The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LITA K. L. M.-B.,1 : Case No. 2:24-cv-3267
:
Plaintiff, : Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
: (by full consent of the parties)
vs. :
:
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL :
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, :
:
Defendant. :
:
DECISION AND ENTRY
Plaintiff Lita K. L. M.-B. brings this case before the Court challenging the Social Security
Administration’s denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). This case is
before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #8), the Commissioner’s Memorandum
in Opposition (Doc. #9), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. #10), and the administrative record (Doc. #7).
I. Background
The Social Security Administration provides SSI to individuals who are under a
“disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470
(1986); see 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The term “disability” encompasses “any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment” that precludes an applicant from performing “substantial gainful
activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469-70.
1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States has
recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security cases, federal courts should refer to plaintiffs
only by their first names and last initials. See also S.D. Ohio General Rule 22-01.
In the present case, Plaintiff protectively applied for benefits on March 3, 20212, alleging
disability due to several impairments, including depression, anxiety, pain in legs, throwing up after
eating, and ear pain. (Doc. #7-6, PageID #324). After Plaintiff’s application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration, she requested and received a video hearing before Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Teresa L. Hoskins-Hart. Thereafter, the ALJ issued a written decision, addressing
each of the five sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.920. She reached the following main conclusions:
Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful employment since March 3,
2021, the application date.
Step 2: Prior to attaining age 18, she had the following severe impairments: anxiety
disorder; depressive disorder; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD); post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); somatoform disorder;
unspecified personality disorder and bilateral hearing loss.
Step 3: Prior to attaining age 18, [Plaintiff] did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Prior to attaining age 18, [Plaintiff] did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equaled the severity of the
listings.
Because [Plaintiff] did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met, medically equaled any listing or functionally equaled
the listings, [Plaintiff] was not disabled prior to attaining age 18.
[Plaintiff] has not developed any new impairment or impairments since
attaining age 18.
Since attaining age 18, [Plaintiff] has continued to have a severe impairment
or combination of impairments.
2 An application for SSI was previously filed on Plaintiff’s behalf when she was a minor on October 22, 2018. That
application was denied by administrative decision March 30, 2020. (Doc. #7-3, PageID #s 119-40). It does not appear
t hat Plaintiff appealed that decision.
2
Since attaining age 18, [Plaintiff] does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Step 4: Her residual functional capacity, or the most she could do despite her
impairments, since attaining age 18, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of the ability “to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels but with the following non-exertional
limitations: she must avoid concentrated or frequent exposure to loud noise
or hazards in the work setting. Also, [Plaintiff] has no limitation in the
capacity to understand, remember, and carry out simple, detailed, and
complex instructions and can use judgment to make such tasks related work
decisions; she can sustain concentration, attention, and pace sufficient
enough to carry out those instructions for two-hour intervals over the course
of typical eight-hour workday; she can work in occupations requiring only
occasional interactions with the public; and she can adapt to routine changes
in work setting or work processes.”
She has no past relevant work.
Step 5: Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, since attaining age 18, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform.
(Doc. #7-2, PageID #s 54-72). Based on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
under a benefits-qualifying disability since March 3, 2021, the date the application was filed. Id.
at 72.
The evidence of record is adequately summarized in the ALJ’s decision (Doc. #7-2,
PageID #s 49-72), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #8), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in
Opposition (Doc. #9), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. #10). To the extent that additional facts are
relevant, they will be summarized in the discussion section below.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to whether the ALJ’s findings are supported
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by substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. Blakley v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742,
745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is such “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708,
722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)). It is
“less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla.” Id.
The second judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal analysis—may
result in reversal even if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). Under this review, “a decision
of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow
its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant
of a substantial right.” Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746 (citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).
III. Discussion
In her sole assignment of error, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ reversibly erred in evaluating
her symptom severity. (Doc. #8, PageID #s 1200-07). In response, the Commissioner maintains
that the ALJ considered the evidence in the record—including the objective evidence, Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living, and Plaintiff’s treatment history—and reasonably concluded that
Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms were not entirely reliable. (Doc. #9, PageID #s 1211-
16).
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When a Plaintiff alleges symptoms of disabling severity, the ALJ must follow a two-step
process for evaluating those symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929; Social Security Ruling (SSR)
16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, *3-7 (October 23, 2017).3 First, the ALJ must determine whether the
individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can reasonably be
expected to produce the symptoms alleged; second, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity,
persistence, and functional limitations of those symptoms by considering objective medical
evidence and other evidence, including: (1) daily activities; (2) the location, duration, frequency,
and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the type,
dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
(5) treatment, other than medication, received for relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) any
measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms; and (7) other factors concerning functional
limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. Id.; See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
In performing this assessment, the ALJ is not required to analyze all seven factors but must
still show that she considered the relevant evidence. Roach v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 1:20- cv-
01853-JDG, 2021 WL 4553128, at *10–11 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2021). Indeed, the ALJ’s
assessment of an individual’s subjective complaints and limitations must be supported by
substantial evidence and be based on a consideration of the entire record. Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247
(internal quotation omitted). Nonetheless, it remains the province of the ALJ and not the reviewing
court to assess the consistency of subjective complaints about the impact of a plaintiff’s symptoms
3 SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, which “provides guidance about how [the SSA] evaluate[s] statements regarding
the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms,” superseded SSR 96-7p and became applicable to
decisions issued on or after March 28, 2016. See SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 (October 25, 2017) (clarifying
applicable date of SSR 16-3p).
