Opinion

Findlay/Hancock Cty. Bar Assn. v. Filkins

  • 90 Ohio St. 3d 1
  • 2000 Ohio 491
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Sep 6, 2000
Status
Published
On the bench
Lundberg Stratton, J.
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 62.3%

holding “that where an attorney represents himself and his client in a business deal, and the client loses money on the deal, a presumption arises that the attorney used client 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO confidences to his client’s disadvantage”

How later courts described this case

  • holding “that where an attorney represents himself and his client in a business deal, and the client loses money on the deal, a presumption arises that the attorney used client 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO confidences to his client’s disadvantage”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 90 Ohio St.3d 1.]

FINDLAY/HANCOCK COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. FILKINS.

[Cite as Findlay/Hancock Cty. Bar Assn. v. Filkins, 2000-Ohio-491.]

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Charges against attorney dismissed when relator

fails to prove alleged disciplinary violations by clear and convincing

evidence.

(No. 99-2233—Submitted March 8, 2000—Decided September 6, 2000.)

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and

Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-16.

__________________

{¶ 1} Relator, Findlay/Hancock County Bar Association, filed a complaint

against respondent, John C. Filkins III of Findlay, Ohio, Attorney Registration No.

0046671. The complaint alleged that respondent violated DR 4-101(B)(2), 7-

102(A)(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8), as well as 1-102(A)(1).

{¶ 2} This disciplinary action arose from respondent’s representation of

Traci Mackey. Traci Mackey (f.k.a. Traci Crow) and Russell Crow were married

on November 24, 1990. During their marriage, they had a son, Reid Crow. At the

time, Traci Mackey and Russell Crow also had custody of two other children,

Chontay (Russell Crow’s daughter from a prior marriage) and Aaron (Traci’s

Crow’s son from a prior relationship).

{¶ 3} Chontay’s biological mother and Russell Crow’s ex-wife, Rochelle

Baumlein, filed a motion seeking custody of Chontay. Respondent defended the

custody action. On October 10, 1991, the trial judge issued an entry ordering

psychological evaluations for the parties (Russell and Rochelle), their spouses

(Traci Mackey and Michael Baumlein), and Chontay. Dr. Frederick P. Ferri

conducted the examinations and authored a report recommending that Chontay

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remain with Russell and Traci Crow. Ultimately, Russell Crow was successful in

retaining custody of Chontay.

{¶ 4} In June 1993, respondent represented both Russell Crow and Traci

Mackey in attempting to get visitation rights to Russell Crow’s niece, Ashley. The

case was subsequently dismissed.

{¶ 5} Traci Mackey also retained respondent’s services to determine the

identity of her biological parents, as well as her family medical history. On

December 16, 1993, respondent filed a petition for release of this information with

the Court of Common Pleas of Highland County, Probate Division. Ultimately,

respondent was unsuccessful in acquiring the information for Traci Mackey

because her biological parents had not authorized a release of their identity.

{¶ 6} Having become unhappy with their marriage, Traci Mackey hired

Robroy Crow (no relation to Russell Crow) to initiate divorce proceedings against

her husband, Russell Crow. On November 6, 1995, Traci Mackey commenced a

divorce action in the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County. Respondent

represented Russell Crow in the divorce action. The couple settled most issues

pertaining to the divorce except custody of their child, Reid. On September 12,

1996, subsequent to a hearing before a magistrate, the trial court issued an entry

that granted the divorce and gave custody of Reid Crow to Russell Crow. The court

ordered Traci Mackey to pay Russell Crow child support.

{¶ 7} Subsequent to the divorce, the Hancock County Child Support

Enforcement Agency filed a “show cause” motion relating to the child support

order against Traci Mackey for Reid Crow. Traci Mackey hired attorney Barbara

Larick to represent her in this matter. Respondent continued to represent Russell

Crow. Larick filed a motion to modify custody. Upon learning that respondent had

represented Traci Mackey prior to his representation of Russell Crow in the divorce

action against Mackey, Larick advised Traci Mackey that she might want to

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consider filing a disciplinary complaint or filing a malpractice action against

respondent.

