Borys v. Kijakazi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SANDRA L. BORYS, : No. 3:23-CV-1041

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

Vv. ot

FRANK BISIGNANO,}! :

Commissioner of Social :

Security Administration, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

Pending before the Court is the appeal by Plaintiff Sandra Borys

of the decision by the Commissioner of Social Security Administration

(“the Commissioner”) to deny her application for disability benefits. For

the reasons set below, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

I. Introduction

Borys seeks judicial review of the Commissioneyr’s final decision to

deny her application for disability benefits under Title IT of the Social

1 Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner on May 7, 2025. Pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d) and Title 42, United States Code, Section 405(g),

Bisignano is substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi, a former Commissioner, as the

Defendant in this suit.

Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Title 42, United

States Code, Section 405(g).

Borys challenges the three alleged errors that Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) Gerard W. Langan committed when determining that she

was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Namely, Borys claims

that the ALJ: (1) made inadequate function-by-function assessments in

defining residual functional capacity; (2) lacked substantial evidence in

rejecting three treating physician opinions on her limitations to time-off

tasks, absences, and unscheduled breaks in formulating her residual

functional capacity; and (8) in step five of the sequential analysis, failed

to identify and resolve a conflict between vocational expert testimony

and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles “DOT”’) with regard to her

overhead reaching limitation. Doc. 8 at 8. The matter is fully briefed

and ripe for decision.

As explained below, ALJ Langan’s conclusion on each of the

challenged issues was supported by substantial evidence in the record,

coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial review.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision to deny

Borys’s claim for social security disability benefits.

II. Background

On April 22, 2020, Borys applied for social security disability

benefits, alleging complete disability from high cholesterol, depression,

anxiety, Barrett's esophagus, cervical fusion, limited upper extremity

movement, insomnia, restless leg syndrome, gastroesophageal reflux

disease, and Raynaud’s disease. Tr.2 83-84. The Social Security

Administration (“SSA”) denied Borys’s application on August 17, 2020.

Id. at 125-28. Borys requested reconsideration, id. at 129, but her

application was denied again on December 23, 2020. Jd. at 1382-84.

Borys accordingly requested a hearing on February 26, 2021. Id. at

135-36. The SSA granted the request and held an administrative

hearing. Id. at 20.

The hearing, held on October 15, 2021, id., concerned whether

Borys was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act from

June 18, 2019, through December 31, 2024—the last date Borys was

eligible to receive social security disability insurance. Jd. at 22. ALJ

Langan evaluated clinical records, medical history, medical expert

2 The administrative record, referred to herein as “Tr.,” encompasses Docs. 7, 7-1,

7-2, 7-8, 7-4, 7-5, 7-6, 7-7, 7-8.

reports, vocational expert testimony, and Borys’s own testimony. Id. at

47-82.

Toward the end of the hearing, ALJ Langan asked Carmine

Abraham, a vocational expert, to assess whether alternative

employment options in the national economy exist for Borys. Jd. at 71—

79. Abraham first confirmed that Borys’s previous job (“a certified

nurse assistant”) was a “medium, semi-skilled” occupation. Id. at 73.

Then the ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume

an individual of the same age, education, past work

experience as that of [the] claimant[].... [The] hypothetical

individual [is] capable of performing light exertional work.

However, [the] hypothetical individual should avoid

unprotected heights|,] ... [and] avoid climbing ladders and

scaffolds but may occasionally climb ramps and stairs. [The]

hypothetical individual would be capable of occasional

exposure to temperature extremes, wetness, and vibration.

Id. at 73-74. When ALJ Langan then asked whether the hypothetical

person could perform Borys’s past job, Abraham answered that such

limitations precluded the occupation. Id. at 74.

Then, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to “provide

representative samples of occupations which exist in the national

economy that an individual with those same limitations and restrictions

would be capable of performing[.|” Jd. Abraham, clarifying that such a

person needs “light work,” testified that the person may work as a

garment folder, rental clerk, or a marker. Id.

The response prompted ALJ Langan to change the hypothetical by

adding that:

[The] hypothetical individual should avoid interaction with

the public[,| except for incidental contact such as providing

directions to a restroom or a department in a larger facility.

In addition, [the] hypothetical individual would be capable of

occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. ...

[The] hypothetical individual also should avoid occupations

which would require a fast production rate pace[,| such as that

found with respect to quotas, piecework, or timed work.

Id. at 74-75. The vocational expert opined that “rental clerk position

would be eliminated due to frequent interaction with the public,” and

stated that such a person would be able to work as a routing clerk. Id.

at 75.

Abraham’s answer prompted the ALJ to impose additional

conditions, namely that the hypothetical person

should be afforded the ability to alternate between sitting and

standing every 80 minutes. In addition, [the] hypothetical

individual should avoid use of the right upper extremity for

overhead activity. [The] hypothetical individual may make

occasional use of the left upper extremity for overhead

activity. Finally, [the] hypothetical individual should avoid

occupations which would expose her to noise above a level 3

noise intensity level.

