(SS) Menchaca v. Commissioner of Social Security

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOSE GAMBINO MENCHACA, ) Case No.: 1:23-cv-1334 JLT GSA

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12 Plaintiff, ) ORDER ADOPTING THE FINDINGS AND

) RECOMMENDATIONS, DENYING

13 v. ) PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

) JUDGMENT, GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

14 FRANK BISIGNANO, ) REQUEST TO AFFIRM, AND DIRECTING

Commissioner of Social Security1, ) ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF

15 ) DEFENDANT

Defendant. )

16 ) (Docs. 16, 20, and 21)

17 Jose Gambino Menchaca seeks judicial review of a final decision denying his application for

18 supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Docs. 1, 16.) Plaintiff

19 asserts the ALJ erred in evaluating the record and finding that he does not suffer from a severe mental

20 health impairment. (See Doc. 16.) The Commissioner asserts the ALJ’s analysis was proper, and

21 substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. (Doc. 17.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s

22 appeal is denied and Commissioner’s request to affirm is granted.

23 I. Decision of the ALJ

24 The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s application using the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in

25 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. (Doc. 12-2 at 19-31.) First, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not engage in

26 substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset date of November 4, 2020. (Id. at 21.) Next, the ALJ

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28 1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal

1 determined that Plaintiff had the following medically determinable impairments:

2 1) history of polysubstance abuse/addiction (opioid []intravenous (IV)

heroin) and methamphetamines (now on methadone maintenance); 2)

3 alcohol use in remission; 3) hepatitis C; 4) hypoglycemia; 5) rash; 6)

dermatitis (neck rash); 7) major depressive disorder; 8) unspecified

4 anxiety disorder; 9) gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD); and 10)

lumbar spine problem (mild lumbar spine disc height loss L5-S1/mild

5 anterior marginal spurring L2-5/mild diffuse facet hypertrophy)…

6 (Id. at 21-22.) However, the ALJ found Plaintiff did “not have an impairment or combination of

7 impairments that has significantly limited (or is expected to significantly limit) the ability to perform

8 basic work related activities for 12 consecutive months.” (Id. at 23.) In so finding, the ALJ considered

9 the medical record and testimonial evidence from Plaintiff and a lay witness. (See id. at 23-31.)

10 The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s mental impairments using the four functional areas in Section

11 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments, also known as the “Paragraph B” criteria: (1) “understanding,

12 remembering, or applying information;” (2) “interacting with others;” (3) “concentrating, persisting, or

13 maintaining pace;” and (4) “adapting or managing oneself.” (Doc. 12-2 at 28-30.) The ALJ found

14 Plaintiff had mild limitations in each of the four functional areas. (Id.) The ALJ held: “Because the

15 claimant’s medically determinable mental impairments cause no more than ‘mild’ limitation in any of

16 the functional areas and the evidence does not otherwise indicate that there is more than a minimal

17 limitation in the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, they are nonsevere.” (Id. at 30.) The

18 ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “physical and mental impairments, considered singly and in

19 combination, [did] not significantly limit the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” (Id.

20 at 31.) Thus, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (Id.)

21 II. Issues Raised by Plaintiff

22 Plaintiff seeks remand for further proceedings, asserting that “[t]he ALJ failed to properly

23 support the finding that Plaintiff does not suffer from a severe mental health impairment.” (Doc. 16 at

24 13, emphasis omitted.) Plaintiff contends “anxiety and depression are ‘severe’ in nature, as these

25 impairments pass the ‘de minimus screening’ test established in Webb v. Barnhart, F.3d 686-687 (9th

26 Cir. 2005), and SSR 85-28.” (Id.) He observes that Dr. Butler performed a consultative examination,

27 and opined Plaintiff was “moderately limited in the ability to handle the usual stressors in the

28 workplace.” (Id., citing AR 313-314 [Doc. 12-2 at 317-18].) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in

1 reconciling the findings of Dr. Butler with the record and failed to properly discount the opinion. (Id.

2 at 14-16.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ “failed to support the rejection of Dr. Butler’s

3 opinion that Plaintiff was at least moderately impaired and … thus, indeed met the ‘severe impairment’

4 standard.” (Id. at 17.)

5 In addition, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “erred dismissing Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.”

