Doe 1 v. State of Tennessee, The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JOHN DOE 1, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. 3:24-cv-00777

)

STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This putative class action challenges several policies and practices that allegedly harm the

rights of disabled children in Tennessee’s juvenile justice system. Before the Court are two

Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 59, 61) that have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision (see

Doc. Nos. 60, 62, 65, 66, 67). For the following reasons, the motion brought by Lizzette Reynolds

will be denied, and the motion brought by the other defendants will be granted in part and denied

in part.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following allegations from the 147-page, 860-paragraph First

Amended Class Action Complaint (“Complaint”), accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable

inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Due to the

protracted nature of the Complaint, however, the Court will recite only those allegations necessary

to resolve the pending motions.

The named Plaintiffs in this case are four individuals and a representative organization

known as Disability Rights Tennessee (“DRT”). The Complaint alleges that the individual

Plaintiffs—John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and Jane Doe 1—are children with one or more

disabilities who are now, or are at imminent risk of being” detained in Tennessee’s juvenile justice

system.1 (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 2 n.1; 37–62). The Complaint refers to these Plaintiffs and other

similarly situated children with disabilities as “Youth.” (Id. ¶ 2 n.1). DRT is a “Protection and

Advocacy Organization” designated by Congress “to protect and advocate for the rights of people

with disabilities” in Tennessee. (Id. ¶¶ 24–36). DRT brought this lawsuit in its “associational

capacity” on behalf of the named plaintiffs and six of its constituents identified as S.W., J.T., O.V.,

R.A., C.K., and M.G. (Id. ¶ 20).

The four Defendants in this case are the State of Tennessee, the Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services (“DCS”), Margie Quin, and Lizzette Gonzalez Reynolds. The State of

Tennessee “operates and oversees the administration of” DCS and the Tennessee Department of

Education (“TDOE”), both of which are state agencies that receive federal funds. (Id. ¶¶ 67–68,

90). DCS “oversees Tennessee’s juvenile justice” system, (id. ¶ 68), and has the power to

“[a]dminister, develop or oversee programs” and services “reasonably necessary for unruly [and]

delinquent” children. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-5-106(a)(1). TDOE “oversees public education in

Tennessee.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 68, 90). Quin is the Commissioner of DCS. (Id. ¶ 78). Reynolds is

the Commissioner of Education and chief executive of TDOE. (Id. ¶ 88).

The allegations in this case begin when Youth first enter the Tennessee juvenile justice

system after being charged with committing a “delinquent or unruly act.” (Id. ¶¶ 2 n.1, 71, 106;

see also Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-102(b)(10), (b)(33). Tennessee juvenile courts then hold

proceedings to determine whether these children are guilty or innocent of the charges. See Tenn.

Code Ann. § 37-1-103(a). Juvenile courts may detain Youth “prior to adjudication” if, among

1 The terms children or “child” refer to a “person under eighteen (18) years of age” or a “person

under nineteen (19) years of age” under certain qualifying circumstances. Tenn. Code. Ann. § 37-

1-102 (b)(5).

other things, there is “probable cause” to believe they committed the acts with which they are

charged. (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 63, 107). Courts typically send these “Pre-Adjudication Youth” to

Juvenile Detention Centers (“JDC”) “designated or operated by the court.” (Id. ¶ 108; Tenn. Code.

Ann. § 37-1-116(a)(4)). DCS and Quin (“DCS Defendants”) “are responsible for oversight of

JDCs, which are either licensed by DCS Defendants or approved by them[.]” (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 71,

108, 125 (alleging that “Tennessee has seventeen JDCS”)).

When a juvenile court adjudicates a Youth as “delinquent or unruly,” the court may commit

the Youth to DCS custody for “post-adjudication services.” (Id. ¶¶ 70, 110). The DCS Defendants

have sole “authority over placement decisions for young people committed to their custody; judges

are not permitted to order that Post-Adjudication Youth be placed in a specific facility.” (Id. ¶¶

111, 121). “The facilities where DCS Defendants confine Post-Adjudication Youth” include, but

are not limited to: (i) Youth Development Centers (“YDCs”); (ii) Residential Child Care Agencies;

(iii) other facilities licensed by the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse

Services; and (iv) out-of-state contracted facilities. (Id. ¶ 114). The Complaint collectively refers

to the facilities that hold Pre-Adjudication Youth (including JDCs) and Post-Adjudication Youth

(including YDCs) as “DCS and DCS-licensed or approved facilities.” (Id. ¶¶ 69-72, 78, 184).

Plaintiffs raise numerous allegations about the experiences of the individual Plaintiffs

during the time they were detained in the Tennessee juvenile justice system. They also allege a

laundry list of ways in which Defendants’ policies, practices, methods of administration, and

procedures violate the rights of both Pre-Adjudication Youth and Post-Adjudication Youth.

Plaintiffs contend, among other things, that “DCS and its agents (1) fail to assess and accommodate

Youths’ disabilities; (2) fail to administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated

setting appropriate to the needs of Youth; (3) fail to provide Youth with medical and mental health

treatment; (4) expose Youth to violence; (5) subject Youth to excessive force through the use of

pepper spray; (6) place Youth in solitary confinement in circumstances that constitute cruel and

unusual punishment and are not rationally related to any legitimate government objective or are

excessive in relation to that purpose; and (7) deny Youth education.” (Id. ¶ 83; see also id. ¶¶ 195–

503). As a result, Plaintiffs asserts the following eleven causes of action against Defendants:

• State of Tennessee: Failure to Accommodate, in violation of Title II of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count One) and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) (Count Three).

