The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 88 Ohio St.3d 190.]
THE STATE EX REL. QUALITY TOWER SERVICE, INC., APPELLANT, v.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES.
[Cite as State ex rel. Quality Tower Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.,
2000-Ohio-296.]
Workers’ compensation—Alleged violation of specific safety requirement
concerning suspension straps—Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G)—Writ of
mandamus vacating Industrial Commission’s award of violation of a
specific safety requirement granted, when.
(No. 98-1117—Submitted January 11, 2000—Decided March 15, 2000.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 97APD04-523.
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{¶ 1} Quality Tower Service, Inc. (“QTS”), appellant, sought a writ of
mandamus requiring appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order
granting an award of additional workers’ compensation to appellees Theresa
Garaux, widow of John D. Garaux, and Richard D. Reed for QTS’s violation of a
specific safety requirement (“VSSR”). The Court of Appeals for Franklin County
denied the writ, finding that the commission did not abuse its discretion in granting
the VSSR award. QTS appeals as of right.
{¶ 2} Decedent Garaux was killed and Reed was severely injured while
dismantling a two-to-three-hundred-foot communications tower for QTS. They
were belted to a “gin pole,” an antenna-like structure used to support tower
technicians during the dismantling process, when the synthetic straps suspending
the structure failed and caused the gin pole, Garaux, and Reed to fall thirty or forty
feet to the ground. The straps failed because, contrary to the direct order of QTS
president and general manager Mark A. Pyron, Garaux rigged the gin pole with
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“ultralight straps” rather than the stronger straps that Pyron had provided for this
purpose.
{¶ 3} After their workers’ compensation claims were allowed, Reed and
Garaux’s widow alleged that QTS had violated, among other safety regulations,
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G). Reed claimed a violation of division (G)(2),
which prohibits employers from exceeding the rated capacity of synthetic webbing.
Garaux’s widow claimed a violation of division (G)(2) and also of division
(G)(1)(b), which requires certain employers to label synthetic web slings with the
“[r]ated capabilities for the type of hitch.”
{¶ 4} QTS conceded that inadequate suspension straps had caused Reed’s
injury and Garaux’s death and that the straps were not properly labeled. But QTS
also established that Garaux had used his own ultralight straps to rig the gin pole,
that Pyron had expressly directed him to use the company’s stronger straps and not
the ultralight straps, and that QTS’s straps were properly labeled. Thus, QTS
argued that Garaux was unilaterally negligent, that his conduct had caused the
accident and, therefore, that QTS had neither committed a VSSR nor caused the
claimants’ injuries.
{¶ 5} The commission found that QTS had violated Ohio Adm.Code
4121:1-3-08(G)(2) with respect to Reed because inadequate suspension straps had
been used to rig the gin pole from which he fell. With respect to Garaux, the
commission found a violation of Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G)(2) and (G)(1)(b)
and that he was not unilaterally negligent. The commission reasoned that these
provisions did not distinguish between whether equipment belonged to the
company or an employee. Moreover, the commission inferred that if Garaux’s
ultralight straps had been properly labeled, he likely would not have used them,
opting instead for the heavier-duty rigging provided by QTS.
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{¶ 6} The court of appeals agreed with the commission, finding that QTS’s
failure to label Garaux’s ultralight straps violated Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-
08(G)(1)(b) and (2) and caused the death and injuries at issue.
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Gibson & Robbins-Penniman, J. Miles Gibson and Kelly A. Willis, for
appellant.
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter and Timothy T. Tullis, for appellee Theresa
Garaux.
W. Michael Shay, for appellee Richard D. Reed.
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Per Curiam.
{¶ 7} The dispositive issue in this case is: Did QTS comply with Ohio
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G) so that it is not responsible for the alleged VSSRs? For
the following reasons, we hold that QTS did comply with this specific safety
regulation and that Garaux unilaterally violated the rule. Accordingly, we reverse
the court of appeals’ judgment and grant the requested writ of mandamus.
{¶ 8} QTS contends that it complied with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-03-
08(G) because it provided Garaux and Reed “properly marked equipment more than
suitable for the job,” Pyron told Garaux on site to use the company’s equipment
and not his own, and Garaux ignored the instruction. We agree.
{¶ 9} This case is an example of what has become known as “unilateral
negligence,” a defense to VSSR liability that has been described as applying “only
where the claimant deliberately renders an otherwise complying device
noncompliant [sic, nonconforming].” (Emphasis added.) State ex rel. R.E.H. Co.
v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 352, 355, 681 N.E.2d 928, 931; State ex rel.
