COLIHAN v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

PATRICK C.,1

Civil No. 24-9154 (RMB)

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Patrick C. asks this Court to overturn the Commissioner of Social Security’s

(Commissioner) denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title

II of the Social Security Act (the Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Patrick faults the Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) for, among other things, not properly crediting certain medical opinions

from treating physicians and state-agency consultant examiners.

For the reasons below, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision finding Patrick not

disabled under the Act.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Standard of Review

The Act grants federal courts limited power to review the Commissioner’s decision to

deny an applicant DIB. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While courts conduct a plenary review of legal

1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United

States has recommended that federal courts should refer to plaintiffs in social security disability cases by only

their first names and last initials given the significant privacy concerns in these matters. See also D.N.J. Standing

Order 2021-10.

issues the Commissioner decides, see Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000), the Act

requires courts to uphold the Commissioner’s factual decisions if supported by “substantial

evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See also Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). This

evidentiary threshold is “not high” and “means only . . . such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587

U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The substantial evidence standard is a deferential one, and a court

cannot set aside the Commissioner’s decision merely because “acting de novo [it] might have

reached a different conclusion.” See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir.

1986). Indeed, courts cannot “weigh the evidence or substitute [its own] conclusions for

those of the [Commissioner.]” Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005) (first

alteration in original, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Still, while deferential, the substantial evidence inquiry is not a perfunctory exercise to

rubberstamp the Commissioner’s decision. Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983)

(explaining the substantial evidence standard is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula

for adjudication,” rather, the standard requires a “qualitative exercise”). Thus, when

reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, courts must “review the evidence in its totality” and

“take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.” K.K. ex rel. K.S. v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 1509091, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2018) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

Where, as here, the Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review of an ALJ’s

decision, the “ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision.” Matthews v. Apfel, 239

F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s decision must have enough information to “permit

meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2004). This requires

the ALJ to explain what evidence the judge considered that “supports the result” and “some

indication of the evidence [the judge] rejected.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 178 F. App’x 106,

111 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)). Otherwise,

courts “cannot tell if significant probative evidence was not credited or simply ignored.”

Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705. Courts will set aside an ALJ’s decision if the judge failed to consider

the entire record or resolve an evidentiary conflict. Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41-42

(3d Cir. 2001).

B. The Social Security Disability Determination

To qualify for DIB, a claimant must show he is disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 423. “Under

the [Act,] a disability is established where the claimant demonstrates that there is some

medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any

substantial gainful activity for a statutory twelve-month period.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 38-39

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claimant is considered unable to engage

in any substantial gainful activity ‘only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments

are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering

his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy.” Id. at 39 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)).

The Commissioner makes a disability determination through a five-step sequential

process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). For steps one through four, the claimant bears the

burden of proof. Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019). At the fifth

step, the Commissioner shoulders the burden. Id. The five-steps are:

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is

performing “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is, he is not disabled. Id.

Otherwise, the ALJ moves on to step two.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any

“severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment”

that meets certain regulatory requirements. Id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe impairment” is

one that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities[.]” Id. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). If the claimant lacks such an impairment, he is not

disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If he has

such an impairment, the ALJ moves on to step three.

At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s

impairments meet or equal the requirements of an impairment

listed in the regulations.” [Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.], 631 F.3d

[632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010)]. If the claimant’s impairments do, he

is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If

they do not, the ALJ moves on to step four.

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional

capacity” (RFC) and whether he can perform his “past relevant

work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s

“[RFC] is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations.” Id.

§§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If the claimant can perform

[his] past relevant work despite [his] limitations, he is not

disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he

cannot, the ALJ moves on to step five.

At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make

an adjustment to other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] . . . age,

education, and work experience.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). That examination typically involves “one or

more hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational

expert.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).

If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, he is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If he

cannot, he is disabled.

Hess, 931 F.3d at 201–02 (some alterations omitted).

II. BACKGROUND

A. Patrick’s Application for DIB, the Commissioner’s Decision, and the Administrative

Hearing

Patrick applied for DIB under the Act claiming a disability onset date of June 23, 2021.

[Administrative Record (AR) 205-AR211.] He claimed a previous stroke and his epileptic

seizures disabled him. [AR249, AR254-AR255.] The Commissioner denied his initial

application and his reconsideration request. [AR117-AR21; AR131-AR136.] Patrick then

requested a hearing before an ALJ to challenge the Commissioner’s decisions. [AR142-

AR43.]

At the hearing, Patrick discussed his prior stroke and seizures. [AR52-AR53.] He had

a seizure while at work and, as a result, could no longer drive. [AR47, AR52-AR53.] He has

had several seizures and has been prescribed medication for the seizures. [AR53.] On top of

the seizures, Patrick complained about back and right-arm pain. [AR54-AR55.] He has been

experiencing back pain for about two years, and the pain is worse when he walks. [AR54.]