{¶ 8} On October 17, 1997, Traci Mackey filed a grievance against

respondent. On April 6, 1998, the relator filed a complaint alleging that respondent

used confidences learned from Traci Mackey during his representation of her to her

disadvantage in violation of DR 4-101(B)(2).1 Eight months later, on December

10, 1998, relator filed an amended complaint, containing two new allegations. The

first new allegation arose from the Chontay custody case and alleged that

respondent had instructed Traci Mackey “not to disclose to the psychologist the

physical, mental, and sexual abuses that Mackey had suffered and was suffering

from Russell A. Crow,” and further “to lie to the psychologist about the relationship

between Russell A. Crow and her.” The second new allegation was that respondent

had “established signals with Mackey through which he would instruct her during

the course of her testimony before the Court as to how to answer the questions

posed to her by him and by opposing counsel.” These instances of misconduct were

alleged to be in violation of DR 7-102(A)(3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8). Mackey

also filed a legal malpractice suit against both respondent and Robroy Crow.

{¶ 9} A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline

of the Supreme Court heard the evidence. The panel found that the relator failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) that respondent had knowingly

concealed that which he was required to disclose or made a false statement in

violation of DR 7-102(A)(3) and (5); and (2) that respondent used signals to instruct

Traci Mackey how to answer questions in violation of DR 7-102(A)(4) and (8).

However, the panel determined that the relator did prove by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) respondent had instructed Traci Mackey not to disclose to the

psychologist in the Chontay custody case that she (Traci) had been abused by her

1. The complaint also alleged that respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(1). DR 1-102(A)(1) merely

precludes a lawyer from violating a Disciplinary Rule.

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husband Russell Crow, in violation of DR 7-102(A)(6) and (7); and that (2)

respondent knowingly used a confidence or secret of his client, Traci Mackey, to

her disadvantage in violation of DR 4-101(B)(2).

{¶ 10} The panel recommended that respondent be suspended from the

practice of law for one year with six months stayed. The board adopted the findings

of fact and conclusions of law of the panel, but recommended that respondent be

suspended for two years, with one year stayed, and that respondent be placed on

probation.

__________________

Roger Miller and Mark Miller, for relator.

John C. Filkins III; Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter and Geoffrey Stern, for

respondent.

__________________

LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.

{¶ 11} “In disciplinary proceedings, the relator bears the burden of proving

the facts necessary to establish a violation. The complaint must allege the specific

misconduct that violates the Disciplinary Rules and relator must prove such

misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Ohio State Bar

Assn. v. Reid (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 327, 708 N.E.2d 193, at paragraph two of the

syllabus. While the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline makes

recommendations to this court, it is this court that renders the final determination

of the facts and conclusions of law in disciplinary proceedings. Id. at paragraph

one of the syllabus.

{¶ 12} This is a difficult case to decide because it relies solely on the

credibility of the witnesses for proof. Upon independent review of all the evidence

in this case, we agree with the board that there is insufficient evidence to prove (1)

that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(3) and (5) (he lied or concealed information),

and (2) that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(4) and (8) (he used signals to

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influence his client’s testimony). However, contrary to the board’s findings, we

find that relator did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) respondent

violated DR 7-102(A)(6) and (7) (he instructed his client to lie) or (2) that

respondent violated DR 4-101(B)(2) (he used client confidences to the

disadvantage of the client).

{¶ 13} We find that there is evidence in the record that undermines the

credibility of Traci Mackey’s testimony. In addition, we find that there is no

evidence to corroborate her testimony, while there are multiple credible witnesses

whose testimony supports respondent. We do not lightly disregard the findings of

the panel. They are conscientious and dedicated individuals who had an

opportunity to see and hear the witnesses and to judge their credibility. However,

we also recognize that we must make the final determination using the clear-and-

convincing-evidence standard.

DR 7-102(A)(6) and (7)

{¶ 14} The board found that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(6) and (7)

when he instructed Traci Mackey not to disclose relevant and truthful information

in an effort to prevail in the Chontay custody motion. DR 7-102(A)(6) and (7) state

that an attorney shall not “[p]articipate in the creation or preservation of evidence

when he knows * * * that the evidence is false” and shall not “[c]ounsel * * * his

client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be * * * fraudulent.”

a. Summary of Relator’s Evidence

{¶ 15} In her testimony before the panel, Traci Mackey alleged that in 1992,

just prior to the psychological evaluation ordered in the Chontay custody case, she

disclosed to respondent that she, Chontay, and Aaron had been abused by her

husband, Russell Crow. The allegations included sexual abuse of Traci Mackey

and Chontay and physical abuse of Traci Mackey, Chontay, and Aaron, including

attacks against Traci Mackey with a knife and a chair. She alleged that Russell

Crow’s abuse was documented in written police reports.

