Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision

[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 80 Ohio St.3d 591.]

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE

COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF

REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF

REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.

CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE

COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF

REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES.

OHIO EDISON COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION

ET AL., APPELLEES.

[Cite as Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. of Revision,

1998-Ohio-179.]

Taxation—Electric utilities—Real property valuation—Requirements of R.C.

5715.13 and 5715.19 substantially complied with in complaint to county

board of revision seeking decrease in valuation of property, when.

(Nos. 96-38, 96-39, 96-40, 96-41, 96-42 and 96-43—Submitted March 19,

1997—Decided January 7, 1998.)

APPEALS from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 95-K-849, 95-K-848, 95-K-843,

95-K-842, 95-K-841 and 95-K-840.

__________________

{¶ 1} On March 31, 1995, appellants, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company (case No. 96-38) and the Duquesne Light Company (case No. 96-39),

each filed a real property valuation complaint with the Lake County Board of

Revision (“BOR”) for tax year 1994. The complaints involved the real property

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

associated with a fossil-fuel-powered generating plant known as the Eastlake Plant,

which is located in the Willoughby-Eastlake School District.

{¶ 2} Also on March 31, 1995, appellants, the Toledo Edison Company

(case No. 96-40), the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (case No. 96-41),

the Pennsylvania Power Company (case No. 96-42), and the Ohio Edison Company

(case No. 96-43), each filed two real property valuation complaints with the BOR

for tax year 1994. One complaint from each company related to real property in

the North Perry Village taxing district, while the other complaint related to

adjoining real property in the Perry Township taxing district. All of these

complaints concerned real property associated with a nuclear-powered generating

plant known as the Perry Plant, which is located in the Perry Local School District.

{¶ 3} The local school districts filed countercomplaints against each

complaint. The Willoughby-Eastlake School Board sought no increase in the

county auditor’s value for the Eastlake Plant. However, the Perry Local School

District sought an increase in the tax value for all the real property of the Perry

Plant. All the foregoing cases have been consolidated for a hearing and decision

by this court.

{¶ 4} The issues raised by these cases relate to the manner in which the

appellants (collectively referred to as “CEI”) answered the questions set forth on

the form entitled “Complaint on the Assessment of Real Property” (the “complaint”

or “DTE Form 1”). Questions 7 and 8 on DTE Form 1 are the questions at issue in

this case.

{¶ 5} The preface to Question 7 on DTE Form 1 reads as follows:

“Statement of Value: The complainant must set forth the amount of increase or

decrease in taxable value that is sought.” Question 7(A) asks the complainant to

set forth its opinion of the true value (fair market value) of its real property.

Question 7(B) asks the complainant for its opinion of the taxable value of the real

property (thirty-five percent of true value). In response to both questions 7(A) and

2

January Term, 1998

7(B) CEI answered “unknown at present.” Question 7(D) on DTE Form 1 asks the

complainant to state the “increase or decrease in total taxable value sought.” In

response to Question 7(D), CEI answered “decrease of at least $50,000.”

{¶ 6} Question 8 on DTE Form 1 asks the complainant to state that “the

increase or decrease in taxable value requested is justified for the following

reasons.” CEI’s response to that question was “To be determined.”

{¶ 7} The school boards filed motions with the BOR seeking to have the

complaints dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The school boards alleged that CEI’s

responses on the DTE 1 form were insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the board

of revision.

{¶ 8} After both parties had filed briefs, but without a hearing, the BOR

dismissed the complaints for want of jurisdiction. CEI appealed the dismissals to

the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”). At the BTA, the BOR moved to dismiss the

appeals, stating that at the BOR, CEI had failed to state “the amount at which

Taxpayers believed the property should be valued” and “the reasons supporting

such a reduction.” The BTA affirmed the BOR’s dismissal of the complaints. The

BTA relied on this court’s decision in Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision

(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 67 O.O.2d 296, 313 N.E.2d 14, which held that the

information solicited on the DTE Form 1 is required by statute to be provided and

that a taxpayer’s failure to provide the information leaves the local board of revision

without jurisdiction to consider the complaint. CEI filed these appeals as of right.

