Tingler v. Kennedy

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES L. TINGLER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:25-cv-952

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

CHIEF JUSTICE SHARON

KENNEDY, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Charles L. Tingler’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full

amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be

allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who

render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid.

This matter is also before the Court for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of

Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. Having performed the initial screen of the

Complaint required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, for the reasons that follow, it is

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

1 Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court

holds pro se ain complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th

Cir. April 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief against each of the seven Justices of the

Supreme Court of Ohio (collectively referred to herein as the “Supreme Court”), challenging

Ohio Supreme Court Practice Rule 4.03(B) relating to vexatious litigators. (ECF No. 1-1.)

Plaintiff primarily seeks the following relief:

A. Declare that S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B), as applied to original jurisdiction filings,

violates the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment on its face and

as applied.

B. Permanently enjoin Defendants and their officers, agents, and employees from

enforcing any leave to file requirement under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) that

conditions my ability to institute original actions in the Supreme Court of

Ohio on prior permission.

C. Order removal of administrative flags or notations that would trigger leave

screening for my future original jurisdiction filings and direct Defendants to

instruct the Clerk to accept and docket my pleadings without a leave

prerequisite.

(Id. at PAGEID #: 5.) By way of background, Plaintiff explains that, on March 2, 2023, the

Supreme Court declared him a vexatious litigator, requiring him to seek leave before he institutes

proceedings in that court. He further states that on June 20, 2025, the court granted him leave in

a specific matter. According to Plaintiff, this “confirms the continuing operation of the leave

regime and its ongoing burdens on my ability to petition.” (Id. at PAGEID #: 3.)

The Court has its own background to add. Plaintiff previously challenged the Supreme

Court’s March 2023 finding that he was a vexatious litigator in an action initiated in this Court

on March 6, 2023, Tingler v. Kennedy, Case No. 2:23-cv-911. That case, asserting a violation of

Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, suggesting violations of the Due Process and Equal

Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and seeking injunctive relief against each of

the seven Justices, was dismissed on October 12, 2023. (See ECF Nos. 5, 6 in Case No. 2:23-cv-

911.)

Plaintiff’s current action is directed to the same issues, albeit from a different angle. As

noted, Plaintiff now attempts to frame his claims as challenges to the Supreme Court Rule of

Practice underlying their finding that Plaintiff is a vexatious litigator. As the basis for his re-

framing, Plaintiff cites what he deems as an “admission by Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy,”

that the imposed filing restrictions authorized by Supreme Court Practice Rule 4.03(B) conflict

with Article IV, Section 2(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) Briefly, that

Section of Ohio’s Constitution prohibits the promulgation of rules “whereby any person shall be

prevented from invoking the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.” Id. In support of his

Complaint, Plaintiff has attached an excerpt of Chief Justice Kennedy’s concurring and

dissenting opinion from one of the fourteen Table decisions issued by the Supreme Court on

May 22, 2024, involving Ronald Bibb, also found to be a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R.

4.03(B). See Bibb v. Am. Elec. Power, 2024-Ohio-1930, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1449.1

1 See also Bibb v. Austin, 2024-Ohio-1922, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1423; Bibb v. Republican

Natl. Commt., 2024-Ohio-1922, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1423; Bibb v. Off. of Clerk, United States Ct. of

Appeals for Sixth Cir., 2024-Ohio-1922, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1423; Bibb v. Franklin Cty. Jury

Comm., 2024-Ohio-1935, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1471; Bibb v. OhioHealth Grant Med. Ctr., 2024-

Ohio-1927, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1435; Bibb v. State Med. Bd., 2024-Ohio-1928, 174 Ohio St. 3d

1440; Bibb v. Klein, 2024-Ohio-1932, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1458; Bibb v. Kentucky Dep't of Tourism,

2024-Ohio-1929, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1444; Bibb v. United States Steel, 2024-Ohio-1923, 174 Ohio

St. 3d 1426; Bibb v. Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter Co., L.P.A., 2024-Ohio-1934, 174 Ohio St. 3d

1467; Bibb v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 2024-Ohio-1931, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1453; Bibb v.

Coldwell Banker, 2024-Ohio-1926, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1431; Bibb v. Franklin Cty. Prob. Ct., 2024-

Ohio-1933, 174 Ohio St. 3d 1462.

As relevant here, in her opinion, Chief Justice Kennedy had this to say about the Supreme

Court’s filing restrictions:

Article IV, Section 2(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution is straightforward: “No law

shall be passed or rule made whereby any person shall be prevented from invoking

the original jurisdiction of the supreme court.”

…

Today and in the past, this court has imposed filing restrictions on relators, ordering

them to be “prohibited from continuing or instituting legal proceedings in this court

without first obtaining leave.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Tingler v. Franklin Cty.

