Foster v. Ohio D.R.C.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER FOSTER, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:22-cv-02153

:

v. : Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF : Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, :

et al., :

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before this Court on Magistrate Judge Gentry’s Report and

Recommendation (ECF No. 88) that this Court dismiss Plaintiff Christopher Foster’s Third

Amended Complaint (ECF Nos. 60, 63), Plaintiff’s Objections thereto (ECF Nos. 92, 93), as well

as Plaintiff’s remaining motions (ECF Nos. 64, 74, 75, 77, 82, 87, 89, 90). Upon independent

review, and for the reasons stated below, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections,

ADOPTS AS MODIFIED the Report and Recommendation, DISMISSES WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s

outstanding motions, and DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to TERMINATE this case.

I. BACKGROUND

This Court presumes a general familiarity with the background and factual nature of this

case. (See ECF Nos. 23, 83). Plaintiff Christopher Foster, proceeding pro se, is currently an

inmate at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio. (See ECF Nos. 76, 78).

On May 11, 2022, Mr. Foster sought to proceed in forma pauperis before this Court while he

was an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institute in Toledo, Ohio. (ECF No. 1 at 1; see ECF

No. 88 at 1–2). As the Magistrate Judge points out, both the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center

and the Toledo Correctional Institute fall under the jurisdiction of the Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”).1 The Northeast Ohio Correctional Center is operated

by a private entity called CoreCivic, Inc. (“CoreCivic”).2 (ECF 88 at 2).

A. Three Strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act

Mr. Foster has previously, on at least three occasions, brought actions as a prisoner that

were dismissed either as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted. (ECF No. 4 at 3). Thus, Mr. Foster had already accumulated at least three

“strikes” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)–(h), and could

proceed in forma pauperis only after showing that he was “under imminent danger of serious

physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (ECF Nos. 15 at 2–4; 23 at 2). In his initial filing on May

11, 2022, Mr. Foster asserted in part that he was under “imminent danger.” (ECF No. 1 at 4).

On February 13, 2023, this Court found that one of Mr. Foster’s allegations, that prison

medical staff had refused him treatment for his chronic pain conditions, was “sufficient to make

a showing” that he was under imminent danger of serious physical injury under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act. (ECF No. 23 at 7). The Magistrate Judge permitted Mr. Foster to

proceed in forma pauperis on June 16, 2023, (ECF No. 40), and Mr. Foster was ordered to cease

filing documents other than the Second Amended Complaint so that the Magistrate Judge could

complete the required initial screening. (ECF No. 41).

1 Facilities and Institutions, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction,

https://drc.ohio.gov/about/facilities/facilities (last visited Sept. 25, 2025).

2 Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, CoreCivic,

https://www.corecivic.com/facilities/northeast-ohio-correctional-center (last visited Sept. 25,

2025).

B. Second Amended Complaint

On June 26, 2023, Mr. Foster filed his Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 42).

Despite the Magistrate Judge’s Order, Mr. Foster continued to submit filings in August,

September, and October of 2023, all of which the Magistrate Judge struck in October pursuant to

the prior Order prohibiting further filing. (ECF No. 46; see ECF Nos. 43–45). Despite this, Mr.

Foster resumed filing in December of 2023, and continued submitting filings until May 2024.

(See ECF Nos. 47, 49–52). The Magistrate Judge struck these additional filings on July 25,

2024, in the Order and Report and Recommendation on the Second Amended Complaint. (ECF

No. 53).

In that Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended this Court

dismiss Mr. Foster’s Section 1983 claims with prejudice, and all other claims without prejudice.