{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court upon appeals as of right.

__________________

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P.

Brown, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Lake County Auditor and

Lake County Board of Revision.

George R. Hicks, Jr.; Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Robin G. Weaver, Bebe

A. Fairchild and Ted B. Clevenger, for appellants Toledo Edison Company,

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Pennsylvania Power Company,

Duquesne Light Company, and Ohio Edison Company.

Wayne E. Petkovic, for appellees Perry Local Schools Board of Education

and Willoughby Eastlake Board of Education.

__________________

PFEIFER, J.

{¶ 10} We find that the appellants in these cases substantially complied

with the requirements of R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19 in seeking a decrease in the

valuation of their property, and we therefore overrule the determinations of the

Board of Tax Appeals.

{¶ 11} The BTA based its decision against CEI on Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning

Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 236, 67 O.O.2d 296, 298, 313

N.E.2d 14, 16, wherein this court found that the DTE Form 1 in use at that time

was “clearly designed to elicit information required by R.C. 5715.19 and 5715.13,”

and that a complaint lacking certain information required by the form is insufficient

to confer jurisdiction on a county board of revision.

{¶ 12} In Stanjim, the taxpayer had left a large portion of the form, entitled

“Pertinent Facts,” completely blank. That portion of the form was designed to elicit

the information required by R.C. 5715.13, which reads:

“The county board of revision shall not decrease any valuation complained

of unless the party affected thereby or his agent makes and files with the board a

written application therefor, verified by oath, showing the facts upon which it is

claimed such decrease should be made.”

{¶ 13} Instead of providing information, the Stanjim taxpayers had

typewritten, “All other pertinent data substantiating this complaint of over

valuation will be presented at requested hearing.” The BOR in Stanjim dismissed

the complaints because they did not comply with the requirements for filing, and

that decision was affirmed by the BTA and this court.

4

January Term, 1998

{¶ 14} But forms have changed. A review of the current DTE Form 1

(Exhibit A [Exhibit A is not included in the INTERNET VERSION of this case])

shows that the primary difference between the current form and the complaint form

used in Stanjim is that the Pertinent Facts section contained in the Stanjim form

(Exhibit B [Exhibit B is not included in the INTERNET VERSION of this case]))

has been dropped. The Tax Commissioner apparently has determined that the

information contained in the Pertinent Facts section of the Stanjim form is no longer

required. One possible explanation for dropping the Pertinent Facts section is the

amendment in 1965 of R.C. 5713.03, which requires the auditors to adopt and use

a real property record. 131 Ohio Laws 1329. Although R.C. 5713.03 was amended

prior to the Stanjim case (decided in 1974) it was not until December 1973 that the

Tax Commissioner amended rule BTA-5-05 (now Ohio Adm.Code 5705-3-05) to

specify the type of data that was to be kept on the property record.

{¶ 15} The data kept on the property record card includes such information

as the size of the parcel, utilities, building details, the date and price of any transfers,

and rental income. Today, if the auditor complies with the property record card

requirements, most of the relevant data requested by the Pertinent Facts section of

the Stanjim form is now recorded on the property record card in his or her

possession.

{¶ 16} In addition, the second page of the current DTE Form 1 sets forth

that if the property owner is seeking a decrease for income-producing, commercial,

or industrial property, he must submit additional information “no later than at the

time of the hearing,” relating to physical data for the property, income data for

rental property, and other data such as zoning and a floor plan.

{¶ 17} Stanjim hinged on the taxpayer’s failure to fill out the “Pertinent

Facts” portion of the DTE Form 1. That section is missing from the current form,

and only a few questions remain that are similar to those on the Stanjim form.

Question 9, for instance, asks whether the property had been sold in the last three

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

years, and Question 10 asks for a copy of the listing agreement. Question 11 asks

for the dates and amounts of capital improvements over the prior three years. CEI

responded to each of those questions.

{¶ 18} The BTA found CEI to be in noncompliance with R.C. 5715.13 due

to its response to Question 8, which requires the complainant to state that “the

increase or decrease in taxable value requested is justified for the following

reasons.” CEI’s response to that question was “To be determined.”

