The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 78 Ohio St.3d 309.]
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. HOLZER.
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Holzer, 1997-Ohio-214.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—One-year suspension—Engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(No. 96-1965--Submitted January 21, 1997--Decided April 30, 1997.)
On Certified Report of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline
of the Supreme Court, No. 95-77.
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{¶ 1} On October 10, 1995, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a
complaint charging respondent, Richard Jean Holzer of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0018814, with violation of three Disciplinary Rules while
representing a client, the city of Englewood. At the time, respondent was a
shareholder at the firm of Pickrel, Schaefer & Ebeling (“firm”). On May 2, 1996,
a hearing was held before a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances
and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). Based on testimony at the hearing,
stipulations filed by the parties, and numerous letters from his clients, friends and
members of the bar attesting to respondent’s good character, ability, and integrity,
the panel found the following facts.
{¶ 2} From October 24, 1992 through February 1, 1995, when the city of
Englewood (“city”) was a client of the firm, another attorney at the firm was
contacted by Eric. A. Smith, the Englewood City Manager, to represent him in a
domestic relations matter. The other attorney was designated in the firm’s
accounting system as the “responsible attorney” for Smith, and respondent was
designated as the “requesting attorney,” “originating attorney,” and “billing
attorney.” During the above period, with Smith’s knowledge, respondent
transferred a portion of the time billed by several attorneys of the firm from the
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
“Eric Smith-Domestic Relations Matter” account to the “City of Englewood-
General Matters” account, making changes that altered the nature of the legal
services performed by the firm. As a result, the city was billed for a total of 60.05
hours of personal legal services performed on Smith’s behalf by lawyers of the firm.
Respondent testified that because the city was a very large client of the firm and
Smith constantly teased him about diverting the city’s work to a competing firm,
he felt obligated to charge Smith’s fees to the city.
{¶ 3} After the alterations were discovered, the firm issued a corrected
invoice to Smith, reimbursed the city a total of $6,142.50, and terminated
respondent as a shareholder. Respondent was charged with theft, and on November
8, 1995 began a “Pre-Trial Diversion Program” developed for those who have
committed first-time nonviolent felony offenses. Upon successful completion of
the program, the criminal case against respondent is to be dismissed with prejudice.
{¶ 4} The panel concluded that respondent’s actions violated DR 1-
102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation). Taking into account respondent’s reputation and the isolated
nature of the incident, the panel recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for two years with the entire suspension stayed, and that he be
placed on probation for two years under the supervision of a monitoring attorney.
While on probation respondent was to perform 1,000 hours of work for
governmental or charitable entities. The board adopted the findings, conclusions,
and recommendation of the panel.
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Geoffrey Stern, Disciplinary Counsel, Lori J. Brown and Alvin E. Matthews,
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
Dwight D. Brannon, for respondent.
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Per Curiam.
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January Term, 1997
{¶ 5} We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board, but believe that
a more severe sanction is warranted. Unlike the fee padding committed in Toledo
Bar Assn. v. Batt (1997), _____Ohio St. 3d ______, _____N.E.2d _____, the work
for which the city was charged in this case was actually performed. The work
performed, however, was for the personal account of the city manager and, despite
this, was knowingly charged to the city. Taking into account respondent’s
reputation and the isolated nature of the incident, we nonetheless find that a year’s
actual suspension is appropriate in this case.
{¶ 6} Respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year
from the date of entry of this order. Costs taxed to the respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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