The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 81 Ohio St.3d 450.]
THE STATE EX REL. HUNTER, JUDGE, APPELLANT, v. SUMMIT COUNTY HUMAN
RESOURCE COMMISSION, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State ex rel. Hunter v. Summit Cty. Human Resource Comm.,
1998-Ohio-614.]
Prohibition to prevent Summit County Human Resource Commission from
proceeding with unclassified juvenile court employees’ appeal of their job
terminations—Writ granted when commission lacks jurisdiction over
employees’ appeal.
(No. 97-1002—Submitted March 3, 1998—Decided April 22, 1998.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 18397.
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{¶ 1} In January 1997, appellant, Judith L. Hunter, commenced her term as
judge of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Judge
Hunter discharged six juvenile court employees. The employees appealed their job
terminations to appellee, Summit County Human Resource Commission
(“commission”).
{¶ 2} Under Section 6.05, Article VI of the Summit County Charter, the
commission has the responsibility for the “resolution or disposition of all personnel
matters, with authority to appoint hearing officers to hear all employee appeals
previously under the jurisdiction of the State Personnel Board of Review.” The
commission administers a county employee classification system that does not
cover “those [county] employees in positions designated as unclassified by general
law.” Section 6.04, Article VI, Summit County Charter. The Summit County
Human Resource Commission Rules provide that no classified employee may be
terminated except for just cause or as otherwise provided by the rules (Section
19.01), and that unclassified employees include “[a]ny position designated as
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unclassified, or at-will, under any federal or state statute, other than the now
inapplicable RC [Chapter] 124 [Section 9.03(G)].”
{¶ 3} The commission scheduled the discharged juvenile court employees’
appeal for a hearing and referred to these employees as classified employees. In
March 1997, Judge Hunter filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for Summit
County for a writ of prohibition to prevent the commission from exercising
jurisdiction over the appeal. The court of appeals granted the commission’s Civ.R.
12(B)(6) motion and dismissed Judge Hunter’s complaint.
{¶ 4} This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.
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Maureen O’ Connor, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, William E.
Schultz and Christopher C. Esker, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P., David J. Millstone and Loren L.
Braverman, for appellee.
__________________
Per Curiam.
{¶ 5} Judge Hunter asserts in her sole proposition of law that the court of
appeals erred by dismissing her prohibition action because the commission patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the discharged employees’ appeal. In
order to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, it must appear beyond doubt that relator can prove no set of facts
warranting relief, after all factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true
and all reasonable inferences are made in relator’s favor. State ex rel. Findlay
Publishing Co. v. Schroeder (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 669 N.E.2d 835, 837.
{¶ 6} Judge Hunter seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the commission
from proceeding with the juvenile court employees’ appeal. Judge Hunter would
be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition if she established (1) that the
commission is about to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) that the
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January Term, 1998
exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that the denial of the writ
will result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary
course of law. Whitehall ex rel. Wolfe v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. (1995), 74 Ohio
St.3d 120, 121, 656 N.E.2d 684, 686. Judge Hunter alleged and the commission
conceded that it is about to exercise quasi-judicial power in hearing the juvenile
court employees’ appeal.
{¶ 7} Regarding the remaining requirements for a writ of prohibition, in
general, absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a tribunal having
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
challenging the tribunal’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. See State
ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court
of Common Pleas (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d 929, 931. If,
however, the tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the
matter, prohibition will lie to prevent the unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction.
State ex rel. Litty v. Leskovyansky (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 97, 98, 671 N.E.2d 236,
238.
{¶ 8} The court of appeals determined that Judge Hunter could not establish
the second and third requirements for a writ of prohibition because the commission
had not yet determined whether it had jurisdiction over the juvenile court
employees’ appeal. The court of appeals relied on State ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd.
of Commrs. v. State Personnel Bd. of Review (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 73, 74, 537
N.E.2d 212, 214, where we held:
“Here, the county alleged that the SPBR was about to exercise unlawful
quasi-judicial authority and that this would cause the county irreparable harm.
However, because the SPBR may ultimately find that it has no jurisdiction, the
county cannot show that it will be injured if a writ of prohibition is denied. Indeed,
if the SPBR finds jurisdiction to be absent and dismisses the pertinent cases, the
county would not want even to consider an appeal. In this sense, the county’s
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complaint was ‘premature,’ and we find that the court of appeals properly dismissed
it on this basis.
“Our conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide whether the county will
have no adequate remedy at law if the SPBR decides the question of jurisdiction
adversely to it. The county asks us to assume how the SPBR will resolve the issue.