• DCS: Failure to Accommodate, in violation of the ADA (Count One) and

Section 504 (Count Three); and Failure to Provide Community Integration, in

violation of the ADA (Count Two) and Section 504 (Count Four).

• Quin (official capacity): Section 1983 claims based on violations of the

Fourteenth Amendment for: Failure to Provide Medical and Mental Health

Treatment (Count Five); State-Created Danger and Failure to Protect (Count

Seven); Excessive Force (Count Eight); and Conditions of Confinement (Count

Nine). In the alternative, § 1983 claims on behalf of Post-Adjudication Youth

for Failure to Provide Medical and Mental Health Treatment (Count Six) and

Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Count Ten), in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.

• Quin and Reynolds (official capacities): Section 1983 claim based on Violation

of Procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Eleven).

(Id. ¶¶ 730–854). Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of other similarly situated Youth in pursuit

of: (1) a declaratory judgment determining that Defendants’ policies and practices violate the

ADA, Section 504, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment; and (2) an injunction

requiring Defendants to reform their policies, practices, and procedures to comply with these laws.

(Id. ¶¶ 857–58).

The DCS Defendants (along with the State) and Reynolds now move to dismiss the

Complaint on four grounds: (i) lack of standing, (ii) sovereign immunity, (iii) failure to state a

claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and (iv) failure to join necessary parties

under Rule 12(b)(7). (Doc. Nos. 59, 61). Given that each ground for dismissal involves a different

legal standard, the Court will address these arguments separately.

II. DISMISSAL UNDER RULE 12(b)(1) FOR LACK OF STANDING

The DCS Defendants argue that John Doe 1 and DRT lack standing to bring any claims

against them. (Doc. No. 62 at 26–31). Reynolds contends that none of the Plaintiffs have standing

to bring a procedural due process claim against her. (Doc. No. 60 at 9–15).

A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is properly characterized as a motion to dismiss

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Forest City

Residential Mgmt., Inc. ex rel. Plymouth Square Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. Beasley, 71 F.

Supp. 3d 715, 722–23 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (citing Stalley v. Methodist Healthcare, 517 F.3d 911,

916 (6th Cir. 2008)). “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can challenge

the sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence of subject matter

jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing

United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994)). Where, as here, defendants make a

facial attack, the Court must take all the allegations in the Complaint as true and determine

“whether the plaintiff has alleged a basis for subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added).

To establish standing at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly

demonstrating that she “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged

conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”

Spokeo Inc. v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560–61 (1992)); see also Soehnlen v. Fleet Owners Ins. Fund, 844 F.3d 576, 581 (6th Cir.

2016). “To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a

legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural

or hypothetical.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560) (internal quotation

marks omitted). “For an injury to be concrete, it must be real, and not abstract, and for an injury

to be particularized, it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Fishon v. Mars

Petcare US, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 3d 555, 563 (M.D. Tenn. 2020) (citing Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339).

“Plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief must make an additional showing that they suffered ‘both past

injury and a real and immediate threat of future injury.’” Id. (quoting Mosley v. Kohl’s Dep’t.

Stores, Inc., 942 F.3d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 2019)) (emphasis added).

A. John Doe 1

As a named plaintiff, John Doe 1 must demonstrate his own individual standing regardless

of whether he seeks to represent a putative class. Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d

410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 522, 532 (S.D.

Ohio 2011). This means he must show he suffered a “past injury and a real and immediate threat

of future injury” for his requested declaratory and injunctive relief in this case. Mosley, 942 F.3d

at 756. The DCS Defendants argue that John Doe 1 cannot meet these requirements because he is

no longer a minor or in DCS custody, and therefore it is not plausible he faces any “imminent risk

of being in DCS custody and/or kept in a DCS-licensed or approved facility” in the future. (Doc.

No. 62 at 26–28).

John Doe 1 responds that he had standing when the original complaint was filed on June

26, 2024. (Doc. No. 66 at 6). That may be true, but that is not the standard the Court must apply

here. Instead, the Court determines standing based on the facts that exist at the time the amended

complaint is filed. See Ohio Citizen Action v. City of Englewood, 671 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir.

2012). “That means a plaintiff’s standing must be assessed anew any time he seeks to amend his

complaint.” Bare v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 2023 WL 395026, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 25, 2023) (citing

Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473–74 (2007) (“[W]hen a plaintiff files a

complaint in federal court and then voluntarily amends the complaint, courts look to the amended

complaint to determine jurisdiction.”); see also Shaw v. Serv. One Credit Union, Inc., 2023 WL

9059668, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 9, 2023). The Court therefore must determine whether John Doe 1

had standing when the amended complaint was filed on November 22, 2024.

When the amended complaint was filed, John Doe 1 had already reached the age of

majority at eighteen years old. (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 37, 41). There are certain circumstances where

juveniles may remain “under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court” until their nineteenth birthday

based on conduct that occurred before they turned eighteen, but there are no allegations that

implicate any of those limited circumstances here. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(5)(B).

