State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

[This decision has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 72 Ohio St.3d 106.]

THE STATE EX REL. EDWARDS, APPELLANT, v. TOLEDO CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

BOARD OF EDUCATION ET AL., APPELLEES.

[Cite as State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.,

1995-Ohio-251.]

Mandamus to compel school district board of education to comply with R.C.

Chapter 3319, reinstate relator as an elementary school teacher, and

award damages, including back pay—Court of appeals abuses its discretion

by summarily dismissing mandamus claim, when.

(No. 94-2104—Submitted February 21, 1995—Decided April 26, 1995.)

Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-94-206.

__________________

{¶ 1} On July 20, 1994, appellant, Edward Edwards III, filed a complaint in

mandamus and declaratory judgment in the Court of Appeals for Lucas County.

According to the complaint, Edwards was employed as an elementary school

teacher in the Toledo City School District under a limited teaching contract for the

1993-1994 school year. On January 21, 1994, Edwards was discharged because of

unsatisfactory teaching evaluations. Edwards alleged in his complaint that

appellees, Toledo City School District Board of Education, Toledo Public Schools

Superintendent Crystal Ellis, and Toledo Public Schools Treasurer David Nissen,

violated various provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319. Edwards further alleged that the

board refused to issue a limited contract and left him "without a plain and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law." Edwards requested (1) a writ of mandamus

compelling appellees to comply with R.C. Chapter 3319, reinstate him, and award

damages, including back pay and (2) a declaratory judgment as to the rights of

parties under the Revised Code.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

{¶ 2} On August 17, 1994, appellees filed an answer which asserted that a

collective bargaining agreement and a supplemental agreement between the board

and the teachers' union superseded certain provisions of R.C. Chapter 3319.

Appellees further contended that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction over

Edwards's declaratory judgment claim, that the complaint failed to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, and that Edwards possessed an adequate remedy

at law via a declaratory judgment action in the appropriate forum.

{¶ 3} On the same date that appellees filed their answer, the court of appeals

sua sponte dismissed Edwards's complaint on the basis that R.C. 3319.16 provided

him with an administrative appeal procedure to address the issues raised in his

complaint.

{¶ 4} The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

__________________

Dwight A. Washington Co., L.P.A., and Dwight A. Washington, for appellant.

Spengler Nathanson, Frank T. Pizza, Theodore M. Rowen and Lisa E. Pizza,

for appellees.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 5} Edwards asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals

abused its discretion in sua sponte denying the writ on the basis that R.C. 3319.16

provided him an adequate remedy at law where the pertinent collective bargaining

agreement was not before the court.

{¶ 6} This court reviews the summary dismissal of a complaint upon a

finding of an adequate remedy at law by determining if the court of appeals abused

its discretion. State ex rel. Hipp v. N. Canton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 102, 103, 637

N.E.2d 317, 318, citing State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d

141, 40 O.O.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631, paragraph ten of the syllabus. The term

"abuse of discretion" connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies

2

January Term, 1995

that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel.

Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 223,

631 N.E.2d 150, 155.

{¶ 7} The court of appeals entered its judgment of dismissal based only on

Edwards's complaint, without any Civ.R. 12(B) motion before it. Although

appellees filed an answer on the same day the court of appeals entered judgment,

the court considered only the complaint in its decision1.

{¶ 8} The Rules of Civil Procedure neither expressly permit nor forbid

courts to sua sponte dismiss complaints. Generally, a court may dismiss a

complaint on its own motion pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, only after the parties are given notice of the

court's intention to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. Mayrides v. Franklin

Cty. Prosecutor's Office (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 381, 383-384, 594 N.E.2d 48, 50;

Prosen v. Dimora (1992), 79 Ohio App.3d 120, 124, 606 N.E.2d 1050, 1052; Besser

v. Griffey (1993), 88 Ohio App.3d 379, 623 N.E.2d 1326; Perez v. Ortiz (C.A.2,

1988), 849 F.2d 793, 797-798; Morrison v. Tomano (C.A.6, 1985), 755 F.2d 515,

516-517. However, some courts have recognized an exception to the general rule,

allowing sua sponte dismissal without notice where the complaint is frivolous or

the claimant obviously cannot possibly prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.

See Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm. (C.A.D.C.1990), 916 F.2d 725, and English

v. Cowell (C.A.7, 1993), 10 F.3d 434, analyzing the similarly worded Fed.R.Civ.P.