Prosecutor's Office, 169 Ohio St.3d 1451, 2023-Ohio-641, 204 N.E.3d 554. We

were wrong to do that, and I was wrong to join those decisions. Those orders

contravened Article IV, Section 2(B)(3), which broadly safeguards the right of “any

person” to invoke the original jurisdiction of this court. “‘Any person’ means every

person” (emphasis sic), State v. Wells, 146 Ohio St. 131, 137, 64 N.E.2d 593 (1945),

including those who engage in frivolous litigation. And this court has recognized

that the language of Article IV, Section 2(B)(3) “will not permit this court either to

adopt or adhere to a rule which requires permission to invoke the exercise of its

original jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Toledo v. Lynch, 87 Ohio St. 444, 449, 101 N.E.

352 (1913).

Id., 2024-Ohio-1930, ⁋⁋ 9, 13.

From the focus of Chief Justice Kennedy’s dissent, Plaintiff extrapolates the following:

Given that the state constitution forbids rules that prevent any person from invoking

the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, ongoing enforcement of a prior

permission regime burdens a fundamental right to petition and denies equal access

to a state tribunal. That burden violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it

restricts speech and petitioning without narrow tailoring and without adequate

process, and it does so under color of state law.

(ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID #: 8.)

Against this backdrop, Plaintiff now asserts the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

restated here verbatim:

Count I First Amendment Petition Clause and Free Speech, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Petitioning courts is protected expression. Conditioning access to the Supreme

Court of Ohio’s original jurisdiction on prior leave is a prior restraint. The rule is

not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest and lacks required procedural

safeguards. It violates the Petition Clause and Free Speech Clause on its face and

as applied.

Count II Procedural Due Process, Fourteenth Amendment, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The rule deprives me of liberty interests in petitioning and court access without

adequate procedures. It authorizes standardless discretion, lacks prompt and

reasoned decisions, and provides no meaningful review.

Count III Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, via 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The rule discriminates against a class of speakers labeled vexatious by imposing

unique barriers to court access that others do not face. The classification burdens

fundamental rights and cannot survive strict scrutiny. It also fails rational basis

because less restrictive, case specific tools exist.2

Initially, despite his efforts to distinguish, Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine of

res judicata.3 Res judicata or “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that could

2 Plaintiff also includes a Fourth Count for Declaratory Judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§

2201 and 2202. The Declaratory Judgment Act, however, does not provide an independent cause

of action. Kelly v. Valeo N. Am., Inc., No. 2:24-CV-11066-TGB-KGA, 2025 WL 933943, at *8

(E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2025) (citing Davis v. United States, 499 F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2007).

“This is because a declaratory judgment is a remedy, not an independent claim.” Id. (citing

Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 587 (6th Cir. 2021)). “[I]n order to be entitled to

declaratory judgment, a plaintiff ‘must first succeed on a cognizable cause of action.’” Id.

(quoting Hancock v. Miller, No. 2:19-CV-00060, 2020 WL 1493609, at *22 (M.D. Tenn. Mar.

27, 2020)).

3 Plaintiff’s claims are also likely barred by the statute of limitations. By Plaintiff’s own

explanation, the Supreme Court applied the Rule he challenges here to deem him a vexatious

litigator on March 2, 2023. “’In Ohio, causes of action premised upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are

subject to a two-year statute of limitations.’” Boyer v. Clinton Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 645 F. Supp.

3d 815, 821 (S.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting Basista Holdings, LLC v. Ellsworth Twp., 710 F. App'x

688, 691 (6th Cir. 2017)). Plaintiff initiated this action on August 21, 2025. For his part,

Plaintiff attempts to circumvent this fact by citing to a recent screening undertaken by the

Supreme Court on June 20, 2025. See ECF No. 1-1 at 3, 23. Because there are several other

bases on which to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint here, the Undersigned will not

undertake an in-depth statute of limitations analysis.

have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.” Lucky

Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties may not

“relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in the

prior action.” Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021). “Suits involve the same claim

or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same transaction or involves a common nucleus

of operative facts.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

In the Sixth Circuit, claims are barred by res judicata if four elements are satisfied:

(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a

subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the

subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in

the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.

Trs. of Operating Eng'rs Loc. 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d

368, 380 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations and quotations omitted).

“If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, ‘[t]he weight of authority supports

dismissal for failure to state a claim.’” Turner v. DeJoy, No. 221CV02223SHLATC, 2022 WL

1817752, at *4–5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No.

221CV02223SHLATC, 2022 WL 1813910 (W.D. Tenn. June 2, 2022) (quoting Owens v. Shelby

Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:18-cv-02345-JTF-dkv, 2018 WL 4374238, at *8 (W.D. Tenn. Jul.