Sitting down and changing his position helps alleviate the back pain. [AR54-AR55.] For his

right-arm, he complained about lack of feeling. [AR55-AR56.] He often has difficulty

gripping objects, like a knife. [AR57, AR60.] He also has trouble with memory and

concentration and has difficulty “finding [his] words.” [AR56.] Sometimes, Patrick becomes

frustrated when he cannot find his words and leaves the social setting he is in out of

frustration. [AR56-57, AR63.]

Despite his health problems, Patrick can perform some household chores, like

vacuuming and limited yardwork, and “sometimes” prepares his own meals. [AR57-AR58,

AR61.] Patrick’s friends help him with chores, provide transportation, take him shopping,

and perform other tasks. [AR56, AR58-AR59.] At the hearing, Patrick’s friend discussed

Patrick’s conditions and how Patrick needs help. [AR70-AR73.]

B. The ALJ’s Decision and the Appeals Council’s Decision

The ALJ found Patrick not disabled under the Act. [AR29.] In doing so, the ALJ

found Patrick could perform work at a medium exertion level with certain limitations.

[AR23, AR27.] While the ALJ found Patrick could not perform his past relevant work as a

heavy machine operator and truck/bus driver given his RFC, the judge concluded that, after

considering Patrick’s age, experience, and education, as well as his RFC, Patrick could make

a “successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national

economy[,]” like a kitchen helper or packager. [AR28-AR29.]

Turning to the ALJ’s reasoning, the judge found Patrick had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity after his alleged disability onset date. [AR19.] At step two, the ALJ found

Patrick’s seizure disorder, discogenic degenerative spine disease, status-post stroke,

hypertension, and adjustment disorder to be severe impairments. [AR19-AR20.] The judge

found those impairments significantly limited Patrick’s ability to perform basic work

activities. [See AR20.] The judge found Patrick’s obesity to be a non-severe impairment given

the lack of evidence “of any significant or additional limitations” attributable to his obesity.

[Id.]

Onto step three, the ALJ found none of Patrick’s impairments met or equaled the

severity of impairments listed in the regulations. [AR20-AR21.] In doing so, the ALJ

considered Listings 11.02 (epilepsy), 11.04 (insult to the brain), 1.15 (skeletal spine disorders

compromising nerve roots), 1.16 (lumbar spinal stenosis compromising the cauda equina),

and 12.04 (depressive, bipolar and related disorders). [AR20-AR22.]

For example, when considering Listing 12.04, the ALJ found Patrick’s mental

impairments did not satisfy the “Paragraph B” or “Paragraph C” criteria. [AR21-AR22.] “To

satisfy the paragraph B criteria, [a claimant’s] mental disorder must result in ‘extreme’

limitation of one, or ‘marked’ limitation of two, of the four areas of mental functioning”—

that is, a claimant’s ability to (1) “[u]nderstand, remember, or apply information;” (2)

“interact with others;” (3) “concentrate, persist, or maintain pace;” and (4) “adapt or manage

oneself.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. Given the medical evidence in the record, the

ALJ concluded that Patrick only has moderate limitations in the four areas of mental

functioning. [AR21-AR22.] Paragraph C criteria requires a mental disorder to be “serious

and persistent” for at least two years and to satisfy additional criteria. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 1. The ALJ found Patrick’s mental impairment did not satisfy the Paragraph

C criteria because the evidence failed to show he has “achieved only marginal adjustment.”

[AR22.] The ALJ concluded Patrick could make adjustments in his environment and daily

life, given his ability to do household chores, interact with others, go shopping, and so on.

[Id.]

For step four, the ALJ found Patrick had the RFC to perform work at the medium

exertion level with several limitations. [AR23.] The ALJ found Patrick can never “climb

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds” and “must avoid all exposure to hazards such as heavy machinery

and unprotected heights.” [Id.] The ALJ found Patrick can “understand, remember, []

carry-out simple instructions[,] . . . use judgment to make simple work-related decisions, . . .

deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting, and . . . have occasional interaction

with the general public.” [Id.] In reaching this RFC, the ALJ concluded Patrick’s medically

determinable impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”

[AR24.] The judge, however, found Patrick’s statements on the “intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of [his] symptoms not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence[.]” [Id.]

For his seizure disorder, the ALJ found the disorder was controlled by medication.

[Id.] The judge noted that Patrick had experienced a seizure after missing a dose of his

medication the day before. [Id.] But after a medical provider increased the dosage, Patrick

remained seizure-free. [AR24-AR25.] Still, given Patrick’s seizure disorder, the ALJ

concluded Patrick could never climb a ladder or ropes, and must avoid exposure to heavy

machinery and unprotected heights. [AR25.]