Id. at 75—76. Those additional limitations led the vocational expert to

state that the available numbers of garment folder, marker, and routing

clerk positions would decrease by about 50 percent. Jd. at 76. Then the

ALJ asked whether Abraham’s opinions were “consistent with the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its related publications.” Id. The

vocational expert responded by stating that “[t]he differences would one

be in regard to the claimant’s past work ... based upon the physical

requirements as the claimant described ... and in the file information,”

and “in regard to alternating of positions, the reduction of the numbers,

as well as overhead activities.” Id. at 76—77.

Based on the evidence, the ALJ denied Borys’s disability claim on

November 380, 2021, finding that she was not disabled during the period

at issue. Id. at 17-35. ALJ Langan reached that conclusion by

employing a five-step analytical process required under the Social

Security Act to evaluate disability insurance and supplement security

income claims. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical

severity of the claimant’s impairments; (8) whether the impairment

meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between

the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, Le.,

the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her

limitations, see id. § 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the

claimant’s residual functional capacity and his or her age, education,

and work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)G)-(v). Should a claimant

proceed past the first three steps, the Commissioner will not find the

claimant disabled when he or she can perform past relevant work under

the third step or adjust to other work under the fourth step. Id.

§ □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ (6), (g).

Applying that analysis, the ALJ first determined that Borys last

met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see id.

§ 404.130, on October 15, 2021. Tr. 22. ALJ Langan also found that

Borys did not engage in substantial gainful activity between her alleged

disability onset date of June 13, 2019, through December 31, 2024. Id.

at 22-23.

At the second step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Borys

suffered from seven severe impairments: degenerative disc disease in

the cervical spine, status-post anterior cervical discectomy and fusion at

C4 and C6, restless leg syndrome, Raynaud’s disease, depression, and

anxiety. Id. at 23. ALJ Langan also acknowledged that Borys suffered

from bursitis, infraspinatus, supraspinatus, and calcific tendinitis;

tendinopathy; chronic kidney disease; lumbar degenerative disc disease;

hypercholesterolemia; gastroesophageal reflux disease; insomnia; and

Barrett's esophagus. Jd. But because “there is no medical evidence of

record to indicate that these conditions have more than minimally

affected her ability to perform work related activities, when properly

treated,” he deemed them “non-severe impairments.” Id.

Moving to the third step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that

Borys’s impairments failed to meet or medically equal one of the

impairments listed in the SSA’s regulations. Id.

Regarding Borys’s cervical conditions and restless leg syndrome,

ALJ Langan found that “they do not satisfy the requisite laboratory,

clinical, and/or diagnostic requirements for listing level severity.” Id.

As for the claimant’s Raynaud’s disease, the ALJ noted that she “does

not suffer from gangrene or ischemia with digital ulcerations that

preclude the claimant from ambulating effectively or from effectively

performing fine or gross dexterous movement in the hands.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the claimant’s condition

does not satisfy the criteria of listing level severity.” Jd. Finally, as to

Borys’s anxiety and depression, ALJ Langan determined that neither

impairment was severe enough. Id. at 25-27. In sum, Borys did not

automatically qualify as disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(111).

Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to determine Borys’s residual

functional capacity before addressing the final two steps in the

sequential analysis. ALJ Langan noted that “the claimant’s statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and

other evidence in the record....” Tr. 29. Instead, based on the medical

evidence of record, the ALJ concluded that:

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform

light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except the

claimant: should avoid exposure to unprotected heights. She

could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb

ladders and scaffolds. She could tolerate occasional exposure

to extreme cold temperatures, wetness, and vibrations. She

should avoid interaction with the public, except for incidental

contact. She could engage in occasional interaction with co-

workers and _ supervisors. She should avoid fast

production/pace rate work. She should be afforded the ability

to alternate between sitting/standing every 30 minutes. She

should avoid use of her right upper extremity for overhead

activity. She could occasionally use her left upper extremity

for overhead activity. She should avoid occupations that

- would expose her to noise above level 3 noise intensity level.

Id. at 27.

In reaching that residual functional capacity determination, ALJ

Langan considered Borys’s own testimony and other medical evidence

on her physical impairments. During the hearing, Borys complained

that not only did she lose mobility in her neck after a surgery performed

by Dr. Alan Gillick, but she also gets headaches that “goes down into

[her] back.” Id. at 57. She also mentioned that her “hands and .. . feet

swell.” Id. Borys testified that she drives locally, “maybe once or twice

every two weeks ... to the pharmacy or post office.” Id. Also, the

claimant mentioned that cannot use a vacuum cleaner, id. at 60, and

that she could do some light chores (such as folding laundry, buying

grocery, and light cooking), albeit with assistance from other family

members. Id. at 60, 246-47. Further, Borys once reportedly climbed a

tree while camping with her husband. Id. at 857.

