“A court may dismiss a claim as ‘factually frivolous’ if the sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’ — that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic[,]’ or ‘delusional.” (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33)
How later courts described this case
- “A court may dismiss a claim as ‘factually frivolous’ if the sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’ — that is, if they are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic[,]’ or ‘delusional.” (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33)
- “[A] pro se complaint generally should not be dismissed without granting the plaintiff leave to amend at least once . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
—————————————————————X
Ziyao Jiang,
Plaintiff, ORDER
-against- 24-CV-6325 (NRM) (SDE)
Queens Public Library at Flushing,
Central Government of China, and
Ministry of Public Security of P.R. China,
Defendants.
—————————————————————X
NINA R. MORRISON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff has filed sixty-seven (67) cases in this court since the beginning of
2024. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915
is granted solely for the purpose of this Order. For the reasons discussed, Plaintiff’s
complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court shall dismiss an in forma
pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” At the pleadings stage of the
proceeding, the Court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory
factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d
111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)), aff’d 569 U.S.
108 (2013). A complaint must plead sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Furthermore, it is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less stringent
standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and that the Court is required to read
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments
it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
9–10 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191–93 (2d Cir.
2008).
However, the Supreme Court has held that a district court has “the authority
to ‘pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations’” when considering an in forma
pauperis complaint. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). The Court further
stated that “a court is not bound . . . to accept without question the truth of the
plaintiff’s allegations. We therefore reject the notion that a court must accept ‘as
having an arguable basis in fact,’ all allegations that cannot be rebutted by judicially
noticeable facts.” Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s complaint is nonsensical and does not present any cognizable claim.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Queens Public Library at Flushing “delete[d] [his]
borrow record in order to perjury (sic) [him] theft book (sic).” Amend. Compl., ECF
No. 7, at 1.1 He further alleges that “Defendant stalked [him] and arranged an Asian
1 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed on October 20, 2024,
pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
in pink color sitting at aisle to perjury (sic) [him] a gay”; “arranged a man bent down
at printer area to perjury [him] assaulting him when [he] walked by to pick up printed
paper”; and arranged for a “security guard getting close to [him] to perjury [him]
under arrested (sic).” Id. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Queens Public Library at
Flushing “got close to [him] to perjury [him] under arrested (sic), and threat[ened]
[him] by saying he has [a] firearm” and “stopped [him from] taking evidence by saying
it’s [a] library rule.” Id. Plaintiff subsequently alleges that “Defendants conspirate
(sic) and execute murder and robbery to [him].” Id. In detailing the compensation he
believes he is due, Plaintiff also appears to allege that Defendants, including the
Central Government of China and the Ministry of Public Security for the People’s
Republic of China, “organiz[ed] a group of people” who stalked, threatened, and
harassed him, without providing further details. Id. He seeks $84,950,000 in
damages. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff’s allegations, even under the very liberal reading afforded to pro se
pleadings (and even if Plaintiff believes them to be true), can only be described as
frivolous and “clearly baseless.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 25, 33 (1992); Gallop v. Cheney,
642 F.3d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 2011) (“A court may dismiss a claim as ‘factually frivolous’
if the sufficiently well-pleaded facts are ‘clearly baseless’ — that is, if they are
‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic[,]’ or ‘delusional.” (quoting Denton, 504 U.S. at 32–33)). “[A]
finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level
of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially
noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Brown v. City
of New York, No. 24-CV-8246 (LDH) (LB), 2025 WL 606155, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2025) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff alleged “that agents of the municipal
government ‘gang stalked,’ ‘accosted,’ ‘harassed’ and drugged her, and that
‘brainwave reading technologies’ were used to thwart her effort to seek help” (quoting
plaintiff’s complaint)); Gilot v. Gov’t, No. 21-CV-4346 (WFK), 2021 WL 3861684, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims as “entirely fanciful and
frivolous”); Khalil v. United States, No. 17-CV-2652 (JFB) (SIL), No. 17-CV-5458
(JFB) (SIL), 2018 WL 443343, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2018) (dismissing complaint
where “[p]laintiff allege[d] a broad conspiracy involving surveillance of and
interference with his life by the United States and various government actors”
because his allegations were “irrational and wholly incredible”).
Given the implausibility of Plaintiff’s allegations, the action cannot proceed.
See Kraft v. City of New York, 823 F. App’x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order)
(holding that “the district court did not err in sua sponte dismissing the complaint as
frivolous,” based on the plaintiff’s assertions that he had “been the subject of 24-hour,
multi-jurisdictional surveillance by federal ‘fusion centers’ and the New York State
Intelligence Center, which put a ‘digital marker’ on him in order to collect his personal
data and harass him” (quoting plaintiff’s complaint)); Walker v. Real Life Church, No.
22-CV-4455 (AMD) (LB), No. 22-CV-4456 (AMD) (LB), 2022 WL 3358088, at *1–2
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (dismissing pro se complaint as frivolous where the Court
could not discern what cognizable harm the plaintiff suffered); Burton v. USA, No.
21-CV-6238 (LDH) (LB), 2022 WL 1093217, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2022) (dismissing
pro se plaintiff’s complaint as frivolous because the allegations rose to the level of the
irrational).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis, is dismissed as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Second Circuit has held that leave to replead should be liberally granted
to pro se litigants. See Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“[A] pro se complaint generally should not be dismissed without granting the
plaintiff leave to amend at least once . . . .”); see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d
162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). “[B]ut amendment should be denied where the complaint
gives no ‘indication that a valid claim might be stated.’” McKie v. Kornegay, No. 21-
1943, 2022 WL 4241355, *3 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)).
Here, the Court concludes that granting leave to amend would be futile and
declines to do so. See Hakaniemi v. Zuckerberg, No. 21-CV-4345 (PKC) (LB), 2021
WL 3566221, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2021) (dismissing pro se plaintiff’s complaint
as frivolous, denying leave to amend where complaint was “devoid of any arguable
basis in fact or in law, defects which cannot be cured by amendment,” and collecting
cases).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment and close this
case.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would
not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of any appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Nina R. Morrison
NINA R. MORRISON
United States District Judge
Dated: September 30, 2025
Brooklyn, New York