Turning to the residual effects of Patrick’s previous stroke, the ALJ found those effects

minimal. [Id.] The judge noted physical examinations were unremarkable and Patrick did

not report weakness in his arms or legs to medical providers. [Id.] A medical provider

diagnosed him with expressive aphasia, id.—“a language disorder that makes it difficult for

individuals to speak clearly and effectively[,]” Sarah Jividen, Expressive Aphasia: What to Know

About Communication Disorders, Verywell Health, May 20, 2024, available at:

https://www.verywellhealth.com/expressive-aphasia-8622957 (last visited Sept. 18, 2025). The

judge noted that a “[s]peech assessment showed only mild dysarthria[,]” AR25—“a

neuromotor disorder that results from abnormalities in speed, strength, accuracy, range, tone,

or duration required for speech control[,]” Dilip Kumar Jayaraman & Joe M. Dias, Dysarthria,

Nat’l Library of Medicine (last updated June 5, 2023), available at:

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK592453/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2025). The ALJ

also noted medical records revealed Patrick “did have some word finding difficulty at

times[.]” [AR25.] Given those difficulties and Patrick’s expressive aphasia, the ALJ

concluded that Patrick can only have “occasional interaction with the general public.” [Id.]

For his back pain, the ALJ noted that imaging showed “advanced generalized

discogenic degenerative spine disease—spinal stenosis.” [Id.] While Patrick’s primary

provider noted “decreased strength” in Patrick’s “bilateral lower extremities” and Patrick had

difficulty “getting up from [a] seated position[,]” the ALJ found the provider did not diagnose

a back impairment or recommend treatment. [Id.] In fact, the ALJ noted Patrick’s treatment

provider “found normal exams, with no mention of back pain.” [Id.] The ALJ concluded

that the medical evidence did not support Patrick’s claims about his limitations on standing,

walking, and sitting. [Id.]

Shifting to Patrick’s depression and adjustment disorder, the ALJ examined Patrick’s

medical records and the findings of a consultative examiner, Dr. Christopher Williamson,

Psy.D. [AR25-26.] For Patrick’s depression, the ALJ noted Patrick’s medical records

revealed he denied feeling down or depressed and had a zero-depression score. [AR25.] The

judge also noted Patrick’s medical records revealed he “was fully oriented, his attention and

concentration were normal, his recent and remote memory were normal, and his fund of

knowledge was normal.” [Id.]

For Patrick’s adjustment disorder, the ALJ considered Williamson’s report.

[AR25-AR26.] The judge observed that Williamson’s examination showed that Patrick “has

no formal thought disorder,” lacked compulsive thinking or behavior, denied suicidal

ideation, and could complete simple math calculations. [AR25.] Williamson conducted

testing using the “Wechsler Memory Scale” and Patrick scored “in the borderline range.”

[AR25-AR26.] Given Williamson’s findings, the ALJ found Patrick must be “limited to

simple, low stress work, defined as only simple instructions, simple work-related decisions,

occasional changes in a routine work setting, and only occasional interaction with the general

public.” [AR26.]

The ALJ also considered opinions by various medical providers, consultative

examiners, and state-agency medical and mental health professionals. [AR26-AR27.]

Relevant here, the ALJ did not “evaluate” Williamson’s report for “persuasiveness” since

Williamson did not “offer an opinion as to degree of function.” [AR26.] That said, the ALJ

found Williamson’s report “offer[ed] a thorough and informative examination.” [AR26.]

The ALJ found Patrick’s presentation for Williamson’s examination to be inconsistent with

his presentation for other medical providers. [Id.] Pointing to Patrick’s neurology records,

the ALJ found certain providers found Patrick to be fully oriented, had normal attention and

concentration, and his recent and remote memory were normal. [Id.]

Turning to the state-agency medical providers, the ALJ rejected those providers’

opinions of “no exertional impairment” since the medical evidence supported a finding of

medium exertion. [Id.] For Patrick’s mental impairments, the ALJ found the state-agency

providers’ opinions as to “mild to moderate mental impairment . . . generally persuasive.”

[Id.] In doing so, the ALJ looked to Williamson’s finding that Patrick “had word finding

difficulties” and could not “complete serial 7s,” id.—“a cognitive assessment requiring a

patient to subtract 7 from 100 in reverse order.” Mary L. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 1058370, at *7

n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 2022). But the ALJ also noted that Williamson concluded Patrick had no

formal thought disorder and could complete simple math equations. [AR27.]

For Patrick’s primary care provider, Dr. Josette Palmer, the ALJ found Palmer’s

opinion on Patrick’s limitations unpersuasive. [AR26.] The ALJ noted Palmer’s opinion

was inconsistent with his treatment notes and the entire medical record. [Id.] The ALJ also

noted Palmer’s opinion was based on Patrick’s presentation “during one visit.” [Id.]

