The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 74 Ohio St.3d 586.]
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. BLANKENSHIP.
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Blankenship, 1996-Ohio-66.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension—Neglect of an entrusted
legal matter—Failure to carry out contract of employment—Causing
prejudice or damage to a client—Attempt to exonerate or limit liability for
malpractice—Failure to maintain client funds--Failure to pay and deliver
client funds—Charging a clearly excessive fee—Engaging in conduct
adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law—Engaging in conduct
involving deceit or misrepresentation—Conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice—Neglecting or refusing to assist in disciplinary
investigation.
(No. 95-1200—Submitted November 15, 1995—Decided February 28, 1996.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 94-70.
__________________
{¶ 1} On October 17, 1994, relator, Columbus Bar Association, charged
respondent, Jeffrey A. Blankenship of Columbus, Ohio, Attorney Registration No.
0014764, with seven counts of professional misconduct. Respondent was served
with notice of the complaint, but did not answer. A panel of the Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”)
heard the matter on relator’s motion for default, filed pursuant to Gov.Bar R.
V(6)(F) and 9(G)(2). A copy of the motion for default was sent to respondent by
regular mail, but he did not reply.
{¶ 2} The panel found that relator’s motion for default judgment was well
taken and that all of the allegations in the complaint were meritorious. The
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
complaint alleged, and the evidence attached to the default motion established, the
following.
{¶ 3} As to Count One, respondent undertook in October 1991 to represent
Laura Silvey in a custody matter. In January 1992, he assured her he would
immediately file her case. By May 1992, respondent had not initiated any necessary
legal action on his client’s behalf, and she fired him. As a result, she incurred
expenses for successor counsel and possible lost child support. After she filed a
grievance, respondent paid Silvey money and required her to sign a release of
claims. The panel found that respondent’s conduct violated DR 6-
101(A)(3)(neglect of entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(2)(failure to carry out
contract of employment), 7-101(A)(3)(causing prejudice or damage to a client), and
6-102(A)(attempt to exonerate or limit liability for malpractice).
{¶ 4} As to Count Two, in January 1993, respondent represented Robert
Rist in a court case, and Rist gave him money to cover certain court costs.
Respondent gave the court clerk a check, on his office account, but the bank
returned the check marked “NSF.” A friend of Rist’s advanced her own funds to
pay these costs, together with the bank’s returned check fee, but respondent refused
to reimburse these costs. The panel found that respondent’s conduct violated DR
9-102(B)(3)(failure to maintain client funds) and 9-102(B)(4)(failure to pay and
deliver client funds).
{¶ 5} As to Count Three, respondent represented Daryl Brown and Bernard
Brown for claims arising out of a 1987 automobile accident. The Browns’ case was
dismissed for want of prosecution, and a subsequent appeal was also dismissed.
The Browns secured a $35,000 default judgment against respondent for
malpractice, but respondent did not pay that judgment. Thereafter, respondent filed
for bankruptcy and sought to discharge this debt, but his bankruptcy suit was
dismissed. Respondent then negotiated a settlement with the Browns, but thereafter
filed successive bankruptcy actions in efforts to frustrate foreclosure proceedings
2
January Term, 1996
to collect the debt. A substantial portion of his settlement debt to the Browns
remains unpaid. The panel found respondent violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-
101(A)(2) and (3), and 6-102(A).
{¶ 6} As to Count Four, in September 1993, Gerald Swank paid the
respondent a retainer and deposit for court costs to file a bankruptcy action. By
December 1993, respondent had all the information and materials necessary to file
that action. As of August 1, 1994, respondent had not filed the petition despite his
client’s repeated requests to do so. Thereafter, Swank sued respondent to recover
his fees and deposit for costs. The panel found respondent’s conduct violated DR
2-106(charging clearly excessive fee), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) and (3), and 9-
102(B)(4).
{¶ 7} As to Count Five, respondent was in-state co-counsel for the personal
injury claims of Andrew Kalmanowicz arising from a July 1989 automobile
accident. After filing the case, just prior to expiration of the statute of limitations,
respondent failed to conduct discovery or prepare the case for trial. When the case
was assigned for trial in June 1992, respondent dismissed the case without notice
to his client or co-counsel. A year later, respondent refiled the case, but did nothing
to prepare for trial. The trial was scheduled for July 1994, but respondent again
failed to notify co-counsel or his client.
{¶ 8} As a result of respondent’s inattention, Kalmanowicz’s damage
claims have been substantially compromised. Respondent also refused and
neglected to provide information and records about this case to co-counsel or his
client. As of October 1994, respondent failed to return all files to his client or co-
counsel, although respondent had been fired. The panel found respondent’s
conduct violated DR 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) and (3), and 9-102(B)(4).
{¶ 9} As to Count Six, Carl Ransbottom hired respondent on January 6,
1994, to file a bankruptcy on his behalf, and respondent received attorney fees and
court costs to file this action. His client also informed respondent that there were
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
two lawsuits against the client and the client’s wife, that a January 20 hearing was
scheduled, and that certain defenses and counterclaims existed as to these two
actions. Respondent failed to file the bankruptcy action before January 20, as
agreed, and failed to take other action to protect his client, or his client’s wife, as
agreed. As a consequence, default judgments were taken against his client and his
client’s wife on January 20. In late January 1994, respondent assured his client that
the bankruptcy had been filed and arrangements had been made with the judgment
creditors. On February 10, 1994, his client learned the bankruptcy had not been
filed. When confronted, respondent claimed the forms had been lost in the mail or
by the court. Further, respondent made disparaging and unprofessional remarks to
his client and failed to return the client’s fees and deposit for costs. The panel found
respondent’s conduct had violated DR1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving
deceit or misrepresentation), 1-102(A)(6) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting
on fitness to practice law), 2-106(A), 6-101(A)(3), 7-101(A)(2) and (3), and 9-
102(B)(4).
{¶ 10} As to Count Seven, respondent repeatedly ignored investigative
requests made by relator and by this court’s Disciplinary Counsel relating to
grievances by his clients against him. Respondent also failed to provide certain
documents from his files relating to the grievances, despite numerous promises to
do so. Thus, respondent exhibited a pattern and practice of neglecting or refusing
to cooperate with disciplinary investigations. As a result, the panel found
respondent’s conduct had violated DR 1-102(A)(5)(conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice), 1-102(A)(6), and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G)(neglecting or
refusing to assist an investigation).
{¶ 11} In additon to these findings and conclusions, the panel noted that
respondent had refused to cooperate with relator and offered no explanation for his
conduct or mitigating evidence. Relator sought an indefinite suspension, and the
panel recommended that respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of
4
January Term, 1996
law in Ohio. The board adopted the findings, conclusions of law, and
recommendation of the panel and further recommended that costs be taxed to
respondent.
{¶ 12} On June 15, 1995, the board certified the proceedings to this court,
and on June 19, 1995, we issued a show cause order to respondent. On July 31,
1995, respondent filed objections to the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and recommendation. Counsel for respondent asserts that respondent has been
adversely affected by a severe problem with alcohol for a number of years. As a
result, respondent was unwilling and unable to deal adequately with his personal
and professional life. Subsequent to the default judgment, his counsel claims
respondent has now begun to resolve his alcohol problem in earnest. At oral
argument, respondent’s counsel urged the court to suspend proceedings so
respondent could be placed on probation.
__________________
Schwartz, Kelm, Warren & Ramirez and Nelson E. Genshaft; Zeiger &
Carpenter and Jeffrey A. Lipps; and Bruce A. Campbell, for relator.
R. Joshua Brown, for respondent.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 13} Having reviewed the record, we concur in the board’s findings and
its recommendation. Relator’s complaint was served upon respondent in October
1994, but respondent did not interpose a response until July 31, 1995, and then only
at the last moment before us. As relator points out, “To allow the Respondent to
ignore *** these proceedings and now to blithely suggest—ten months * * *
[later]—that the process begin again, would be to totally disregard the public and
professional obligations of the disciplinary system.” Moreover, respondent has
repeatedly failed to perform legal services for which he accepted responsibility,
misused client funds, and compromised his clients’ legal interests.
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 14} Accordingly, we order that respondent be indefinitely suspended
from the practice of law in Ohio. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and PFEIFER,
JJ., concur.
COOK, J., dissents and would disbar.
__________________
6