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{¶ 16} Traci Mackey testified that she disclosed the abuse allegations to

respondent at his office and her home. She testified that she discussed the abuse

with respondent “many times.” “Usually they [the conversations] took place over

the phone and then I would go see him.” Traci Mackey admitted that she did not

have a driver’s license but claimed that friends drove her to respondent’s office on

those occasions when she went to discuss Russell Crow’s abusive nature.

{¶ 17} Despite the alleged disclosure of Russell Crow’s abuse to

respondent, Traci Mackey alleged that respondent instructed her to lie to the doctor

and tell him that Russell Crow was a “wonderful father, that he had a wonderful

relationship with the kids.”

{¶ 18} Finally, Traci Mackey testified that she also described Russell

Crow’s abusive nature to Robroy Crow, the attorney who represented her in her

divorce from Russell Crow.

b. Summary of Respondent’s Evidence

{¶ 19} In support of respondent, Russell Crow, Traci Mackey’s ex-husband,

testified that respondent never instructed him or Traci Mackey to lie to the doctor

conducting the psychiatric evaluation. In fact, Russell Crow testified that

respondent instructed him and Traci Mackey “to be honest with the doctor, tell him

the truth.” Russell Crow also testified that respondent never came to their (Russell

and Traci Crow’s) house for a meeting. He also testified that he was the only person

to drive Traci to respondent’s office because she had no friends in the area to give

her rides to respondent’s office.

{¶ 20} Respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent stated that Traci

Mackey “never” indicated to him that Russell Crow was abusive. He also testified

that he never counseled Traci Mackey to lie in the psychological evaluation.

Respondent testified that he never met with Traci Mackey alone before the divorce

action. Finally, he testified that he had never met Traci Mackey at her residence.

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January Term, 2000

{¶ 21} Robroy Crow testified that contrary to Traci Mackey’s assertion, she

never disclosed to him that Russell Crow had abused her. He also testified that had

he been aware of any abuse, he would have attempted to introduce it in the divorce

case.

c. Analysis

{¶ 22} Traci Mackey’s testimony is the sole evidence in support of the DR

7-102(A)(6) and (7) violations. The board found that “[h]er testimony was too

detailed and specific not to be found to be credible.” However, we find that the

record reveals information that we believe erodes the credibility of her testimony.

This, in conjunction with the testimony of three witnesses that directly contradicts

Traci Mackey’s testimony, leads us to determine that the evidence is not clear and

convincing that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(6) or (7).

{¶ 23} Traci Mackey admitted to the panel that she lied to the examining

psychologist in the Chontay custody case about Russell Crow’s alleged abuse, even

though she knew that a lie would keep Chontay with this allegedly abusive man.

Relator’s counsel asked Traci Mackey, “did you, in fact, lie in those psychological

evaluations?” She answered, “Yes.”

{¶ 24} Traci Mackey also admitted to the panel that she had lied under oath

in a court of law. Specifically, a member of the panel posed the following question:

“The signals, were those signals ever intended for you to lie on the witness stand?”

She answered, “I did lie.”

{¶ 25} Traci Mackey admitted that she lied on several other occasions. She

admitted that she lied to her husband about an affair that she was having with

Dwayne Mackey. It is apparent from the record that she lied to Deborah Mackey,

Dwayne Mackey’s wife, about her affair with Dwayne Mackey. In fact, Traci

Mackey persuaded Deborah Mackey to let her move in with Deborah and Dwayne,

claiming that Russell Crow had assaulted her, even though Traci Mackey had been

having an affair for several months with Deborah Mackey’s husband. She engaged

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in further deception by having Deborah Mackey baby-sit her children while she and

Deborah Mackey’s husband would go to a motel and engage in sex.

{¶ 26} Traci Mackey’s admission of the aforementioned lies erodes her

credibility with regard to her allegations against respondent. The lies she admitted

to in her divorce case were of a particularly deceptive nature. Yet even more

detrimental to her credibility were her admitted lies that occurred in court, where a

person is sworn to tell the truth, and in the court-related psychiatric examination.

