DANIELS v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

:

N.D., : Civil Action No. 24-09523

:

Plaintiff, :

: OPINION

v. :

:

COMMISSIONER OF :

SOCIAL SECURITY, :

Defendant. :

:

:

CHESLER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on the appeal by Plaintiff N.D. (“Plaintiff”) of

the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) determining

that he was not disabled under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). This Court exercises

jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and, having considered the submissions of the

parties without oral argument, pursuant to L. CIV. R. 78.1(b), finds that the Commissioner’s

decision will be affirmed.

In brief, this appeal arises from Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits,

alleging disability beginning February 28, 2022. A hearing was held before ALJ Jason

Mastrangelo (the “ALJ”) on September 27, 2023, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on

December 27, 2023. Plaintiff sought review of the decision from the Appeals Council. After

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision became the

Commissioner’s final decision, and Plaintiff filed this appeal. Of note, Plaintiff had previously

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been found disabled within the meaning of the Act as a minor in 1997, as an adult in 2003, again

in 2010, and most recently, he was found not disabled in 2021.

In decision of December 27, 2023, the ALJ found, at step two, that Plaintiff has several

severe impairments, including depressive, anxiety, and personality disorder, cognitive disorder,

schizo-affective disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder. At step three, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff’s condition does not meet the requirements of any of the Listings of Impairments. At

step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform a full range of exertional tasks but has a series of non-exertional limitations. Finally, at

step five, the ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy that plaintiff can perform. In making these determinations, the ALJ chose not to obtain

and admit into the record all prior decisions issued by ALJs regarding Plaintiff’s disability status,

as well as medical records associated with those decisions. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has

not been disabled within the meaning of the Act.

On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and the case

remanded for five reasons: 1) the ALJ improperly excluded from the record prior ALJ decisions

and medical records attendant to those claims; 2) at step two, the ALJ’s determination that

Plaintiff’s physical conditions are not severe is not supported by substantial evidence; 3) at step

three, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s condition does not meet the requirements of the

Listings of Impairments is not supported by substantial evidence nor by an adequate rationale; 4)

at step four, the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by substantial evidence; and 5) at step

five, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform alternative work which exists in

significant numbers in the national economy is not supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Br.

at 11, 15, 16, 22, 26, 28).

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In reviewing the ALJ’s determination, this Court must affirm the Commissioner’s final

decision if it is “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Courts are not

permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Further, on appeal, Plaintiff carries twin

burdens of proof. First, Plaintiff bears the burden at the first four steps of the analysis of

demonstrating how his impairments, whether individually or in combination, amount to a

qualifying disability. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). Second, Plaintiff bears

the burden of showing not merely that the Commissioner erred, but also that the error was

harmful. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009). At the first four steps, this requires that

Plaintiff show that, but for the error, he might have proven his disability. In other words, when

appealing a decision at the first four steps, if Plaintiff cannot articulate the basis for a decision in

his favor, based on the existing record, he is quite unlikely to show that an error was harmful.

First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision not to include all prior ALJ decisions and medical

records attendant to such decisions was improper and requires reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

This line of argument appears to be an attempt by Plaintiff to shift the responsibility for

producing old medical records that the Plaintiff himself did not produce for this application. As

discussed, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving disability at the first four steps. It is not the

responsibility of the Commissioner to obtain the records that the Plaintiff did not produce.

Further, as the ALJ points out in his decision, “the relevant issue is whether the claimant has

been under a disability since February 28, 2022.” Accordingly, it makes little sense to fault the

ALJ for not obtaining records dating back decades to decide this disability application. This

Court is satisfied that the ALJ considered the issue, found these decades-old medical records

immaterial to his determination, and relied instead on many other sources of medical evidence

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that he thought sufficient to “establish that the claimant has a long history of mental health

treatment” and that in fact contained “records of treatment received by the claimant over the

course of the past two decades.” (Tr. 11). The ALJ did not err by not considering records that

Plaintiff did not produce.

Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination that his physical conditions do not

constitute severe impairments. At step two, the ALJ found the following psychological

conditions to be severe impairments: depressive, anxiety, and personality disorder; cognitive

disorder; schizo-affective disorder; posttraumatic stress disorder. (Tr. 13). However, the ALJ

did not find any of the physical conditions raised by the Plaintiff to be severe.

The Third Circuit has interpreted the relevant Rulings and Regulations to hold that “[t]he

step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” Newell v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 347 F.3d 541, 546 (3d Cir. 2003). The Newell Court further emphasized:

An impairment or combination of impairments can be found “not severe” only if

the evidence establishes a slight abnormality or a combination of slight

abnormalities which have “no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s

ability to work.” SSR 85-28, 1985 SSR LEXIS 19 at *6-8. Only those claimants

with slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any “basic work activity”

can be denied benefits at step two. See Bowen, 482 U.S. at 158 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring). If the evidence presented by the claimant presents more than a

“slight abnormality,” the step-two requirement of “severe” is met, and the

sequential evaluation process should continue. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at

1290. Reasonable doubts on severity are to be resolved in favor of the claimant.

Newell, 347 F.3d at 546; accord McCrea v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir.

2004) (“The burden placed on an applicant at step two is not an exacting one. . . . Any doubt as

to whether this showing has been made is to be resolved in favor of the applicant.”) In McCrea,

the Third Circuit reaffirmed the severity standard announced in Newell and added that, in light of

the low threshold for severity, findings that an impairment is not severe “should be reviewed

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with close scrutiny” and are “certain to raise a judicial eyebrow.” McCrea, 370 F.3d at 357.

