The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BLUE CASTLE (CAYMAN) LTD.,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEE CHANG YEE A/K/A DECHANG YEE
A/K/A DE YEE, PETER DEYU TAN, CITY OF MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
NEW YORK ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 23-cv-01724 (LDH) (LB)
BOARD, CITY OF NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
PARKING VIOLATIONS BUREAU, SING
CHEN, SUN ZHEN, ANN CHEN,
Defendant.
LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:
Presently before the Court is Blue Castle (Cayman) Ltd.’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for
reconsideration, (see Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 31), of this Court’s
Memorandum and Order, which adopted, in its entirety, then-Magistrate Judge Lois Bloom’s
report and recommendation (the “R&R”) concerning Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment
against Dee Chang Yee a/k/a Dechang Yee a/k/a De Yee, Peter Deyu Tan (“Defendant Tan”),
the City of New York Environmental Control Board, the City Of New York Department Of
Transportation Parking Violations Bureau, Sing Chen, Sun Zhen, and Ann Chen (collectively,
“Defendants”). (See Mem. and Order, dated Sept. 30, 2024, ECF No. 29.)
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ general familiarity with this litigation and recites only the
facts relevant to Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion. On March 6, 2023, Plaintiff brought this
diversity foreclosure action against Defendants pursuant to New York Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) Article 13, seeking to foreclose on a mortgage encumbering
certain real property located at 132-05 Avery Avenue, Flushing, NY 11355. Plaintiff moved for
a default judgment and judgment of foreclosure and sale against Defendants. On February 20,
2024, Magistrate Judge Bloom issued the R&R recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for default
judgment be denied and the complaint be dismissed without prejudice. (R&R, ECF No. 25.)
Plaintiff timely objected, contesting one-of-two grounds upon which the R&R recommended
dismissal: Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the RPAPL. Ultimately, by Memorandum and
Order dated September 30, 2024, (the “Memorandum and Order”), this Court overruled
Plaintiff’s objection and denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment on the same two grounds
pronounced in the R&R. Specifically, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment was denied
because: (1) Plaintiff’s allegation of compliance with the RPAPL was not well-pleaded and its
section 1306 filings were untimely; and (2) Plaintiff failed to comply with the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”) as to Defendant Tan.1 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration of this Court’s denial of its motion for default judgment. (See
generally Pl.’s Mot.)
DISCUSSION
“The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the sound discretion
of the district court.” Mauze v. CBS Corp., No. 15-CV-4905, 2019 WL 8137641, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019) (citation omitted). However, “[t]he standard for granting . . . a motion
[for reconsideration] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving
1 Although not referenced in the Court’s Memorandum and Order nor substantively relied on in the R&R, the R&R
also referenced a third reason why Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment should be denied: Plaintiff’s unexplained
failure to include Defendants’ actual last known phone numbers in its § 1306 filings. (R&R at n.5.) As then-
Magistrate Judge Bloom noted, Plaintiff’s failure to include a reachable phone number—and instead providing
Defendants’ phone number as “111111111”—made it “impossible for the state to call [D]efendants to offer them
foreclosure assistance.” (Id.)
party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Shrader
v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). “The major grounds justifying
reconsideration are an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or
the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Of course, “a motion to reconsider should not be granted where the moving party
seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257. Further, “[a] party
seeking reconsideration may not ‘advance new facts, issues or arguments not previously
presented to the Court.’” McBeth v. Gabrielli Truck Sales, Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 392, 395
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citation omitted). This is because “[a] court cannot overlook matters which
were not before it previously.” Green v. Gonzalez, No. 09 CIV. 2636 (PAC) (KNF), 2010 WL
5094340, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2010)
Here, much of Plaintiff’s arguments in support of its motion for reconsideration equate to
an improper rehashing of issues previously addressed by this Court in the Memorandum and
Order. See Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Rule 59 is not a
vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on
the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’”). Indeed, in its motion for
reconsideration, Plaintiff neither points to an intervening change in controlling law nor the
availability of new evidence. Instead, Plaintiff improperly raises new arguments in its
reconsideration motion that it failed to assert in the underlying motion. See Sequa Corp., 156
F.3d at 144. Specifically, and notwithstanding the R&R recommending denial of Plaintiff’s
motion on each ground it now contests, Plaintiff argues for the first time that: (1) it was improper
for this Court to premise the denial of its motion on Plaintiff’s failure to comply with RPAPL
without Defendants initially raising this defense, (Pl.’s Mot. at 9-11); and (2) that section 3953 of
the SCAR dictates that the SCAR does not afford protection to Defendant Tan, (Pl.’s Mot. 11-
13). (See also R&R at 8-11, n.8.) Because Plaintiff neither raised these arguments in its
underlying motion nor in its filed objections, it waived its right to seek reconsideration on both
points. Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). Put differently,
Plaintiff’s sole arguments for reconsideration are foreclosed from this Court’s consideration.