All in all, the ALJ found that Patrick had severe impairments, but the judge concluded

Patrick’s allegations on his limitations and symptoms were inconsistent with the medical

evidence. [AR27.] So the ALJ formulated an RFC at the medium exertion level with

additional limitations. [Id.]

With that RFC at hand, the ALJ found Patrick could not perform his past work as a

heavy machine operator and driver. [AR28.] But, after considering Patrick’s age,

educational level, and work experience, the ALJ found Patrick could perform other work in

the national economy that exists in significant numbers, like a kitchen helper or packager.

[AR28-AR29.] Accordingly, the ALJ found Patrick not disabled. [AR29.]

The Appeals Council denied Patrick’s request for review. [AR1-AR6.]

III. PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

A. Patrick’s Arguments

Patrick first argues substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s mental RFC

determination because the judge improperly discredited Williamson’s and the state-agency

reviewing psychologists’ opinions. [Pl.s’ Br. at 8-14 (Docket No. 5).] For Williamson’s

opinion, Patrick faults the ALJ for not considering his opinion a “functional opinion.” [Id.

at 8.] Patrick argues Williamson found Patrick’s memory was “significantly compromised”

and his scores on memory testing placed him in the “borderline range” in working memory.

[Id.] Patrick also asserts that Williamson found Patrick has “significant difficulty”

remembering new information and has difficulty retrieving new information. [Id. at 9.]

While Patrick recognizes Williamson’s opinion is “not expressed in functional terms[,]”

Patrick asserts Williamson did provide information on Patrick’s functioning, like his memory.

[Id.] Patrick contends the ALJ’s decision never mentions his “extremely low percentile scores

in memory.” [Id. at 10.] Patrick adds that Williamson’s opinion meets the definition of a

medical opinion under the Social Security regulations and the ALJ glossed over the functional

limitations Williamson noted in his report. [Id.]

Shifting to the state-agency reviewing psychologists’ opinions, Patrick faults the ALJ

for failing to fully consider the limitations expressed in their opinions. [Id. at 11.] For

example, Patrick asserts those psychologists noted Patrick has moderate limitations in

understanding, remembering, and applying information, concentrating, persisting, and

maintaining pace, and so on. [Id.] Yet Patrick contends the ALJ failed to consider those

limitations. [Id.] In addition, Patrick asserts the ALJ never considered moderate limitations

in completing a normal workday “without interruptions from psychologically-based

symptoms[.]” [Id. at 12.]

Patrick also contends substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s mental RFC

determination that Patrick can have occasional public contact given his cognitive and memory

limitations. [Id. at 13.] Patrick asserts the ALJ never imposed any limitations on Patrick’s

interactions with supervisors or co-workers. [Id.] He contends the ALJ gave no explanation

of how Patrick can interact freely with supervisors or co-workers, but not the public. [Id.]

Because the ALJ never gave that explanation, Patrick contends the ALJ’s mental RFC

determination is flawed. [Id. at 13-14.]

On top of the ALJ’s mental RFC determination, Patrick challenges the ALJ’s physical

RFC determination. [Id. at 14-15.] Patrick argues the ALJ improperly rejected Palmer’s

opinion. [Id.] Patrick contends that his lumbar spine x-rays referenced in Palmer’s notes

support Palmer’s opinion on Patrick’s functional limitations. [Id.] According to Patrick, the

ALJ’s failure to consider those x-rays as supporting Palmer’s opinion was prejudicial error.

[Id.]

B. The Commissioner’s Arguments

The Commissioner argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC

determination. [Comm’r Br. at 9-21 (Docket No. 7).] The Commissioner asserts the ALJ

thoroughly considered Patrick’s allegations and the objective medical evidence, including

Patrick’s medical records that showed largely unremarkable examinations. [Id. at 10-11.] The

Commissioner contends the medical record evidence did not fully support Patrick’s

statements on his limitations and symptoms. [Id. at 10.]

First, the Commissioner rejects Patrick’s challenge to the ALJ’s mental RFC

determination, arguing the ALJ properly considered the state-agency psychologists’ opinions

when crafting the RFC. [Id. at 12-15.] The Commissioner asserts the limitations that the

state-agency psychologists noted appear in Section I of the Disability Determination

Explanation worksheet, which is not the RFC assessment. [Id. at 12.] Pointing to the Third

Circuit’s decision in Smith, the Commissioner argues that limitations appearing in Section I

of that worksheet are not limitations that an ALJ need to consider or accommodate. [Id. at

13.] Instead, the Commissioner contends courts must look to the narrative section of that

worksheet because that section provides the state-agency consultant’s medical opinion. [Id.]

And the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC determination aligns with the

state-agency psychologists’ opinions in the narrative section of that worksheet. [Id. at 13-14.]

In fact, the ALJ provided a more restrictive RFC than the state-agency psychologists by

limiting Patrick’s interaction with the public to occasional. [Id. at 14.]