6 (Doc. 16 at 17.) Plaintiff asserts the ALJ did not properly address factors such as his level of activity,

7 because “the cognitive skill level involved in such acts does not equate to the ability to perform skilled

8 or even semi-skilled work,” and his activities were “not evidence of the ability to sustain full time

9 skilled work.” (Id. at 18-19.) He indicates that he “should not be penalized for attempting to lead

10 normal lives in face of their limitations.” (Id. at 19, citation omitted.) Plaintiff also asserts the ALJ

11 wrongfully considered his lack of treatment for mental impairments, because the ALJ did not

12 acknowledge that he “is homeless and lacks resources.” (Id. at 20.) He identifies medical evidence he

13 believes supports his subjective statements. (Id. at 20-21.) Plaintiff concludes the record shows he has

14 a severe mental impairment. (Id. at 22-23.)

15 III. Findings and Recommendations

16 The magistrate judge found the evidence upon which Plaintiff relies “does not establish a severe

17 impairment even if adopted.” (Doc. 21 at 5.) The magistrate judge observed that Plaintiff “relies

18 heavily, if not exclusively,” on the finding from Dr. Butler that Plaintiff was “moderately impaired in

19 his ability to deal with the usual stress encountered in the workplace.” (Id. at 6, emphasis omitted.).

20 However, the magistrate judge found: “even accepting Dr. Butler’s functional assessment in full,

21 including the moderate impairment as to stress intolerance, it would not necessarily establish a severe

22 mental impairment because it would not establish more than mild limitations in the paragraph B criteria

23 …, nor constitute a significant limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities....”

24 (Id.) The magistrate judge observed that the Ninth Circuit determined “a moderate limitation with

25 respect to one work activity does not translate into a severe mental impairment.” (Id., citing Koehler v.

26 Astrue, 283 Fed. Appx. 443, 445 (9th Cir. 2008); Ward v. Berryhill, 711 Fed. Appx. 822, 824 (9th

27 Cir. 2017).) Consequently, the magistrate found that Dr. Butler’s opinion “does not necessarily

28 translate to Plaintiff having a severe mental impairment.” (Id. at 7.)

1 Next, the magistrate judge found the ALJ properly considered several factors to reject Plaintiff’s

2 subjective complaints, including Plaintiff’s level of activity, the medical evidence, and Plaintiff’s lack

3 of treatment. (Doc. 21 at 7-10.) The magistrate judge determined the ALJ identified activities that

4 were “in tension with Dr. Butler’s opinion that Plaintiff’s stress tolerance was significantly limited …

5 [and] Plaintiff’s related testimony, such as his fear of going outside.” (Id. at 8.) The magistrate judge

6 also opined, “The ALJ did not err in finding Dr. Butler’s mental status examination findings

7 unsupportive of a moderate impairment in stress tolerance.” (Id. at 9.) Finally, the magistrate judge

8 determined the ALJ properly considered the reasoning Plaintiff’s lack of treatment, which Plaintiff did

9 not attribute to homelessness when testifying at the hearing, but rather to closure of the clinic he “was

10 just used to … going to.” (Id. at 10, quoting AR 53 [Doc. 12-2 at 57].)

11 The magistrate judge concluded substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff

12 did not have a severe mental impairment. (Doc. 21 at 10.) Thus, the magistrate judge recommended

13 the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion, and

14 affirm the ALJ’s decision. (Id.)

15 IV. Objections and Reply

16 Plaintiff requests the Court decline to adopt the Findings and Recommendations and remand

17 for further proceedings. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff contends the magistrate judge erred in stating that “the

18 ALJ must consider all of the evidence in record, not just one lone sentence,” and this holding includes

19 “two fallacies”: (1) an ALJ must consider “the number of assessed limitations, [rather than] the degree

20 of assessed limitations” and (2) Plaintiff does not rely only upon “a single sentence” to support his

21 assertion of a severe mental impairment. (Id. at 2, emphasis in original.) Plaintiff maintains the ALJ

22 erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Butler. (Id. at 3-4.) In addition, Plaintiff reiterates the argument

23 raised in his opening brief that ALJ properly rejected his subjective statements. (Id. at 4-6; compare

24 with Doc. 16 at 17-21.)