Thus, John Doe 1 was no longer a child who could be detained by a Tennessee juvenile court or

DCS at the time the amended complaint was filed. See id. This made it impossible (let alone

implausible) that he “remained at imminent risk of being in DCS custody and/or kept in a DCS-

licensed or approved facility.” (See Doc. No. 53 ¶ 41).

The Court is concerned about John Doe 1’s negative experiences within the Tennessee

juvenile justice system. For example, he alleges that he spent up to twenty-three or twenty-four

hours in solitary confinement some days, “was violently beaten by other youth nearly thirty times,”

missed “nearly an entire year of school,” and was retaliated against when he filed a grievance for

improper sexual activity. (See id. ¶¶ 362–63, 509–32). He further alleges that his time in DCS

custody “degraded his mental health” and exacerbated his “depression, PTSD, [ADHD], and

anxiety disorder.” (Id. ¶¶ 37–38, 506–07). These allegations are worrisome. Nevertheless, they

do not plausibly demonstrate that eighteen-year-old John Doe 1 faces any immediate threat of

future injury for his requested injunctive relief.

Accordingly, the Court must dismiss John Doe 1’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

standing. With this holding, there is no need for the Court to address the DCS Defendants’

alternative argument that his claims are moot. (See Doc. Nos. 66 at 9–11; 67 at 3 n.3).

B. DRT

The DCS Defendants next argue that DRT does not have associational standing to bring

claims in this case. (Doc. No. 62 at 28–31). A protection and advocacy organization, like DRT,

may “bring suit on behalf of its members when [1] its members would otherwise have standing to

sue in their own right, [2] the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and [3]

neither the claim requested nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.” Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health, 900 F.3d 250, 254–

55 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528

U.S. 167, 181 (2000)). The DCS Defendants contend that DRT cannot satisfy the first and third

prongs of this test.

As to whether DRT’s members would have standing (prong 1), the DCS Defendants argue

that DRT’s constituents are not “members,” and therefore none of DRT’s “members” have

standing to sue on their own right. (Doc. No. 62 at 30). Multiple “federal statutes” authorize DRT

to, among other things, “pursue administrative, legal and other remedies on behalf of people with

disabilities.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 24–27); see also 42 U.S.C. § 15043(a)(2)(A)(i). In a recent

published decision, this Court recognized that the individuals whom DRT “is called on to protect

are not members of the organization but . . . something more like constituents or beneficiaries.”

Trivette v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 739 F. Supp. 3d 663, 689 (M.D. Tenn.). Indeed, all “Youth

described in the Complaint” are “DRT Constituents who have disabilities that limit one or more

of their major life activities.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 35). But even if DRT does not have “a formal

membership roster,” it can still rely on associational standing to sue on behalf of its constituents if

those constituents have “indicia of membership.” Trivette, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 689 (citing Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 344 (1977)); see also Nestle Ice Cream Co. v.

NLRB, 46 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 1995).

The DCS Defendants contend that DRT’s constituents do not “possess all of the indicia of

membership” because they do not control DRT’s “activities and finances,” “serve on the board,”

or “fund” the organization. (Doc. No. 62 at 30). While true, that is not what associational standing

requires. Instead, as this Court previously held, “sufficient indicia of membership are present with

regard to those specific, named individuals who have directly participated in DRT’s litigation

efforts in this case.” Trivette, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 689. “DRT’s demonstrated relationship with the

specifically identified [Youth] who have participated in this litigation is significantly closer than

many relationships that meet the formal definition of ‘membership.’” Id. The Complaint alleges

that “DRT has worked extensively with the Doe Plaintiffs, as well as various other Youth, to

monitor their treatment, investigate claims of abuse and/or neglect involving them, and to advocate

for appropriate services for them.” (See Doc. No. 53 ¶ 36). Given that the named Plaintiffs are

DRT constituents, voluntarily joined this case, and seek the same remedies as DRT, the Court finds

that DRT plausibly satisfies prong one of the associational standing test. (See id.).

As to whether DRT’s constituents will be required to participate in this lawsuit, the DCS

Defendants argue that the Court cannot adjudicate Plaintiffs’ “claims, nor issue the relief DRT

requests, without the individual participation of every one of those constituents.” (Doc. No. 62 at

30–31). “This prong of the associational standing test is a prudential standing requirement, not a

constitutional requirement.” Dayton Area Chambers of Commerce v. Becerra, 2024 WL 3741510,

at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 8, 2024) (citing United Food and Com. Workers Union Loc. 75, 517 U.S.

546, 555 (1996)). “[T]he general rule is that individual participation of members ‘is not normally

necessary when an association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members[,]’ but may

be required when the association is seeking damages.” Id. (quoting United Food, 517 U.S. at 546).

Here, Plaintiffs seek purely prospective systemic injunctive relief, and there is no reason to believe

that individual participation of all of DRT’s members is necessary for the Court to grant that relief.

Last, the DCS Defendants argue, in the alternative, that even if DRT has standing with

respect to the named Plaintiffs, it does not have broad standing to seek relief on behalf of all

disabled youth in general. (Doc. No. 62 at 29–30). This argument is premature because “the issue

here is not what standing DRT might be able to establish” in the future, “but what standing it has

actually demonstrated in court.” Trivette, 739 F. Supp. 3d at 690. For now, it is sufficient that

DRT has associational standing to challenge “the policies alleged to have injured its identified

constituents—that is, the plaintiffs and the [six] additional individuals identified.” Id. The Court

will revisit this issue later, if needed, when determining the scope of any relief.