The Magistrate Judge also recommended that Mr. Foster be given “one final” opportunity to

“assert claims that have a nexus to the claimed imminent danger of serious physical injury (lack

of medical treatment for chronic pain), are asserted against proper defendants, and contain

factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted.” (ECF

No. 53 at 18). Specifically, Mr. Foster would need to describe: (1) the chronic pain left

untreated; (2) how treatment was denied; and (3) how that denial led to imminent danger of

serious physical injury. (Id. at 10). Mr. Foster would also need to connect the alleged imminent

danger from lack of treatment to the defendants’ conduct. (Id. at 13). Otherwise, Mr. Foster’s in

forma pauperis action would be improper. (See ECF No. 83 at 5).

Mr. Foster filed his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations

on August 14, 2024. (ECF No. 58). Then, he filed his “Third Amended Emergency Complaint”

on August 20, (ECF No. 60), a “Motion to Stay, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order” on

August 28, (ECF No. 61), a “Motion to Add to [ECF No.] 61 Good Faith” on September 5, and

“Part Two” of his Third Amended Complaint on September 9, 2024. (ECF No. 63).

Mr. Foster’s Fall filings continued. He filed a “Motion for Recommittal” following ECF

Nos. 61 and 62 on September 19, 2024, (ECF No. 64), a “Good Faith Enlargement Motion Pro

Se” on September 26, (ECF No. 65), a “Reques[t] for Court on Basis of Castro Theory” on

October 10, (ECF No. 66) a “Motion for Court to Proceed” on October 11, (ECF No. 67), a

Concession “In Part” to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on October 16,

(ECF No. 68), and a Request for Issuance of Summons to the White House, CoreCivic, and the

Department of Justice on October 30, 2024 (ECF No. 69).

On November 5, 2024, the Magistrate Judge ordered Mr. Foster to “stop filing documents

in this case until the Court has completed the initial screen of his Third Amended Complaint”

unless he had “extraordinary cause,” informing Mr. Foster that “[r]e-asserting arguments or

attempting to add additional arguments does not constitute extraordinary cause,” and directing

the Clerk of Court to hold service of the summonses until further order. (ECF No. 70 at 1–2).

Mr. Foster objected to this Order, (ECF Nos. 72, 73), and despite it, continued filing additional

motions after his objections, including a “Renewed Motion to Proceed While Black” on

November 21, (ECF No. 74), an “Extraordinary Rule 65(b) Motion” on December 3, 2024, (ECF

No. 75), a “Motion for Court Access” on February 10, 2025, (ECF No. 77), and a “Motion to

Consider the Priority Nature of This Matter” along with notice on a change of address to “670

Marion–Williamport E. Road, Marion, Ohio 43302”3 on February 26, (ECF No. 82).

3 It appears that Mr. Foster was transferred to the ODRC’s North Central Correctional Complex

in Marion, Ohio. North Central Correctional Complex (NCCC), Ohio Department of

Rehabilitation and Correction, https://drc.ohio.gov/about/facilities/north-central-correctional-

complex (last visited Sept. 25, 2025). Indeed, months later, Mr. Foster alleged that he had “been

placed on three retaliatory transfers since the . . . initiation of this case.” (ECF No. 86 at 1).

On March 25, 2025, this Court issued its Order (ECF No. 83) adopting the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendations regarding the Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 53),

overruling Mr. Foster’s objections (ECF No. 58), and denying his stay and temporary restraining

order, (ECF Nos. 61, 62). This Court concluded that Mr. Foster failed to establish an imminent

danger in his Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 42) and his Objection (ECF No. 58) to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 83 at 5–6). First, this Court found

that Mr. Foster’s allegations of danger and death were “general” and insufficient at connecting

his Americans with Disabilities Act claims to his supposed lack of treatment for chronic pain.

(Id. at 6). Next, this Court determined that Mr. Foster’s other allegations of insufficient prison

personnel for grievances, lack of access to WiFi, and opened mail lacked any connection to a

lack of medical treatment for chronic pain. (Id.). Without any connection between Mr. Foster’s

lack of medical treatment for chronic pain to his claims, Mr. Foster’s lawsuit could not proceed

in forma pauperis, and was dismissed. (Id.). This Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation, however, to afford Mr. Foster a final chance to allege imminent danger

connected to his chronic pain claims. (Id. at 6–7).