25 The Commissioner filed a response to the objections, “largely [relying] on his earlier brief and

26 the Recommendations.” (Doc. 23.) The Commissioner notes that while Plaintiff faults the magistrate

27 judge for considering “the number” of his assessed moderate impairments, the magistrate judge

28 “merely quot[ed] the Ninth Circuit’s instruction.” (Id. at 2.) The Commissioner asserts the magistrate

1 judge properly considered the ALJ’s analysis and determined that even if the ALJ accepted the

2 functional assessment, the findings of Dr. Butler “would not necessarily establish a severe mental

3 impairment because it would not 1) establish more than mild limitations in the Paragraph B criteria, or

4 2) constitute a significant limitation on Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities.” (Id. at 2-3,

5 emphasis omitted.) The Commissioner notes that Plaintiff does not reply to the cases cited by the

6 magistrate judge to support the decision—including Koehler and Ward—and argues that as a result

7 Plaintiff “forfeited the issue.” (Id. at 3.) The Commissioner contends the magistrate judge properly

8 found “the ALJ had satisfied the ‘clear and convincing’ standard in assessing symptom testimony.”

9 (Id. at 6; see also id. at 3-5.)

10 V. Discussion

11 A district judge may “accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and

12 recommendations...” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files objections, “the court shall make a

13 determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed finding or recommendations to

14 which objection is made.” Id. A de novo review requires the Court to “consider[] the matter anew, as

15 if no decision had been rendered.” Dawson v. Marshall, 561 F.3d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 2009).

16 A. Step Two

17 The inquiry at step two is a de minimus screening for severe impairments “to dispose of

18 groundless claims.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). At step

19 two, a claimant must make a “threshold showing” that (1) he has a medically determinable impairment

20 or combination of impairments and (2) the impairment or combination of impairments is severe.

21 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1987); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.922(a). For an impairment to

22 be “severe,” it must significantly limit the claimant’s “physical or mental ability to do basic work

23 activities,” or the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.922(a)-(b).

24 Plaintiff failed to carry this burden to show his mental impairments are severe.

25 B. Plaintiff’s assessed functional abilities

26 As discussed above, Dr. Butler performed a consultative psychological examination of Plaintiff

27 and made findings regarding Plaintiff’s functional abilities. (Doc. 12-2 at 315-319.) Dr. Butler opined

28 Plaintiff’s “ability to deal with the usual stress encountered in the workplace [was] moderately

1 impaired.” (Id. at 318.) However, as Plaintiff acknowledges, Dr. Butler found Plaintiff was “mildly

2 impaired” with other areas of functioning, including performing simple, detailed, and complex tasks;

3 performing “work activities on a consistent basis without special or additional instruction;” and the

4 “ability to maintain regular attendance and complete a normal workday/workweek without interruption

5 from a psychiatric condition.” (Id.; see also Doc. 16 at 8-9.) Dr. Butler also determined Plaintiff was

6 “unimpaired” with the abilities “to accept instruction from a supervisor” and “interact with coworkers

7 and the public.” (Id.)

8 The ALJ reviewed the evidence and found the determination that Plaintiff had a “moderate”

9 limitation was “not persuasive” because was not supported by the physician’s own observations or

10 Plaintiff’s self-reports at the consultative examination. (Doc. 12-2 at 28, citation omitted.) In

11 addition, the ALJ determined the finding was not consistent with other evidence, including “an earlier

12 treating examination of a normal mood and affect or with an even earlier observation at intake

13 assessment for substance use treatment that the claimant was high functioning.” (Id., citation omitted.)

14 Towards this end, the ALJ considered the required supportability and consistency factors in addressing

15 the decision of Dr. Butler.2 See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 20

16 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2) (“we will explain how we considered the

17 supportability and consistency factors for a medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative

18 medical findings in your determination or decision”).

19 Even if the ALJ did not properly find the moderate limitation was “not persuasive,” the Ninth

20 Circuit expressly determined such a moderate limitation “does not mandate” a conclusion that a

21 claimant’s impairment is “severe” at step two. Koehler, 283 Fed. Appx. at 445; see also Ward, 711

22 Fed. Appx. at 824. Indeed, in Koehler, the same moderate limitation was in issue: the ability to

23 respond to changes in the workplace setting. The Court explained, “The regulatory scheme … does not

24 mandate that the diagnosis of a ‘moderate’ degree of limitation in one's ability to respond to changes in

25 the workplace setting must be found to be a ‘sever[e]’ mental impairment.” Koehler, 283 Fed. Appx. at

