Defendants Chief Justice Debra

Todd, Andrea Tuominen, Steven Rothermel, Darian Halland, and Michael F. Krimmel’s

(collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss. (Doc. 27). The Reports informed Xu that she

had 14 days to file an objection. (Doc. 75, at 5; Doc. 108, at 26). Since Judge Carlson filed

the Reports, Xu has continued to file numerous repetitive motions and other filings alleging

judicial misconduct, demanding recusal, and asserting Judge Carlson is not an official

magistrate judge. (Doc. 60; Doc. 62; Doc. 78; Doc. 80; Doc. 81; Doc. 82; Doc. 84; Doc. 85;

Doc. 88; Doc. 96; Doc. 98; Doc. 100; Doc. 102; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc. 109; Doc. 111;

Doc. 113; Doc. 117; Doc. 118; Doc. 119; Doc. 121; Doc. 123; Doc. 125). Some of these filings

are marked as objections, but all the filings contest the Reports. The Court will construe all of

Xu’s filings as objections to the Reports under the liberal pleading standard for pro se plaintiffs.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (stating “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be

liberally construed’”) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also JAMES

WATSON, Plaintiff v. JOSEPH PETERS, et al., Defendants. Additional Party Names: Ct. of

Common Pleas of Wyoming Cnty., Debra Hiese, No. 3:24CV2035, 2025 WL 1647750, at *1

(M.D. Pa. June 9, 2025) (construing a pro se filing in response to a report and recommendation

as an objection). Based on the Court's review of Xu’s filings along with the Reports, Xu’s

objections are OVERULED, and the Reports will be ADOPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“A district court may ‘designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings, including

evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and

recommendations for the disposition’ of certain matters pending before the court.” Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)). Within fourteen

days of being served a Report and Recommendation, “any party may serve and file written

objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules of court.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a party timely files objections, the district court is to conduct a de

novo review of the challenged portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings unless the objection

is “not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6–7 (3d Cir.1984); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). The Court may then “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “Although the standard is de novo, the extent of

review is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge, and the court may rely on

the recommendations of the magistrate judge to the extent it deems proper.” Rahman v.

Gartley, No. CV 3:23-363, 2024 WL 555894, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2024) (citing United v.

Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

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II. DISCUSSION

Since the Reports correctly state the procedural and factual background of this case, it

will not be repeated in its entirety here. (Doc. 75; Doc. 108). However, the necessary

background for the purpose of the instant Order is as follows. Xu initiated this pro se action

by filing a complaint on March 10, 2025. (Doc. 1). Xu alleges Defendants, who are the Chief

Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and various Pennsylvania state court

administrators, violated her constitutional rights and committed various acts of maleficence.

(Doc. 1). Xu’s claims arise out of her disapproval of the Pennsylvania Court System’s

handling of various cases involving her and her son. (Doc. 1). As explained by Judge Carlson,

Xu has filed numerous similar lawsuits in various courts which have all been dismissed (Doc.

108, at 2). On April 9, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Xu’s complaint. (Doc. 27).

Despite this, Xu filed four motions seeking an entry of default judgment. (Doc. 52; Doc. 62;

Doc. 68; Doc. 72). Judge Carlson issued the Reports on September 8, 2025, and September

17, 2025, recommending the Court deny Xu’s motions for default judgment and dismiss the

complaint with prejudice. (Doc. 75; Doc. 108).

Regarding Xu’s motion for default judgment, Judge Carlson correctly noted that

default judgment is only appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a) where a

defendant fails to respond to a complaint and here, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.

(Doc. 27; Doc. 75, at 3). Regarding Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Carlson also

correctly noted that Xu’s complaint is based on the false premise that courts may not issue per

curium decisions or decide motions without first conducting hearings. (Doc. 108, at 9). As

explained by Judge Carlson, such practices are accepted and commonplace in state and

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federal courts throughout the country. (Doc. 108, at 9). Further, the Court agrees with Judge

Carlson’s conclusions that Xu’s requests for injunctive relief amount to impermissible

invitations for the Court to review state court decisions under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

and Defendants, as state court officials, are immune from liability for damages. (Doc. 108, at

8-15, 17-25).

The Court finds Judge Carlson’s analysis to be well-reasoned and supported by the

applicable law. (Doc. 75; Doc. 108). Courts in this Circuit have held that even though pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed, “courts should not assume the role of advocate and

dismissal is proper where claims are supported only by vague and conclusory allegations.”

Coley v. Beard, No. CIVA 3:05CV2290, 2006 WL 1670253, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 13, 2006).

Courts overrule objections when they lack legal foundation and are “more commentary than

recognizable substantive objection.” Coley, 2006 WL 1670253, at *4 (overruling pro se

objections that were vague and unintelligible and stating “[p]laintiff's filings are more in the

nature of a fishing expedition where he would have the [c]ourt accept as factual allegations

what are more accurately characterized as bald assertions or legal conclusions and assume

the role of advocate in fashioning a legal theory for him.”); see Miller v. Cnty. of Lancaster, No.

1:24-CV-00014, 2024 WL 4615199, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2024), aff'd, No. 24-2934, 2025

WL 2104973 (3d Cir. July 28, 2025) (stating “[m]ere disagreement with the report and

recommendation is not a basis to decline to adopt the report and recommendation”).