C. Reynolds

Reynolds argues that Plaintiffs’ procedural-due-process claim in Count Eleven (the only

claim against her) should be dismissed for lack of standing. (Doc. No. 60 at 9–15). Count Eleven

alleges that Youth in Tennessee’s juvenile justice system are subject to ongoing policies and

procedures that deprive them of their property interest in an education without due process. (Doc.

No. 53 ¶¶ 850–54). It alleges that Reynolds, as the Commissioner of TDOE, is responsible for

developing rules to ensure that Pre-Adjudication Youth and Post-Adjudication Youth receive the

education to which they are entitled under Tennessee law. (Id.). But Reynolds allegedly failed in

this role by adopting and enforcing “official policies, practices, and procedures (including an

official policy of inaction) that deprive Youth of” this protected right “without being provided with

notice of the reason for the deprivation, an opportunity to be heard, or other procedural safeguards

to protect their entitlement to education. (Id. ¶¶ 88, 91, 852). The Complaint further alleges that

Youth are deprived of their right to education without notice when, among other things, they are

shuffled between DCS-licensed or DCS-approved facilities in a way that disrupts their education

(id. ¶¶ 313–14), held in solitary confinement for twenty-three hours a day (id. ¶¶ 308, 356, 402),

removed from school for administrative or disciplinary reasons (id. ¶ 550), coerced into opting out

of school (id. ¶ 403), given instruction that does not allow them to progress towards graduation

(id. ¶ 651–52), and given fewer hours of instruction than the law requires (id. ¶¶ 301, 305, 542,

561, 632, 682). The Court finds that these allegations satisfy the injury-in-fact, traceability, and

redressability requirements for standing.

It is well settled that Youth in Tennessee “have a legitimate property interest in educational

benefits and, therefore, in actually attending school.” Laney v. Farley, 501 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir.

2007); see also Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs allege that Reynolds’s

policies and lack of policies deprive them of their property interest in education without

constitutionally adequate process, such as pre-deprivation notice or a hearing. (Doc. No. 53 ¶

852). This injury is both concrete and particularized because each Plaintiff alleges they suffered

a deprivation of their education experience and rights without procedural due process while

detained in the Tennessee juvenile justice system. (See id. ¶¶ 542, 561, 620–21, 682). It is

plausible that John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and Jane Doe 1 face a “real and immediate” threat of future

deprivations because they were each detained in pre-adjudication or post-adjudication custody

when the amended Complaint was filed. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 61). Accordingly, the Court finds that at the

pleading stage, the individual Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged an Article III injury for their claim

against Reynolds.

Reynolds urges the Court to reach a different result because the Complaint ignores “the

existence of statutory grievance processes” available for juveniles who allege they receive

inadequate education. (Doc. No. 60 at 11–13). The Court does not find that the potential

availability of post-deprivation grievance procedures is relevant to the standing analysis. This is

because it is plausible that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim is based on a lack of pre-

deprivation procedures, such as notice and an opportunity to be heard. (See Doc. No. 53 ¶ 852).

This factual argument about the adequacy or availability of post-deprivation procedures also goes

to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, rather than whether Plaintiffs asserted an Article III injury. See,

e.g. CHKRS, LLC v. City of Dublin, 984 F.3d 483, 488–89 (6th Cir. 2021); see also Brooks v.

Butler Cnty., 2022 WL 2526601, at *3 (6th Cir. Jul. 7, 2022) (noting that courts are especially

cautious with the injury-in-fact analysis in procedural due process cases because it often overlaps

with “the merits of whether a protected property interest exists”). “The standing inquiry is not a

merits inquiry.” Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4th 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). For

now, it is enough that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged an injury-in-fact for injunctive relief based on

their allegations that Reynold’s policies do not provide any pre-deprivation procedural safeguards

for Youth.

The remaining requirements for standing—traceability and redressability—are relaxed

where Plaintiffs allege procedural injuries. For traceability, “a defendant’s actions must have a

‘causal connection to the plaintiff’s injury.’” Id. (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Here, Plaintiffs’

injuries are fairly traceable to Reynolds’ conduct. The Complaint alleges her policies, including

an “official policy of inaction,” deny Youth their right to education in detention without pre-

deprivation notice or an opportunity to be heard. These allegations satisfy the “relatively modest”

burden of demonstrating traceability at the pleading stage. See Buchholz v. Meyer Njus Tanick,

PA, 946 F.3d 855, 866 (6th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs also satisfy the redressability requirement

because they seek an injunction requiring Reynolds to reform her policies to ensure that Youth are

not deprived of their property interest in education without due process of law. If Reynolds is

required to implement policies that protect Youth education rights, “then the harms that allegedly

flow from the current system will be prevented, and thus Plaintiffs’ claimed injuries redressed.”

Bull v. Carter, 2025 WL 2201101, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2025). The Court further finds that

because the individual Plaintiffs have standing to bring their procedural due process claims against

Reynolds, DRT also has associational standing to bring these claims.