{¶ 19} No specific, verifiable information is requested in Question 8. It

seeks not so much fact as opinion or theory. In this case, appellants fully answered

the factual questions that remained from the Stanjim form; much of the other

information sought by the Stanjim form is now contained in the property record

held by the auditor.

{¶ 20} We find that Question 8 of the DTE Form 1 used in this case does

not elicit information required by R.C. 5715.13. The Stanjim court characterized

the data requirements of R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19 as “minimal.” Stanjim, 38 Ohio

St.2d at 236, 67 O.O.2d at 299, 313 N.E.2d at 16. Question 8 does not seek data, it

seeks an argument. As such, it seeks much more than the minimal amount of

information required by the Stanjim form. We find that R.C. 5715.13 does not

require a response to Question 8 on the DTE Form 1 used in this case.

{¶ 21} The BTA also found that CEI did not meet jurisdictional

requirements of R.C. 5715.19(D), which requires a complaint to state “the amount

of overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or

incorrect classification or determination upon which the complaint is based.”

{¶ 22} Question 7 of the DTE Form 1 concerns valuation. Part (A) of that

question requests the complainant’s opinion of true value (fair market value) of the

property. CEI responded “unknown at present.” Question 7(B) requests the

complainant’s opinion of total taxable value, which is simply thirty-five percent of

true value. Having answered “unknown” as to part A, CEI left Question 7(B) blank.

6

January Term, 1998

Question 7(C) asks for the current total taxable value, and CEI responded with

figures ranging from $75,500 to $49,725,180. Question 7(D) asks for the “increase

or decrease in total taxable value sought.” In their complaint, CEI asked for a

“decrease of at least $50,000.”

{¶ 23} CEI’s responses to Question 7 were somewhat vague, but were not

a complete omission. For example, by demanding a decrease of at least $50,000 in

total taxable value, and given the property’s current taxable value (thirty-five

percent of true value) of $49,725,150 (parcel No. 05A-888-0-00-100-0), CEI opines

that the taxable value of the property is no more than $49,675,180. Since the

taxable value is thirty-five percent of true value, CEI’s opinion of the maximum

true value of the property therefore would be $141,929,086. Thus, save a few

simple mathematic computations, CEI’s opinion of true value was contained in its

complaint. The question remains, however, whether giving a “ceiling” figure is

enough to satisfy the requirements of R.C. 5715.19(D).

{¶ 24} There is no requirement that the value of the property, as determined

by the board of revision, must match the opinion of value set forth in the complaint.

In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1974), 40 Ohio St.2d

61, 69 O.O.2d 353, 320 N.E.2d 658, this court considered whether in an appeal to

a court of common pleas (in lieu of an appeal to the BTA) from a decision of the

board of revision, the court could find a value which was lower than that claimed

by the taxpayer in its complaint filed with the board of revision. The argument

raised in Jones & Laughlin was that by setting a value in the complaint filed with

the board of revision, the taxpayer made an admission that the real estate in question

had the value stated in the complaint. This court rejected that argument and stated

that in determining value the complaint “places neither minimum nor maximum

limitations on the court’s determination of value, and there are none save the

judicial requirement that the determination be supported by the evidence.” Id. at

63, 69 O.O.2d at 354, 320 N.E.2d at 660.

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 25} Thus, since a taxpayer is not bound to his opinion of value in the

complaint, a ceiling value fits within the requirements of R.C. 5715.19(D). Our

only remaining concern is whether a ceiling figure upsets the procedural efficiency

of the tax appeal process.

{¶ 26} In Akron Std. Div. v. Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10, 11 OBR 9,

462 N.E.2d 419, this court enunciated a “core of procedural efficiency” standard

regarding substantial compliance with a tax statute as it related to the requirements

of a reassessment petition. In Akron Standard, this court held that lack of a

statutorily mandated verified signature was not a basis for dismissing a

reassessment petition:

“The lack of a verified signature in a reassessment petition does not prevent

the attachment of jurisdiction by an otherwise satisfactory filing, since substantial

compliance with the requirements of the statute has taken place. The verification

requirement is to be distinguished from the requirement that a notice of appeal be

filed within thirty days of assessment, and also from the requirement that the order

of the commissioner be included in the notice of appeal. The latter two

requirements are essential in that they run to the core of procedural efficiency.”