However, in State, ex rel. B.F. Goodrich, v. Griffin (1979), 59 Ohio St.2d 59, 13
O.O.3d 55, 391 N.E.2d 1018, we refused to make a similar assumption prior to a
common pleas court’s ruling on facts relating to its jurisdiction. We find Griffin
sufficient authority for us to refuse to make the assumption needed to reach the
county’s claim here.” See, also, State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Oryshkewych (1992),
65 Ohio St.3d 462, 463, 605 N.E.2d 30, 31; State ex rel. Independence Local School
Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 134, 136, 580
N.E.2d 430, 432.
{¶ 9} Nevertheless, none of the foregoing cases involved a patent and
unambiguous lack of jurisdiction. If there is a patent and unambiguous lack of
jurisdiction, Judge Hunter’s complaint is not premature. In other words, when a
tribunal patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to consider a matter, a writ
of prohibition will issue to prevent assumption of jurisdiction regardless of whether
the tribunal has ruled on the question of its jurisdiction. State ex rel. Barclays Bank
PLC v. Hamilton Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 536, 541,
660 N.E.2d 458, 462; State ex rel. Rice v. McGrath (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 71,
577 N.E.2d 1100, 1101; State ex rel. Albright v. Delaware Cty. Court of Common
Pleas (1991), 60 Ohio St.3d 40, 41, 572 N.E.2d 1387, 1388; Ohio Dept. of Adm.
Serv., Office of Collective Bargaining v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 54 Ohio
St.3d 48, 562 N.E.2d 125, syllabus.
{¶ 10} Therefore, the dispositive issue is whether the commission patently
and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the discharged employees’ appeal. The
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January Term, 1998
commission concedes on appeal that if the discharged employees are unclassified
or at will, it lacks jurisdiction over their appeal:
“Section 6.04, Article VI, of the Charter and Commission Rule 19 confer
jurisdiction on the Commission only over matters of discharge over employees who
are in the classified civil service. Commission Rule 9.03(G) defines the
unclassified service to include ‘any position designated as unclassified, or at-will,
under any federal or state statute, other than the now inapplicable RC [Chapter]
124.’ ”
{¶ 11} R.C. 2301.03(I)(2) provides that the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas Juvenile Division Judge “shall be, and have the powers and
jurisdiction of, the juvenile judge as provided in Chapter 2151. of the Revised
Code” and “shall have charge of the employment, assignment, and supervision of
the personnel of the juvenile division.” R.C. 2151.13 provides that juvenile court
judges “may appoint such bailiffs, probation officers, and other employees as are
necessary” and that “[s]uch employees shall serve during the pleasure of the judge.”
{¶ 12} Under R.C. 2301.03(I)(2) and 2151.13, juvenile court employees are
at-will employees who are unclassified employees under the commission’s own
rules. An unclassified employee is appointed at the discretion of the appointing
authority and serves at the pleasure of such authority. See Lee v. Cuyahoga Cty.
Court of Common Pleas (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 620, 622-623, 602 N.E.2d 761,
763 (Court employees who serve at pleasure of court are unclassified employees
who have no vested property interest in continued employment.); Peters v. Jackson
(1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 302, 311, 653 N.E.2d 1238, 1244, quoting Schack v.
Geneva Civ. Serv. Comm. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 689, 694, 621 N.E.2d 788, 791
(Unclassified employees serve at the pleasure of the appointing power and are not
entitled to civil service protection.).
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, after construing the allegations of Judge
Hunter’s complaint most strongly in her favor, it is not beyond doubt that Hunter
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can prove no set of facts entitling her to the requested extraordinary relief in
prohibition. The court of appeals thus erred in concluding otherwise and granting
the commission’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss.
{¶ 14} Normally, reversal of a court of appeals’ erroneous dismissal of a
complaint requires a remand for further proceedings. See State ex rel. Rogers v.
Brown (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 408, 410-411, 686 N.E.2d 1126, 1128. If the parties,
however, are in agreement about the pertinent facts, we can exercise our plenary
authority in extraordinary actions and address the merits. State ex rel. Kaylor v.
Bruening (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 142, 147, 684 N.E.2d 1228, 1233. Here, based on
the commission’s admission that it lacks jurisdiction over the juvenile court
employees’ appeal if they are unclassified employees and R.C. 2301.03(I)(2) and
2151.13 and the commission’s own rules providing that they are unclassified
employees, the commission patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the
employees’ appeal. Prohibition should therefore issue despite the commission’s
failure yet to rule on this jurisdictional issue. State ex rel. Barclays Bank PLC and
Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv., Office of Collective Bargaining.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and
issue a writ of prohibition preventing the commission from proceeding with the
juvenile court employees’ appeal.1
Judgment reversed
and writ granted.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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1. By so holding, we need not consider Judge Hunter’s remaining claimed jurisdictional issues, i.e.,
the lack of a county council ordinance establishing the commission’s policies, separation of powers,
etc.
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