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27 2 The supportability inquiry is an assessment of “the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by

explaining the relevant objective medical evidence.” Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal

28 quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, consistency compares an opinion with other evidence to determine its

1 445. Similarly, in Ward, the Court found an ALJ did not err in finding the claimant did not have a

2 severe mental impairment, despite a physician’s determination that Ward was “moderately impaired”

3 with the ability to “maintain regular attendance in the work place and perform work activities on a

4 consistent basis.” Ward, 711 Fed. Appx. at 824. The Court explained, “An ALJ must consider all of

5 the evidence in the record, not just a lone sentence.” (Id., emphasis added.) The Court noted the ALJ

6 considered the physician’s decision, which included finding that Ward was “unimpaired” and “mildly

7 impaired” with other functional areas. Id. Therefore, the Court rejected Ward’s assertion that the one

8 moderate impairment “means that [he] has a severe mental impairment.” Id.

9 As the Ninth Circuit determined in Koehler and Ward, the one “moderate” limitation identified

10 by Dr. Butler neither undermines the ALJ’s findings nor mandates a finding that Plaintiff has severe

11 mental impairments. Moreover, the decision of the ALJ is supported by the medical opinions of Drs.

12 Schwartz and Cosgrove, who reviewed the medical record—including the findings from Dr. Butler—

13 and found Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe. (Doc. 12-2 at 30, 70, 83-84.)

14 C. Plaintiff’s subjective statements

15 To evaluate a claimant’s statements regarding the severity of his symptoms, an ALJ must

16 determine first whether objective medical evidence shows an underlying impairment “which could

17 reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504

18 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)).

19 Second, if there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must set forth clear and convincing reasons for

20 rejecting subjective complaints. Id. at 1036. The ALJ found Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

21 impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms.” (Doc. 12-2 at 24.)

22 However, the ALJ also determined “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence

23 and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent…” (Id.)

24 Evaluating Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s level of activity,

25 lack of work history, the treatment sought and received, and inconsistencies with the medical record.

26 (Doc. 12-2 at 24-25, 28.) The parties dispute whether the reasons identified by the ALJ are “clear and

27 convincing” reasons.

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1 1. Plaintiff’s work history

2 As an initial matter, the ALJ observed: “While the claimant said he had not worked full-time

3 since the amended alleged onset date, he admitted at the hearing that he had never had a real job in the

4 past because he had spent a lot of time in prison.” (Doc. 12-2 at 24.) The ALJ observed that “[t]his

5 peaks to an unavailability for work, not to symptoms that have limited his ability to work.” (Id.) In

6 addition, the ALJ noted Plaintiff “admitted that he had engaged in casual work in the past and had

7 continued to do so since the alleged onset date,” including working on cars, “changing oil, or working

8 on brakes.” (Id.)

9 Importantly, a claimant’s work record—or the lack thereof—can be considered in evaluating the

10 credibility of subjective complaints. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting the

11 claimant’s “extremely poor work history”); 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3) (“We will consider all of the

12 evidence presented, including information about your prior work record”). The ALJ did not err in

13 considering Plaintiff’s work history in evaluating his statements concerning the severity of his

14 symptoms. See, e.g., Taylor v. Colvin, 618 Fed. Appx. 342, 343 (9th Cir. 2015) (“the ALJ also

15 reasonably took into account [claimant's] poor work history”); Kimmel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018

16 WL 4204786, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2018) (finding the “ALJ reasonably found that Plaintiff’s

17 poor work history suggested that his current unemployment might not be due to any impairment,” even

18 where the claimant reported “his history of incarceration” explained the poor work history). Therefore,

19 Plaintiff’s work history was a clear and convincing reason to support the ALJ’s decision.3

20 2. Plaintiff’s reported activities

21 A claimant’s level of activity may support an ALJ’s determination to give less weight to his

22 subjective statements. When a claimant spends a substantial part of the day “engaged in pursuits

23 involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific

24 finding as to this fact may be sufficient to discredit a claimant’s allegations.” Morgan v. Comm’r of

25 the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). In addition, the Ninth

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27 3 Although Plaintiff acknowledged his testimony concerning working on cars, he did not challenge the ALJ’s consideration

of his work history. (Doc. 16 at 19.) Thus, any challenge to this factor was waived. Bray v. Comm’r of SSA, 554 F.3d

28 1219, 1226 n.7 (9th Cir. 2009) (argument not made in a claimant’s opening brief was deemed waived); Zango v. Kaspersky

1 Circuit determined that a claimant’s activities may be used to support an adverse credibility

2 determination where the capabilities contradict the severity of the symptoms reported. See, e.g.,

3 Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009); Stubbs-Danielson v.