Akron Standard, 11 Ohio St.3d at 12, 11 OBR at 10, 462 N.E.2d at 420.

{¶ 27} In Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d

142, 572 N.E.2d 56, a property valuation case, this court explained the Akron

Standard decision:

“If the omitted requirement runs to the core of procedural efficiency, then

the requirement is essential, the omission is not substantial compliance with the

statute, and the appeal is to be dismissed.” Renner, 59 Ohio St.3d at 144, 572

N.E.2d at 57.

{¶ 28} Where an insufficient opinion of valuation might adversely affect

procedural efficiency is in regard to the operation of R.C. 5715.19(B), the section

which sets forth most of the procedural elements regarding a protest of valuation.

8

January Term, 1998

Among other things, R.C. 5715.19(B) requires that notice be made to certain other

interested parties should the amount of overvaluation exceed $17,500. The statute

reads:

“(B) Within thirty days after the last date such complaints may be filed, the

auditor shall give notice of each complaint in which the stated amount of

overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or

incorrect determination is at least seventeen thousand five hundred dollars to each

property owner whose property is the subject of the complaint, if the complaint was

not filed by such owner, and to each board of education whose school district may

be affected by the complaint. Within thirty days after receiving such notice, a board

of education or a property owner may file a complaint in support of or objecting to

the amount of alleged overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation,

illegal valuation, or incorrect determination stated in a previously filed complaint

or objecting to the current valuation. Upon the filing of a complaint under this

division, the board of education or the property owner shall be made a party to the

action.”

{¶ 29} R.C. 5715.19(B) sets the timetable for the prosecution of the case. It

also sets the stage for the battle at the heart of most valuation cases—the school

board’s determination that the property is not overvalued. Within thirty days after

the last possible filing date, the auditor informs the school board of a complainant’s

claim of overvaluation, if the claimed overvaluation is at least $17,500. This is a

key point for the orderly administration of an overvaluation claim. The statute, in

requiring notice to school boards, identifies them as an integral part of the

determination of a claim. Anything that would affect that notice being given,

therefore, goes to the core of procedural efficiency. Thus, certainly, any response

to claimed valuation which does not make clear whether notice to the school board

is necessary is necessarily insufficient. It is the triggering of that notice that goes

9

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

to the very core of procedural efficiency. The case cannot go forward if that

information is insufficient.

{¶ 30} In this case, however, the information given was sufficient to trigger

notice to the school board. CEI claimed overvaluation of “at least $50,000,” well

over the amount necessary for notice to be given. The local school board responded

within the statutorily mandated thirty days.

{¶ 31} To comply with the core of procedural efficiency does not require

that a complainant prove his case within the complaint. Indeed, R.C. 5715.19(G)

requires that the complainant must “provide to the board of revision all information

or evidence within his knowledge or possession that affects the real property that is

the subject of his complaint.” The statute does not require that all that evidence be

contained within the complaint itself.

{¶ 32} The determination of a claim is to be made in an efficient manner.

The statute is clear on the earmarks of that efficiency—a filing by March 31, a

statement of whether the claimed valuation is at least $17,500, notice to school

boards if the amount is at least $17,500, a thirty-day response time by the objecting

party, and a ninety-day time limit to determine the claim. This court has also

determined that the questions on the Stanjim form also go to the core of procedural

efficiency; this court said that the form “is meant to expedite orderly administrative

process.” Stanjim, 38 Ohio St.2d at 236, 67 O.O.2d at 298, 313 N.E.2d at 16. As

stated above, CEI responded satisfactorily to the questions remaining from that

form.

{¶ 33} We find that any omissions CEI made on its DTE Form 1 complaint

did not go to the core of procedural efficiency and that its responses met the

requirements of R.C. 5715.13 and 5715.19. We accordingly reverse the decisions

of the BTA.

Decisions reversed.

DOUGLAS, DICKINSON and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.

10

January Term, 1998

MOYER, C.J., and F.E. SWEENEY, J., dissent.

RESNICK, J., not participating.

CLAIR E. DICKINSON, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for COOK, J.