The ALJ here may have erred here, but this Court need not reach the substance of Plaintiff’s

contention that he has a slew of severe physical impairments that the ALJ improperly failed to

recognize. Regardless of whether the ALJ erred, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he was

prejudiced by this error, as required by Shinseki. At step two, the ALJ found four severe

impairments. Had the total count been eight, instead of four, it would not have made any

difference to the outcome. Plaintiff has not persuaded this Court that any potential error at step

two harmed him.

Third, at step three, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s condition

does not meet the requirements of particular Listings of Impairments is not supported by

substantial evidence nor by an adequate rationale. To persuade the Court that the Commissioner

committed harmful error at step three, Plaintiff must muster the evidence and demonstrate that

there is evidence of record that supports the conclusion that he met every requirement of a

Listing. In the absence of such a demonstration, under Shinseki, the Court cannot conclude that

any error was harmful. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. In fact, Plaintiff states that he

“disagree[s]” with the notion that he must prove that the Listings of Impairment are actually met

to show error that is more than harmless. (Pl.’s Br. at 22).

Fourth, at step four, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination is not supported by

substantial evidence. In deciding Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff only had non-

exertional limitations as follows:

The claimant is limited to understanding and following simple instructions; He

can sustain attention and concentration to carry out simple tasks and instructions;

He can occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers and the general public;

He can tolerate simple changes in a work setting; He can use judgment to make

simple work-related decisions; He can perform non-pressured work tasks,

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meaning goal-oriented tasks, and can work primarily with things and objects

rather than people.

(Tr. 19). Plaintiff’s objection to this determination primarily fails because it does not meet the

requirements of Shinseki by pointing to evidence of record which, if credited, would support

inclusion of additional limitations in the RFC. In other words, Plaintiff’s argument largely lacks

specific evidence of record that indicates his lack of capacity to function at work.

The closest Plaintiff comes to such evidence are the discussions of Dr. Busch’s assessment of

Plaintiff’s hearing impairment and Dr. Hoffman’s assessment of Plaintiff’s lumbar disc disease.

(Pl.’s Br. at 22-23). Specifically, with respect to Dr. Busch’s assessment, Plaintiff argues that

Dr. Busch’s advice that certain hearing devices would “be an adequate accommodation” in most

settings but without those devices, “employment is still possible” but “may be more limited,”

(Tr. 3778), should have compelled the ALJ to include Plaintiff’s hearing issues as a limitation

factored into his RFC. (Pl.’s Br. at 22-23). Similarly, with respect to Dr. Hoffman’s analysis,

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider Dr. Hoffman’s finding of “limitations

of range of motion of the spine with positive straight leg raising and diminished grip strength and

motion of the left wrist.” In other words, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not sufficiently

incorporate the comments of these doctors into his RFC assessment.

However, in both cases, Plaintiff seems to be once again asking this Court to re-weigh

evidence the ALJ already considered. The ALJ dealt in detail at step four with Dr. Busch’s

assessment and explained why he concluded that Plaintiff’s hearing impairment did not make for

an exertional limitation. (Tr. 25). Similarly, the ALJ addressed Dr. Hoffman’s assessment and

considered Plaintiff’s lumbar disc disease earlier in the decision, ultimately finding it non-severe

(Tr. 14-15), and stated that he “considered all of the claimant’s medically determinable

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impairments, including those that are not severe, when assessing the claimant’s residual

functional capacity.” (Tr. 16). Even if the ALJ did err by not directly addressing Dr. Hoffman’s

opinion in his discussion of Plaintiff’s RFC, the error was harmless for two reasons: first, the

three alternative jobs that the ALJ identified at step five (Maid, Package Sorter, and Mail Clerk)

are all at the “light” exertional level, which appears to be the level of functional capacity Plaintiff

believes the lumbar disc disease necessitates (Pl.’s Br. at 23) and second, Dr. Hoffman did not

actually state in his assessment that Plaintiff ought to be limited to light work. (Tr. 3783-92).

Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s RFC determination regarding his psychological

impairments. Plaintiff does not point to any clearly overlooked piece of evidence that would

have changed the outcome of his case. For example, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Mintzer’s

assessment of Plaintiff’s cognitive function should have led the ALJ to a different conclusion.

But, as Plaintiff admits, Dr. Mintzer did not “provide a specific assessment of function.” (Pl.’s

Br. at 24). Additionally, the ALJ weighed the evidence provided by Dr. Mintzer in coming to his

conclusion. (Tr. 23-24). As already stated, under Third Circuit law, this Court may not re-weigh

the evidence the ALJ considered. Further, the ALJ’s decision here was based on a careful

consideration of the various pieces of the medical record, including the assessment of state

agency psychological consultant Dr. Michael Plasay, and is thus based on substantial evidence.

(Tr. 23).

Finally, at step five, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff could perform

alternative work which exists in significant numbers in the national economy is not supported by

substantial evidence. The thrust of Plaintiff’s argument is that the ALJ’s RFC determination is

inaccurate, and therefore the ALJ’s determination regarding alternative work must be invalid.

(Pl.’s Br. at 26). The Court already considered this argument at step four and, as just explained,

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because this Court finds the RFC to be supported by substantial evidence, this argument fails.

Plaintiff has failed to persuade this Court that the ALJ erred in his decision, or that Plaintiff

was harmed by any errors. This Court finds that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence and is affirmed.

s/ Stanley R Chesler

STANLEY R. CHESLER, U.S.D.J.

Dated: September 30, 2025

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