An opinion by Dr. Gillick, who performed a cervical fusion on

Borys on July 25, 2019, id. at 423, reported that Borys had “some

discomfort but her pain [wa]s much improved form preoperatively.” Id.

at 426. On October 14, 2019, the claimant was “struggling with some

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neck discomfort” and “a lot of pain in the right shoulder area.” Jd. at

427. The physician also observed that Borys felt “pain with attempted

overhead range of motion, either in flexion or abduction. [He] could not

reproduce pain with internal or external rotation.” Id. Then, on

November 20, 2019, Dr. Gillick noted that Borys reported “pain with

gentle flexion and extension and right and left rotational movements.

[Borys’s] upper extremity motor, sensation and reflexes are normal.

Good circulation.” Id. at 429.

About three months later, on February 29, 2020, Dr. Gillick

observed that Borys continued to “struggle[] with overhead range of

motion of the right shoulder but really had minimal relief with an

injection.” Id. at 481. By September 28, 2020, the claimant’s “upper

extremity motor and sensation and reflexes were normal],]” but she

continued to suffer “pain with any attempted overhead range of

motion[.}”’ Jd. at 1276. Similarly, on December 28, 2020, Borys

complained of “pain with attempted overhead range of motion|,] both in

flexion and abduction|,]” id. at 1298, and received significant relief from

an injection. Id. at 1297. On April 19, 2021, the same physician noted

that Borys’s “right shoulder... show[ed] minimal tenderness but

11

significant restriction in range of motion|,] particularly abduction and

flexion secondary to pain[.]” Jd. at 1281. Dr. Gillick also noted that an

injunction offered relief for several weeks. Id.

Such examinations enabled Dr. Gillick to provide his opinion on

Borys’s residual function capacity on May 138, 2020. Id. at 1312-21.

Relevantly, the doctor stated that Borys: (1) could occasionally lift and

carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach or handle; (8) could sit for

six hours, and stand or walk for about four hours in an eight-hour

workday; (4) must change her position every 30 minutes; (5) must be

“off-task” for about 20% of an eight-hour working day; (6) must take an

unscheduled break every two hours; and (7) must take about four to five

absences each month. Jd. at 1314-16.

Similarly, Dr. Sean McCall noted on October 3, 2019, that Borys

was “[p]rogressing well[]” after her cervical fusion. Id. at 458-59. On

October 12, 2020, Borys reported to the same doctor that she

experienced “tremendous difficulty postoperatively from her neck

surgery with arm weakness and pain.” Jd. at 952-58. Based on such

observations, Dr. McCall opined that Borys: (1) could occasionally lift

and carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach, handle, or finger

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frequently; (3) could sit for two hours, and stand or walk for about two

hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) must change her position every 15

to 30 minutes; (5) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour

working day; (6) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30

minutes; and (7) must take an indefinite number of absences each

month. Jd. at 1810-11. Then, on March 29, 2021, id. at 1413, after

examining Borys, Dr. McCall recorded that Borys’s neck was “supple”

but “non-tender,” and showed “no adenopathy, .. . bruits, .. . [jugular

vein distention], ... nodularity, [or] stridor.” Jd. at 1417.

Dr. Samuel Grodofsky, who examined Borys for her neck pain on

at least six occasions, continuously noted Borys’s complaint of neck

pain. Jd. at 406 (April 21, 2020), 408 (April 28, 2020), 413 (May 21,

2020), 416 (June 1, 2020), 1044 (July 6, 2020), 1048 (October 20, 2020).

At the same time, in each of those visits, Borys demonstrated a “5/5

power in all upper extremity muscle groups],|” as well as stable pain.

Id. at 408, 411, 414, 417, 1045, 1049. Based on such observations, on

May 18, 2020, Dr. Grodofsky opined that Borys could: (1) could

occasionally lift and carry up to 10 pounds; (2) could never reach,

handle, or finger; (8) could sit for two hours, and stand or walk for about

13

two hours in an eight-hour workday; (4) must change her position every

15 minutes; (5) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour

working day; (6) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30

minutes of working; and (7) must take an indefinite number of absences

each months. Jd. at 13804—07.

Also relevant to ALJ Langan’s assessment of Borys’s residual

functional capacity were the materials provided by Dr. Gaye Gustitus, a

state agency consultant who examined Borys on July 20, 2020. Id. at

83-98. Dr. Gustitus determined that Borys could: (1) occasionally lift

and carry up to 20 pounds, and frequently lift and carry up to ten

pounds; (2) sit for up to six hours, and stand or walk for up to six hours

in an eight-hour workday; (8) occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but

never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (4) occasionally perform some

posturing activities, such as stooping or crouching; (5) occasionally

reach overhead; and (6) avoid exposure to wetness, extreme cold,

vibrations, and industrial hazards (including machinery and heights).

Id. at 92-938. Dr. Robert Czwalina, another state agency consultant

who examined Borys on December 21, 2020, reached the same

conclusions. Jd. at 111—15, 121.

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The cumulative evidence on Borys’s residual functional capacity

led ALJ Langan to disagree with her pertinent testimony. Id. at 29.