This Court also agreed that Mr. Foster had failed to state a claim for relief under the

Americans with Disabilities Act against ODRC and Congress, and that Mr. Foster had

improperly brought Section 1983 claims against Congress and the ODRC, neither of whom can

be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 7–8). Last, this Court determined that Mr. Foster had

failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a case for a Temporary Restraining Order,

and likewise denied the request. (Id. at 8–10).

On April 10, Mr. Foster filed notice of a change in his address back to the Northeast Ohio

Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio (ECF No. 86), and on June 20, he filed a “Motion to

be Relieved of ECF No. 83.” (ECF No. 87).

On August 27, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on the

Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 88). Meanwhile, presumably due to the mailing time it

would take for Mr. Foster to receive the magistrate’s Report and Recommendation and for his

filings to be received, Mr. Foster’s non-objection filings continued. On August 29, he filed a

“Motion for Security Waiver” (ECF No. 89), and on September 4, he filed a “Priority Rule 65(b)

Motion” (ECF No. 90). On September 8, he filed his objection to the magistrate’s Report and

Recommendation, styled as “Ohio Revised Code 9.06(k) Objection” (ECF No. 92), and

September 22, 2025, he filed an “Emergency Notice” titled “Warning to Magistrate” that also

essentially reiterated his “Ohio Revised Code 9.06(k)” objection.4 (ECF No. 93 at 2).

C. Third Amended Complaint

Mr. Foster’s theory of the case is essentially unchanged. His Third Amended Complaint

consists of two filings, which he filed in two parts, styled as an “Emergency Complaint for

Joinder” and “Part Two of [the Third Amended Complaint] Timely.” (ECF Nos. 60, 63; see ECF

No. 91). In his “Emergency Complaint for Joinder,” Mr. Foster sues the ODRC, CoreCivic, the

“Cincinnati Police” Department, “Congress, and the Department of Justice/Attorney General.”

(ECF No. 60 at 2). He first alleges that the Cincinnati Police Department and ODRC “are liable

for implied contractual breach failures of the ADA coextensively through Section 504 in light of

4 Although the Magistrate Judge ordered Mr. Foster to only file “ONE DOCUMENT” in

objection to the Report and Recommendation, (ECF No. 88 at 10), and Mr. Foster has made a

habit out of ignoring the Magistrate Judge’s orders regarding his filing limitations, this Court

will consider both the “Ohio Revised Code 9.06(k) Objection” and the short subsequent

“Warning to Magistrate” in the interests of justice. (ECF Nos. 92, 93).

financial assistance conditions,” noting that they receive federal funding, and are being sued in a

public entity capacity. (Id. at 3). Next, he alleges that Congress is also liable for violating the

ADA and is also being sued in a public entity capacity. (Id.). He then alleges that the

Department of Justice “or” the “Attorney General’s office” is being sued in an official capacity

“for violating the ADA and RA by coextensive means, but not contract type.” (Id.). Next, he

states that ODRC is liable for CoreCivic, and CoreCivic itself is liable for violating the ADA for

its hospital and for how it treats Mr. Foster while he participates in Ashland University “within

this building.”5 (Id.). Mr. Foster alleges that Congress authorized, the Department of Justice and

Attorney General supervised, ODRC and the Cincinnati Police “operat[e],” and CoreCivic “acts”

to create “a pattern” of “a failure to accommodate, discrimination, etc., exclusion, inaccessibility,

practice, policy, failure to train, or custom of policies concerning all parties joined.” (Id. at 4).

Mr. Foster then recounts the history of the ODRC “ending and returning [his] disability

needs” for his medical and accommodation issues from 2014 to 2020. (Id. at 4–5). Mr. Foster

also discusses an employment suit “regarding an office that will permanently and prospectively

suppress an insurrection policy created by then President Trump,” arguing that the existence of

the “insurrection policy” “caused [Foster] actual ongoing imminent danger on the basis of [his]

disability.” (Id. at 5) (emphasis added).