Martin Painting & Coating Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 333, 339,
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678 N.E.2d 206, 211; State ex rel. Pressware Internatl., Inc. v. Indus. Comm.
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 284, 288, 707 N.E.2d 935, 939; State ex rel. Hirschvogel,
Inc. v. Miller (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 215, 218, 714 N.E.2d 386, 388. Unilateral
negligence derives from State ex rel. Frank Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.
(1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 162, 524 N.E.2d 482, in which an employer was exonerated
from VSSR liability because an employee had removed a part of a scaffold that had
been required by a specific safety requirement. Brown held that (1) employers can
be subject to VSSR penalties for “only those acts within the employer’s control,”
and (2) a specific safety requirement does not impose a duty of “constant
surveillance” just by requiring a securely and rigidly based scaffold. Id. at 164, 524
N.E.2d at 485.
{¶ 10} QTS relies principally on Brown, whereas the other parties rely
mainly on State ex rel. Cotterman v. St. Marys Foundry (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 42,
544 N.E.2d 887. In Cotterman, an employer was held liable for violating a
regulation requiring sufficient chain-sling capacity for suspending overhead loads.
There, a supervisory employee was killed because he selected chains too weak to
suspend a huge core. Contrasting Brown, the Cotterman court held, in effect, that
this specific safety requirement imposed an absolute duty of compliance
notwithstanding the supervisory employee’s mistake.
{¶ 11} Brown and Cotterman are regularly cited for establishing the
boundaries of the unilateral negligence defense, Pressware at 288, 707 N.E.2d at
939; Martin Painting at 339, 678 N.E.2d at 211; State ex rel. Northern
Petrochemical Co., Nortech Div. v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 453, 455,
575 N.E.2d 200, 201-202; however, the defense is not actually about an employee’s
negligence. The employer instead avoids VSSR liability when “[the] employee
unilaterally violates a safety requirement [emphasis added],” Cotterman at 47, 544
N.E.2d at 892; Pressware at 288, 707 N.E.2d at 939, that is, when the employee
removes or ignores equipment or instruction that complies with a specific safety
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requirement. Brown at 164, 524 N.E.2d at 485; Northern Petrochemical. On the
other hand, an employee’s negligence in failing to protect himself from injury due
to an employer’s VSSR will never bar recovery because specific safety
requirements exist to promote a safe work environment and “to protect employees
against their own negligence and folly.” Cotterman and Pressware. Thus, the
critical issue in a VSSR claim is always whether the employer complied with the
specific safety requirement. Id.
{¶ 12} Here, it is undisputed that QTS properly labeled and made available
synthetic web straps adequate to hoist Garaux, Reed, and the gin pole. This is all
that Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G) required.1 Thus, QTS complied with this rule
and did not commit a VSSR.
{¶ 13} Moreover, while appellees offer Cotterman as authority for holding
QTS responsible for this tragic accident, the absolute duty of compliance
recognized in Cotterman is too strict and has not been enforced for this reason. For
example, in Northern Petrochemical Co., we found no VSSR liability when an
employee died after falling out of an unsecured lift cage. Since the operating
employees had been trained and warned to check that the cage was securely
attached to a forklift mechanism, and the accident resulted purely from employee
carelessness in failing to adequately inspect, we did not penalize the employer for
the employee’s conduct.
{¶ 14} Similarly, in State ex rel. Mayle v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 86 Ohio
St.3d 74, 711 N.E.2d 687, we found no VSSR liability when an employee died after
falling off an electrical tower. Again, the employer complied with the specific
1. Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-08(G) provides only that:
“Synthetic webbing (nylon, polyester and polypropylene)
“(1) The employer shall have each synthetic web sling marked or coded to show
“(a) Name or trademark of manufacturer.
“(b) Rated capacities for the type of hitch.
“(c) Type of material.
“(2) Rated capacity shall not be exceeded.”
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safety requirement by supplying safety belts for the employee’s use; the employee
just never wore them. Thus again, we refused to penalize the complying employer
for the employee’s mistake.
{¶ 15} QTS did everything that could reasonably be expected to comply
with Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-08(G). Pyron provided sufficient equipment and
directly ordered Garaux to use it. Pyron did not have to rig the gin pole himself or
check Garaux’s work to make sure that Garaux had followed his instructions.
Brown. In view of this compliance, QTS’s actions did not constitute a VSSR or
cause Garaux’s death and Reed’s injury.
{¶ 16} The court of appeals’ judgment, therefore, is reversed, and a writ of
mandamus is granted to vacate the commission’s VSSR award.
Judgment reversed
and writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent.
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ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J., dissenting.
{¶ 17} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
DOUGLAS and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting
opinion.
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