More specifically, the ALJ determined that:

[a]lfter reviewing all of the evidence, the undersigned

concludes that the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to perform work activity at a range of a light

exertional level with limitations resulting from her

impairments. The above residual functional capacity

assessment is supported by and consistent with the objective

medical evidence, including the measurable findings upon

clinical examination. The claimant reported complaints of

multiple physical and mental health problems. The existence

of her problems and resultant symptomatology are supported

somewhat by the objective evidence of record, but not to the

extent as alleged by the claimant. Limitations to exertional,

postural, mental, and environmental factors have been

included to address the claimant’s well-supported objective

deficits of record. The residual functional capacity is

consistent with the claimant’s activity level as indicated. The

objective evidence does not support a finding that the

claimant is more severely limited than stated above. In light

of the evidence of record, the above residual functional

capacity gives the claimant the benefit of the doubt but still

does not preclude her from performing work activity.

Id. at 29, 38.

In sum, based on the evidence on Borys’s physical impairments,

the ALJ concluded that her “the claimant’s statements concerning the

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not

15

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the

record[.]” Jd. at 29.

Having determined Borys’s residual functional capacity and

rejected several grounds for further limitation, ALJ Langan proceeded

to the fourth step of the analysis to determine whether she was disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. Id. at 33. Here, the ALJ

compared Borys’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity,

finding that she was unable to perform her prior employment as a

warehouse worker. Jd. at 33-34.

Finally, in the fifth step of the sequential analysis process, ALJ

Langan considered Borys’s age, education, work experience, and

residual functional capacity to perform light work, concluding that

Borys was “capable of making a successful adjustment to other work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Jd. at 35.

Here, the ALJ leveraged testimony provided by Abraham that a person

fitting Borys’s parameters could meet the requirements of

“representative occupations” such as a folder, a marker, or a routing

clerk. Id. at 34-35. ALJ Langan further noted that:

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, ... the vocational expert’s testimony

was generally consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational

16

Titles. However, in terms of the way the jobs identified by the

vocational expert, regarding both the physical and cognitive

aspects of these jobs (including the reduction in job quantities

available), any divergence from the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles was formulated based upon the vocational

expert’s knowledge and experience in this field Gncluding

observations and literature reviews) ....

Id. at 35. As a result of this analysis, ALJ Langan determined that

Borys was not disabled and denied her application for disability benefits

on November 30, 2021. Id. at 17-19. Borys unsuccessfully appealed the

denial to the SSA’s Appeals Council. Jd. at 1-3. The instant appeal to

the Court followed.

Borys initiated this action with the Court on June 23, 2023.

Doc. 1. The Commissioner provided the requisite transcripts from the

disability proceedings on August 21, 2023. Docs. 7-8. The parties then

filed their respective briefs. Docs. 8, 17-18. The parties also consented

to magistrate judge jurisdiction on June 30, 2023. Docs. 5, 19.

Borys alleges three errors warranting reversal or remand. Doc. 8

at 8. Specifically, Borys alleges that the ALJ: (1) performed an

inadequate function-by-function assessment; (2) “failed to provide any

reason for rejecting” limitations proposed by “three separate treating

17

physician[s]”; and (8) erred in his analysis of the fifth step under the

sequential analysis as to her overhead reaching limitations. Id.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s

application for social security disability benefits is limited to

determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).

Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence

but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d

1211, 12138 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1988)). In an

adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [ALJ Langan’s decision]

18

from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Commn., 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).

Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are

supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue,

901 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(¢). This court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make

factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that

the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of

reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial

review.” Diaz v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)

(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by

stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is

relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,

181 F.3d 429, 438 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when

there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for

discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,

429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,

1064 (8d Cir. 1998) (holding that substantial evidence standard is

19

unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing

evidence).

Here, ALJ Langan’s factual findings were supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those

conclusions was sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review.

B. Function-by-Function Assessment in Formulation of

the Residual Functional Capacity

Borys first contends that ALJ Langan did not provide an

explanation for his alleged decision to exclude sitting, standing, and

walking limitations from her residual functional capacity, and that the

failure violated his duty to conduct an adequate function-by-function

assessment. Doc. 8 at 14-18. According to Borys, not only does this

error frustrate meaningful judicial review, but, because the inclusion of

such functional limitations may have impacted the vocational expert’s

testimony on her employment prospects, it was not harmless. Id. A

review of the record, however, finds that ALJ Langan included sitting,

standing, and walking limitations in Borys’s residual functional

capacity, and conducted an adequate function-by-function assessment

in compliance with the applicable regulations.

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When crafting a claimant’s residual functional capacity and

assessing whether a claimant can perform their past work at step four

of the sequential evaluation process, an ALJ must explain which level of

work the claimant is currently capable of performing. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)—(iv), 404.1545(a)(5)(i)—Gi); Heckler v. Campbell,

461 U.S. 458, 460-62 (1983). The Social Security regulations include a

tiered series of work capacities, ranging from “sedentary work” to “very

heavy work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-(e). Relevant here are the

regulations that define “light work,” which expressly address sitting,

standing, and walking:

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time

with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10

pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a

job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking

or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with

some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light

work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these

activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he

or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional

limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit

for long periods of time. .