Turning to Patrick’s challenge to the ALJ’s treatment of Williamson’s report, the

Commissioner argues the ALJ thoroughly considered Williamson’s examination throughout

the judge’s decision. [Id. at 19-20.] For example, the Commissioner notes the ALJ considered

Williamson’s report when rating the “Paragraph B” criteria. [Id. at 19.] The Commissioner

also asserts that the ALJ considered Williamson’s finding on Patrick’s memory and recall,

but ultimately concluded those findings were inconsistent with other medical evidence. [Id.]

The Commissioner explains that some of Williamson’s findings, like Patrick’s word-finding

difficulties, were inconsistent with other medical providers’ observations that found Patrick

to have fluent speech, no dysarthria, and so on. [Id.] In sum, the Commissioner contends

the ALJ considered Williamson’s findings and provided reasons on her treatment of the

doctor’s report. [Id. at 20-21.]

The Commissioner also argues substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s mental RFC

limitation on public interaction. [Id. at 15-16.] Pointing to Patrick’s testimony, the

Commissioner asserts that Patrick interacts with friends and neighbors and “denied problems

getting along with them.” [Id. at 16.] The Commissioner argues that the ALJ balanced

Patrick’s word-finding difficulties and expressive aphasia observed during a consult exam

with the other medical record evidence showing unremarkable findings on speech and

communication. [Id.] The Commissioner asserts no medical source has found Patrick has

any social limitations. [Id.]

Lastly, the Commissioner contends Patrick cannot show any error with the ALJ’s

treatment of Palmer’s opinion. [Id. at 18-19.] The Commissioner argues the ALJ provided

sufficient reasons for not crediting Palmer’s opinion. [Id. at 18.] For example, the ALJ noted

Palmer’s own records undermined the doctor’s opinion, which showed no physical

examination abnormalities besides a single visit. [Id.] Thus, the Commissioner argues

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s physical RFC determination. [Id. at 19.]

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Treatment of the Medical Provider’s and

State-Agency Psychologists’ Opinions

Under the Social Security regulations, “a medical opinion is a statement from a

medical source about what [a claimant] can still do despite [his] impairment(s) and whether

[he has] one or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions” for several work-related

abilities, like the “ability to perform mental demands of work activities, such as

understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; carrying out

instructions; or responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a

work setting.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). ALJs cannot “defer or give any specific

evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s), including those from [a claimant’s] medical sources.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a). The Social Security regulations require ALJs to consider several

factors when evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion. §§ 404.1520c(a),

404.1520c(c). But ALJs only need to provide an explanation on “whether medical opinions

were (1) based on ‘objective medical evidence and supporting explanations’ and (2) consistent

with other medical opinions in the record.” Zaborowski v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 115 F.4th 637,

639 (3d Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). “[A]n ALJ ‘need not reiterate the magic words

‘support’ and ‘consistent’ for each doctor,’ so long as the ALJ ‘weave[s] supportability and

consistency throughout [the judge’s] analysis of which doctors were persuasive.’” Chung v.

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 1065241, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025) (quoting Zaborowski, 115

F.4th at 639).

1. Williamson’s Report

To start, the ALJ erred by not evaluating Williamson’s report for persuasiveness

because the judge found the report “does not offer an opinion as to degree of function.”

[AR26.] Williamson’s report qualifies as a medical opinion under the Social Security

regulations because the report details Patrick’s memory impairments and his limitations on

memory recall that will affect his “ability to perform mental demands of work activities[.]” §

404.1513(a)(2)(ii). For example, after conducting testing, Williamson found Patrick

“experiences a rapid loss of relevant information required to accurately perform mental

operations at the levels of his peers.” [AR609.] Williamson explained that “[w]orking

memory is an important prerequisite in many cognitive abilities such that inadequate working

memory skills will likely affect [Patrick’s] ability to perform other mental operations

efficiently.” [Id.] And Williamson’s report revealed that Patrick “could complete simple

mathematical calculations of addition and subtraction” and that “despite his limitations, it

does appear that [Patrick] is competent to handle his own funds at the present time.” [AR609-

AR610.] So Williamson’s report lays out what Patrick can still do “despite [his]

impairment(s)[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). Thus, Williamson’s report qualifies as a

medical opinion that the Social Security regulations required the ALJ to evaluate for

persuasiveness. § 404.1520c(a).

