The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DAJUAN SAUNDERS, : Civil No. 1:22-CV-00819
:
Petitioner, :
:
v. :
:
SUPERINTENDENT THOMAS :
MCGINLEY, et al., :
:
Respondents. : Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Respondents’ motion to lift the stay in this matter and
dismiss the petition. (Doc. 15.) Petitioner was ordered to notify the court within
thirty days of the conclusion of state court proceedings. It has been over one year
since Petitioner’s state court proceedings concluded, and he has yet to notify the
court. Therefore, the court will lift the stay in this action nunc pro tunc and
dismiss the petition as moot.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
DaJuan Saunders (“Petitioner”) is a self-represented litigant who filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 seeking relief from
his state court judgment on May 24, 2022. (Doc. 1.) At the time of filing,
Petitioner was held at the State Correctional Institution in Coal Township,
Pennsylvania (SCI-Coal Township).1 (Doc. 1, p. 1.)2 Petitioner states that he
pleaded guilty to simple assault in the Lackawanna County Court of Common
Pleas in October of 2019. (Id., pp. 1, 3.)
At the time the petition was filed, the court determined that Petitioner had
two unaddressed petitions in state court filed under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). (Doc. 14.) Therefore, on August 29, 2022, this
court stayed the pending case to allow Petitioner to conclude the state court
proceedings prior to addressing the pending Section 2254 petition. (Id.) As a part
of that order, Petitioner was instructed to notify the court within thirty days of the
conclusion of the state court proceedings, and if he failed to notify the court, the
stay would be vacated nunc pro tunc. (Id., p. 5.)
On June 6, 2025, Respondents filed a motion to lift the stay, alleging that
Petitioner’s state court proceedings had concluded in July of 2024 and he had not
notified the court. (Docs. 15, 16.) Respondents are requesting that the August 29,
2022 order be vacated nunc pro tunc and the petition be dismissed. (Id.)
A review of the dockets available for Case No. CP-35-CR-0001453-2019
and Case No. 1732 MDA 2022 at hppts://ujsportal.pascourts.us/CaseSearch,
1 Petitioner’s location is currently unknown as he cannot be found using the Pennsylvania Parole
Board’s Inmate/Department Supervised Individual Locator at https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/.
2 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
demonstrate that the denial of Petitioner’s final PCRA petition was affirmed on
July 1, 2024 by the Superior Court after he was released from custody. In the 14
months since the PCRA petition’s denial was affirmed by the Superior Court,
Petitioner has not appealed the Superior Court’s order or notified this court that the
pending proceedings in state court have been fully adjudicated.
DISCUSSION
Because Petitioner has not timely notified the court of the conclusion of the
state court proceedings, this court will vacate the court’s August 29, 2022 order
staying the case nunc pro tunc. See Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 154 (3d Cir.
2004).
With the stay no longer in place, the court will dismiss the petition since
Petitioner has been released from custody. “Article III of the [United States]
Constitution limits federal ‘judicial Power’ to the adjudication of ‘Cases’ or
‘Controversies.’” Abreu v. Superintendent Smithfield SCI, 971 F.3d 403, 406 (3d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2)). In order “[f]or a case or controversy
to exist, a petitioner, throughout each stage of the litigation, ‘must have suffered, or
be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the [respondent] and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” See id. (quoting DeFoy v.
McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)) (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank
Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). Consequently, “a habeas corpus petition
generally becomes moot when a prisoner is released from custody because the
petitioner has received the relief sought.” See id. (citing DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 441).
Nevertheless, a petitioner who has been released from custody “may obtain
judicial review of a [habeas] petition by showing that he continues to suffer from
secondary or collateral consequences of his conviction,” see id. (citations omitted),
or sentence, see Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Generally
speaking, “collateral consequences will be presumed when the [petitioner] is
attacking his conviction while still serving the sentence imposed for that conviction
[and] where the [petitioner] is attacking that portion of his sentence that is still
being served.” See id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 242 (3d Cir.
2008)).
Once a petitioner has been released, however, the court does “not presume
that a conviction carries collateral consequences.” See Abreu, 971 F.3d at 406
(citing Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). Instead, the court “must ‘address[ ] the issue of
collateral consequences in terms of the likelihood that a favorable decision would
redress the injury or wrong.’” See id. (quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148). For that
reason, “[i]t is not enough if ‘collateral consequences proffered by the petitioner’
amount to ‘a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability.’” See id.
(quoting Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148).
Typically, the court would grant Petitioner an opportunity to demonstrate
that he continues to suffer from secondary or collateral consequences of his
sentence. However, the court deems such an opportunity unnecessary for
Petitioner. The Superior Court’s determination in affirming the PCRA petition’s
denial was that he was no longer in custody, thus, rendering the appeal moot. In
the 14 months since that determination, Petition has taken no action to seek relief
from any potential secondary or collateral consequents of his sentence. Therefore,
this court will likewise dismiss the Section 2254 petition as moot.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability (“COA”), an appeal may not be taken from a final order
in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A COA may issue only if the applicant
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional
claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should
issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000). Here, jurists of reason would not find the procedural disposition of this
case debatable. Accordingly, no COA will be issued.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, Respondents’ motion to lift the
stay will be granted, the court’s order entering the stay will be vacated nunc pro
tunc, and Petitioner’s Section 2254 petition will be dismissed without prejudice as
moot. The case will be closed.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: October 1, 2025