Here, Xu filed numerous objections to the Court’s referral of this matter to Judge

Carlson without her consent. See e.g. (Doc. 85; Doc. 121). Under 28 U.S.C. §636(b), this Court

has the discretion to refer matters to a magistrate judge who may then issue a report and

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recommendation even where the plaintiff does not consent to the referral. See Miller v. Cnty. of

Lancaster, No. 1:24-CV-00014, 2024 WL 4615199, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2024), aff'd, No.

24-2934, 2025 WL 2104973 (3d Cir. July 28, 2025) (finding district court judges have the

discretion to refer matters to magistrate judges without the plaintiff’s consent). Xu also filed

numerous objections and motions based on her mistaken belief that Judge Carlson is not a

magistrate judge. See e.g. (Doc. 100; Doc. 104; Doc. 123). Judge Carlson has explained to Xu

that he is a magistrate judge, but this has not stopped Xu from filing repeated frivolous

motions based on her misunderstanding. (Doc. 108, at 1). Despite the numerosity of Xu’s

filings, Xu fails to respond the Reports’ substantive arguments beyond making conclusory

statements that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and judicial immunity do not apply due to

Defendants’ alleged misconduct. (Doc. 117). Xu’s objections also rely on meritless arguments

that Judge Carlson somehow acted improperly by citing to state court records or providing

unreported Westlaw citations. (Doc. 85, at 2; Doc. 89, at 1; Doc. 99, at 1; Doc. 117, at 1).

Xu’s objections amount to mere commentary and general disagreement with the Reports and

do not provide “a basis to decline to adopt the [Reports].” Miller, 2024 WL 4615199, at *2;

see Coley, 2006 WL 1670253, at *4. Accordingly, the Court OVERULES Xu’s objections.

III. XU’S REQUESTS FOR RECUSAL

Xu filed several motions demanding the undersigned’s recusal from this case. (Doc.

60; Doc. 123; Doc. 125). “A party seeking recusal need not demonstrate that the judge is

actually biased, but rather that she would appear to be biased to ‘a reasonable person, with

knowledge of all the facts.’” N'Jai v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 487 F. App'x 735, 738 (3d Cir.

2012) (quoting United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended (July 2,

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2007)). To meet that burden, a party must present an affidavit “stating facts and reasons

establishing that said judge has a personal bias or prejudice against the party seeking recusal,

or in favor of the adverse party.” Lu v. Kerry, No. CV 24-1169, 2025 WL 888490, at *6 (E.D.

Pa. Mar. 21, 2025), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lu v. Tucker L. Grp. LLC, No. 25-1532, 2025 WL

2771452 (3d Cir. Apr. 8, 2025). A plaintiff’s disagreement with a judge’s prior rulings is not a

basis for recusal. See N'Jai, 487 F. App'x at 738 (stating “an unfavorable ruling is not a basis

for recusal”). Putting aside Xu’s failure to file an affidavit supporting recusal, Xu’s arguments

in favor of recusal appear to be based on Xu’s objections to the undersigned’s decisions in

unrelated cases, referral of this case to magistrate judges, and Xu’s misconception that cases

cannot be referred to magistrate judges through verbal orders. (Doc. 61; Doc. 124; Doc. 126).

None of Xu’s various requests for recusal present any facts which suggest the undersigned is

biased and thus do not provide a basis for recusal. See N'Jai, 487 F. App'x at 738; see also Lu,

2025 WL 888490, at *6. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Xu’s requests for recusal. (Doc. 60;

Doc. 123; Doc. 125).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court finds no clear error in Judge Carlson’s recommendation that leave to amend

be denied. (Doc. 108, at 25). The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable

to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment,

unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp, 293 F.3d

103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Granting leave to amend would be futile here because Xu’s claims

are based on her misunderstandings of the law and have no legal basis. See Stephens v. Manley

Deas Kochalski, LLC, No. CV 16-3845, 2016 WL 6804441, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2016),

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dismissed, No. 16-4346, 2017 WL 11776722 (3d Cir. Apr. 6, 2017) (stating “[b]ecause none of

plaintiff's four counts has a legal basis, amendment would be futile and I will dismiss her

complaint without leave to amend”). Leave to amend would also be futile because Xu’s

requests for injunctive relief are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine and Defendants are

immune from Xu’s claims for damages. See Owens v. U.S. Bank Tr. Nat'l Ass'n as Tr. for RCF 2

Acquisition Tr., No. CV 24-6372, 2025 WL 996419, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2025) (finding

amendment futile where claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Finnegan v.

Mikielski, No. 1:23-CV-326, 2024 WL 3013738, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 14, 2024) (stating “leave

to amend the claims against [defendant] is futile due to the application of absolute judicial

immunity”). Accordingly, the complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice.1

V. CONCLUSION

The Court agrees with the Reports’ sound reasoning and discerns no error of law.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Reports (Doc. 75; Doc. 108) are

ADOPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY as opinions of the Court. This action is DISMISSED

with prejudice. As Xu is denied leave to amend, the Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this

case.

Dated: October 3, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

1 Because the Court dismisses this action with prejudice, Xu’s pending motions are

DENIED as moot. (Doc. 4; Doc. 44; Doc. 52; Doc. 60; Doc. 62; Doc. 68; Doc. 72; Doc. 78;

Doc. 82; Doc. 84; Doc. 88; Doc. 96; Doc. 98; Doc. 100; Doc. 102; Doc. 104; Doc. 106; Doc.

109; Doc. 111; Doc. 113; Doc. 119; Doc. 121; Doc. 123; Doc. 125).

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