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with the record as a whole. See id. Therefore, “absent a compelling reason,” an ALJ’s
credibility/consistency determination will not be disturbed. Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th
Cir. 2001).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to cause her alleged symptoms but found her statements concerning the intensity,
persistence and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the objective
medical evidence. (Doc. #7-2, PageID #s 68-70).
Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ’s RFC determination is unsupported by substantial
evidence because [she] improperly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints pursuant to SSR 16-
3p and mischaracterized the record to find improvement while ignoring a probative line of
evidence that was consistent with Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.” (Doc. #8, PageID #s 1200-
07). A key component of the probative line of evidence that Plaintiff asserts provides the more
wholistic view of Plaintiff’s mental health impairments is her 2019 psychiatric evaluation with
Dorothy Rosenke, Psy.D.. Id. at 1204. Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Rosenke on May 10, 2019.
(Doc. # 7-7, PageID #s 440-50). Dr. Rosenke reported that Plaintiff presented with a blunted affect,
poor insight, terse responses, reluctance to elaborate, defensive and irritable demeanor, inability
to build rapport, and lack of response to praise. Id. at 443. Dr. Rosenke opined that Plaintiff’s
“profile was marked by significant elevations across a number of different scales, indicating a
broad range of clinical features and increasing the possibility of multiple diagnoses.” Id. at 447.
She identified concerns about Plaintiff’s pessimism and [sense] of hopelessness.” Id. Dr. Rosenke
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also noted, “[Plaintiff] has reported a level of depressive symptomatology that is unusual even in
clinical samples.” Id.
Plaintiff additionally argues that Dr. Rosenke’s 2019 evaluation findings were consistent
with Plaintiff’s mother’s 2023 hearing testimony. (Doc. #8, PageID #1205). During the
administrative hearing, Plaintiff’s mother testified that she had observed Plaintiff’s change in
mood, isolation, lack of communication, an inability to get out of the house, and angry episodes.
(Doc. # 7-2, PageID #105). She described violent and dangerous behavior during these episodes.
Id. She also described Plaintiff’s inability to physically function when affected by PTSD, stating
that Plaintiff “becomes like a noodle.” Id. at 106. Her mother described having to carry Plaintiff
to the bathroom when her PTSD “acts up.” Id. at 106-07. She did not believe Plaintiff could work
because of her mental health issues as well as her chronic emesis. Id. at 108.
After a review of the entire record, Plaintiff’s argument is not well-taken for several
reasons. First, while Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring Dr. Rosenke’s May 2019
psychological evaluation, Plaintiff ignores the findings of Dr. Rosenke’s April 2023 psychological
evaluation. (Doc. #7-8, PageID #s 879-86). In her April 2023 assessment, Dr. Rosenke found that
Plaintiff’s self-reported ratings of adjustment showing “significant elevations on every possible
diagnosis assessed by the measure,” although “psychometrically valid, appeared to suffer from a
pattern of over-endorsement.” Id. at 886. This finding directly contradicts Plaintiff’s testimony
regarding her symptom severity, by the same psychologist that Plaintiff asserts the ALJ improperly
ignored. The ALJ did, however, cite to Dr. Rosenke’s February 2023 observation that Plaintiff had
“euthymic mood, good motivation and fully cooperative behavior” in her symptom severity
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analysis. (Doc. #7-2, PageID #69) (citing Doc. #7-8, PageID #874). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
assertion that the ALJ mischaracterized Plaintiff’s treatment records by not discussing Dr.
Rosenke’s May 2019 evaluation is unpersuasive, given that Dr. Rosenke’s later evaluation aligned
with the ALJ’s findings.