{¶ 27} We also find that the record reveals that Traci Mackey has a

propensity for making unsubstantiated allegations. She alleged that Russell Crow

abused her, Chontay, and Reid, as well as her son Aaron. However, to date, nothing

in the record indicates that any of these claims have been substantiated. In fact, at

one point, Children’s Services directed her to stop bringing Chontay into the

hospital for exams based on these unsubstantiated allegations because doing so was

abusive in and of itself to Chontay.

{¶ 28} Finally, Traci Mackey accused Rochelle Baumline of being racist

and of threatening to run someone over with a car. Again these allegations are

unsubstantiated by the record. We find that Traci Mackey’s propensity for making

unsubstantiated allegations further erodes her credibility.

{¶ 29} Traci Mackey filed her grievance against respondent on October 17,

1997. The relator filed the initial complaint on April 6, 1998. It alleged that

respondent used confidences gained by him to Traci Mackey’s disadvantage in

violation of DR 4-101(B)(2). It was not until eight months after the initial

complaint, and fourteen months after the filing of the grievance, on December 10,

1998, that relator filed an amended complaint with the additional allegations that

respondent had instructed Traci Mackey to lie.2

2. The amended complaint also alleged that respondent used signals to instruct Mackey how to

testify, a violation of DR 7-102(A)(4), (6), and (7). However, because we have affirmed the board’s

finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove this charge and because we are addressing the

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{¶ 30} The allegation that respondent instructed Mackey to lie arose from

respondent’s representation of Traci Mackey in the early 1990s. We find it suspect

that Traci Mackey apparently failed to disclose or remember this allegation until

eight months after the initial complaint was filed and some fourteen months after

the grievance was filed.

{¶ 31} An allegation of counseling a client to lie is not an insignificant

charge that the accuser would disregard or forget. Yet the claim was not asserted

until fourteen months after the initial grievance was filed.

{¶ 32} A divorce strains emotions, especially where a parent loses custody

of a child. Traci Mackey had just been through a divorce and lost custody of her

son, Reid, to her ex-husband, Russell Crow. Such emotions could have motivated

Traci Mackey to seek retribution. Thus, Traci Mackey had a motive to fabricate

the allegations against respondent. This could explain why Traci Mackey did not

file the allegation that respondent lied until some fourteen months after she filed

her initial grievance. It would also explain the malpractice action she filed against

respondent because much as a criminal verdict may support a civil action for

damages, a successful disciplinary action may support a malpractice action for

damages.

{¶ 33} We find that the fourteen-month delay in asserting these additional

allegations, with no justification for the delay, further erodes Traci Mackey’s

credibility with regard to the allegations that respondent instructed her to lie.

{¶ 34} Finally, Traci Mackey’s testimony made reference to two separate

instances that we believe provided the relator with a prime opportunity to bolster

her testimony with probative, corroborative evidence. The first instance pertained

to her testimony that she first divulged and subsequently discussed Russell Crow’s

abusive nature to respondent at his office. Traci Mackey admitted that she had to

allegations that respondent counseled Mackey to lie, we find no reason to further discuss this

allegation here.

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rely on friends to give her a ride to respondent’s office because her driver’s license

was expired. However, Russell Crow testified that he was her only ride to

respondent’s office. And respondent testified that he never met with Traci Mackey

alone. Relator had a prime opportunity to impeach the testimony of respondent’s

witnesses’ testimony by presenting a witness who would testify that he or she

chauffeured Traci Mackey to respondent’s office as she claimed. However, relator

provided no such witness(es).

{¶ 35} Traci Mackey also testified that written police reports were made

pertaining to Russell Crow’s abusive episodes. Yet the relator failed to submit a

single copy of a police report in this regard or provide any explanation as to why

such documentation was unavailable. Copies of police reports would have verified

Russell Crow’s abusive nature and in turn supported Traci Mackey’s testimony that

she divulged this critical information to respondent and Robroy Crow.

{¶ 36} Contrary to relator’s case, we find the witnesses testifying in support

of respondent to be credible. These witnesses included respondent, Russell Crow,

and Robroy Crow.

