Brown v. Cole CA2/2

Filed 10/3/25 Brown v. Cole CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

LANA BROWN, B339587

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 23STCV24085)

v.

JONATHAN COLE,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles

County. Jessica A. Uzcategui, Judge. Affirmed.

PTAH Law Group and Cherisse Gay Lanier for Plaintiff and

Appellant.

Lester, Cantrell & Kraus, Colin A. Northcutt and Cole Heggi for

Defendant and Respondent.

________________________________

Lana Brown appeals from an order entered after the trial court

granted a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, commonly

known as an anti-SLAPP motion) filed by defendant Jonathan Cole.

Brown alleges that Cole engaged in misconduct while serving as court-

appointed counsel and guardian ad litem in underlying probate and

trust proceedings. In her opening brief, Brown argues that the trial

court erred in granting Cole’s anti-SLAPP motion because (among

other asserted errors) the court should not have found that the claims

against Cole arose from protected activity under the anti-SLAPP

statute.

Brown, however, has failed to provide an adequate record for

appellate review. We must presume that the record before the trial

court supports its ruling, and we accordingly affirm the order granting

Cole’s anti-SLAPP motion.

BACKGROUND

In designating the record on appeal, Brown requested that the

court clerk provide only a handful of documents. Noticeably absent

from Brown’s designation were her complaint, Cole’s Anti-SLAPP

motion, Brown’s own opposition papers, the reply, evidence submitted

by the parties in connection with the motion, objections to the evidence,

and other documents necessary for an adequate review. (See Cal. Rules

of Court, rule 8.122(a), (b)(3)(A)–(B) [notice designating documents in a

clerk’s transcript must include documents filed in trial court and

exhibits admitted in evidence].)

As the record on appeal is inadequate, we briefly summarize the

factual background recounted in the trial court’s order granting Cole’s

anti-SLAPP motion: In February 2020, Brown filed a petition for

conservatorship of Grace Elaine Taylor Barnwell, alleging that

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Shavonne Hunter, Barnwell’s niece, was financially abusing Barnwell.1

Hunter filed a competing petition for conservatorship, alleging that

Brown exerted undue influence over Barnwell, inducing her to modify

her estate plan. The probate court appointed Cole as court-appointed

counsel for Barnwell, and later as her guardian ad litem. Cole’s actions

included seeking confirmation that Barnwell’s property was held in a

trust, and requesting and obtaining appointment of a special trustee.

Following Barnwell’s death in 2022, Brown filed the complaint in this

case, alleging causes of action including financial elder abuse,

professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty against Cole and

the special trustee. According to the trial court’s order, the gravamen

of Brown’s complaint against Cole is that he used his position as court-

appointed counsel and guardian ad litem to commit elder abuse, and

that he failed to protect Barnwell’s interests.

The trial court granted Cole’s anti-SLAPP motion on May 16,

2024, finding that the causes of action against Cole arose from

protected activity, and that Brown could not demonstrate a probability

of prevailing on the merits because Cole’s conduct as court-appointed

counsel and guardian ad litem was protected by quasi-judicial

immunity.

Brown filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Parties who challenge an order on appeal must provide an

adequate record for review. “A fundamental principle of appellate

practice is that an appellant ‘ “must affirmatively show error by an

adequate record. ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed

correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it

on matters as to which the record is silent.’ ” ’ ” (Null v. City of Los

1 The limited record does not explain the nature of Brown’s

relationship with Barnwell. The opening brief states that they were

close friends.

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Angeles (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1528, 1532.) When the appellant fails to

provide a record sufficient to evaluate her claims, the court must

resolve the issues against her. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281,

1295–1296.) The paltry record in this matter is insufficient to evaluate

Brown’s claims that the trial court erred in granting Cole’s anti-SLAPP

motion.

As noted above, Brown’s notice designating the record on appeal

failed to seek inclusion of nearly every essential document.

Consequently, her opening brief lacks record citations and relies on

unsupported assertions, violating the rule that a party must support

factual assertions with citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court,

rule 8.204(a)(1)(C); Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48

Cal.App.5th 1014, 1079.) “The claimed existence of facts that are not

supported by citations to pages in the appellate record . . . cannot be

considered by this court.” (Mueller v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 176

Cal.App.4th 809, 816, fn. 5.)

“ ‘[I]t is axiomatic that statements made in briefs are not

evidence’ [citation] and that reviewing courts ‘do not consider’

unsupported ‘factual assertions’ in appellate briefs ‘that find no basis in

the record.’ ” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 697.) Brown

argues broadly that the claims against Cole did not arise from

protected activity and that quasi-judicial immunity did not cover Cole’s

conduct as court-appointed counsel and guardian ad litem. But without

the pertinent pleadings, motion and opposition papers, or evidence, we

cannot meaningfully review the trial court’s order granting Cole’s

motion. Because the record is inadequate, we must presume the trial

court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion was correct. (Roberson v.

City of Rialto (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1507 [“In the absence of an

adequate record, the judgment is presumed correct.”].)

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DISPOSITION

The May 16, 2024 order is affirmed. Cole is entitled to his costs

on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

*Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, assigned by

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California

Constitution.

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