Mr. Foster alleges that when he “filed for federal employment” in 2020, the ODRC

revoked his “access to chronic care for [his] disability medical needs, food, etc.”; that he could

not “obtain treatment for [his] severe neuropathy ([gunshot wound]) pain” or gain accessibility

accommodation; and that by 2021, the Department of Justice failed to handle his employment

complaints, accommodation requests, or “resolve the inaccessible facility issues causing [him] to

5 The “building” appears to be a reference to the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center. (See ECF

No. 60-3).

suffer ongoing untreated severe chronic gunshot wound neuropathy pain” due to a “lack of

access to safe mobility routes” that he could “use to participate in the facility without a threat of

bodily harm by use of force.” (Id. at 6–7). Mr. Foster states that he complained to (or possibly

filed complaints against) the Department of Justice and Congress from 2019 (or 2020) through

2024, but to no avail. (Id. at 8). He also alleges that, in January 2024, he was sent to “ODRC’s

CoreCivic wing,”6 where he initially received treatment that “helped eliminate a lot of [his] . . .

pain,” but that this treatment later was stopped, and he was denied other medical treatments for

his pain. (Id. at 8–11). According to Mr. Foster, at this new facility, he now lacks “a plan on

how [he] will manage pain and take [his classes]” at Ashland University; he has been “put in the

hole on bogus pretense[s]”; he has been placed in cells without a sink, proper ventilation,

accessibility accommodations, or access to the law library; he has fallen in his cell and been

injured due to the lack of accommodations; he has nearly missed court deadlines due to lack of

law library access; and information has been hidden from him by the police. (Id. at 11–14).

Mr. Foster asked for injunctive and declaratory relief in a variety of forms, consisting of:

(1) stopping the ODRC from opening his court mail; (2) mandating employment for Foster for

“RA also ADA police duties” at the Department of Justice, preparing an “Office of Deterrent

Investigation and Enforcement” with jurisdiction to handle Title II concerns, and notifying the

entities to be regulated by this office; (3) ordering the ODRC and CoreCivic to provide Foster

with “the medical chronic pain benefit the state permits, 28 C.F.R. § 35.152(b)(3)”; (4)

permanent relief; (5) the firing of certain CoreCivic employees; (6) the release of certain medical

and police records; and (7) $1 in nominal and $20.1 million in compensatory damages. (Id. at

15–19).

6 This appears to refer to Mr. Foster’s incarceration at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center.

In his “Part Two of [the Third Amended Complaint] Timely,” Mr. Foster purports to

continue discussing the “Post 2010 ADA amendments issue,” but he largely rehashes his prior

arguments or raises irrelevant points. (ECF No. 63 at 1). He suggests that President Trump’s

“insurrection policy” included abandoning “ADA and RA progress” and infringing on the

separation of powers with the Article I and III branches of government. (Id. at 2). He claims

that, in this case, he can “get relief from the imminent danger by eliminating discrimination,”

including the ODRC’s purported denial of his court access from 2015–22. (Id.). He restates his

claims that he was not adequately treated for “neuropathy [gunshot wound] pain”; was impeded

from accessing the law library and the courts; suffered side effects from depression medication;

was placed in the hole on false pretenses; was placed in an inadequate, non-accessible cell where

he injured himself; was left without proper electronics access; was not medically treated; was not

accommodated; and was intentionally discriminated against. (Id. at 3–7, 9–11). He seeks

additional relief, requesting “buffer zone[s]” be placed in work history and credit reports of

CoreCivic employees, compensatory damages from the ODRC, and declaratory relief. (Id. at

12–13). He also claims that had he been properly treated, he “likely” would have been “freed

from prison,” which would have “eliminat[ed] [the] prison context imminent danger in the first

place.” (Id. at 5). He restates a non-specific imminent danger, stating that “the Courts are still

pending in my case about this ongoing imminent danger by failure to Act, etc., failure to

accommodate.” (Id. at 8).

