Purvis v. Lackawanna County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KRISTA PURVIS,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-01907

v. (MEHALCHICK, J.)

LACKAWANNA COUNTY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Krista Purvis (“Purvis”) initiated this action by filing a complaint on

December 1, 2022. (Doc. 1). On June 29, 2023, Purvis filed the operative amended complaint

against Defendant Lackawanna County (“Lackawanna County”). (Doc. 27). Before the

Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Lackawanna County. (Doc. 38). For the

reasons provided herein, Lackawanna County’s motion will be GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. (Doc. 38).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from the parties’ statements of material facts and

responses thereto.1 (Doc. 39; Doc. 43-1). Lackawanna County has employed Purvis since

1 Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, the Court accepts as true all undisputed material facts

supported by the record. Where the record evinces a disputed fact, the Court will take notice.

The facts have been taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party with respect to

the motion. The Court notes that Purvis filed both a response to Lackawanna County’s

statement of facts and a counter statement of facts. (Doc. 43-1; Doc. 43-2). Lackawanna

County argues that a separate counter statement of facts is not explicitly authorized by Local

Rule 56.1 but does not request the Court strike or not consider Purvis’s counter statement of

fact. (Doc. 44, at 1-2). While courts in this district have recognized that a separate counter

statement of facts is not explicitly authorized by Local Rule 56.1, courts have found that such

2017 when Purvis began working for the Lackawanna County Public Defender’s Office. (Doc.

39, ¶¶ 2-3; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 2-3). While at the Public Defender’s Office, Purvis met Debi

Domenick (“Domenick”). (Doc. 39, ¶ 7; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 7). The two became friends and

Domenick served as a reference for Purvis when she applied to work at the Lackawanna

County Prison. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 7-11; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 7-11). On or about February 5, 2020,

Lackawanna County hired Purvis to work as a lieutenant at the Lackawanna County Prison.

(Doc. 39, ¶ 1; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 1). Domenick served as Lackawanna County Commissioner at the

time Purvis worked at the prison. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 7-11; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 7-11). On June 15, 2020,

Purvis became Acting Captain of Treatment at the prison. (Doc. 39, ¶ 12; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 12).

On August 8, 2020, Purvis became Deputy Warden of Treatment at the prison. (Doc. 39, ¶

13; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 13).

Purvis, a woman in a same-sex marriage, asserts that throughout her tenure at the

prison, Lackawanna County Prison Warden Timothy Betti (“Warden Betti”), Former County

Deputy Director and Lackawanna County Human Resources Director Justin MacGregor

(“MacGregor”), along with other male officials at the prison, regularly subjected Purvis to

highly offensive, sexist, homophobic, and sexual comments. (Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 14-15, 20).

Lackawanna County denies that Purvis was regularly subjected to such comments and asserts

that Purvis was subjected to offensive comments eleven times. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 14-15).

The parties agree that in early December 2021, Warden Betti and other prison officials

investigated Purvis regarding a relationship she allegedly had with Theresa Hernandez

a filing is part of the record and “the court must utilize the document as a conduit to both

access and navigate the record evidence upon which [a non-moving party] relies.” Barber v.

Subway, 131 F. Supp. 3d 321, 322 (M.D. Pa. 2015); see also Konsavage v. Mondelez Glob. LLC,

No. 3:15-CV-1155, 2017 WL 468228, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017).

2

(“Hernandez”), a supervisory employee at Wellpath, the Prison’s medical provider. (Doc. 39,

¶¶ 28-40; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 28-40). According to Lackawanna County, Warden Betti and other

officials investigated Purvis based on serious allegations that Purvis had an improper

relationship with Hernandez. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 28-38). Lackawanna County asserts that the

investigators ultimately concluded that there was not enough independent evidence for prison

officials to discipline Purvis and prison officials did not change the terms of Purvis’s

employment. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 38-40) According to Purvis, Warden Betti and Colleen Orzel, the

Deputy Warden of Operations, instigated the investigation “simply because of [Purvis’s]

sexuality” and the accusations were based on rumors and fabrications. (Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 28-40).