Notably, while Plaintiff contends that her mother’s testimony was consistent with her
symptomology and Dr. Rosenke’s 2019 psychological evaluation, Plaintiff’s teachers’ evaluations
starkly contrasted Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and her mother’s testimony. In May 2019, as
part of Dr. Rosenke’s evaluation, Ms. Persico indicated that Plaintiff has problems that “slightly
or occasionally affect her academics and her peer relationships,” but had no additional concerns
about Plaintiff as a student and noted that Plaintiff had “done a great job of completing assignments
and being part of class this year.” (Doc. #7-7, PageID #s 445-446). In August 2019, three months
after Dr. Rosenke’s evaluation, Ms. Brown found no problems in Plaintiff’s ability in acquiring
and using information, attending and completing tasks, interacting and relating with others, or
moving about and manipulating objects. Id. at 468-71. While Ms. Brown did find a slight problem
in Plaintiff’s caring for herself, she provided an explanation that Plaintiff “has no major concerns
in this area.” Id. at 472. Finally, in June 2021, Ms. Walton, Plaintiff’s education plan case
manager, indicated that Plaintiff had no problems in the areas of interacting and relating with
others, moving about and manipulating objects, and caring for herself. (Doc. #7-6, PageID #s 337-
39). Although Ms. Walton found a slight problem in Plaintiff’s ability in comprehending and doing
math problems and attending and completing tasks, and an obvious problem with working at a
reasonable pace/finishing on time, she did not provide any narrative explanation for her findings
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that matched the level of symptomology that Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s mother testified at the hearing.
Id. at 335-36. The ALJ noted at several points in her decision that Plaintiff’s teachers had not found
significant limitations in Plaintiff. (Doc. #7-2, PageID #s 59, 65-67). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
assertion that the ALJ mischaracterized or cherry-picked the record ignores multiple teachers’
questionnaires finding her less limited in her symptomology.
Additionally, Plaintiff points to her treatment records at Duke Health Clinic regarding her
chronic emesis as another portion of medical evidence that the ALJ mischaracterized in her
symptom severity analysis. (Doc. #8, PageID #1206). While Plaintiff contends that the “significant
symptomology and its profound effect on her well-being” makes it uncertain whether the ALJ
analyzed the evidence properly, the ALJ did review and incorporate her chronic emesis records
into her analysis. (Doc. #7-2, PageID #65, 69-70). The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff had been
diagnosed with somatoform disorder, the underlying cause of her chronic emesis, and that it caused
a limitation to Plaintiff. Id. at 65. She also noted that when Plaintiff’s teachers inquired whether
Plaintiff’s somatoform disorder prevented in-person attendance, Plaintiff’s providers responded
that “there [was] no psychiatric barrier for patient to return to school or participating in
schoolwork.” Id. at 65, 69-70, citing Doc. #7-8, PageID 1128. The ALJ relied on this evidence in
ultimately finding that limitation to be “less than marked” and the effects of Plaintiff’s symptoms
to be less extreme than alleged. Id. Notably, Plaintiff’s providers had prognosed that the most
likely cause of Plaintiff’s chronic emesis was “psychological” and “psychogenic” at multiple
points in the record. (Doc. #7-7, PageID #545, 776). Furthermore, the ALJ specifically included
mental limitations in Plaintiff’s RFC for her mental impairments and treatment, one of which was
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her somatoform disorder. Id. at 70. Therefore, rather than mischaracterize records related to
somatoform disorder and its symptoms, the ALJ specifically accounted for these records in her
decision.
Furthermore, while Plaintiff contends that the ALJ could not solely rely on the “normal
mental status examinations” or lack of “in-patient psychiatric treatment” when discounting
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the undersigned finds that the ALJ additionally considered
Plaintiff’s daily activities in her symptom severity analysis. (Doc. #7-2, PageID #s 69-70). In
January and February 2023, Plaintiff reported doing “pretty well,” was sleeping well, and stated
that she was interested in makeup trends, a Chinese pop dance group, drawing fashion designs,
and talking with her boyfriend. (Doc. #7-8, PageID #s 1123, 1129-31). Upon further review of
the record, Plaintiff endorsed at different points during the alleged period of disability that she had
“soccer, fishing, [and] [T]aekwondo” as hobbies, as well as “singing, dancing, and writing.” (Doc.
#7-7, PageID #835); (Doc. #7-8, PageID #854). Since Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and her
mother’s testimony of self-isolation, violent outbursts at home, inability to function when affected
by PTSD, and inability to work caused by her chronic emesis were inconsistent with objective
medical evidence and other evidence, the ALJ did not err in discounting them. See Warner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004). Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ did not account for every one of her subjective complaints, an ALJ is not
required to discuss “every piece of evidence in the record for his decision to stand,” if the ALJ
considered the evidence. Thacker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2004).4
4 While Thacker concerned SSR 96-7p, not its superseding SSR 16-3p, the case law remains fully applicable to SSR
1 6-3p determinations. See Prichard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-573, 2020 WL 5544412, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
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The ALJ’s reliance on objective evidence, Plaintiff’s teachers’ questionnaires, Plaintiff’s treatment
history, and Plaintiff’s daily activities demonstrates that the ALJ considered the entire record in
assessing Plaintiff’s symptom severity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors is not well-taken.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #8) is OVERRULED;
2. The Commissioner’s non-disability determination is
AFFIRMED; and
3. The case is terminated on the docket of this Court.
September 29, 2025 s/ Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
Peter B. Silvain, Jr.
United States Magistrate Judge
Sept. 16, 2020) (Bowman, M.J.).
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