__________________

Moyer, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent. These causes should be resolved in accordance

with the well-established precedent of Stanjim Co. v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Revision

(1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 233, 67 O.O.3d 296, 313 N.E.2d 14, because Stanjim is

consistent with controlling statutes, and because the facts underlying these causes are

not substantively distinguishable from those in Stanjim.

{¶ 35} R.C. 5715.19(D) provides: “Each complaint shall state the amount of

overvaluation, undervaluation, discriminatory valuation, illegal valuation, or incorrect

classification or determination upon which the complaint is based.” (Emphasis

added.)

{¶ 36} R.C. 5715.13 provides: “The county board of revision shall not

decrease any valuation complained of unless the party affected thereby or his agent

makes and files with the board a written application therefor, verified by oath,

showing the facts upon which it is claimed such decrease should be made.” (Emphasis

added.)

{¶ 37} In Stanjim, we determined that “BTA Form 1 represents a lawful

interpretation of the minimal, data requirements of R.C. 5715.19 and 5715.13” and

held that a complaint that is not responsive to the questions posed on the form fails to

establish jurisdiction in a board of revision. Id., 38 Ohio St.2d at 236, 67 O.O.2d at

299, 313 N.E.2d at 16. See, also, Cardinal Fed. S. & L. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd.

of Revision (1975), 44 Ohio St.2d 13, 73 O.O.2d 83, 336 N.E.2d 433. More recently,

in Middleton v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 226, 227, 658

N.E.2d 267, 268, we reaffirmed that “[c]omplainants must fully comply with R.C.

11

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

5715.19 and 5715.13 before a county board of revision may act on their claims.”

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 38} It is true that former BTA Form 1, referred to in Stanjim, has been

replaced by DTE Form 1. However, the differences between the two forms do not

justify disregard of the substantive principles upon which the holding of Stanjim was

based.

{¶ 39} DTE Form 1 indeed omits the “Pertinent Facts” section contained in

the Stanjim form, and some of the information previously requested in BTA Form 1

is now obtainable from real property records of the county auditor. Nevertheless,

whether portions of the information previously requested in BTA Form 1 are

obtainable elsewhere or not, the requirements of R.C. 5715.13 remain. That statute

clearly requires a verified application showing facts which demonstrate that a decrease

in property assessment is justified.

{¶ 40} The statements contained in the complaints in these cases, which are

equivalent to mere expression of opinion that the assessed value is at least $50,000

too high, simply do not satisfy the statutory requirement of R.C. 5715.13 of a written

application “verified by oath, showing the facts upon which it is claimed such decrease

should be made.”

{¶ 41} The majority acknowledges that the complainants’ responses to

Questions 7 and 8 constitute unsupported expressions of mere opinion. However,

rather than properly concluding that the complainants thereby failed to comply with

the statutory mandate, the majority instead concludes that Question 8 of DTE Form 1

need not be answered at all, because it solicits the expression of opinion. We should

construe DTE Form 1 in a manner consistent with R.C. 5715.13, rather than contrary

to it. Moreover, even assuming that the language of the form might have been better

formulated, a lack of precision in its language certainly cannot override the mandate

established by statute.

12

January Term, 1998

{¶ 42} Question 7 on DTE Form 1 requires the complainant to set forth his or

her opinion of the fair market value of the property. In the case at bar the

complainants’ response was “unknown at present.” Because the complainants

declared and swore that the form had been filled out in a “correct and complete”

manner, we must accept that, at the time the complaints were filed, the complainants

had no opinion as to the value of the subject property. Similarly, Question 8 on DTE

Form 1 asks the complainant to explain the reasons why an increase or decrease in

taxable value was justified. In responding “[t]o be determined,” the complainants

indicated that they could, at that time, provide no reasons why the assessed property

value should be changed. The only factual response made to Question 7, beyond the

current assessed total taxable value already known or available to the board of

revision, was that the complainants sought a “decrease of at least $50,000” in that

current assessed value.

{¶ 43} Because the amount of tax liability is directly correlated to the value of

property, the complainants’ responses to the questions on the form did little more than

express the opinion that the current tax bills were too high and that the appropriate

school boards should be notified of the complaints. These responses cannot be

deemed complete, and do not constitute “full compliance” with DTE Form 1, as

required by Middleton and Stanjim.