On February 15, 2022, Purvis retained Attorney Derrek W. Cummings (“Cummings”),

who sent a letter to Lackawanna County officials accusing prison officials of discriminating

against Purvis on the basis of her gender and sexual orientation. (Doc. 38-15; Doc. 39, ¶ 41;

Doc. 38-15; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 41). The letter states that prison officials subjected Purvis to hostile

treatment due to her gender and sexual orientation throughout her tenure at the prison and

asserts that prison officials further discriminated against Purvis by falsely accusing her of

having an affair with Hernandez, female co-worker. (Doc. 38-15). Lackawanna County

asserts that this letter was the first time Purvis made a formal report accusing anyone at the

prison of discrimination. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 17-19). According to Lackawanna County, Purvis had

only once emailed MacGregor regarding inappropriate comments, and complained about

certain comments to Domenick as a friend rather than a Lackawanna County official. (Doc.

39, ¶¶ 20-22). Purvis counters that she repeatedly complained to Domenick, the Lackawanna

County Commissioner, about being discriminated against on the basis of her gender and

sexual orientation. (Doc. 43-1, ¶ 19). Purvis further asserts that she complained to MacGregor

3

and to Lackawanna County Labor Counsel Matthew Carmody (“Carmody”) that she felt she

was being targeted by Warden Betti based on her gender and sexual orientation in January

2022, prior to her retaining counsel. (Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 19-20).

The parties agree that on March 7, 2022, Warden Betti interviewed Purvis regarding

an incident wherein it was alleged that Odaliz Wong the spouse of inmate Steven Wong

(“Inmate Wong”), mailed Purvis a package containing contraband. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 42-54; Doc.

43-1, ¶¶ 42-54). The parties dispute whether Purvis acted appropriately in connection with

this package and whether this package contained contraband. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 42-54; Doc. 43-1,

¶¶ 42-54). According to Lackawanna County, on March 2, 2022, the prison received a

package from Odaliz Wong addressed to Purvis containing contraband Odaliz Wong wanted

Purvis to deliver to Inmate Wong. (Doc. 39, ¶ 42). Lackawanna County asserts that prison

officials receiving contraband and delivering it to an inmate is a serious violation of prison

policies, and Warden Betti interviewed Pervis regarding the package. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 43-44).

Lackawanna County claims that Purvis refused to cooperate with the interview, was

insubordinate, and contradicted herself. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 45-46).

Purvis counters that the prison received a package containing a crucifix chain and a

wedding ring, neither of which are contraband under prison policy. (Doc. 43-1, ¶ 42).

According to Purvis, it is neither uncommon nor against prison policy for inmates to have

family members or friends send items directly to prison officials with or without the official’s

consent, especially when those items are not contraband. (Doc. 43-1, ¶ 43). Purvis claims that

this incident would not have “raised a single eyebrow” had the incident not involved Purvis,

who had recently accused Warden Betti and others of discrimination. (Doc. 43-1, ¶ 43). Purvis

denies being insubordinate or dishonest and asserts that when she was interviewed, she

4

expressed hesitance to answer questions without her lawyer present due to her belief that the

interview was an act of retaliation. (Doc. 43-1, ¶ 45).

On March 7, 2022, the Lackawanna County determined that Purvis should be

suspended pending a due process hearing, but on that same day, Purvis requested Family and

Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave, which Lackawanna County promptly granted rather

than suspending Purvis. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 48-49; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 48-49). Purvis’s FMLA leave ended

on May 5, 2022, and Purvis was placed on paid administrative suspension pending a due

process hearing. (Doc. 39, ¶ 50; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 50). On June 14, 2022, a three-member panel

including Warden Betti, Carmody, and Human Resources Compliance Officer Ted Praschak,

held a due process hearing, and the panel recommended that Purvis be terminated. (Doc. 39,

¶¶ 51-52; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 51-52). On June 15, 2022, the Lackawanna County Prison Board

approved Purvis’s termination and Lackawanna County terminated Purvis. (Doc. 39, ¶¶ 52-

54; Doc. 43-1, ¶¶ 52-54).

Purvis filed the operative amended complaint on June 29, 2023, alleging three counts

under state and federal law. (Doc. 27). Count I alleges Lackawanna County violated Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) by retaliating against Purvis after she complained

about discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual orientation. (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 44-46). Count

II alleges that Lackawanna County violated Title VII by subjecting Purvis to a hostile work

environment and terminating Purvis because of her gender and/or sexual orientation. (Doc.

27, ¶¶ 47-51). Count III alleges Lackawanna County violated the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (“PHRA”) by subjecting Purvis to a hostile work environment, retaliating

against Purvis after she complained about discrimination on the basis of gender and sexual

5

orientation, and terminating Purvis because of her gender and/or sexual orientation. (Doc.

27, ¶¶ 52-58).