III. DISMISSAL BECAUSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The next issue is whether Defendants are entitled to sovereign immunity. Reynolds argues

that sovereign immunity shields her from this lawsuit entirely, (Doc. No. 60 at 15–20), and the

State and DCS Defendants contend that sovereign immunity shields them from claims brought by

Pre-Adjudication Youth or Youth at “imminent risk” of returning to DCS custody, (Doc. No. 62

at 31–33). The Court is not persuaded by their arguments.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity normally deprives federal courts of subject matter

jurisdiction when a citizen sues a State or state official in her official capacity. Russell v.

Lundergan-Grimes, 784 F.3d 1037, 1046 (6th Cir. 2015); Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 618

(6th Cir. 2020). Plaintiffs argue that sovereign immunity does not bar their claims because the Ex

parte Young exception applies here. (Doc. Nos. 65 at 23–27; 66 at 14–15). The Ex parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity allows plaintiffs to bring “a suit challenging the constitutionality

of a state official’s action.” Kaplan v. Univ. of Louisville, 10 F.4th 569, 577 (6th Cir. 2021). “To

determine if Ex parte Young applies, a court need only conduct a straightforward inquiry into

whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly

characterized as prospective.” Lee, 2022 WL 982667, at *5 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “Whether the state official’s challenged action is actually inconsistent with federal law

is not part of the inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex parte Young.” Id. (citing Verizon Md.,

Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).

Reynolds argues that “nearly all the specific facts” alleged in the Complaint “concern past

events,” and therefore the Complaint does not allege that any Plaintiffs are suffering an “ongoing

violation” of the education rights. (Doc. No. 60 at 16–17). The Complaint discusses past events

to provide “illustrative examples” of how “Defendants’ ongoing policies, practices, and procedures

. . . violate the statutory and constitutional rights of Youth.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 20 n.5 (emphasis

added)). Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court finds that it

sufficiently alleges “ongoing policies, practices, and procedures” that violate Plaintiffs’ rights

under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Counts One, Two, Three, and Four), the Fourteenth

Amendment (Counts Five, Seven, Eight, Nine, and Eleven), and the Eighth Amendment (Counts

Six and Ten). (See id. ¶ 20 n.5). The Complaint also seeks purely prospective relief “requiring

Defendants to reform” these “policies, practices, and procedures” to comply with the law. (Id. ¶

858). These allegations are “sufficient to invoke the Young fiction.” Telespectrum, Inc. v. Pub.

Serv. Com’n of Ky., 227 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of

Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997)).

The State and DCS Defendants similarly argue that claims involving Youth not in DCS

custody, Pre-Adjudication Youth, and Youth at “imminent risk” of returning to DCS custody are

speculative and request relief for no other reason “to right past wrongs.” (Doc. No. 62 at 32–33).

This argument reflects a premature merits challenge to the Complaint’s class allegations that can

be raised when Plaintiffs move to certify a class. “[T]he inquiry into whether suit lies under Ex

parte Young does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim[s].” Verizon, 535 U.S. at 646.

For now, the Court is only concerned with whether the named Plaintiffs have alleged an ongoing

violation of federal law and seek prospective relief. Because Plaintiffs satisfy both conditions, the

Ex parte Young exception applies. Plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by sovereign immunity.2

IV. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Defendants next move to dismiss several claims under Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6)

authorizes the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In making this determination at the motion to dismiss stage, the

Court must accept as true all plausible factual allegations in the complaint, draw all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement

to relief. Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 581 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678–79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The Court considers

each of Defendants’ specific challenges below.3

A. Claims Against the State of Tennessee (Counts One and Two)

Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the two ADA claims against the State of

Tennessee because the Complaint alleges “broad and conclusory claims against all Defendants

without stating “with any level of specificity how the State, rather than DCS, has violated the

ADA.” (Doc. No. 67 at 7–8). Without any allegations specific to the State of Tennessee,

Defendants contend “there is no cognizable legal theory to include the State as a defendant in this

action.” (Doc. No. 62 at 13).

2 Given this conclusion, the Court need not decide whether Congress abrogated sovereign

immunity over Plaintiffs’ specific claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act in this case. (See

Doc. No. 66 at 15); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (holding that

Congress unequivocally intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity over Title II ADA claims

premised on conduct that independently violates the Fourteenth Amendment).

3 Defendants do not move under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 Fourteenth

Amendment claims in Counts Five, Seven, Eight, or Nine. (See Doc. No. 62 at 2–3).

The Court agrees that the Complaint repeatedly lumps the State and the DCS together as

“Defendants,” and that it says very little about the State specifically. But that does not mean

Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the State. The Complaint specifically alleges that the “State

of Tennessee operates and oversees the administration of DCS and TDOE.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 67).

And it alleges that “Defendants’ official policies, practices, and procedures . . . violate the ADA

by failing to provide Youth with reasonable accommodations” (Count One), and by failing to

detain Youth in least restrictive and most integrated setting of community placement with

appropriate services and support (Count Two) (Id. ¶¶ 730–60). These allegations at least give the

State “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. Of course, whether Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail against the State on summary

judgment or at trial is a different story, as that will depend on what evidence they can show to

demonstrate that the State is personally responsible for the policies at issue here. Plaintiffs are

reminded that merely showing that Tennessee is responsible for DCS, and DCS violated the ADA,

is not enough. See Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117, 1119–22 (6th Cir. 2021) (holding that

vicarious liability does not apply to Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act). At this time,

however, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court will not dismiss the State as a defendant for lack

of specificity.