That said, the ALJ’s error was harmless because it would not have changed the

outcome. Holloman v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 639 F. App'x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining the

harmless error review applies to “administrative appeals” and requires a claimant to “explain

. . . how the . . . error to which he points could have made any difference” (cleaned up,

omissions in original) (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 413 (2009))). Despite the

ALJ saying she would not evaluate Williamson’s report for persuasiveness, the judge, in fact,

thoroughly considered Williamson’s report. [AR21, AR25-AR27.] Indeed, the ALJ found

Williamson’s report to be “thorough and informative” and relied on Williamson’s findings to

determine whether Patrick’s mental impairments satisfied the Paragraph B criteria at step

three. [AR21, AR26-AR27.] The judge also looked to Williamson’s report when evaluating

the persuasiveness of the state-agency mental health professionals’ opinions, and formulating

the RFC. [AR26-AR27.]

The ALJ wove the judge’s consideration of the supportability and consistency factors

throughout her decision. Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 639. To start, the ALJ noted Williamson’s

report provided “Williamson’s clinical findings” and Williamson’s diagnosis and findings

were based on the doctor’s examination and testing of Patrick. [AR21, AR25-AR26.] So the

ALJ addressed the supportability factor. § 404.1520c(c)(1). Likewise, the ALJ addressed the

consistency factor when the judge found Williamson’s findings inconsistent to other medical

providers’ findings based on Patrick’s presentation. § 404.1520c(c)(2). For example, the ALJ

contrasted Williamson’s findings to another doctor who performed a mental status

examination on Patrick. [AR27.] That doctor concluded Patrick “had intact recent and

remote memory, normal attention, normal concentration, full language, and normal fund of

knowledge.” [Id.]

What’s more, the ALJ never rejected Williamson’s report. The ALJ relied on it several

times to craft the RFC. [AR26-AR27.] The judge provided specific reasons why she accepted

some portions of the report and rejected others. Because the Court can discern the reasons

why the ALJ did not accept all Williamson’s findings, a remand is unnecessary. Smith, 178

F. App’x at 111.

2. The State-Agency Psychologists’ Opinions

Patrick’s challenge to the ALJ’s treatment of the state-agency psychologists’ opinions

fails. Patrick’s challenge rests on the limitations the state-agency psychologists noted in the

Disability Determination Explanation worksheet. [Pl.’s Br. at 11-12.] But the section of the

worksheet that Patrick points to—a list with checkboxes—is not persuasive evidence. See

Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Form reports in which a physician's

obligation is only to check a box or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best.”).

The various limitations that Patrick relies on appear in the “MRFC1—Mental

Residual Functional Capacity” (MRFC) section of the Disability Determination Explanation

worksheet. [AR102-AR103, AR112-AR113.] According to Social Security Program

Operations Manual System (POMS) DI 24510.060(B), the MRFC1 “is merely a worksheet to

aid in deciding the presence and degree of functional limitations and the adequacy of

documentation and does not constitute the RFC.” Ilaria G. v. Colvin, 2024 WL 5244864, at

*16 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2024) (emphasis removed) (addressing the MRFC1). The Third Circuit

has found that ALJs may assign “little or no weight” to the MRFC1. See Smith, 631 F.3d at

636-37; accord Wise v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 626 F. App'x 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e have

said that ALJs are not required to give any weight to these fill-in-the-blank and checklist

portions of RFC assessments[.]”). So the ALJ did not err by failing to explicitly consider the

limitations checked-off in the MRFC1 when formulating Patrick’s RFC. See, e.g., Marshie v.

Colvin, 2015 WL 6082130, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 15, 2015).

That aside, the ALJ found the state-agency psychologists’ findings that Patrick had

“mild to moderate impairment but insufficient to grant disability . . . generally persuasive.”

[AR27.] Rather than focus on the limitations listed in the MRFC1, ALJs should focus on the

“narrative portions of the assessments [in the Disability Determination Explanation

worksheet] where the medical experts expound on their opinions.” Wise, 626 F. App'x at 360.

In the narrative portions of the MRFC here, the state-agency psychologists found Patrick

“retains capacity to perform simple tasks, persist at tasks for two hour intervals, interact with

others, and adjust to simple changes in work settings.” [AR103, AR114.] Both psychologists

found “no evidence of significant social limitations.” [AR103, AR113.] The ALJ found the

state-agency psychologists’ findings persuasive after contrasting them with Williamson’s

findings. [AR27.] The ALJ largely accounted for the state-agency psychologists’ opinions

when crafting the RFC, but imposed a more restrictive RFC by limiting Patrick’s public

interaction to occasional. [AR26-AR27.] Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

decision about how much weight to give the state-agency psychologists’ opinions. See

Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640.

Patrick’s reliance on Cheyenne M. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 17959521 (D.N.J. Dec. 27,

2022) is misplaced. There, this Court remanded an ALJ’s decision because the judge found

a state-agency consultant’s opinion “somewhat persuasive” and accepted the consultant’s

opinion on a social interaction limitation, but the ALJ excluded that limitation in the RFC

without explanation. Id. at *7. Unlike here, Cheyenne M. concerned a state-agency

consultant’s narrative RFC—not the limitations merely checked-off in the MRFC1 that

Patrick relies on here. Id. Thus, Cheyenne M. is different. And unlike the ALJ in Cheyenne M.

who excluded a limitation in the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ largely accepted the state-agency

consultants’ RFC, but provided a more restrictive RFC than the state-agency consultants did.