Id. § 404.1567(b).

In determining Borys’s residual functional capacity, ALJ Langan

concluded that she was limited to performing “light work as defined in

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20 CFR 404.1567(b),” a category that by definition limits her to no more

than “frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds[,]”

and a “good deal of walking or standing” during the workday. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1567(b). The regulations further instruct that “[flrequent’ means

occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time. Since frequent

lifting or carrying requires being on one’s feet up to two-thirds of a

workday, the full range of light work requires standing or walking, off

and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR

83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 (1983). Thus, by limiting Borys to light

work, ALJ Langan found that Borys was, at a minimum, limited to

walking off and on for approximately 6 hours of the workday. See id.;

20 C.F-.R. § 404.1567(b).

The ALJ then proceeded to list further limitations on Borys’s

ability to perform certain activities, including her ability to sit and

stand. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). As highlighted by the

Commissioner, Doc. 17 at 28, the ALJ explicitly provided that Borys

“should be afforded the ability to alternate between sitting/standing

every 30 minutes.” Tr. 27. The Social Security regulations expressly

provide for the incorporation of this type of limitation where “the

99

medical facts lead to an assessment of RFC which [is] compatible with

the performance of either sedentary or light work except that the person

must alternate periods of sitting and standing. The individual may be

able to sit for [some] time, but must then get up and stand or walk for

awhile before returning to sitting.” SSR 88-12, 1983 WL 31258, at *4

(1983). The ALJ accordingly provided special limitations to

accommodate Borys’s more limited ability to sit and stand, which were

more restrictive than the definition of “light work.” See id.

Borys relies on SSR 96-8p to assert that ALJ Langan’s findings

were in error. Doc. 8 at 15-18. Specifically, Borys leverages the

“Exertion Capacity” section of the ruling, which provides, in pertinent

part, that:

Each function must be considered separately (e.g., “the

individual can walk for 5 out of 8 hours and stand for 6 out of

8 hours’), even if the final RFC assessment will combine

activities (e.g., “walk/stand, lift/carry, push/pull”). Although

the regulations describing the exertional levels of work and

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and its related volumes

pair some functions, it is not invariably the case that treating

the activities together will result in the same decisional

outcome as treating them separately.

Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96—-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474, 34477 (July 2,

1996).

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Conducting a “function-by-function assessment” requires that an

ALJ “articulate how the evidence in the record supports the RFC

determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained work-

related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistencies in

the record.” Brooks v. Saul, 2019 WL 7048794, *7 (E.D. Pa. 2019)

(quoting Bencivengo v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 251 F.8d 158 (8d Cir.

2000)). This does not mean, as Borys seems to urge, that the ALJ must

“make specific, written findings on dozens of individual work function

categories.” Jd. Rather, it simply means the ALJ’s “RFC determination

must include an explanation of the substantial evidence upon which it

relies.” Id.

The limitation findings an ALJ makes during a residual functional

capacity assessment are subject to the general duty of articulation

standard set forth above. See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41

(3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he ALJ’s finding of residual functional capacity must

‘be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis on

which it rests.” (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 (8d Cir. 1981))).

This means that well-articulated residual functional capacity

assessments supported by substantial evidence are permitted to

D4.

include, in the absence of or in addition to their individually tailored

limitation findings, ones pulled from the regulation’s tiered series of

work capacities. See Chiaradio v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App’x

158, 161 (8d Cir. 2011) (affirming residual functional capacity

assessment with “light work” functional limitation that did not engage

in “task by task analysis,” but was well-articulated and supported “by

substantial evidence on the record.”).

That is precisely what ALJ Langan did here, enumerating a

comprehensive discussion of the substantial evidence upon which his

residual functional capacity determination relied. The ALJ’s discussion

included consideration of symptom allegations, clinical records,

examination evaluations, treatment records, and opinion evidence; in

other words, it addressed all the pertinent evidence of record. Tr. 27—

33. ALJ Langan explained that, based on certain evidence—

specifically, treatment notes; history of treatment and pain; and some

limitations in performing daily activities—Borys, in addition to

standard light work limitations, required individualized exertional,

postural, mental, and environmental limitations. Jd. at 27. Those

additional restrictions, coupled with the inherent limitations of the

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“light work” definition, were consistent with the evidence and

physicians’ opinions in the record that the ALJ deemed persuasive. Id.

at 27-33. The Court refrains from reweighing those factual

determinations. See Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504.

ALJ Langan also found that, because the record lacked sufficient

evidence supporting Borys’s allegations of pain after surgery and of an

impaired ability to perform daily functions, no additional limitations

beyond those already outlined were necessary. Tr. 27-30. That well-

articulated “explication of the basis on which” ALJ Langan’s function-

by-function assessment relied was substantially supported by the

evidence of record, id. at 88—98, 100-21, 406-18, 426-31, 458-63, 952—

58, 1044-50, 1276-81, 1297-98, 1802-07, 1309-11, 1312-21, 1413-21,

comports with the mandates of SSR 96-8p, and does not give rise to any

analytical error. See Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41.