{¶ 44} Complainants acknowledge that they had notice of the challenged tax

valuation as early as January 1995. Nevertheless, their complaints challenging that

valuation were all signed on March 31, 1995—the day of the expiration of the statute

of limitations. R.C. 5715.19(A). By giving the answers “unknown at present” and

“To be determined,” the taxpayers implied that the information solicited by the form

would be provided at some unknown time in the future. In effect, the complainants

thereby notified the board of revision that they intended to complete the complaints

after the statutory filing deadline. If a taxpayer is not required to give responsive

answers to the questions on DTE Form 1 at the time of filing, but is permitted to

13

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

complete the form after the expiration of the statute of limitations, then he or she is

able in effect to circumvent the filing deadline. There simply is no statutory basis for

filing, completing or amending a complaint in order to cure a jurisdictional defect after

the filing deadline. The law that produces the result here, if applied to other statutory

deadlines, would change a substantial amount of settled law of this state that is

contrary to the principle established by the majority.

{¶ 45} I cannot accept the majority’s contention that expression by a

complainant of a ceiling of maximum true value satisfies the applicable requirements.

Whether a taxpayer is bound by the opinion of value expressed in his complaint

thereafter is irrelevant to the determination of whether the taxpayer fully complied

with all requirements for perfecting the appeal. The Tax Commissioner is required

by R.C. 5715.29 and 5715.30 to establish forms to be used to challenge real property

valuations, and complainants are required by the precedent established in Stanjim to

use them. These complainants simply did not observe the express directions

preceding Question 7 that “[t]he complainant must set forth the amount of increase or

decrease in taxable value that is sought.” The statutes no more authorize complainants

to pick and choose portions of the form to answer than they authorize complainants to

pick the most convenient timing to provide required information.

{¶ 46} The majority suggests that the complainants’ failure to respond to

Question 7 should not be deemed jurisdictional in that the information sought to be

elicited does not “go to the core of procedural efficiency,” citing Akron Std. Div. v.

Lindley (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 10, 11 OBR 9, 462 N.E.2d 419. Again I disagree.

Questions 7 and 8 ask the complainant to set forth the amount of overvaluation and

the reasons why the assessed value is an overvaluation.

{¶ 47} When those reasons are omitted from the complaint the board of

revision is provided with virtually no information upon which it may process the

complaint. It gives the board and interested persons no notice of a complainant’s

rationale for complaining. If, on the contrary, the information is contained on the

14

January Term, 1998

complaint, a procedural course is set for the board of revision to follow. If the amount

of the overvaluation is at least $17,500 of taxable value, the board knows to give the

appropriate school board notice. The amount of the desired decrease will also provide

information to the boards of revision to use in determining whether to call experts or

other witnesses. R.C. 5715.10.

{¶ 48} Moreover, the majority fails to consider the negative effect such

abbreviated responses may have on school boards or other property owners in

determining whether to oppose reduction of assessed property values, in filing

counter-complaints, and procuring evidence to be presented in opposition to reduction

in valuation at the board of revision hearing. See R.C. 5715.19(B). I simply do not

understand why this court would place school boards and property owners in that

situation.

{¶ 49} If the answers provided by these complainants are deemed sufficient,

then the complaint form could be further simplified by requiring a complainant to

merely state that it wants a decrease in an amount which does or does not exceed

$17,500. Such a form would ignore both the relevant statutes and the procedural needs

of the board of revision and possible opponents.

{¶ 50} The board of revision dismissed the complaints for want of jurisdiction.

On appeal the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed the board of revision’s dismissal of the

complaints pursuant to Stanjim. The majority has disregarded our statutory mandate

to affirm decisions if “the decision of the board appealed from is reasonable and

lawful.” R.C. 5717.04. Because the decisions of the administrative boards, which

relied on long-standing precedent, were both reasonable and lawful, they should be

affirmed.

F.E. SWEENEY, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

__________________

APPENDIX

15

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

[The Appendix, consisting of Exhibits A and B, has not been included

in the Internet version of this case.]

16