[Compare AR23, with AR103, and AR114.]

3. Palmer’s Opinion

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of Palmer’s opinion. The ALJ

considered both the supportability and consistency factors when finding Palmer’s opinion

unpersuasive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(c). And the ALJ provided sufficient

reasons to reject Palmer’s opinion on Patrick’s physical limitations.

For the supportability factor, the ALJ found Palmer’s own treatment notes did not

support his opinion. [AR26.] Palmer’s treatment records—before and after Palmer’s

opinion—reveal largely unremarkable physical exams, Patrick denied joint-pain and

musculoskeletal weakness, and Palmer found Patrick’s motor strength in his upper and lower

extremities to be normal. [See, e.g., AR617-AR618, AR620-AR621, AR623-AR624, AR626-

AR627, AR630-AR632, AR634-AR636, AR726-AR727.] What’s more, Palmer never

diagnosed a back impairment or recommended treatment. So the ALJ did not need to credit

Palmer’s opinion on Patrick’s physical limitations. See Chung, 2025 WL 1065241, at *3

(finding no error in the ALJ’s persuasiveness evaluation of claimant’s treating physician’s

opinion where physician did not refer claimant to “pain management” or “raise the possibility

of surgery” but instead “recommended long-term physical therapy, home exercises, and

acupuncture” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Turning to the consistency factor, the ALJ found Palmer’s opinion inconsistent with

other medical evidence. [AR26.] The ALJ noted the medical record “shows little to no

evidence of back and leg pain and weakness[.]” [Id.] The ALJ did not “need to say more

than that.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640.

But Patrick complains the ALJ did not consider his x-rays contained in Palmer’s

treatment records. [Pl.’s Br. at 14-15.] That’s wrong. The ALJ did consider the x-rays when

crafting Patrick’s RFC. [AR25.] The judge found the x-rays revealed a spine disease and that

Palmer had noted a decrease in strength in Patrick’s bilateral lower extremities. [Id.] Still,

the ALJ concluded Palmer never diagnosed a back impairment or recommended treatment

and had normal exams with Patrick. [Id.] Likewise, the ALJ found no evidence in the record

to support Patrick’s—or Palmer’s opinion on Patrick’s—alleged limitations on standing,

walking, and sitting. [AR25-AR26.] Even so, given the spine disease shown on the x-rays,

the ALJ limited Patrick to work at the medium exertional level. [AR25.]

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s RFC Determination

A claimant’s RFC is the most he can do despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1545(a)(1). In formulating an RFC, the ALJ need only include “credibly established”

limitations. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554; see also Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir.

2014) (explaining the ALJ has discretion to choose whether to include “a limitation [that] is

supported by medical evidence, but is opposed by other evidence in the record” but “[t]his

discretion is not unfettered—the ALJ cannot reject evidence of a limitation for an

unsupported reason” and stating that “the ALJ also has the discretion to include a limitation

that is not supported by any medical evidence if the ALJ finds the impairment otherwise

credible”). ALJs are free to reject a claimant’s subjective complaints of pain and limitations

when they are inconsistent with the medical evidence. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113,

129-30 (3d Cir. 2002).

Start with the ALJ’s mental RFC determination. Williamson’s findings, the

state-agency psychologists’ opinions, Dr. Lotkowski’s treatment records as well as Patrick’s

neurological records, coupled with the record evidence that Patrick can interact with others,

were enough evidence to support the ALJ’s mental RFC determination. [AR23-AR27.] The

ALJ found Patrick could perform simple-work related tasks based on Williamson’s findings

and the state-agency psychologists’ opinions. [AR25-AR27.] The judge imposed the public

interaction limitation after considering Williamson’s findings and various neurological

medical records, as well as Patrick’s testimony about interacting with others. [AR23, AR25.]

That is “more than a mere scintilla[]” of evidence. Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103.

Still, Patrick protests, arguing the ALJ did not adequately explain the occasional public

interaction limitation. [Pl’s Br. at 13-14.] And pointing to A.D. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.,

2021 WL 4438239 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2021), Patrick argues that inadequate explanation

requires a remand. [Id.] Not so.

To start, A.D. is different. There, the ALJ found the claimant’s borderline personality

disorder prevented her from having any interaction with the public, which is not the case here.

2021 WL 4438239, at *7. Still, the ALJ found the claimant’s disorder allowed her to have

only occasional interaction with supervisors and co-workers. Id. This Court remanded

because the ALJ never explained that occasional interaction limitation. Id. So A.D. involved

a gap in the ALJ’s reasoning because on the one hand, the ALJ found the claimant’s disorder

prevented public interaction, but on the other hand, found the disorder allowed occasional

interaction with supervisors and co-workers.