Borys further argues that the supposedly factually analogous

matters of Barbour v. Kijakazt, 2021 WL 4478332 (M.D. Pa. 2021), and

Mattox v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 5943135 (M.D. Pa. 2023), militate in favor

of remand here. Docs. 13 at 16-18; 18 at 7-8. A review of Barbour and

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Mattox finds that those nonbinding cases are inapposite to the facts now

before the Court.

In Barbour, the Court rejected an ALJ’s residual functional

capacity determination because “the inadequacies in the ALJ’s function-

by-function assessment, and evaluation of the medical opinion evidence”

frustrated meaningful judicial review. 2021 WL 4478332, at *5.

Specifically, the ALJ made no specific findings regarding the claimant’s

ability to stand and walk, despite lingering record inconsistencies

concerning those functional capacities. Jd. This, the Court found, was

significant because it may have impacted the testimony elicited from

the vocational expert. Id. at *6.

Likewise, in Mattox, the Court remanded a disability benefits

denial because the administrative decision had inadvertently and

materially mischaracterized a medical opinion on which it relied when

fashioning the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations.

2023 WL 5943185, at *7. The Court found that not only did this error

frustrate judicial review, but it was harmful because, similar to the

facts in Barbour, it had a potential impact on the testimony delivered

by the vocational expert. Id. at *8.

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Here, unlike the circumstances in Barbour and Mattox, ALJ

Langan accurately summarized the medical opinions he considered

when fashioning the claimant’s residual functional capacity limitations

in the areas of walking, standing, and sitting, Tr. 830-33, and made

specific findings regarding the claimant’s ability in those areas, both

through a residual functional capacity assessment of light work, and

additional specific limitations. Jd. at 27. Accordingly, since ALJ

Langan’s function-by-function assessment in his residual functional

capacity determination was premised on substantial evidence and was

sufficiently articulated to permit judicial review, it will be left

undisturbed.

C. Evaluation of Medical Opinions provided by Drs.

Gillick, McCall, and Grodofsky

Borys further contends that ALJ Langan erred in rejecting the

medical opinions of treating physicians Drs. Gillick, McCall, and

Grodofsky. Doc. 8 at 18-24. But Borys’s disagreement with the ALJ’s

assessment of those opinions does not warrant remand where, as here,

that evaluation comported with all applicable regulatory requirements.

The three doctors all opined that Borys needs some non-exertional

limitations. Dr. Gillick opined that Borys: (1) must be “off-task” about

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20% of an eight-hour working day; (2) must take an unscheduled break

every two hours; and (8) must take about four to five absences each

month. Tr. 1316. Likewise, both Drs. McCall and Grodofsky stated that

Borys: (1) must be “off-task” for more than 20% of an eight-hour

working day; (2) must take an unscheduled break every 15 to 30

minutes; and (8) must take an indefinite number of absences each

month. Jd. at 1306, 1311.

Borys takes umbrage with the ALJ’s decision to credit the

opinions of Drs. Gustitus and Czwalina, two state agency consultants,

over those provided by the three treating physicians. Doc. 8 at 18-24.

She correctly observes that Drs. Gustitus and Czwalina did not

establish non-exertional limitations regarding off-task time,

unscheduled breaks, and monthly absences. Jd. at 19. Borys concludes

that, as ALJ Langan found the state agency consultants’ opinions are

“largely persuasive,” Tr. 33, but determined that the statements

provided by the three treating physicians were “unpersuasive,” id. at

32, without providing any explanation, the administrative decision

warrants aremand. Doc. 8 at 18—24.

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Under the current regulation, medical opinions are not entitled to

any specific weighting, and are instead evaluated for persuasiveness.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)—-(b). An ALJ determines the persuasiveness of

a prior medical finding or medical opinion by assessing five factors: (1)

supportability; (2) consistency; (8) relationship with the claimant; (4)

specialization; and (5) other factors. Id. § 404.1520c(a)-(c). The factors

related to the substance of medical opinions—supportability and

consistency—are the “most important factors.” Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

Examining supportability entails a review of the opinion’s basis in

relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations

presented by a medical source.” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency is

assessed based on how consistent a finding or opinion is “with the

evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the

claim[.]” Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

The Court of Appeals explained that, when weighing the record,

an ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or the wrong reason” and

must explain “why probative evidence has been rejected ... so that a

reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were

improper.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706-07 (8d Cir. 1981). This

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does not mean, however, that the ALJ must undertake an exhaustive

discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42; Hur

v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 188 (8d Cir. 2004) (“There is no

requirement that the ALJ discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence

included in the record.”).

Here, ALJ Langan found the treating physicians’ opinions

unpersuasive because they lacked significant support in and were

inconsistent with the weight of the evidence. The ALJ explained that

those statements “overestimate[d] the claimant’s degree of limitation,”

and noted that Borys’s “physical examination findings more consistently

revealed more mild to moderate symptoms. ... Because the claimant’s

signs, symptoms, and residual ability are more consistent with an

individual who retains a light residual functional capacity, this opinion,

an opinion that suggests complete disability, is found to be

unpersuasive.” Tr. 32.