This Court is now tasked with a de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation regarding Mr. Foster’s Third Amended Complaint, as well as Mr. Foster’s

Objections, to determine the central question: whether Mr. Foster has connected his alleged

imminent danger to a lack of chronic pain treatment in 2022.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation, “[t]he district

judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been

properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). In so doing, “[t]he district judge may accept,

reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to

the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss” their complaint or

any portion of it that: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). While detailed factual allegations are not necessary at the pleading

stage, mere “labels and conclusions” are insufficient to state a proper claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but “basic

pleading essentials” still are required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see

Johnson v. Stewart, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010) (“The liberal treatment of

pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of substantive law.”) (citations omitted).

Thus, to survive screening, a complaint must contain sufficient facts which, if accepted as true,

would plausibly state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, when a prisoner “has, on 3 or more prior

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of

the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted,” the prisoner cannot proceed in forma pauperis

“unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

At the pleading stage, to qualify for an exception to this general bar on prisoners proceeding in

forma pauperis with three strikes, a prisoner movant must “only . . . assert allegations of

imminent danger; he need not affirmatively prove those allegations at this stage.” Tucker v.

Pentrich, 483 F. App’x 28, 30 (6th Cir. 2012). All the movant must allege are facts from which

the court “could draw the reasonable inference that [he] was under an existing danger at the time

he filed his complaint.” Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir.

2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The physical injuries must be

“impending,” and are “serious” under § 1915(g) when they are with “potentially dangerous

consequences such as death or severe bodily harm.” Gresham v. Meden, 938 F.3d 847, 850 (6th

Cir. 2019).

This Court first addresses the recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge (ECF No.

88) and then Mr. Foster’s objections (ECF Nos. 92, 93). In screening Mr. Foster’s Third

Amended Complaint, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court dismiss the complaint

without prejudice, deny Mr. Foster’s remaining outstanding motions as moot, and terminate the

case. (ECF No. 88 at 1). The Magistrate Judge reached this determination noting that: (1) this

Court provided Mr. Foster with permission to proceed in forma pauperis based on and limited to

“allegations that prison medical staff have refused [Plaintiff] treatment for his chronic pain

conditions,” (id. at 2 (quoting ECF No. 23 at 7)); (2) that Mr. Foster’s Second Amended

Complaint failed to allege claims with “a nexus to Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied

treatment for his chronic pain condition,” (id. at 2–3); and (3) that Mr. Foster’s Third Amended

Complaint still fails to allege any “nexus” between Mr. Foster’s claims and the “imminent

danger” coming from “the failure to provide medical care for his chronic pain conditions,” (id. at

6, 7, 9, 10).

This Court essentially agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,

as set forth below.

A. Voluntary Dismissals

As a threshold matter, the Magistrate Judge construed two of Mr. Foster’s filings

following his Third Amended Complaint to constitute self-effectuating notices of dismissal of

Congress, the Cincinnati Police Department, CoreCivic, and the Department of Justice, as per

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). This Court agrees. On October 16, 2024, Mr. Foster “concede[d] to the

R&R (ECF No. 53) in part. The only defendants for this case . . . are the White House . . . and

the ODRC/CoreCivic defendant, along with the [Department of Justice].” (ECF No. 68 at 1).