4 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008). For example, the Ninth Circuit determined the ability to

5 cook, clean, do laundry and manage finances may support an adverse finding of credibility. Stubbs-

6 Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175. The Ninth Circuit explained, “Even where ... activities suggest some

7 difficulty functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that

8 they contradict claims of a totally debilitating impairment.” Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175; see

9 also Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693 (finding the ALJ identified “a clear and convincing reason to reject

10 [the claimant’s] subjective testimony” where the level of activity “contradicted [his] contentions about

11 how debilitating his fatigue was”).

12 The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s activities—including working on cars, riding a bike to a clinic

13 each day, performing household chores, and preparing simple meals— were “not suggestive of

14 limitations that would prevent him from engaging in work-related activities due to physical or mental

15 symptoms.” (Doc. 12-2 at 25.) Significantly, the identified activities are like those the Ninth Circuit

16 found sufficient in Stubbs-Danielson to support the rejection of the claimant’s statements. See Stubbs-

17 Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175; see also Curry, 925 F.2d at 1130 (a claimant’s ability to care for personal

18 needs, “prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop for some groceries,” may be viewed as

19 “inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity”). Thus, the

20 capabilities and activities identified by the ALJ support the decision to give less weight to Plaintiff’s

21 testimony concerning the severity of his symptoms.

22 3. Inconsistent statements

23 The ALJ found Plaintiff made inconsistent statements concerning his abilities and symptoms.

24 (Doc. 12-2 at 24.) As one example, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff “related that he had difficulty

25 reading” at the hearing. (Id. at 24.) On the other hand, the ALJ noted Plaintiff also “denied reading

26 difficulties with medication labels and forms” when talking to a primary care provider. (Id. at 25.)

27 Plaintiff contends “no such allegation exists” concerning difficulty reading. (Doc. 16 at 21.)

28 However, this is contradicted by his testimony at the hearing. When Plaintiff was asked if he would

1 have difficulty with a job providing “a list of things that [he] needed to complete,” Plaintiff responded,

2 “Well … I don’t know how to read too good” and following a written list would be difficult. (Id. at 50-

3 51.) Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ did not properly identify inconsistent statements concerning his

4 reading ability is unavailing. Inconsistent statements, such as those Plaintiff made, are a clear and

5 convincing reason supporting the ALJ’s decision. See Chaudry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 672 (9th Cir.

6 2012) (an ALJ may consider “prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other

7 testimony the claimant that appears less than candid”) (citation omitted).

8 4. Treatment received

9 An ALJ may consider “an unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or

10 follow a prescribed course of treatment.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff

11 contends the ALJ erred in considering his lack of treatment, because he was homelessness.4 However,

12 the ALJ observed that even when Plaintiff sought treatment, it was not for mental health. Rather, the

13 ALJ found treatment Plaintiff received was “narrow” and “inconsistent with the claimant’s allegations

14 of … mental symptoms.” (Doc. 12-2 at 25-26.) Further, the ALJ observed that the record also

15 “contain[s] express denials of ... mental symptoms such as depression.” (Id. at 26; see also id. at 28.)

16 The ALJ opined, “The absence of treatment records addressing mental conditions other than an opioid

17 use disorder during the relevant period is not consistent with significant symptoms or limitations.” (Id.

18 at 28.) Plaintiff fails to show the ALJ erred with these findings related to the treatment sought and

19 received. The “narrow” treatment sought and provided is a clear and convincing reason that supports

20 the ALJ’s decision. See Fair, 885 F.2d at 604 (when “pain is not severe enough to motivate [the

21 claimant] to seek treatment…, and if [he] remains able to perform ordinary household and personal

22 tasks, then he has not carried his burden of proving” an inability to work).