Further, ALJ Langan explained his reasoning for finding the

opinions provided by Drs. Czwalina and Gustitus more persuasive:

the medical evidence of record, inclusive of the physical

examination findings and the objective evidence, supports the

limitation to light work suggested by Drs. Czwalina and

Gustitus. Throughout the period of review, the claimant has

27

experienced sufficiently documented symptomatology that

has restricted the claimant’s ability to work and to address

her daily household/personal tasks .... Her care, save her

cervical spinal surgery, remains largely conservative with

medication management. Accordingly, the undersigned finds

that these opinions are largely persuasive.

Id. at 33.

Those analyses readily meet ALJ Langan’s regulatory duty to

consider the consistency and supportability of the two branches of

opinions, in arriving at the conclusion that the treating physicians’

statements were unpersuasive. See, e.g., Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d

125, 129 (8d Cir. 1991) (holding medical opinions that are inconsistent

with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not persuasive or

controlling); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (8d Cir. 1990) (same).

Furthermore, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence to make its

own factual determinations. Chandler v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d

356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).

Borys raises seven additional arguments in contending that the

ALJ made a reversible error, Doc. 8 at 19-24, but none prevail. They

are:

1. ALJ Langan “only discussed the ... opinions as it pertains to

the ability to perform ‘light work,” which “has nothing to do

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with the need for time off task, absences from work, or

unscheduled breaks|]”;

2. The ALJ failed to cite evidence that is inconsistent with the

opinions provided by Drs. Gillick, McCall, and Grodofsky;

3. ALJ Langan failed to explain how Borys’s daily activities are

inconsistent with the treating physicians’ opinions;

4. The ALJ incorrectly stated that the treating physicians’

opinions provide for complete disability;

5. ALJ Langan’s analysis is backward, as he “pre-determined

[Borys’s] activities to be consistent with light work and then

compared to the opinions to this pre-determination|]”;

6. The ALJ “necessarily relied upon his own lay

reinterpretation of the evidence to reject the treating source

opinions,” as the state agency consultants did not opine on

Borys’s “limitations in time off task, absences from work,

and unscheduled breaks|]”; and

7. ALJ Langan “gave no reason for rejecting the opinions

regarding the limitations in time off task, absences from

work, and unscheduled breaks,” which were provided by the

three treating physicians.

Id.

Two of the seven averments, the first and sixth, rest on the

additional limitations as to time-off tasks, absences from work, and

unscheduled breaks. Id. at 20-21. Those accommodations, as discussed

above, fail to provide grounds for remand.

Three of the other five considerations stretch the record. For

example, Borys’s second and third arguments claim that ALJ Langan

33

found some of the medical opinions inconsistent, Doc. 8 at 20-21,

though the ALJ merely said that he found that evidence “unpersuasive.”

Tr. 32. In any event, the ALJ detailed his reasoning for finding those

opinions unpersuasive, when compared to the objective evidence of

record. Jd. Her fourth contention is that the ALJ stated incorrectly

that the medical materials provided by Drs. Gillick, McCall, and

Grodofsky “provide for ‘complete disability,” Doc. 8 at 21, when they

merely outline “specific functional limitations.” Id. But, as the

Commissioner correctly notes, Doc. 17 at 15 n.4, this statement was

based on the comments that Borys remains “incapable of sedentary

work.” Tr. 1802, 1312. As sedentary work is the lowest of the tiered

series of work capacities set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)-{e), any

opinion that a claimant is unable to perform such work logically leads to

an interpretation of complete disability.

Borys’s remaining two arguments also fail to establish that

remand is warranted. Specifically, Borys’s fifth contention is that the.

ALJ’s “analysis is backwards,” as he allegedly “pre-determined [her]

activities to be consistent with light work and then compared to the

opinions to this pre-determination.” Doc. 8 at 21. Her seventh

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argument is that “the reports of non-examining sources are generally

given less weight than those of examining and treating sources.” Jd. at

22 (citations omitted). Both arguments fail to undermine the

substantial evidence on which ALJ Langan issued his decision, and this

Court’s ability to conduct meaningful judicial review. See Sponheimer

v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 734 F. App’x 805, 808-09 (8d Cir. 2018) (quoting

Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380 (8d Cir. 2008)) (holding that

judicial courts “defer to [ALJ’s] credibility determination” when

substantial evidence outweighs complaints “not otherwise supported by

the record.”); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a) (declaring that ALJ does

“not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling

weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical

finding(s), including those from... medical sources.”).

Therefore, because ALJ Langan evaluated the medical opinions

pursuant to his regulatory duty to gauge persuasiveness, his findings

will not be disturbed.