18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 4179076 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2018)

(collecting Sixth Circuit cases affirming Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal based on res judicata)). “Courts

are ‘empowered to raise res judicata sua sponte ... in the interests of, inter alia, the promotion of

judicial economy.’” Id. (quoting Holloway Const. Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 891 F.2d 1211,

1212 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted)). Finally, “res judicata is an appropriate basis to dismiss

for failure to state a claim during the initial screening of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).”

Id. (citing Smith v. Morgan, 75 F. App'x 505, 506 (6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal “pursuant

to § 1915(e) because the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of the instant complaint”) and

Leirer v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Compliance Unit, 246 F. App'x 372, 374 (6th Cir.

2007) (affirming dismissal based on res judicata pursuant to § 1915(e) because the plaintiff

“could have made all of the same allegations and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that

earlier second lawsuit”)).

Here, the first element of res judicata is satisfied because a final decision on the merits

was entered in Plaintiff’s prior case. See Tingler v. Kennedy, No. 2:23-CV-911, 2023 WL

5509517, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:23-CV-

0911, 2023 WL 6646598 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 12, 2023). Dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) constitutes a

final decision on the merits. See Davis v. Butler Cnty., Ohio, 658 Fed. App'x 208, 213 (6th Cir.

2016) (noting that “dismissal under § 1915(e) operates as an adjudication on the merits only as to

future complaints filed in forma pauperis”). The second element is satisfied because Plaintiff

filed the prior case against the then sitting justices of the Supreme Court seeking injunctive

relief. Id. The third element is satisfied because Plaintiff’s previous case involved the same

issue, whether Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the Supreme Court’s finding that he is a

vexatious litigator. Finally, the fourth element is satisfied because Plaintiff raises the same First

and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenges raised in his previous action to attack the

same vexatious litigator finding in this case.

Further, even if Plaintiff’s current angle, attacking S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B), somehow would

render res judicata inapplicable, his claims here still would fail. The starting point of any

analysis is the Supreme Court Rule itself, which provides:

If a party habitually, persistently, and without reasonable cause engages in frivolous

conduct under division (A) of this rule, the Supreme Court may, sua sponte or on

motion by a party, find the party to be a vexatious litigator. If the Supreme Court

determines that a party is a vexatious litigator under division (A) of this rule, the

court may impose filing restrictions on the party. The restrictions may include

prohibiting the party from continuing or instituting legal proceedings in the

Supreme Court without first obtaining leave, prohibiting the filing of actions in the

Supreme Court without the filing fee or security for costs required by S.Ct.Prac.R.

3.04 and 3.05, or any other restriction the Supreme Court considers just.

S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). The Supreme Court has described its authority under that Rule in this way:

We may declare a party to be a vexatious litigator if he has “habitually, persistently,

and without reasonable cause” engaged in frivolous conduct. Id. Habitual and

persistent frivolous conduct may occur in a single case before the court. This

understanding of S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) is consistent with the vexatious-litigator

statute applicable to conduct in Ohio's courts of appeals and trial courts. See R.C.

2323.52(A)(3) (defining “vexatious litigator” to include any person “who has

habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged in vexatious

conduct in a civil action or actions” [emphasis added]); see also Farley v. Farley,

2003-Ohio-3185, 2003 WL 21405558, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.) (noting that under R.C.

2323.52(A)(3), “the finding that a person is a vexatious litigator can be based upon

his or her behavior in a single civil action or multiple civil actions”).

State ex rel. Ware v. Vigluicci, 2024-Ohio-5492, 177 Ohio St. 3d 381, 383–84.

Notably, Section 2323.52 of the Ohio Revised Code, the statute governing Ohio’s lower

courts, is not new to this Court. As this Court has explained, that statute does not pose an

absolute bar to litigation.4 Id. “’Instead, it establishes a screening mechanism under which the

vexatious litigator can petition the declaring court, on a case-by-case basis, for a determination of

whether any proposed action is abusive or groundless.’” Brock v. Att'y Gen. of The State of

Ohio, Mike Dewine, No. 2:15-CV-3050, 2015 WL 9478195, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 29, 2015),

report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Brock v. Att'y Gen. of the State of Ohio, No. 2:15-

CV-3050, 2016 WL 2621991 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2016) (citing O.R.C. § 2323.52(D)(1)(a), (b),

(3)). (quoting Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St. 3d 3, 15 (2000)). The same can be said of the

Supreme Court Rule Plaintiff challenges here based on its plain language. Accordingly, the

4 Indeed, it did not operate as a bar to Plaintiff’s ability to “commence proposed writs of

mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus” for which he sought leave on June 16, 2025. ECF

No. 1-1 at 23.