1. Even assuming, arguendo, that the answer was before the court of appeals, Civ.R. 12(D) would

still have required appellees to file an application in the form of a Civ.R. 12(B) motion in order to

request a pretrial adjudication on the Civ.R. 12(B) issues included in their answer. McGlone v.

Grimshaw (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 279, 286-287, 620 N.E.2d 935, 939-940 (Stephenson, J.,

concurring); see, also, 4 Harper, Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (1987) 332, Section 152.07 (A

Civ.R. 12[D] "'application' is a motion; hence a motion must be served and filed in order to call to

the court's attention the defenses which should be disposed of preliminarily. And therein lies the

practical problem of raising a 'motion' defense by responsive pleading." [Footnote omitted.]); 1

Klein, Browne & Murtaugh, Baldwin's Ohio Civil Practice (1988) 47, Section T 15.01. Since

appellees never filed a motion requesting judgment, it is manifest that the court of appeals dismissed

the complaint on its own motion.

3

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12. For the reasons that follow, Edwards's mandamus claim is not frivolous, nor

would reversal necessarily be futile.

{¶ 9} It is evident that the court of appeals dismissed Edwards's complaint

based upon Civ.R. 12(B)(6), i.e., it held that Edwards possessed an adequate legal

remedy via R.C. 3319.16, precluded mandamus relief. In determining whether a

complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, all factual allegations of

the complaint must be presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be

made in favor of the nonmoving party. Perez v. Cleveland (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d

397, 399, 613 N.E.2d 199, 200. Additionally, in order to dismiss a complaint under

Civ.R. 12(B)(6), it must appear beyond doubt that relator can prove no set of facts

warranting relief. State ex rel. Seikbert v. Wilkinson (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 489,

490, 633 N.E.2d 1128, 1129, citing O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union,

Inc. (1975), 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 71 O.O.2d 223, 327 N.E.2d 753, syllabus.

{¶ 10} We have previously noted that Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions attack the

sufficiency of the complaint and may not be used to summarily review the merits

of a cause of action in mandamus. State ex rel. Horwitz v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 323, 325, 603 N.E.2d 1005,

1007; Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger (1989),

42 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 537 N.E.2d 1292, 1293. We have further stated that a

claim that a relator possesses an adequate legal remedy precluding a writ of

mandamus seeks an adjudication on the merits, which is normally improper in a

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) determination. State ex rel. Birdsall v. Stephenson (1994), 68 Ohio

St.3d 353, 355, 626 N.E.2d 946, 949. Nevertheless, in other cases, we have

affirmed dismissals pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) based upon the existence of an

adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Sobczak v. Skow (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 13,

14, 550 N.E.2d 455, 456; State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman (1973), 34 Ohio St.2d

55, 63 O.O.2d 88, 295 N.E.2d 659, paragraph three of the syllabus.

4

January Term, 1995

{¶ 11} In reconciling this seeming conflict, we interpret the language of

Kiger, Horwitz, and Birdsall to be limited to the precept that a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

dismissal based upon the merits is unusual and should be granted with caution,

rather than setting forth a new standard. As always, the applicable standard is that

set forth in O'Brien, supra. In other words, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate in certain

cases where "merits" issues are raised. For example, Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal is

proper where the claim for mandamus relief arises from a contract which is

incorporated in and attached to the complaint, and the contract indicates that the

relief requested is not warranted. See 4 Harper, supra, at 345-346, Section 152.12,

fn. 8; see, also, 2A Moore's Federal Practice (2 Ed.1994) 12-90 to 12-91, Section

12.07[2.-5] ("material which is submitted as part of the complaint *** may be

considered by the court" [footnotes omitted] under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12[b][6]; cf.

McCormac, Ohio Civil Rules Practice (2 Ed.1992) 149, Section 6.20 (statute of

limitations may be raised by a Civ.R. 12[B][6]); motion where the bar is apparent

from the face of the complaint).

{¶ 12} Nevertheless, despite the general rule that a plaintiff or relator is not

required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage and need only give reasonable

notice of the claim, "[i]n a few carefully circumscribed cases, this court has

modified the standard for granting a motion to dismiss by requiring that the plaintiff

plead operative facts with particularity." York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol (1991),

60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063, 1065, citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co.