B. Claims Brought by Pre-Adjudication Youth” or Youth at “Imminent Risk” of Being

in DCS Custody (All Counts)

Defendants move to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ class allegations regarding Pre-Adjudication

Youth (including those at ‘imminent risk’ of being in DCS custody)” for failure to state a claim

because juvenile courts, “not DCS or the State, are responsible for the custody” and well-being “of

Pre-Adjudication Youth.” (Doc. No. 62 at 18 (emphases added)). As the Court previously

mentioned in its analysis of sovereign immunity, this argument strikes the Court as a premature

attack on Plaintiffs’ proposed class and subclasses. It is true that the Complaint alleges that

Plaintiffs seek to certify a class that includes Youth who “are now, or are at imminent risk of being,

in DCS custody and/or kept in a DCS-licensed or approved facility.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 697). It is

also true that Plaintiffs seek to certify a Pre-Adjudication Youth subclass. (Id.). It is also true that

Rule 23 requires the Court to decide whether to certify a class or subclasses “[a]t an early

practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

Nevertheless, the Court finds that the better approach is to address these issues in the context of a

motion for class certification under Rule 23 after the relevant discovery is complete. See Lammert

v. Auto-Owners (Mutual) Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 3d 807, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 2019); see also Fallick

v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 410, 423–24 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that once a “class

representative establishes his individual standing to sue,” the issue of whether he can represent the

putative class “depends solely on whether he is able to meet the additional criteria encompassed

in Rule 23”) (emphasis added).

For present purposes, the Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges facts to survive

dismissal. The Complaint alleges that the State oversees DCS, and that DCS oversees JDCs and

other facilities where Pre-Adjudication Youth typically are detained. (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 108). It is

unclear what this oversight entails, but the Complaint raises plausible allegations that the State and

the DCS Defendants failed to perform their oversight functions for both Pre-Adjudication Youth

and Post-Adjudication Youth. (Id. ¶¶ 179–94). Accordingly, the Court does not have a sufficient

basis to remove Pre-Adjudication Youth from the case at this time. After discovery is complete,

Defendants are free to revisit this issue if they can demonstrate, based on evidence, that DCS has

no control over, or responsibility to, Pre-Adjudication Youth or those at imminent risk of being

placed in DCS custody.

C. Failure to Accommodate Under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Counts One and

Three)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ failure-to-accommodate claims on several grounds,

including that “allegations of inadequate mental, behavioral, and medical health treatment cannot

form the basis of an ADA or Section 504 claim.” (Doc. No. 62 at 14–17). Plaintiffs respond that

this argument is a red herring because their failure-to-accommodate claims do not seek to address

the sufficiency of medical or mental health treatment. (Doc. No. 66 at 18).

“Claims brought under the ADA and Section 504 generally are evaluated together.” M.G.

ex rel. C.G. v. Williamson Cnty. Schs., 720 F. App’x 280, 287 (6th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs “seeking

to state a claim under either the ADA or § 504 against a school receiving federal financial

assistance must show that he or she is (1) disabled under the statute, (2) ‘otherwise qualified’ for

participation in the program, and (3) being excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of,

or subjected to discrimination under the program by reason of his or her disability.” S.S. v. E. Ky.

Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). For the third element, a “plaintiff may

allege disability discrimination under two theories: intentional discrimination and failure to

reasonably accommodate.” Knox Cnty. v. M.Q., 62 F.4th 978, 1000 (6th Cir. 2023) (citations

omitted). Plaintiffs argue that they “pleaded failure to accommodate claims, rather than intentional

discrimination claims, under the ADA and Section 504.” (Doc. No. 66 at 16).

The Court finds that the Complaint plausibly alleges facts to satisfy the three elements for

a failure to accommodate claim. First, it alleges that Plaintiffs are disabled within the meaning of

the ADA and Section 504. (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 46–48 (John Doe 2), 52–53, 591–92 (Jane Doe 1), 58–

59 (John Doe 3); see also id. ¶¶ 731, 762). Second, it alleges that Plaintiffs are eligible to

participate in DCS’s services, programs, or activities while being detained in the Tennessee

juvenile justice system. (Id. ¶¶ 239 (alleging that John Doe 2, Jane Doe 1, and John Doe 3 “are in

juvenile justice custody”), 732, 746, 763). Third, it alleges that Defendants (namely the State and

DCS) refused to provide Plaintiffs with reasonable accommodations for certain programs,

including the “Point and Level Systems” and “Youth Commitment Reduction Credit” program.

(Id. ¶¶ 534, 542, 556, 558 (John Doe 2), 595 (Jane Doe 1), 62 (John Doe 3); see also id. ¶¶ 196,

269–96). DCS-licensed or approved facilities use these two programs to reward “good” behavior

and punish “bad” behavior. (Id. ¶ 269). For example, Youth that perform well in these programs

could receive additional recreation time or contact with family members, whereas those who do

not comply with program requirements may receive additional restrictions and longer sentences.

(Id. ¶¶ 275–77). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants utilize these programs without giving Youth any

reasonable accommodations, which effectively punishes Youth for their disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 278–

79). The Complaint provides a specific example in which T.K., a Youth, lost points and access

to activities when she refused to clean her room because of her severe mental and behavioral

disabilities. (Id. ¶ 282). Another example is when a Youth with ADHD “lost points” for “talking

out loud,” without receiving any reasonable accommodations for their disability. (Id. ¶ 294).

Plaintiffs’ inability to participate in these programs without reasonable accommodations, if true,

means it is plausible that they are being excluded from or denied the benefits of services, programs,

or activities because of their disabilities. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 196, 533, 595, 680). (Id. ¶¶ 287–96).

Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts One and Three

because the allegations above give Defendants’ “fair notice” of Plaintiffs’ claims and the grounds

upon which they rest. See Vasser v. Shiroki N. Am., Inc., 2021 WL 1088181, at *7 (M.D. Tenn.

Mar. 22, 2021) (citation omitted). Those grounds, according to Plaintiffs, do not include

“allegations of inadequate mental, behavioral, and medical health treatment.” (Doc. No. 62 at 14–

17).

D. Eighth Amendment Claims (Counts Six and Ten)

On behalf of “Post-Adjudication Youth,” Plaintiffs bring § 1983 claims against Quin under

the Eighth Amendment for failure to provide medical and mental health treatment (Count Six) and

for cruel and unusual punishment (Count Ten). Plaintiffs bring Count Six “in the alternative” to

their Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to provide medical and mental health treatment

(Count Five), and they bring Count Ten “in the alternative” to their Fourteenth Amendment claims

for state-created danger and failure to protect (Count Seven), excessive force (Count Eight), and

conditions of confinement (Count Nine). (Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 806, 836). Quin argues that these

“alternative” claims should be dismissed because the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the

Eighth Amendment, applies to Post-Adjudication Youth. (Doc. No. 62 at 19–20).

Plaintiffs concede that their Fourteenth Amendment claims in Counts Five, Seven, Eight,

and Nine challenge the same conduct as their Eighth Amendment claims in Counts Six and Ten,

and that the Eighth Amendment does not apply in this case because “[n]either pre-adjudication nor

post-adjudication Youth have been convicted of a crime.” (Doc. No. 53 at n.137); see also Harris

v. Brooks, 2023 WL 6964751, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2023) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430

U.S. 651, 664 (1977)) (noting that “the Eighth Amendment applies only to ‘those convicted of

crimes’”). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs ask the Court not to dismiss their Eighth Amendment claims

simply because they pled these claims “in the alternative” to their Fourteenth Amendment claims.

(Doc. No. 66 at 28–30).

This is not a situation where the Complaint alleges viable theories of liability in the

alternative, such as when a plaintiff pleads a breach of contract claim and an equitable contract-

based claim, even though Plaintiffs cannot ultimately prevail on both theories. Instead, Plaintiffs

concede that Post-Adjudication Youth are not protected by the Eighth Amendment because they

have not been convicted of crimes. Because the parties agree that the Eighth Amendment does not

apply here, the Court will dismiss the alternative Eighth Amendment claims in Counts Six and Ten

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

E. State Education-Based Claims (Counts One, Two, Three, and Four)

Defendants next move to dismiss Counts One, Two, Three, and Four to the extent they

allege a failure to provide educational services. (Doc. No. 62 at 20–26). Defendants argue that

the gravamen of these claims seek relief under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(“IDEA”), and therefore the Court should dismiss these claims for failing to exhaust administrative

remedies. “The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement grew out of the reality that three laws potentially

allow children with disabilities to seek relief for difficulties that they encounter at school: the

ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the IDEA.” Doe by K.M. v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 56 F.4th

1076, 1080 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Fry ex rel. E.F. v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154, 170–

71 (2017)). The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act “protect all individuals with disabilities,”

whereas the IDA “protects only children with disabilities.” Id. (citations omitted). The IDEA

conditions federal funding on states making a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”)

“available to all children with disabilities residing in the State.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. §

1412(a)(1)(A)).

Plaintiffs may “pursue overlapping claims under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, but they

must complete the IDEA’s administrative process if they are ‘seeking relief that is also available

under’” the IDEA. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)). The “IDEA allows parents to seek relief

only for one injury: the denial of a” FAPE. Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs do not need to exhaust

administrative remedies under the IDEA if they seek relief other than a FAPE—“even if they could

have sought” a FAPE as their relief. Id. (citation omitted). To determine whether a Complaint

seeks a FAPE as the remedy, the Court asks two hypothetical questions: (1) could the plaintiff

have “sought the relief if the challenged conduct had arisen outside school in, say, a public theater

or library,” and (2) “could a teacher or guest at the school (rather than a student) have requested

the same relief?” If the answer is “no” to these questions, then the plaintiff likely seeks a FAPE.

Id. The Sixth Circuit summarized the standard from these hypotheticals as follows: Plaintiffs

“seek ‘relief’ that is ‘available’ under the IDEA only if a child needs an instructional change, not

just a non-instructional accommodation to some school rule or policy.” Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. §

1415(l)).

Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, it is plausible that the

failure-to-accommodate claims are directed at the disciplinary and behavioral management

practices that prevent Youth from going to school at all, rather than to any instructional changes.

(Id. at 1083; see also, e.g., Doc. No. 53 ¶¶ 277, 281 (alleging that the Points and Levels System

deprives Youth, including John Doe 3, from attending school at all). For example, a reasonable

accommodation for Youth participating in the Points and Levels System to ensure they can attend

school would have “nothing to do with the child’s instruction.” Doe by K.M., 56 F. 4th at 1083.

Moreover, the Complaint does not allege that DCS failed to provide “special education” to

Plaintiffs who, by reason of their disabilities, need special education and related services. Id. Nor

does it allege that Plaintiffs requested “uniquely tailored teaching.” Id. Based on the allegations

in the Complaint alone, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the pleading requirements for their

failure to accommodate claims, and that it is at least plausible they are not seeking a FAPE. This

is enough to survive dismissal.

F. Procedural Due Process (Count Eleven)

Last, Quinn and Reynolds argue that the Court should dismiss the procedural due process

claim in Count Eleven because the Complaint does not “identify the inadequacies of the procedural

mechanisms available to them that protect disabled Tennessee students’ interest in a FAPE.” (Doc.

Nos. 62 at 26; 60 at 20–22). The Court already addressed this issue in the context of whether

Plaintiffs have standing to sue Reynolds in her official capacity. As the Court explained, the crux

of Count Eleven is that Quin’s and Reynold’s policies or lack of same deny Youth their right to an

education in Tennessee without any pre-deprivation procedural safeguards for Youth. Based on

these allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Count Eleven is about the denial of a FAPE.

For these reasons, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs’ procedural due process claim

is deficient merely because the Complaint does not allege anything about post-deprivation

grievance procedures. There is a “critical” difference “between a procedural due process claim

arising from a deprivation which requires a [pre-deprivation] or a [post-deprivation] process, each

of which are evaluated under different legal standards.” Cranberry Promenade, Inc. v. Cranberry

Tp., 2010 WL 653915, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2010) (citation omitted). “When a deprivation

occurs through an established state procedure,” as is alleged here, “then it is both practical and

feasible for the state to provide pre-deprivation process, and the state must do so regardless of the

adequacy of any post-deprivation remedy.” Johnson v. City of Saginaw, 980 F.3d 497, 508 (6th

Cir. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “An aggrieved individual can bring a

§ 1983 claim for a deprivation which requires a [pre-deprivation] process immediately, as the harm

to that individual from the alleged due process violation has already occurred.” Cranberry

Promenade, 2010 WL 653915, at *5.

Here, the Complaint plausibly alleges that Quin’s and Reynold’s policies deprive Plaintiffs

and other Youth “of education for extended or indefinite periods of time . . . without being provided

with notice of the reason for the deprivation, an opportunity to be heard, or other procedural

safeguards to protect their entitlement to education.” (Doc. No. 53 ¶ 852). This suggests that

Count Eleven asserts a pre-deprivation due process claim. Accordingly, the Court cannot dismiss

Count Eleven at this time merely because Defendants raise a factual dispute about whether there

were post-deprivation procedures available.

V. DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO JOIN NECESSARY PARTIES

Defendants’ final argument is that the Court cannot accord complete relief among existing

parties without joining the nonparty “facilities that are licensed, contracted, or approved by DCS,

but that are owned and/or operated by other entities.” (Doc. No. 62 at 33–35). As such, Defendants

ask the Court to either dismiss this case under Rule 12(b)(7), or find that the DCS-licensed or

approved facilities must be joined as necessary parties.

A defendant may move to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(7) for “failure to join a

party under Rule 19.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(7) is appropriate

‘when there is an absent person without whom complete relief cannot be granted.” SDC Fin., LLC

v. Bremer, 2019 WL 4393543, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 13, 2019) (citation omitted). This

“analysis under Rule 19 involves two steps: (1) the court must determine whether the absent parties

are required parties; and if so, (2) the court must determine whether, in their absence, equity and

good conscience require that the case be dismissed.” Id. (citing School Dist. of Pontiac v. Sec’y

of U.S. Dept. of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 264 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). “If the answer to either

question is no, then Rule 19 does not” require dismissal. School Dist. of Pontiac, 584 F.3d at 265.

Here, the Court does not find that the DCS-licensed or approved facilities are necessary for

the Court to grant Plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory or injunctive relief. Plaintiffs “seek relief

only against Defendants’ policies and practices,” and “[t]he mere fact that relief against

Defendants might affect third parties does not make those parties necessary under Rule 19.” (Doc.

No. 66 at 30). Based on the allegations in the Complaint, it does not appear that the Court needs

to join the facilities to require Defendants to reform their own policies, practices, and procedures.

The DCS Defendants argue that “the relief requested in this case would later impact parties

in a manner that could expose the DCS Defendants to obligations inconsistent with their authority

or control,” but they do not offer any analysis or explanation about how this could happen. (Doc.

No. 62 at 35). This naked assertion is insufficient for the Court to make a reasoned decision about

whether Plaintiffs’ requested relief will impose inconsistent obligations on the DCS Defendants.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion under 12(b)(7) without prejudice to them

renewing their motion if discovery reveals that one or more of the DCS-licensed or approved

facilities are required parties to this action under Rule 19.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Reynold’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 59),

and deny in part and grant in part the State and DCS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No.

61). The Court will dismiss John Doe 1 as a plaintiff for lack of standing, and it will dismiss

Counts Six and Ten for failure to state a claim.

An appropriate order will enter.

Web S. Bshed

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25