On November 4, 2024, Lackawanna County filed a motion for summary judgment

along with corresponding exhibits, a statement of facts, and a brief in support. (Doc. 38; Doc.

39; Doc. 40). On December 5, 2024, Purvis filed a brief in opposition, a response to statement

of facts, a counter statement of facts, and corresponding exhibits. (Doc. 43; Doc. 43-1; Doc.

43-2). On December 19, 2024, Lackawanna County filed a reply brief. (Doc. 44). On February

25, 2025, Purvis filed a motion for leave to file a sur reply. (Doc. 47). On April 1, 2025, the

Court granted Purvis’s motion for leave to file a sur reply brief and Purvis filed her sur reply

brief that same day. (Doc. 51; Doc. 52). Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is

now ripe for disposition.

II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be

granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return

a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary

judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the

non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir.

1994). However, a party opposing a summary judgment motion must comply with Local Rule

56.1, which specifically directs the oppositional party to submit a “statement of the material

6

facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [to be filed

by the movant], as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried”; if the

nonmovant fails to do so, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be served

by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted.” See M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1.

A federal court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to make credibility

determinations, weigh evidence, or draw inferences from the facts. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Rather, the court must simply “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249.

The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute

of any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes

such a showing, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings with affidavits or declarations,

answers to interrogatories, or the like to demonstrate specific material facts which give rise to

a genuine issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant must produce

evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case, which it bears the burden

of proving at trial, because “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at

323. Furthermore, mere conclusory allegations and self-serving testimony, whether made in

the complaint or a sworn statement, cannot be used to obtain or avoid summary judgment

7

when uncorroborated and contradicted by other evidence of record. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990); see also Thomas v. Delaware State Univ., 626 F. App’x 384, 389

n.6 (3d Cir. 2015) (not precedential) (“[U]nsupported deposition testimony, which is

contradicted by the record, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment.”); Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd.

v. FES, 301 F.3d 83, 95 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[The plaintiff’s] testimony. . . amounts to an

unsupported, conclusory assertion, which we have held is inadequate to satisfy the movant’s

burden of proof on summary judgment”).

III. DISCUSSION

Lackawanna County moves for summary judgment on four bases. First, Lackawanna

County avers that the Court should grant summary judgment on Purvis’s retaliation claims

Purvis has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. (Doc. 40, at 5). Lackawanna

County next avers that the Court should grant summary judgment on Purvis’s retaliation

claims because Lackawanna County had a nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Purvis.

(Doc. 40, at 5-8). Lackawanna County then posits that the Court should grant summary

judgment on Purvis’s discrimination and hostile work environment claims because Purvis has

failed to present a prima facie case of a hostile work environment. (Doc. 40, at 8-14). Finally,

Lackawanna County moves for summary judgment on Purvis’s punitive damages claims

because punitive damages are not available against a county in Title VII claims and are never

available for PHRA claims. (Doc. 40, at 14-15).

8

The Court will begin its analysis with Purvis’s retaliation claims. (Doc. 28, ¶¶ 44-46,

52-58). Retaliation claims are analyzed through the McDonnell Douglas2 burden shifting

standard under which Purvis must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Moore v.

City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 13, 2006). For the

reasons discussed infra Section III.A, there are genuine disputes of material fact which

preclude summary judgment on Purvis’s prima facie cases of retaliation and as such, the Court

will continue its analysis under the McDonnell Douglas standard. See Moore, 461 F.3d at 342.

The Court will analyze whether Lackawanna County has provided non-discriminatory

reasons for terminating Purvis and whether Purvis has presented evidence from which a

reasonable jury may infer that Lackawanna County’s proposed reasons were pretextual. See

Moore, 461 F.3d at 342. As discussed infra Section III.B, the Court finds Lackawanna County

has presented nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Purvis, but Purvis has presented

evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that those reasons were pretextual.

Accordingly, the Court will DENY Lackawanna County’s motion for summary judgment on

Purvis’s retaliation claims. (Doc. 38).

2 This standard was first established by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, in which the Court held that when analyzing discriminatory hiring

claims, courts first must consider whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie case that an

employer’s decision not to hire them was discriminatory. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), holding

modified by Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993). The Court further

found that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to

propose a non-discriminatory reason for its decision not to hire the plaintiff. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03. The Court concluded that if the employer establishes a non-

discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to

establish that the employer’s proposed non-discriminatory reason is pretextual or

“discriminatory in its application.” McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 807.