{¶ 37} Respondent presented his own case to this court and emphatically

denied that he had counseled Traci Mackey to lie. In addition to these assertions,

respondent presented several witnesses that testified favorably to respondent’s

credibility and reputation. Attorney R. Edward Marks of Advocates for Basic Legal

Equality, Inc. (“ABLE”) testified as to respondent’s reputation. Marks, who

operated ABLE’s legal aid program, made numerous referrals to respondent and

had received positive evaluations. Marks testified that he found respondent to have

a “high reputation for personal integrity and professional competence.”

{¶ 38} Doug Bonnoront, a personal friend and client of respondent, testified

that respondent was trustworthy and “very ethical.”

{¶ 39} Bruce Brimley, acting municipal court judge and respondent’s

current employer, testified: “I guess in sum, if I didn’t believe in John’s integrity

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and John’s honesty, I would not be here testifying on his behalf and he would not

be working for me and I think the fact that he works for me testifies as to my opinion

as to his integrity, his candor and his honesty.”

{¶ 40} Finally, respondent submitted several letters from peers, from a

common pleas judge, and a former employer that praise respondent’s honesty,

integrity, and high moral ethics.

{¶ 41} In an apparent attempt to discredit respondent, the relator presented

the testimony of attorney Patti Baumgartner-Novak. She testified that respondent

can be difficult at times and will fight in cases where others would settle. She stated

that not many attorneys litigate cases to trial in Hancock County but admitted that

respondent had a duty to go to trial if his client did not want to settle. She also

testified about an incident where she suspected that respondent had advised two of

his clients not to return a child to Ohio even though he was under a court order to

do so. However, she admitted that respondent, on record, denied giving that advice.

No proof or evidence was ever presented that respondent had not been truthful and

Baumgartner-Novak conceded that she had never heard anyone say that respondent

was dishonest.

{¶ 42} Barbara Larick also testified to another incident where she felt that

respondent acted in a case with a possible conflict of interest. But she admitted that

respondent withdrew after she challenged him on the issue.

{¶ 43} While Baumgartner-Novak and other witnesses challenged

respondent’s style of practice, neither she nor any of relator’s witnesses presented

any evidence to attack respondent’s credibility, the issue at stake here.

{¶ 44} Having observed his demeanor in presenting his case before this

court, we find respondent’s testimony credible. Respondent’s credibility is

bolstered by the testimony and letters of his employers, friends, and colleagues and

by relator’s failure to successfully attack respondent’s credibility.

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{¶ 45} Russell Crow testified that respondent told him and Traci to tell the

truth to the doctor conducting the psychological examination in the Chontay case.

His testimony corroborates respondent’s testimony in this regard.

{¶ 46} However, perhaps the most persuasive testimony was that of

attorney Robroy Crow. In our view, he provided key testimony, because it

corroborates respondent’s testimony that Traci Mackey never disclosed Russell

Crow’s abuse. Yet the panel never addressed why they disregarded Robroy Crow’s

testimony.

{¶ 47} Traci Mackey alleged that during her divorce case, she disclosed

Russell Crow’s abuse to Robroy Crow, but that Robroy Crow told her that “it was

irrelevant * * * because of the circumstances surrounding the divorce, that I would

lose anyway.” However, Robroy Crow testified that Traci Mackey never told him

that Russell Crow was abusive. He indicated that had he known of the abuse, he

would have used the evidence in the divorce proceedings.

{¶ 48} Robroy Crow is an attorney experienced in domestic law. Thus, he

knew the value of this information in winning Traci Mackey custody of her son and

his obligation as an attorney to use it. There is no credible evidence in the record

as to why Robroy Crow would advise Traci Mackey that Russell Crow’s abusive

nature was irrelevant to determination of the custody of their son, which would

have been a blatant violation of his obligation to her. In fact, upon direct

examination of Traci Mackey in the divorce proceeding, Robroy Crow made a

detailed inquiry as to Russell Crow’s fitness as a father, giving Traci Mackey a

golden opportunity to expose the abuse. Yet, the only faults as a father that she

testified to were that he slept too much and occasionally failed to put shoes or socks

on their child.3 Because Traci Mackey failed to testify as to Russell Crow’s abuse,

3. Deborah Mackey relates one incident that occurred after Traci Mackey started her affair with

Dwayne Mackey in which Traci alleged that her husband, Russell Crow, “beat her up.” However,

Russell Crow conveys a much different account of that event. Moreover, if all the alleged abuse did

indeed occur it makes no sense that Deborah Mackey would relate this single incident to the

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especially when the custody of her son was at stake, we are inclined to believe that

she either did not tell Robroy Crow of Russell Crow’s abuse or that in fact Russell

Crow was not abusive. Under either scenario, Robroy Crow was unaware of any

abuse inflicted by Russell Crow. Such a conclusion only corroborates respondent’s

position that Traci Mackey never disclosed Russell Crow’s alleged abusive nature

to him either.