Subsequently, on February 19, 2025, Mr. Foster sought “to make the complaint smaller” by

“dismissing CoreCivic[,] Police[,] [and] [the Department of Justice].” (ECF No. 81 at 1, see id.

at 9–12 (seeking specific relief only against the ODRC, Congress, and individuals not already

named in a complaint)). Mr. Foster does not contest this part of the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation. Thus, the only remaining defendant is ODRC.7

B. Remaining Claims

1. Contractual Claims

The Magistrate Judge construes Mr. Foster’s claim that the ODRC is “liable for implied

contractual breach failures of the ADA coextensively through Section 504 in light of financial

assistance conditions” to be about ODRC’s supposed “liab[ility] for CoreCivic,” who Mr. Foster

suggests incarcerated him “in an inaccessible manner” in violation of the ADA. (ECF No. 60 at

3; see ECF No. 88). Although it is unclear exactly what Mr. Foster is suggesting in his

7 Because Mr. Foster was ordered to stop filing additional documents until the Magistrate Judge

could screen his Third Amended Complaint, the Magistrate Judge held his summons against the

White House.

Complaint, this Court believes the Magistrate Judge may have misconstrued his contractual

argument against the ODRC as being solely premised on the ODRC’s relationship with

CoreCivic. Construed and understood liberally, it appears that Mr. Foster also alleges (based on

the Third Amended Complaint and his objections) that the ODRC is contractually obligated to

provide him with ADA accommodations either because (1) it is statutorily obligated to do so as

the recipient of federal funding, see 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); or (2) it has a duty of care to Mr. Foster.

(See ECF No. 60 at 3–4; 92 at 2–3).

Thus, this Court does not agree that an analysis of Mr. Foster’s contractual claims turns

solely on the fact that CoreCivic operates the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, but not the

Toledo Correctional Institution. (See ECF No. 88 at 5–6). Although the Magistrate Judge is

correct that Mr. Foster’s claims must have a nexus to the imminent danger, and that the imminent

danger must have existed when the case was filed, this claim cannot be dispensed of due to the

fact that CoreCivic does not operate the prison where Mr. Foster was incarcerated when he first

filed this case. However, Mr. Foster still must connect a legal claim to his allegation of

imminent danger. That issue is specific and narrow. As this Court previously laid out, Mr.

Foster must demonstrate a legal claim that has a nexus—or a connection or link—to the alleged

failure to provide medical care for his chronic pain conditions when he filed the case. (ECF No.

83 at 6). Even though Mr. Foster has repeatedly and tirelessly suggested that the ODRC was

contractually obligated, in some way, to accommodate him, he has failed to demonstrate why he

was in imminent danger due to the alleged failure to provide him with medical care for his

chronic pain conditions when he initiated this case in 2022.

Simply put, neither Foster’s argument that he has always been in the custody of the

ODRC (ECF No. 92 at 2), nor that Ohio is obligated to accommodate disabilities (ECF No. 92 at

2–3), provide any more connection to his alleged imminent danger. Instead, they merely raise

the question of what the imminent danger is. It is not enough that Mr. Foster claim “a denial of

medical services.” (ECF No. 92 at 1). Mr. Foster’s suggestion that “an added imminent danger

that would occur for [his] decision to grieve also, sue, about this denial” misses the point. (ECF

No. 92 at 1). The imminent danger cannot be speculative. This Court has limited Mr. Foster’s in

forma pauperis suit, requiring that he show imminent danger arising from a failure to provide

medical care for his chronic pain condition—not claims that might derive out of a denial of

medical services more generally.

Mr. Foster’s reliance on the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Charron v. Allen is misplaced.

(ECF No. 92 at 1 (citing Charron, 37 F.4th 483 (8th Cir. 2022)). Although Charron suggested

that a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis could obtain relief for other claims, it presumed that

at least one claim “satisf[ied] the imminent danger exception.” Charron, 37 F.4th at 487; see

Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2010) (clarifying that “a prisoner with three

strikes who adequately alleges imminent danger can, in the same suit, proceed [in forma

pauperis] on other claims that lack a nexus to immediate danger”) (emphasis added). Here, Mr.

Foster’s Third Amended Complaint has still “failed to tie his legal claims to allegations of

[imminent danger],” and thus, his in forma pauperis status can be denied. Lapine v. Waino, 2018

WL 6264565, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 11, 2018).