D. Conflict between Vocational Expert Testimony and

DOT

In her third and final challenge, Borys attacks ALJ Langan’s

alleged failure to consider that Borys “can never use her right... arm

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for overhead activity and can only occasionally use her left arm for

overhead activity.” Doc. 8 at 9-14 (citation omitted). According to

Borys, each of the jobs identified by the vocational expert—a folder, a

marker, and a routing clerk position—“requires frequent or constant

reaching” under DOT, and neither DOT nor the Selected

Characteristics of Occupations, a complementary text to DOT,

distinguishes “between overhead reaching and reaching in other

directions.” Jd. at 10. Therefore, Borys surmises, the ALJ failed to

resolve the apparent conflict between the vocational expert's testimony

and DOT, warranting a remand. Id. at 11, 14. This position, however,

does not yield any relief.

Under the current regulatory framework governing the fifth step

of the sequential analysis, when an ALJ “determine[s] that unskilled,

sedentary, light, and medium jobs exist in the national economy ... ,

[he or she] will take administrative notice of reliable job information

available from various governmental and other publications,” including

DOT. 20C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1).

Regarding vocational expert testimony and potential conflicts, the

regulatory framework provides that:

26

Occupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert]...

generally should be consistent with the occupational

information supplied by the DOT. When there is an apparent

unresolved conflict between [vocational expert] . . . evidence

and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable

explanation for the conflict before relying on the [vocational

expert] ... evidence to support a determination or decision

about whether the claimant is disabled. At the hearings level,

as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record,

the adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or

not there is such consistency.

Social Security Ruling, SSR 00—4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 75759, 75760 (Dec. 4,

2000).

Notably, “[nJeither the DOT nor the [vocational expert]...

evidence automatically “trumps” when there is a conflict.” Jd. Instead,

the ALJ “must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation

given by the [vocational expert] .. . is reasonable and provides a basis

for relying on the [expert’s] . . . testimony rather than on the DOT

information.” Jd. This means that the ALJ must: “(1) ask, on the

record, whether the [vocational expert’s] testimony is consistent with

the DOTI;] (2) ‘elicit a reasonable explanation’ where an inconsistency

does appear|;| and (8) explain in its decision ‘how the conflict was

resolved.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 617 (8d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (8d Cir. 2002)).

387

Here, the Court is unconvinced that this case should be remanded

for two reasons. First, the ALJ need not “inquire into conflicts” if “the

DOT and testimony of the vocational expert w[ere| not necessarily

inconsistent....” Burns, 312 F.3d at 128 (footnote omitted). A

corollary is that no reversible error exists if DOT lacks discussions of a

certain limitation in its job descriptions, and thus does not contradict an

expert’s testimony. See Sanborn v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App’x

171, 177 (8d Cir. 2015). As Borys herself acknowledges, neither DOT

nor its companion text distinguish between types of reaching or

“address overhead reaching specifically.” Doc. 8 at 10. Thus, any

limitations that she has on overhead reaching does not necessarily

contradict the generalized reaching requirements of a folder, marker, or

routing clerk under the DOT. See Sanborn, 613 F. App’x at 177.

Borys argues that the analogous case of Fariss v. Berryhill, No. 17-

CV-1741 (M.D. Pa. 2017), favor remand here. Docs. 8 at 9-13. In

Fariss, the issue was the evident discrepancy between the frequencies of

reaching that were established by DOT and the ALJ. Fariss v.

Berryhill, No. 17-CV-1741, report & recommendation at 14-15 (M.D.

Pa. Apr. 17, 2017) (“each position cited by VE... requires more than

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‘occasional’ reaching, while the ALJ limited Plaintiff to occasional

overhead reaching.” (citing Pearson v. Colvin, 810 F.3d 204 (4th Cir.

2015))), report and recommendation adopted, order (M.D. Pa. May 7,

2019). In the instant case, the alleged conflict involves the types of

reaching defined by DOT and ALJ Langan. Doc. 8 at 10. As explained

above, the two sources do not create a clear contradiction. The ALJ

thus was not required to reconcile his findings with DOT. See Burns,

312 F.3d at 128; Sanborn, 613 F. App’x 177.

Second, to the extent any conflict does exist, ALJ Langan met his

duties during and after the hearing. The ALJ asked on record whether

Abraham’s opinions have “been consistent with the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles and its related publications.” Tr. 76. Abrahams

stated that her opinions conflicted “in regard to alternating of positions,

the reduction of the numbers, as well as overhead activities,” as those

requirements “were ... based upon evaluating representative examples

such as the ones [she] provided [that day] within the economy.” Jd. at

76-77. The ALJ accordingly reasoned that the expert testimony “was

generally consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,” and

that “any divergence from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles was

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formulated based upon the vocational expert’s knowledge and

experience in this field Gncluding observations and literature reviews)

.... Id. at 35. Thus, the ALJ fulfilled his duties of inquiring about

any potential conflicts, eliciting a reasonable explanation on the record,

and explaining the basis of his resolution in the decision. See Burns,

312 F.3d at 127-28.

Therefore, since ALJ Langan’s determination at the fifth step of

the sequential analysis was founded on substantial evidence, the Court

will not disturb the Commissioner's decision on this ground. .

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision. A

separate order shall be issued.

Date: September 30, 2025 S/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge

40