{¶ 49} Accordingly, we find that Robroy Crow’s testimony that Traci

Mackey never informed him of Russell Crow’s alleged abuse was credible. This

conclusion tends to discount the allegation that Russell Crow was abusive and

strikes another blow against Traci Mackey’s credibility.

{¶ 50} Finally, and perhaps more persuasive than our individual analysis of

each witness’s credibility, is the collective effect of the testimony presented by

respondent compared to the relator’s case, which relied almost solely on the

testimony of Traci Mackey. Respondent and Robroy Crow testified that Traci

Mackey never informed them of the alleged abuse. Neither recalled having seen

any abuse marks on Traci Mackey’s body, which she alleged were visible when she

spoke to both of them. Both respondent and Robroy Crow would have known the

importance of the abuse and their obligation to disclose it in their respective cases,

but each failed to do so despite the fact that they could have disclosed it easily.

{¶ 51} In weighing the evidence, we note that respondent presented three

witnesses who testified that respondent did not violate DR 7-102(A)(6) or (7). The

credibility of these witnesses was never effectively impeached. Their testimony

was consistent and appealed to logic and common sense. Conversely, relator relied

primarily upon a single witness to prove that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(6)

and (7). There are many questions pertaining to the credibility, logic, and common

sense of her testimony, as well as a failure to corroborate several key portions of

exclusion of arguably more grave alleged previous incidents of sexual and physical abuse against

Traci Mackey and her children, including the alleged attack with a knife.

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her testimony. Thus, we are compelled to find that relator failed to present clear

and convincing evidence that respondent violated DR 7-102(A)(6) or (7).

DR 4-101(B)(2)

{¶ 52} The board also found that “Respondent violated DR 4-101(B)(2)

when he used confidential information that he knew regarding Traci Mackey,

especially her relationship with her children, and other relationships, in seeking to

obtain custody of the child born of her marriage with Russell Crow.” DR 4-

101(B)(2) prohibits an attorney from “[using] a confidence or secret of his client to

the disadvantage of the client.”

a. Summary of Relator’s Evidence

{¶ 53} In her testimony before the panel, referring to the period of time prior

to the divorce, Traci Mackey stated that “Mr. Filkins [respondent] and Rusty

[Russell Crow] and I, we, all of the, well, a lot of meetings we had, it wasn’t just

attorney-client go ins, do your business and leave. I mean, we talked about friends,

we talked about his wife, she was going to have a baby at that time.” Traci Mackey

confirmed that many of the conversations with respondent were social in nature,

pertaining to their children, soccer, and the birth of respondent’s child.

{¶ 54} In answering a question about what confidences imparted to

respondent were used by him in representing Russell Crow in the divorce, Traci

Mackey stated, “Well, everything, I think, was used against me in the divorce. Mr.

Filkins knew about, like I said, everything about me. He knew everything about

my children. He knew, you know, if I would lose one of my children I would be

devastated. He knew everything and I believe he used everything he had against

me, every ounce of me.” When asked by a member of the panel to be more specific,

she stated, “I’m going to have to say it would be, again, that my children are very

important to me because during recess of that case there was a threat made from

John Filkins to Robroy Crow stating that if I didn’t stop with trying to get custody

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away from Rusty that I would pay and that I would lose my son and that was my

threat, so that he knew how to threaten me by using my children.”

b. Summary of Respondent’s Evidence

{¶ 55} When asked what confidences he used against Traci Mackey,

respondent testified, “[A]s I sit here today, I can’t tell you of any.” Robroy Crow

also indicated that he did not believe that respondent used any confidences.

c. Analysis

{¶ 56} The vague allegation that “he used everything he had against me” is

unsupported by any specifics in the record. Although there is no definition of

“confidence” as the term is used in DR 4-101(B)(2), the following two cases

provide some guidance as to its meaning. In Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Osborne

(1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 140, 1 OBR 175, 438 N.E.2d 114, the court held that the

respondent used a confidence to his own advantage in violation of DR 4-101(B)(3).