Cooke v. Frank Brunckhorst Co., LLC, 734 F. Supp. 3d 206, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (new
arguments are “not cognizable on a motion for reconsideration”). This, alone, is fatal to
Plaintiff’s reconsideration motion. In any event, the Court is certain that the express language of
the SCRA supports the denial of Plaintiff’s default judgment motion notwithstanding the new
argument raised by Plaintiff.
“Pursuant to the SCRA, in any civil action in which the defendant does not make an
appearance, the plaintiff is required to file an affidavit with the court before entering default
judgment: (a) stating whether or not the defendant is in military service and showing necessary
facts to support the affidavit; or (b) if the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the
defendant is in military service, stating that the plaintiff is unable to determine whether or not the
defendant is in military service . . . .” (Pl.’s Mot. at 10-11 (citing 50 U.S.C.A. § 3931).) For a
plaintiff to satisfy section 3931(b), it is required to provide specific facts necessary to support its
conclusion regarding whether the defendant is in military service. Uribe v. Nieves, No. 17-CV-
5155(RRM) (RER), 2018 WL 4861377, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2018) (“The affidavit must
provide the specific facts necessary to support the conclusion stated, and may not be based on
conclusory statements or on ‘information and belief.’” (citations omitted)). Against this
backdrop, Plaintiff argues that it would manifest injustice if the Court were to not consider
reversing its decision. (See Pl. Mot. at 9-13.) In doing so, Plaintiff attempts to do violence to the
SCRA by effectively erasing the section that seeks to protect servicemembers from default
judgments. The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s antics.
Notwithstanding Plaintiff referencing the very section of the SCRA that precludes it from
being granted default judgment in this case (50 U.S.C. § 3931), Plaintiff inexplicably argues 50
U.S.C. § 3953(a) renders 50 U.S.C. § 3931 obsolete. (Pl.’s Mot at 12-13.) That is, Plaintiff
argues that because 50 U.S.C. § 3953(a) instructs that this “section” applies only to obligors on
real or personal property, the entire SCRA does not extend protection to servicemembers when
the underlying action relates to mortgages and deeds of trust. (Pl.’s Mot. at 12; see also 50
U.S.C. § 3953(a).) This is patently false. Plaintiff’s interpretation attempts to substitute the
word “section” with “chapter” in 50 U.S.C. § 3953(a) in a manner that would render 50 U.S.C. §
3931 meaningless. 2 Indeed, the absurdity of Plaintiff’s argument is amplified by the title of 50
U.S.C. § 3931: “Protection of servicemembers against default judgments.” 50 U.S.C. § 3931.
Section 3953 in no ways diminishes the mandatory procedures in Section 3931 that are designed
to protect servicemembers against default judgments. Further, “[t]he court lacks discretion to
excuse the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statute.” Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y, FSB as
trustee of Aspen Holdings Tr. v. Fernandez, 712 F. Supp. 3d 324, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2024).
2 By Plaintiff’s own admission, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3953 is inapplicable to the instant action because Defendant Tan is
not an obligor. Moreover, the case cited by Plaintiff, Gustavia Home, LLC v. Vaz, is readily distinguishable from
this case. (Pl.’s Mot. at 12 (citing Gustavia Home, LLC, 488 F. Supp. 3d 17 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).) For example, in
Gustavia Home, LLC, the court had already granted Plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of foreclosure and sale and,
most importantly, the defendant servicemember had appeared in the action and requested that the sale at issue there
be stayed. 488 F. Supp. 3d at 18. Here, no judgment of foreclosure and sale has been entered and Defendant Tan
has not appeared.
Plaintiff also claims it complied with section 3931(b) vis-à-vis its January 2024
Declaration. (Pl.’s Mot. at 11; see also Malekan Decl. ¶¶ 4-6, ECF No. 31-8). This declaration,
however, is wholly insufficient because it makes no reference to Defendant Tan nor does it
provide specific facts adduced from an investigation that would necessarily support its
conclusion as to Defendant Tan’s military service, as required. See Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc'y,
FSB as trustee of Aspen Holdings Tr., 712 F. Supp. 3d at 332-33 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (holding
affidavits did not comply with the SCRA because they failed to “describe any investigation
[plaintiff] might have conducted to form [its] belief” as to defendant’s military status).
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment was rightfully denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH
September 30, 2025 LASHANN DEARCY HALL
United States District Judge