The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 78 Ohio St.3d 373.]
MEDINA COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION V. GRIESELHUBER.
[Cite as Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Grieselhuber, 1997-Ohio-58.]
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Public reprimand—Violating Disciplinary Rules
relating to attorney advertising.
(No. 96-2783—Submitted February 19, 1997—Decided May 14, 1997.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 95-52.
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{¶ 1} On June 5, 1995, relator, Medina County Bar Association, filed a
complaint against respondent, Pierre A. Grieselhuber of Strongsville, Ohio,
Attorney Registration No. 0005648, charging that respondent placed
advertisements in the 1994-1995 Medina/Brunswick GTE Yellow Pages and the
1995-1996 Medina County Yellow Pages that violated the Disciplinary Rules
relating to attorney advertising. Respondent filed an answer denying any violations
and further asserted that the advertising was within his constitutional rights and
within the guidelines set down by the United States Supreme Court.
{¶ 2} As a result of a hearing on the complaint and answer, a panel of the
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court
(“board”) on November 25, 1996, found that advertisements THAT respondent
placed in the above-mentioned publications contained the heading “Body Injury
Legal Centers” as a trade name, and concluded that such a designation violated DR
2-102(B) (a lawyer in private practice shall not practice under a trade name). The
panel also found that respondent’s trade name suggested that he had multiple legal
centers. In substance, however, in addition to his office in Strongsville, respondent
did some work in Huron, Ohio, at the offices of a friend, knew two or three lawyers
in Port Clinton, Ohio, with whom he considered working, maintained a boat and a
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condominium in Port Clinton, and was considering working with former classmates
in Florida.
{¶ 3} The panel found that the words, “Pierre A. Grieselhuber and
Affiliates,” which appeared below the trade name in the advertisements, suggested
that respondent had affiliates. In fact, he was a sole practitioner and did not have
“affiliates,” although at one time attorneys had shared space with him. The panel
also found that the words in the advertisements, “Practice limited to representing
the Injured across the Country and around the World,” were misleading because
respondent did some work in other areas of the law. While his national experience
consisted in having done some business in twenty-three other states, his
international experience was related to having some clients from foreign countries
and having been admitted pro hac vice in the British Virgin Islands. The panel
concluded that these misleading representations violated DR 2-101(A)(1) (a lawyer
shall not use any form of public communication that contains false, fraudulent,
misleading, or deceptive statements).
{¶ 4} The panel additionally found that the words “WE GET PAID FROM OUR
RECOVERY OF MONEY DAMAGES FOR YOU” failed to inform prospective clients about
the costs and expenses of litigation and concluded that respondent had violated DR
2-101(E)(1)(c) (contingent fees may be communicated provided that the statement
discloses that litigant could be liable for the payment of court costs and expenses).
The panel also found that the words “We Do It Well,” which appeared in the 1994-
1995 advertisement, were not verifiable and concluded that their use constituted a
violation of DR 2-101(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not use any for of public
communication that contains a claim that is not verifiable). The panel found that
respondent’s violations were the result of error, not malice, and that no one had
been misled or otherwise harmed by the advertisements. Hence the panel
recommended that respondent receive a public reprimand. The board agreed with
the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel.
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January Term, 1997
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Patricia A. Walker and Stephen J. Brown, for relator.
Pierre Grieselhuber, pro se.
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Per Curiam.
{¶ 5} We recognize that advertising assists the public in the selection of an
attorney. EC 2-9. However, our Ethical Considerations, which represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive warn that
“[m]ethods of advertising that are false, misleading or deceptive should be and are
prohibited.” EC 2-9. To enable attorneys to meet these ethical objectives, our
Disciplinary Rules provide specific guidelines for the content of public
communications by attorneys. Underlying these guidelines is the standard of
truthfulness.
{¶ 6} We accept the findings of the board and agree with its conclusions
that the advertisements of respondent contain unverifiable as well as misleading
statements. We further agree with the board that the wording in respondent’s
advertisements violates specific Disciplinary Rules.
{¶ 7} Respondent’s claim that his advertisements are within the guidelines
regarding commercial speech by professionals set out by the United States Supreme
Court is inaccurate. For example, DR 2-102(B) proscribes the practice of law under
a trade name, a restriction found to be valid with respect to professional
optometrists in Friedman v. Rogers (1979), 440 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 887, 59 L.Ed. 2d
100. DR 2-101(E)(1)(c) requires that infomation regarding contingent fees be
accompanied by a statement that the litigant might be liable for costs and expenses.
The Supreme Court found such a restriction to be valid in Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel (1985), 471 U.S. 626, 652-653, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2282-2283,
85 L.Ed.2d 652, 673. In short, our Disciplinary Rules do not infringe on
respondent’s right of commercial speech.
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{¶ 8} We further agree with the recommendation of the board. Respondent
is hereby publicly reprimanded. Costs taxed to respondent.
Judgment accordingly.
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur.
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