(1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (employee's intentional tort claim

against employer) and Byrd v. Faber (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584

(negligent hiring claim against religious institution). These cases have required

"fact" rather than "notice" pleading because of important public policy

considerations. York, supra, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145, 573 N.E.2d at 1065. We have

also required pleading of specific facts in certain mandamus cases involving

inmates, see State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 324, 544 N.E.2d

5

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

639; State ex rel. Seikbert, supra; State ex rel. Carter v. Wilkinson (1994), 70 Ohio

St.3d 65, 637 N.E.2d 1, and recently, in all original actions, except habeas corpus,

filed in this court. S.Ct.Prac.R. X(4)(B) ("[A]ll complaints shall contain a specific

statement of facts upon which the claim for relief is based ***."). Similarly, for

habeas corpus actions, a petitioner must disclose his claim with particularity in

order to avoid dismissal under R.C. 2725.06. Hammond v. Dallman (1992), 63

Ohio St.3d 666, 590 N.E.2d 744.

{¶ 13} In the case at bar, Edwards claims that he was wrongfully discharged

from his employment as a teacher. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint

based on the holding of this court in State ex rel. Webb v. Bryan City School Dist.

Bd. of Edn. (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 27, 32, 10 OBR 178, 183, 460 N.E.2d 1121, 1125

(since R.C. 3319.16 provides administrative and judicial remedies to review a

teacher's claim of wrongful discharge, R.C. 3319.16 is an adequate legal remedy

precluding mandamus relief). However, State ex rel. Webb preceded the enactment

of R.C. 4117.10(A), which allows public employment collective bargaining

agreements to supersede provisions of the Revised Code.

{¶ 14} In State ex rel. Hipp, supra, 70 Ohio St.3d at 103-104, 637 N.E.2d at

319, we recently reversed a court of appeals' summary dismissal of a mandamus

action based upon its finding of an adequate remedy at law:

"Given only the pleadings in this case, with no information as to the contents

of any collective bargaining agreement, grievance procedure, or protest procedure,

we fail to see how the court of appeals could have perceived that appellant had an

adequate legal remedy. *** Accordingly, we find that the court of appeals abused

its discretion by summarily dismissing the case on the merits."

{¶ 15} Similarly, Edwards's complaint states that he has no adequate legal

remedy, and there is no collective bargaining agreement incorporated in and

attached to his complaint. Even though a collective bargaining agreement and a

supplemental agreement were attached to appellees' answer, the court of appeals

6

January Term, 1995

did not consider the answer and, further, could not in a Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

determination. See, e.g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Morris (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d

107, 579 N.E.2d 702. This is not a case which falls under one of the recognized

exceptions to the general requirement of notice pleading. There is a "set of facts,

consistent with the [relator's] complaint, which would allow the [relator] to

recover." York, supra, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145, 573 N.E.2d at 1065. Therefore, based

solely on the complaint, it is not beyond doubt that Edwards can prove no set of

facts warranting relief. Accordingly, the court of appeals abused its discretion in

summarily dismissing Edwards's mandamus claim.

{¶ 16} The court of appeals dismissed the entire complaint, including

Edwards's declaratory judgment claim. Edwards does not contend on appeal that

dismissal of this claim was improper, and it is axiomatic that courts of appeals lack

original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions. Section 3(B), Article IV,

Ohio Constitution. Since Edwards's claim for declaratory judgment is so obviously

inappropriate that remand on this claim would be an exercise in futility, the court

of appeals' sua sponte dismissal of the complaint is affirmed as to that claim.

{¶ 17} Finally, appellees claim that the court of appeals did not abuse its

discretion by dismissing the complaint as to appellees Ellis and Nissen because

Edwards never alleged in his complaint "any action by either of them contrary to

his interests" and never sought "relief with respect to either of them." Contrary to

appellees' assertions, Edwards alleged in his complaint that "[a]s a result of

Respondent/Defendants [sic] failure to comply with O.R.C. {3319.16,

Relator/Plaintiff [sic] is entitled to reemployment and back pay." (Emphasis

added.) Further, Edwards requested a writ of mandamus against all appellees.

Therefore, appellees' argument in this regard is without merit.

{¶ 18} Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed as to

the declaratory judgment claim and is reversed and remanded for further

proceedings as to the mandamus claim.

7

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Judgment affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and cause remanded.

MOYER, C.J., WRIGHT, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur.

DOUGLAS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.

__________________

DOUGLAS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.

{¶ 19} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in all respects.

Because the majority does not do so, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in

part.

__________________

8