23 5. Objective medical evidence

24 In general, “conflicts between a [claimant’s] testimony of subjective complaints and the

25 objective medical evidence in the record” can be a clear and convincing reason to reject a claimant’s

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4 Notably, Plaintiff did not attribute his lack of treatment to his homelessness at the administrative hearing. Rather, as the

28 ALJ observed, Plaintiff testified that a clinic where he received treatment shut down, and he did not go to other available

clinics because he “was just used to going to the one [he] was going to.” (Doc. 12-2 at 28, 57.)

1 subjective testimony. Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999).

2 The Ninth Circuit explained, “[w]hile subjective pain testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground

3 that it is not fully corroborated by objective medical evidence, the medical evidence is still a relevant

4 factor in determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins v.

5 Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.

6 2005) (“although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole basis for discounting pain testimony, it

7 is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis”). Because the ALJ did not base the

8 rejection of Plaintiff’s subjective statements solely on the fact that the medical record did not support

9 the degree of symptoms alleged by Plaintiff, the objective medical evidence was a relevant factor in

10 evaluating his subjective complaints.

11 However, if an ALJ cites the medical evidence, it is insufficient for the ALJ to make a general

12 finding that the record contradicts the testimony. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir.

13 2001). Instead, an ALJ must identify “what testimony is credible and what evidence undermines the

14 claimant’s complaints.” Greger v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006). Towards this end,

15 unless the ALJ links the claimant’s testimony to the medical record summary, the summary is

16 insufficient to reject subjective statements. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493; see also Lambert v. Saul,

17 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding the ALJ erred by “offering non-specific conclusions that

18 Lambert’s testimony was inconsistent with her medical treatment”). In addition, district court may not

19 review an ALJ’s summary of the record to itself establish a link between a claimant’s testimony and the

20 record. In Brown-Hunter, the claimant argued the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons

21 for rejecting her symptom testimony. Id., 806 F.3d at 491. The district court identified inconsistencies

22 in the ALJ’s summary of the medical record that it opined gave rise to reasonable inferences about the

23 plaintiff’s credibility. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined the ALJ failed to identify the

24 specific testimony she found not credible and did not link that testimony to support the adverse

25 credibility determination. Id. at 493. The Court explained that even if the district court’s analysis was

26 sound, the analysis could not cure the ALJ’s failure. Id. at 494.

27 In contrast to Brown-Hunter and Lambert, the ALJ sufficiently carried the burden to link

28 Plaintiff’s subjective statements to the record. For example, the ALJ found: “Despite the claimant’s

1 allegations of back pain, gastrointestinal symptoms, and mental symptoms, treatment records mainly

2 center on treatment for a skin rash and participation in a methadone maintenance program to treat an

3 opioid use disorder related to heroin use.” (Doc. 12-2 at 25, citations omitted.) Although the link

4 between Plaintiff’s statements and the medical record may be minimal, the analysis is sufficient to

5 show the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony while discussing the medical record, and the ALJ carried

6 the burden to identify evidence that contradicted the testimony concerning the severity of his

7 symptoms. Compare with Holcomb v. Saul, 832 Fed. App’x. 505, 506 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2020) (finding

8 no link where “the ALJ never mentioned [the claimant’s] symptom testimony while discussing the

9 relevant medical evidence”).

10 6. Conclusion

11 Where the ALJ makes “a reasonable interpretation” of the claimant’s testimony in light of the

12 evidence, “it is not [the Court’s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th

13 Cir. 2001). The ALJ carried the burden to identify clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff’s

14 subjective complaints and set forth findings “sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to

15 conclude the ALJ rejected the claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds.” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367

16 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004).

17 VI. Order

18 According to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court performed a de novo review of this case.

19 Having carefully reviewed the entire matter—including Plaintiff’s objections and the Commissioner’s

20 response—the Court concludes the Findings and Recommendations are supported by the record and

21 proper analysis. The Court must affirm the administrative decision because substantial evidence

22 supports the ALJ’s findings. Thus, the Court ORDERS:

23 1. The Findings and Recommendations (Doc. 21) are ADOPTED in full.

24 2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and request for remand (Doc. 16) are

25 DENIED.

26 3. Defendant’s request to affirm the administrative decision (Doc. 20) is GRANTED.

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1 4. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate pending motions; enter judgment in favor ¢

2 defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Jos

3 Gambino Menchaca; and to close this case.

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5 || IT IS SO ORDERED.

© || Dated: _ September 1, 2025 Charis [Tourn

7 TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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