9

The Court will then turn to Purvis’s hostile work environment claims. (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 47-

54). For the reasons discussed infra Section III.C, the Court finds that Purvis has presented a

genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether she was subjected to a hostile work

environment and the Court will DENY Lackawanna County’s motion for summary

judgment on Purvis’s hostile work environment claims. (Doc. 38). Finally, the Court will

GRANT Lackawanna County’s motion for summary judgment on Purvis’s punitive damages

claims, as it is unopposed. (Doc. 38).

A. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

PURVIS’S PRIMA FACIE CASE OF RETALIATION.

Counts I and III allege that Lackawanna County violated the Title VII and the PHRA

by retaliating against Purvis for engaging in a protected activity. (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 86-112, 133-55).

Lackawanna County contends that Purvis has failed to establish a prima facie case for

retaliation because she cannot show a causal connection between her participation in a

protected activity and her termination. (Doc. 40, at 3-8). Purvis avers that she has established

a prima facie case of retaliation and there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

causation. (Doc. 43, at 8-14).

Title VII states “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to

discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment. . . because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” 42

U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3. Similarly, the PHRA provides that it is unlawful for an employer to

“discriminate in any manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any

practice forbidden by this act, or because such individual has made a charge, testified or

10

assisted, in any manner, in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act.” 43 Pa.

Stat. Ann. § 955 (d).

These provisions prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for

engaging in protected activity under the acts and courts analyze “retaliation claims arising

under Title VII and the PHRA coextensively.” Steele v. Pelmor Lab’ys, Inc., 725 F. App’x 176,

178 (3d Cir. 2018). To survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must first establish

a prima facie case of retaliation. Moore, 461 F.3d at 340. To establish a prima facie case, “a

plaintiff must tender evidence that: ‘(1) she engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the

employer took an adverse employment action against her; and (3) there was a causal

connection between her participation in the protected activity and the adverse employment

action.’” Moore, 461 F.3d at 340–41 (quoting Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir.

1995)). This prima facie burden is not onerous. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ.,

851 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Leese v. Dep’t of Ins., No. 3:17-CV-00274, 2019 WL

3246746, at *6 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2019). Once the plaintiff meets her initial burden to

establish a prima facie case, courts apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard where

“‘the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason’ for its

conduct and, if it does so, ‘the plaintiff must be able to convince the factfinder both that the

employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the

adverse employment action.’” Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126

F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Lackawanna County submits that Purvis has failed to present evidence showing a

causal link between Purvis’s termination and her engaging in protected activity. (Doc. 40, at

5). “Cases in which the required causal link has been at issue have often focused on the

11

temporal proximity between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse employment

action.” Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997). However,

temporal proximity is only one factor considered when assessing a causal link and

“circumstantial evidence of a ‘pattern of antagonism’ following the protected conduct can

also give rise to the inference. These are not the exclusive ways to show causation, as the

proffered evidence, looked at as a whole, may suffice to raise the inference.” Kachmar, 109

F.3d at 177. A plaintiff is not required to show that they would have suffered an adverse action

but for their protected activity in the prima facie stage, but rather, only needs to needs to present

evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that their protected action was the likely

reason for the adverse action. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 262; see also Leese, 2019 WL

3246746, at *9.

Purvis has presented evidence which creates a genuine dispute of fact regarding

causation. Both parties agree that on February 15, 2022, Purvis arranged for Cummings, her

counsel, to send a letter stating that Purvis had been subjected to discrimination. (Doc. 39, ¶

41; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 41; Doc. 43-4, at 497-499). Lackawanna County does not dispute that a

reasonable jury may infer that this letter constituted a protected activity, but rather, avers that

there is no evidence of a causal link between Purvis’s protected activity and her termination.

(Doc. 40, at 5; Doc. 44, at 3). Lackawanna County emphasizes that Purvis was not terminated

until June 17, 2022, four months after Purvis’s protected activity. (Doc. 40, at 5).

While Purvis was not terminated until June 2022, Purvis has presented evidence from

which a reasonable jury may infer that there was a “pattern of antagonism” following Purvis’s

protected conduct, which creates a genuine dispute of fact regarding causation. Kachmar, 109

F.3d at 177. First, Purvis presents evidence that Cumming’s letter was not Purvis’s only

12

protected activity. Purvis presents a January 13, 2022, email from MacGregor to prison

officials stating that he was recusing himself from the investigation into Purvis’s alleged affair

with Hernandez because Purvis complained that the investigation was “all because of her

sexual orientation and added that she has obtained legal representation.” (Doc. 43-4, at 477).