Unlike here, the ALJ never found Patrick cannot interact with the public. The ALJ

incorporated the occasional public interaction limitation based on objective medical evidence

on word-finding difficulties, expressive aphasia, and mild dysarthria. [AR25-AR26.]

Nothing in the record supports a total public interaction ban. Indeed, the record reveals that,

at times, medical providers noted Patrick had normal and fluent speech. [AR369, AR575,

AR777, AR790, AR803.] And Patrick testified about interacting with friends; sometimes he

gets frustrated with his word-finding difficulties and will leave the social setting he is in.

[AR56-AR57, AR63-AR64.] Patrick denied having any arguments with his friends. [AR57.]

Unlike A.D., this Court can reasonably discern the ALJ’s decision to limit Patrick’s

interaction with the public and not co-workers and supervisors. Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S.

357, 369 (2021) (“[A] reviewing court must uphold even a decision of less than ideal clarity if

the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)). The record shows that at times, Patrick had normal and fluent speech, and at other

times, he did not. It also shows he can interact with people he is familiar with without conflict.

As the Commissioner argues, and Patrick has not addressed2, there are clear links in the

record for this Court to discern why the ALJ imposed an occasional interaction with the

public without imposing any limitations on his interactions with supervisors or co-workers.

And as explained above, the state-agency psychologists found “no evidence of significant

social limitations[]” and Patrick could interact with the public. [AR102-AR103, AR113-

AR114.] The ALJ found those psychologists’ opinions persuasive. [AR27.] The ALJ,

nonetheless, imposed a more restrictive RFC by limiting Patrick’s public interaction to

occasional after considering the entire record. [AR26-AR27.]

Patrick persists, arguing the ALJ gave no explanation for her implicit finding that

Patrick can interact with supervisors and co-workers with no social limitations. [Pl.’s Br. at

13.] True enough, but this Court can glean that finding from the record and the ALJ’s

decision. The record shows, and the ALJ noted when addressing Patrick’s mental

impairments at step three, that Patrick often interacts with others without any difficulty.

[AR21, AR276.] For example, in his Function Report, Patrick stated he interacts with others

2 Patrick has not filed a reply brief in support of his appeal.

in person “every few days[,]” to “watch sports and movies, go shopping, [and] have dinner.”

[AR276.] Patrick considers himself a “generally [] friendly person” and stated he has “no

problems with authority[,]” and can follow written and spoken instructions. [AR277.]

Despite his speech difficulties, Patrick admits he still interacts with others. [AR276-AR277.]

The ALJ balanced Patrick’s responses in his Function Report and his testimony, and found

Patrick only has a “moderate limitation” in interacting with others. [AR21.] This Court

cannot say the ALJ did not consider Patrick’s speech limitations. So while the ALJ did not

explicitly explain why Patrick can work with co-workers and supervisors without any social

limitations, the Court can discern the basis for the ALJ’s mental RFC determination. Ming

Dai, 593 U.S. at 369.

At bottom, Patrick appears to ask this Court to find more limitations than the ALJ did.

But this Court cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.

Chandler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). This is so even if, reviewing

the record anew, the Court would have reached a different result than the ALJ did. Raglin v.

Massanari, 39 F. App'x 777, 778 (3d Cir. 2002). Courts must review an ALJ’s RFC

determination under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review. Burns, 312 F.3d

at 129. And, for the reasons already discussed, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

mental RFC determination here.

Turning to the ALJ’s physical RFC determination, substantial evidence supports that

determination. Patrick’s challenge to that determination rests on the ALJ’s treatment of

Palmer’s opinion. [Pl’s Br. at 14-15.] Up top, this Court found substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s finding that Palmer’s opinion is unpersuasive. See supra at 20-21. That aside, the

ALJ based the physical RFC determination largely on Patrick’s degenerative spine disease

indicated on x-rays. [AR25.] The judge also considered Patrick’s testimony on his physical

limitations but ultimately found that testimony inconsistent with the objective medical

evidence. [AR24-AR25.] This Court must defer to that credibility call. Courtney W. v. Comm'r

of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 5244299, at *9 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2024). And the ALJ refused to accept

the state-agency medical consultants’ findings that Patrick has no exertional limitations

because, in the ALJ’s view, the record supported a medium exertion limitation. [AR27.] In

the end, the ALJ thoroughly considered the objective medical evidence, opinion evidence,

and Patrick’s testimony. That evidence was “enough to clear [the substantial evidence] low

threshold.” Zaborowski, 115 F.4th at 640.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court AFFIRMS the ALJ’s decision finding Plaintiff Patrick

C. not disabled under the Act. An accompanying Order of today’s date shall issue.

s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge

Dated: September 30, 2025