To the extent Mr. Foster argues that his case “evolved,” citing to the Sixth Circuit in

Tolliver v. Noble, he is similarly mistaken. (ECF No. 92 at 1 (citing Tolliver, 752 F. App’x 254,

265 (6th Cir. 2018)). Tolliver was about a prisoner’s right to amend a complaint, not about a

right to shift the parameters when the court has allowed an in forma pauperis suit to proceed on

narrow grounds. Mr. Foster still must satisfy the imminent danger pleading requirement for this

Court to hear the suit he filed in 2022. For instance, Mr. Foster cannot now allege that

“imminent danger can be the result of a public entity using legal mail trade secret intelligence[]

to assist . . . interference efforts,” (ECF No. 92 at 1), because that is not related to a failure to

provide medical care for his chronic pain condition.

Put another way—Mr. Foster filed this action in on May 11, 2022, claiming to be in

imminent danger and seeking leave to file in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 4; ECF No. 4 at

2). He has been told by this Court time and again that he must show that he was in imminent

danger in 2022 because of the alleged failure to provide medical care for his chronic pain

conditions. (ECF No. 23, 83). He has failed to do so.

2. Employment Claims

This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge regarding Mr. Foster’s employment claims.

It is unclear what, precisely, Mr. Foster means when he discusses the “insurrection policy,” but it

appears he is suggesting that he might not have been placed in future imminent harm had he been

able to investigate and enforce federally-funded operations overseeing disability policy. (ECF

No. 60 at 5–7).

Again, this Court has limited Mr. Foster’s potential in forma pauperis claim for imminent

danger arising from a failure to provide medical care for his chronic pain condition as it was in

2022—the Court will not entertain Mr. Foster’s suggestion that the imminent harm derives from

the Department of Justice’s rejection of his “employment accommodation complaint[] in 2020,”

(ECF No. 60 at 5), untethered to specific allegations of how this led to denial of his treatment

and placed him in imminent danger in 2022. It is insufficient for Mr. Foster’s suit that he

believes he is in “imminent danger about matters of interference about his civil suit[] and

grievance filings,” (ECF No. 92 at 4), just as President Trump’s actions (or inactions) and the

legal status of those who were at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, (see ECF No. 92 at 5–6),

are simply irrelevant here.

3. Denial of Treatment Claims

The Magistrate Judge’s analysis next focused on Mr. Foster’s denial of treatment claims.

The Magistrate Judge analyzed Mr. Foster’s allegations under Section 1983 and Title II of the

ADA. This Court does not disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, or the conclusion that

Mr. Foster’s allegations here are insufficient, particularly in light of Mr. Foster’s “vague and

conclusory allegations.” (ECF No. 88 at 8). Indeed, though Mr. Foster alleges that treatment for

his “disability medical needs” was ended around April 1, 2020, and that his “access to the route

needed to continue getting to [the] medical hospital of the facility” was discontinued, he next

discusses his medical treatment in February of 2024. (ECF No. 60 at 6, 8–9). Mr. Foster

provides no concrete allegations about the state of his medical care in May of 2022 or around

that time, when he first brought this action. (Accord ECF No. 88 at 9).

Though Mr. Foster objects that “part of [his] imminent danger, was his ongoing exposure

to a denial of pain disease neuropathy medical services,” (ECF No. 92 at 7), his objection does

not provide this Court with any more detail regarding his supposed denial of treatment. As this

Court previously noted, Mr. Foster “has not shown why” he “would be in ‘danger of more

serious afflictions if he [was] not treated’ for his chronic pain.” (ECF No. 83 at 6 (quoting

Vandiver, 727 F.3d at 586)) (emphasis added). He has also failed to make factual allegations

about what was happening to him in 2022. Mr. Foster has only served to repeat his general

allegation, rather than elaborate or explain it.