In Osborne, the respondent and his client transacted several business deals between

them. The respondent in effect represented himself as well as his client in these

deals, and the client lost money. Although the court never identified a specific

confidence that respondent used to his advantage, the violation was evident. It is

virtually axiomatic that where an attorney represents himself and his client in a

business deal, and the client loses money on the deal, a presumption arises that the

attorney used client confidences to his client’s disadvantage.

{¶ 57} In Greater Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Watkins (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 11,

22 O.O.3d 125, 427 N.E.2d 516, the respondent attorney used his client’s

confidence to his own advantage in violation of DR 4-101(B)(3). In Watkins, a fee

disagreement prompted respondent’s client to file a grievance with the bar

association. During the investigation of the grievance, respondent called the

client’s employer, told him that he knew of the employer’s “under the table”

payments to the client, and threatened to go to the authorities unless the grievance

was dropped. The information that the client had been paid under the table had

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been imparted to the respondent in his role as attorney and was used against the

client. Thus, respondent was found to have violated DR 4-101(B)(3).

{¶ 58} Unlike Osborne and Watkins, the “confidences” Traci Mackey

identifies in her testimony are merely generic statements of her love for her

children, which could apply to virtually any parent. Further, the fact that a client

cherishes his or her child is hardly the sort of information that can be used in a

custody case to the disadvantage of the client. Therefore, we decline to define the

broad statements identified by Mackey as “confidences” for purposes of DR 4-

101(B)(2).

{¶ 59} During her divorce with Russell Crow, Traci Mackey petitioned the

court to issue a shared-parenting plan for Reid. A review of the transcript of the

divorce proceeding reveals that respondent never used any of the “confidences”

identified by Mackey in the divorce proceeding.

{¶ 60} In sum, we can find no specific fact or information that would have

come from respondent’s prior representation of Traci Mackey that was used as the

basis for Reid Crow’s custody determination. No references were made to the

custody battle for Chontay. No information, history, doctor or psychology reports

from the prior three matters were ever mentioned; all of the questioning by

respondent dealt with Traci Mackey’s then-current lifestyle and plans for work and

child care.

{¶ 61} In addition, attorney Robroy Crow, who represented Traci Mackey,

presented an affidavit, which stated:

“4. That Affiant did not regard any prior and terminated representation by

[respondent] as an issue to be raised in the case Traci Lynn Crow vs Russell Alan

Crow.

“5. That Affiant never saw, believed, or concluded that [respondent] had

any confidential information about Traci Lynn Crow which could be considered

detrimental to Traci Lynn Crow in the case, Traci Lynn Crow vs Russell Alan Crow.

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January Term, 2000

“6. To the best of Affiant’s knowledge and belief, [respondent] did not use

any confidential information about Traci Lynn Crow to the disadvantage or

prejudice of Traci Lynn Crow in the case, Traci Lynn Crow vs Russell Alan Crow.”

{¶ 62} Robroy Crow, Traci Mackey’s attorney in her divorce proceeding,

was in the best position to evaluate the evidence and determine whether his

opponent had used confidential information. Respondent testified that he disclosed

his prior representation of Traci Mackey to Robroy Crow and that Traci Mackey

had no issue with respondent representing Russell Crow. Relator never refuted this.

However, the panel seemed to totally ignore this evidence.

{¶ 63} Instead, the panel apparently relied in part on the testimony of

attorney Barbara Larick as corroborating Traci Mackey’s testimony. However, an

examination of Barbara Larick’s testimony is not persuasive on the issue.

{¶ 64} On direct examination, Larick stated:

“I said something to John about, how can you do this? Don’t you have an

obligation to zealously represent your client and use everything that you could

possibly use and he said, I did use everything. He said, why do you think we won

in the prior divorce case, he got custody, meaning that Mr. Crow had gotten custody

of the couple’s son, Reed [sic] Allen Crow, in the divorce matter.”

{¶ 65} However, on cross-examination, Barbara Larick backtracked:

“A. He didn’t say I had used, that he had used everything. He just said, I

did use—I said, how can you use the information and he said, I did use it, why do

you think we won, he got custody, didn’t he?