Court’s analysis relying on Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2013), applied in rejecting

Plaintiff’s previous challenge to the Supreme Court’s ruling that he is a vexatious litigator,

applies equally here.

Plaintiff’s reliance on what he characterizes as Justice Kennedy’s “admission” as the

impetus for his current claims does nothing to change that. This is so because, most simply, as a

dissenting opinion, it cannot be found to have any binding impact warranting consideration here.

See generally Sanders v. Wayne State Univ., No. 22-12025, 2023 WL 6035570, at *3 (E.D.

Mich. Aug. 9, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-CV-12025, 2024 WL 340812

(E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2024) (recognizing the non-binding nature of dissenting opinions). Equally

fundamental, to the extent Justice Kennedy reasoned that S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) violates the Ohio

Constitution, that document is one of independent force and may afford greater rights than those

secured by the U.S. Constitution. State v. Mole, 2016-Ohio-5124, 149 Ohio St. 3d 215.

Plaintiff’s claims here, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seek remedies based on alleged

violations of the U.S. Constitution. Gammarino v. Sycamore Twp., No. 1:22-CV-200, 2024 WL

760097, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2024), aff'd sub nom. Gammarino v. Sycamore Twp., OH, No.

24-3149, 2025 WL 674222 (6th Cir. Mar. 3, 2025) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a private cause of

action to remedy violations of the United States Constitution not the Ohio Constitution).

Moving on more specifically to Plaintiff’s claims, he seeks, in part, a declaration that

S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) is facially unconstitutional for violating the First and Fourteenth

Amendments. In Hall, the Sixth Circuit rejected these same arguments when directed to Section

2323.52 of the Ohio Revised Code.

As for a First Amendment claim, the Sixth Circuit noted, “although access to courts is a

fundamental right, the ability to file frivolous lawsuits is not.” Hall, 727 F.3d at 456 (citing Bill

Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983) (“Just as false statements are not

immunized by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, baseless litigation is not

immunized by the First Amendment right to petition.”) (citations omitted)). Because “vexatious

conduct is not protected by the First Amendment,” and because vexatious litigators are not

banned from filing future lawsuits “as long as those lawsuits have merit,” the Court held that §

2323.52 did not infringe upon the First Amendment. Id. at 456-457.

The Hall Court also rejected the argument that Ohio’s vexatious litigator statute violated

the Due Process Clause, for two reasons. Id. at 457. First, Ohio’s vexatious litigator statute

“does not arbitrarily and capriciously deprive citizens of a constitutionally protected liberty or

property interest,” because it is “rationally related to legitimate ends, so it is not arbitrary.” Id.

(citing Grundstein v. Ohio, No. 1:06-cv-2381, 2006 WL 34999990, at *6; Regents of Univ. of

Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985)). And second, the

statute “also restrains narrowly only the conduct it seeks to prohibit, by providing a mechanism

by which even vexatious litigants can file meritorious actions.” Id.

Finally, the Hall Court held that the argument that Ohio’s vexatious litigator statute

violated the Equal Protection Clause “clearly has no merit,” because Plaintiff had failed to

“demonstrate that a discrimination of some substance has occurred which has not occurred

against other individuals who were similarly situated.” Id. (citing City of Cleburne, Texas v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

Additional reasoning in Hall also forecloses Plaintiff’s as-applied constitutional

challenge to S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). To the extent Plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Rule is

unconstitutional as applied in his prior state court proceeding and seeks relief from that

judgment, such a claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine limits this

Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate appeals from or collateral attacks on state-court rulings. See

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the

notion that appellate review of state-court decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings

is limited to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack

jurisdiction to review such matters.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries

caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi

Basic Ind. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “The pertinent question in determining whether a

federal district court is precluded under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-

matter jurisdiction over a claim is whether the source of the injury upon which plaintiff bases his

federal claim is the state court judgment.” In re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s attempt to pre-empt application of this doctrine is to no avail. His claim that

he is not seeking review of a specific judgment but bringing only a general challenge is belied by

his requested relief. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4, 5.) For example, at paragraph B of his Request for

Relief, he seeks his release from continued vexatious litigator restrictions. Further, he requests

that this Court direct the Supreme Court “to instruct the Clerk to accept and docket [his]

pleadings without a leave prerequisite.” (Id. at 5 ⁋ C.) These are nothing but requests that this

Court reject the Supreme Court’s judgment. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks this relief,

his claim is plainly barred by Rooker-Feldman and should be dismissed.

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED in

their entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim for which relief can

be granted.

III.

For the reasons explained above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be

DISMISSED in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is

FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that

for the foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation

would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff’s application to proceed

in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely

objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v.

Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report,

which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . .

.” (citation omitted)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: October 1, 2025 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers__________

ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE