Opinion

State ex rel. Butler Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Sage

  • 95 Ohio St. 3d 23
  • 2002 Ohio 1494
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Apr 3, 2002
Status
Published
Cited by
6 cases
Authority
More cited than 69.6%

The opinion

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 95 Ohio St.3d 23.]

THE STATE EX REL. BUTLER COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD,

APPELLANT, v. SAGE, JUDGE, APPELLEE.

[Cite as State ex rel. Butler Cty. Children Serv. Bd. v. Sage, 2002-Ohio-1494.]

Mandamus sought to direct common pleas court judge not to disclose child abuse

records—Dismissal of complaint affirmed.

(No. 01-1668—Submitted February 5, 2002—Decided April 3, 2002.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County, No. CA2001-07-164.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In May 1999, James Hughes, Sharon Hughes, and their minor

daughter, Mary Hughes, filed a complaint in the Butler County Court of Common

Pleas alleging that appellant, Butler County Children Services Board (“BCCSB”),

and certain of its employees had committed defamation and various other tortious

acts. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel BCCSB and the other defendants to

produce a protective-service referral form that BCCSB claimed was privileged.

The form included child-abuse allegations. The plaintiffs alternatively requested

that the common pleas court conduct an in camera inspection of the form to

determine whether it was privileged.

{¶ 2} After conducting an in camera inspection of the form, appellee, Butler

County Court of Common Pleas Judge Michael Sage, granted the motion to compel

disclosure of the form by entry dated July 12, 2001. The entry did not contain a

Civ.R. 54(B) express determination of no just reason for delay.

{¶ 3} On July 16, 2001, BCCSB filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals

for Butler County for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition

“directing the court not to disclose the child abuse records.” On July 18, 2001, the

court of appeals ordered Judge Sage not to release the form until August 2001 so

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that BCCSB’s writ action could be resolved before that time. As the writ action

proceeded, BCCSB and the other defendants in the underlying action filed a notice

of appeal from Judge Sage’s July 12 entry.

{¶ 4} On August 1, 2001, the court of appeals dismissed the writ action.

The court of appeals reasoned that BCCSB had an adequate remedy by appeal to

challenge Judge Sage’s July 12 entry. This cause is now before the court upon

BCCSB’s appeal as of right.

{¶ 5} In its sole proposition of law, BCCSB contends that Judge Sage’s July

12, 2001 entry ordering BCCSB to release its confidential records during discovery

“is an order which is subject to an action in mandamus to challenge its validity.”

In the conclusion of its appellate brief, BCCSB claimed that “[a] reversal will allow

the Appellants to pursue an action in mandamus to challenge the validity of the trial

court’s order.” On appeal, BCCSB does not appear to specifically claim that the

court of appeals’ dismissal of its prohibition claim was erroneous.

{¶ 6} Regarding BCCSB’s mandamus claim, it requested a writ of

mandamus “directing the [common pleas] court not to disclose the child abuse

records.” “ ‘In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus

indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory

injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be

dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ ” State ex rel. Phillips v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of

Elections (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 535, 537, 757 N.E.2d 319, quoting State ex rel.

Grendell v. Davidson (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704; State ex rel.

Walker v. Bowling Green (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 391, 392, 632 N.E.2d 904.

BCCSB’s mandamus claim is merely an ill-disguised request for prohibitory

injunctive relief, i.e., to prevent Judge Sage from disclosing the child abuse records.

Therefore, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the

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January Term, 2002

mandamus claim. See State ex rel. Forsyth v. Brigner (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 71,

72, 711 N.E.2d 684.1

{¶ 7} Moreover, even if BCCSB’s argument here were sufficiently broad to

encompass its prohibition claim, dismissal is additionally warranted for the

following reasons.

{¶ 8} As we have consistently held, “ ‘trial courts have the requisite

jurisdiction to decide issues of privilege; thus extraordinary relief in prohibition

will not lie to correct any errors in decisions of these issues.’ ” State ex rel. Abner

v. Elliott (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 11, 16, 706 N.E.2d 765, 769, quoting State ex rel.

Herdman v. Watson (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 537, 538, 700 N.E.2d 1270; State ex rel.

Children’s Med. Ctr. v. Brown (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 194, 196, 571 N.E.2d 724;

Rath v. Williamson (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 419, 583 N.E.2d 1308.

{¶ 9} Finally, BCCSB has an adequate remedy by immediate appeal of

Judge Sage’s July 12, 2001 entry and a motion to stay the order pending appeal.

Neither prohibition nor mandamus will issue if the relator has an adequate remedy

in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio

St.3d 426, 428, 751 N.E.2d 472.

{¶ 10} Notwithstanding BCCSB’s claims to the contrary, the July 12, 2001

entry that granted the provisional remedy ordering the discovery of the allegedly

privileged record did not need to comply with Civ.R. 54(B) to constitute a final

appealable order. A provisional remedy is a remedy other than a claim for relief.

Therefore, an order granting or denying a provisional remedy is not subject to the

requirements of Civ.R. 54(B). Bob Krihwan Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen.

Motors Corp. (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 777, 781-782, 753 N.E.2d 864; Premier

Health Care Serv., Inc. v. Schneiderman (Aug. 21, 2001), Montgomery App. No.

1. Even assuming that BCCSB is correct that the court of appeals erred in its specified rationale for

dismissal, this would not require reversal. See Johnson v. Timmerman-Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio

St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (“we will not reverse a correct judgment based on an appellate

court’s erroneous rationale”).

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18795, unreported, 2001 WL 1479241; but, cf., Chambers v. Chambers (2000), 137

Ohio App.3d 355, 360, 738 N.E.2d 834.

{¶ 11} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed

BCCSB’s action, and we affirm its judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and

LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

__________________

Jack C. McGowan & Associates and Jack C. McGowan, for appellant.

__________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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