“***

“Q. I think you’ve already said this, I want to make sure I heard. Mr. Filkins

did not detail this information to you [i.e., the information he knew as a result of

representing Traci]?

“A. No. Mr. Filkins did not detail the information.”

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{¶ 66} Larick interprets respondent’s remark to mean that he used

confidential information. Yet it is clear from her testimony that Larick does not

have any personal knowledge that respondent used any confidences against Traci

Mackey. The respondent could just as easily have been referring to the evidence in

the divorce case.

{¶ 67} In fact, in awarding custody of Reid to Russell Crow, the magistrate

in his decision stated:

“The parties have, at times, demonstrated the ability to work together on

parenting issues. This is evidenced by the parties trying different parenting

arrangements on their own. Ultimately, however, this proved to be unsuccessful

and resulted in conflict. The Plaintiff [Traci Mackey] will be moving in the next

couple of weeks. Although she will be less than an hour and one-half from

Defendant [Russell Crow], this will also make shared parenting difficult.

“The child has lived most of his young life in Findlay, most recently in the

marital home where the Defendant continues to reside. He attends day care in

Findlay. His extended family is in the Findlay area. The Plaintiff is moving to Port

Clinton, Ohio, to get a new start. This move would require the child to move to a

new city, away from his day care, away from his father, and away from extended

family.

“The Plaintiff stated she is moving to get a fresh start. She plans at some

time to be residing with her boyfriend. The Plaintiff did not explain how this could

be construed to be in Reid’s best interests. She, herself, stated that Reid will be

harmed by such a move. She also admitted putting her own interests ahead of those

of her children. It also appears that the Plaintiff will have limited time available to

parent Reid. She plans on working at a day care, starting in the early morning, and

she also has a restaurant job in the evening. The Plaintiff stated she was not sure

how she was going to combine this employment. The Plaintiff will be doing all

this while pursuing a new relationship with another man. Although the Plaintiff

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January Term, 2000

will be at the day care center when Reid is there as a cook [sic], she will have

limited contact with him during the day.

“The Plaintiff’s shared parenting plan is found not to be in Reid’s best

interests. The Defendant should be designated as the residential parent for Reid.”

{¶ 68} None of the reasons delineated in the magistrate’s decision in

awarding custody of Reid to Russell Crow corresponds with the “confidences” that

Traci Mackey identified in her testimony. Further, the reasons cited by the

magistrate (Traci Mackey’s move, her affair, her employment plans) were not

known to respondent before he represented Russell Crow in his divorce from Traci

Mackey.

{¶ 69} In addition, respondent testified that he revealed his prior

representation of Traci Mackey to Robroy Crow and received clearance for him to

represent Russell Crow in the divorce proceeding. Robroy Crow testified that

respondent did not disclose any of Traci Mackey’s “confidences” in the divorce

proceedings.

{¶ 70} Barbara Larick’s conclusory statement, standing alone, does not rise

to the level of clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated any client

confidences when compared to the testimony of Robroy Crow, who was in the best

position to know the facts. While the better practice would have been to decline to

further represent Russell Crow in the subsequent divorce, these facts simply do not

rise to the level of a Disciplinary Rule violation. And in fact, once Barbara Larick

did raise the issue when Traci Mackey moved for a change of custody, respondent

promptly withdrew. As he explained in his testimony:

“There was also a Motion filed by Traci’s counsel at that point, Barbara

Larick, to have me withdrawn as counsel on Russ’s behalf.

“I would have spoken with Russ and would have indicated to him, in

essence, I don’t want this to be a distraction from your issue. I don’t want my

representation to detract from your seeking to continue as residential parent and the

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SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

best way to do that at this point is for you to obtain other counsel. I don’t want this

to become an issue about me versus an issue about you being residential parent.”

{¶ 71} For all the aforementioned reasons, we find that relator has failed to

prove that respondent violated DR 4-101(B)(2) by clear and convincing evidence.

{¶ 72} Accordingly, because we find that relator has failed to prove the

alleged disciplinary violations by clear and convincing evidence, we decline to

accept the recommendation of the board and dismiss the charges against

respondent.

Cause dismissed.

MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment.

__________________

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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