4. Post-filing Claims

Last, the Magistrate Judge determined that Mr. Foster’s post-filing claims could not

provide the required nexus to his claimed imminent harm when he brought this case in May

2022. (ECF No. 88 at 9). This Court agrees. Mr. Foster’s allegations about the medical

treatment he has or has not received since 2022, along with his other treatments more generally,

cannot provide the basis for his claimed imminent harm, made in 2022, in his in forma pauperis

suit. To the extent Mr. Foster claims that his legal mail was surveilled at the Toledo prison,

(ECF No. 92 at 9; 93 at 1); that he was placed in an “inoperable cell,” “harsh” in combination

with his neuropathy, with an inaccessible toilet, (ECF No. 92 at 11); that officers have harmed

him for suing in the past, harmed him worse for this case, “and will do it again,” (ECF No. 92 at

7–8); that a variety of staff attacked him on or about March 29, 2025, and “claimed [this attack]

would not be taking place if [Foster] simply dropped the lawsuit,” (ECF No. 92 at 15); or that he

has been moved around from prison to prison or could be “return[ed] . . . to MTC,” (ECF No. 93

at 3); none of these allegations are relevant or sufficient to establish the supposed imminent harm

he was under due to his chronic pain condition in 2022.

Mr. Foster suggests that “at the time when [he] filed this case, in 2022 . . . [he] was in

imminent danger of all these issues taking place in response to his filing this case about

imminent danger as to his ongoing exposure to a denial of neuropathy disability medical

services.” (ECF No. 92 at 15–16) (emphasis added). This is the colloquial chicken-and-egg

problem—Mr. Foster suggests that his imminent danger arose from his filing the case about

imminent danger. Mr. Foster has failed to allege and show that it was the ongoing denial of

prison medical staff to treat Mr. Foster’s chronic pain condition that was the cause of his

imminent danger in 2022. It was his obligation to “allege[] facts from which [this] [C]ourt,

informed by its judicial experience and common sense, could draw the reasonable inference that

[he] was under an existing danger at the time he filed his complaint.” Vandiver, 727 F.3d at

585 (emphasis added). This means that the danger cannot originate in response to Mr. Foster’s

filing of the complaint.

C. Plaintiff’s Objections and Findings

Mr. Foster’s objections largely acquiesce or substantively fail to contest the Report and

Recommendation. Crucially, Mr. Foster still has not connected or linked his allegation of

imminent danger to his chronic pain condition in 2022 when he initiated this case. See Frazier v.

Woods, 2020 WL 9263004, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 2020) (“Because [plaintiff’s] objections did

not specifically address the magistrate judge’s findings or conclusions, [he] has arguably waived

further review of his . . . claims.”). Instead, Mr. Foster has used this forum to bring up wide-

ranging and varied grievances. As this Court has previously noted, it is sympathetic to Mr.

Foster, given what he claims. (ECF No. 83 at 9). At least some of Mr. Foster’s allegations, if

true, raise grave concerns. (See, e.g., ECF No. 92 at 15 (alleging that more than five prison staff

members “unleashed a full fledged attack on [Foster] while he was on mental health observation

in medical” and “claim[ing] it would not be taking place if [he] simply dropped the lawsuit”)).

However, this Court must determine whether Mr. Foster has sufficiently shown imminent danger

related to his allegations that prison medical staff refused his treatment for chronic pain

conditions. Mr. Foster alleged this when he brought this suit, and that was the sole basis for

imminent danger that this Court permitted him to proceed on an in forma pauperis basis.

Mr. Foster has not made the required showing of a nexus between his claims in 2022 and

imminent harm. He is not permitted to cite to supposed imminent harms separate from what he

alleged about his chronic medical condition when he brought this suit.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 88) AS

MODIFIED above. Plaintiff's Objections (ECF Nos. 92, 93) are OVERRULED. Plaintiffs

Third Amended Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff's remaining

outstanding motions (ECF Nos. 64, 74, 75, 77, 82, 87, 89, and 90) are DENIED AS MOOT.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED TO TERMINATE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ke Aha

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: September 30, 2025

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