A reasonable jury may infer that this informal complaint constituted a protected activity

because it was made to MacGregor, a human resources manager, and invoked a specific basis

for discrimination, sexual orientation. See Bonson v. Hanover Foods Corp., 451 F. Supp. 3d 345,

357 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (finding informal complaints to management constitute protected

activity if they invoke the specific type of discrimination at issue). Purvis presents her own

testimony stating that after she complained about the Hernandez investigation being

discriminatory, she was treated differently at the prison and was left out of certain events such

as an event with drug dogs and group lunches. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 65-66; Doc. 43-4, at 29-30).

Purvis’s testimony also includes that individuals she normally had lunch with stopped having

lunch with her and stopped talking to her. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 65-66; Doc. 43-4, at 30). A

reasonable jury may conclude that Purvis was subjected to antagonism after a protected

activity based on this evidence, but the evidence of a pattern of antagonism does not end there.

Purvis also submits evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that after

Cummings sent his letter accusing prison officials of discrimination, Lackawanna County

officials attempted to circumvent Purvis’s counsel before suspending Purvis and terminating

her. Specifically, Purvis presents Cummings’s February 15, 2022, letter which requests that

Lackawanna County officials meet with Cummings to come to an “amicable resolution.”

(Doc. 43-4, at 497). Purvis also points to an email from Richard Jones, a Lackawanna County

insurance and risk management employee, sharing the letter with Lackawanna County Prison

13

leadership, including Warden Betti, on March 2, 2022. (Doc. 43-2, ¶ 70; Doc. 43-4, at 501).

Purvis further points to a March 3, 2022, email from JoAnne Granza (“Granza”), a

Lackawanna County human resources manager, sent to Purvis and not Cummings which

asks Purvis to meet with human resources regarding her accusations. (Doc. 43-2, ¶ 71; Doc.

43-4, at 507). The same email thread shows that Purvis forwarded Granza’s email to

Cummings, who then emailed Granza to offer to arrange a meeting. (Doc. 43-2, ¶ 70; Doc.

43-4, at 506). The record contains Granza’s testimony, in which she stated that she never met

with Cummings. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 72-73; Doc. 43-4, at 522-24). Purvis further presents testimony

from Granza stating that on March 7, 2025, Lackawanna County human resources allowed

Warden Betti, whom human resources knew Purvis accused of discrimination, conduct a

disciplinary interview with Purvis and conduct an investigation into Purvis. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 72-

73; Doc. 43-4, at 522-24). Both parties agree that Lackawanna County determined Purvis

should be suspended on March 7, 2022, and Purvis would have been suspended that day had

she not requested FMLA leave. (Doc. 39, ¶ 48; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 48).

Examining the record, a reasonable jury may conclude that the 20-day gap between

Cummings sending a letter and Purvis being suspended is unduly suggestive of discrimination.

See Par. v. UPMC Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 373 F. Supp. 3d 608, 636 (W.D. Pa. 2019),

cause dismissed sub nom. Par. v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pi, No. 19-2049, 2019 WL 5884996 (3d Cir.

July 24, 2019) (finding a temporal gap of 16 days is unduly suggestive); see Shealey v. Pittsburgh

Mercy Health Sys., Inc., No. 2:23-CV-01511-CCW, 2025 WL 327310, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 29,

2025) (finding 19 days “within the general range of timing that may be considered unduly

suggestive”). However, even absent unduly suggestive timing, a reasonable jury may infer

that Lackawanna County officials engaged in a pattern of antagonism following Purvis’s

14

protected conduct based on evidence from which the jury may conclude that after Purvis

complained about discrimination, prison officials excluded her from events, refused to have

lunch with her, refused to speak with her, attempted to circumvent her counsel, allowed an

individual she accused of discrimination to investigate her, suspended her, and then

terminated her. (Doc. 39, ¶ 48; Doc. 43-1, ¶ 48; Doc. 43-2, ¶ 65-66, 70-71; 72-73; Doc. 43-4,

at 29-30, 477, 497, 501, 506-07; 522-24). There is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

Purvis’s prima facie case of retaliation because a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis’s

complaints about discrimination caused her suspension and eventual termination. See

Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 262; see also Shealey, 2025 WL 327310, at *9; see also Leese, 2019

WL 3246746, at *9. The burden thus shifts to Lackawanna County to provide a

nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Purvis, and then to Purvis to present evidence from

which a reasonable jury may infer that Lackawanna County’s reason is pretextual.

B. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BASED UPON LACKAWANNA COUNTY’S PROPOSED NONDISCRIMINATORY REASON

FOR TERMINATION.

Lackawanna County avers that it is entitled to summary judgment on Purvis’s

retaliation claims because the record exclusively shows Purvis was placed on leave and

terminated due to receiving contraband intended to be delivered to an inmate, acting

insubordinate during an investigatory interview regarding the package, and dishonestly

denying knowledge of the package. (Doc. 40, at 6-8). Lackawanna County further argues that

Purvis cannot establish that its reasons for terminating Purvis were pretextual because the

decision to terminate Purvis was made by the Lackawanna County Prison Board, a neutral

third party, rather than an individual with potential retaliatory animus. (Doc. 44, at 6-7).

Purvis counters that a reasonable jury may conclude that Lackawanna County’s reasons for

15

terminating Purvis were pretextual and she was terminated due to retaliatory animus. (Doc.

43, at 14-17). Purvis further posits that although the Lackawanna County Prison Board made

the final decision to terminate Purvis, a reasonable jury may infer that this decision was based

on Warden Betti’s recommendation to terminate Purvis and Warden Betti was motivated by

retaliatory animus against Purvis. (Doc. 52, at 5-9).

If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, courts apply the McDonnell

Douglas standard where “‘the burden shifts to the employer to advance a legitimate, non-

retaliatory reason’ for its conduct and, if it does so, ‘the plaintiff must be able to convince the

factfinder both that the employer’s proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was

the real reason for the adverse employment action.’” Moore, 461 F.3d at 342 (quoting Krouse,

126 F.3d at 500). “To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot

simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken.” Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d

759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Fennell v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt., LLC, 628 F. Supp.

3d 554, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2022). A plaintiff must “provide evidence from which a factfinder could

reasonably infer that the employer’s proffered justification is merely a pretext for

discrimination [or retaliation].” Burton, 707 F.3d at 426 (3d Cir. 2013). To make a showing

of pretext, “the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a

factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer’s articulated legitimate reasons;

or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating

or determinative cause of the employer’s action.” Burton, 707 F.3d at 427 (quoting Fuentes, 32

F.3d at 764); see also Leese, 2019 WL 3246746, at *11; see also Shealey, 2025 WL 327310, at *10.

A plaintiff may establish pretext by presenting evidence from which a reasonable jury may

infer that the employer fabricated accusations of wrongdoing and there is an issue of material

16

fact regarding whether the plaintiff would have been terminated but-for their protected activity.

See Branch v. Temple Univ., 554 F. Supp. 3d 642, 659 (E.D. Pa. 2021); see also Shealey, 2025 WL

327310, at *10.

In addition to making the above required showing of pretext, if a defendant provides

evidence that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was made by a neutral party rather than

an individual with potential retaliatory animus, the plaintiff must present evidence from

which a reasonable jury may infer that an individual with retaliatory animus recommended

termination which “bore a direct and substantial relation to [plaintiff]’s termination and that

the [biased party’s] recommendation was not independent and was foreseeable.” McKenna v.

City of Philadelphia, 649 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Mason v. Se. Pennsylvania

Transportation Auth., 134 F. Supp. 3d 868, 877 (E.D. Pa. 2015)

Lackawanna County asserts that it terminated Purvis because Wong, the wife of

Inmate Wong, sent Purvis alleged contraband, Wong tasked Purvis with delivering that

contraband to Inmate Wong, Purvis was insubordinate when interviewed about this incident,

and Purvis dishonestly claimed during an interview that she did not know about the package.

(Doc. 40, at 6). The Court finds that Lackawanna County has presented a nondiscriminatory

reason for terminating Purvis and the burden shifts back to Purvis to present evidence from

which a reasonable jury may infer that this reason was pretextual. See Bisbing v. Lehighton

Ambulance Ass’n, Inc., 142 F. App’x 71, 74 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding insubordination to be a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination); see also Hatch v. Franklin Cnty. Jail, No.

1:14-CV-2318, 2017 WL 6397830, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Hatch v.

Franklin Cnty., 755 F. App’x 194 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding a violation of prison security policy

to be a nondiscriminatory reason for termination).

17

A genuine dispute of material fact precludes summary judgment because Purvis has

presented evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that Lackawanna County’s stated

reasons for suspending and terminating Purvis lack credibility and retaliatory animus was the

real reason for her termination. See Branch, 554 F. Supp. 3d at 659; see also Shealey, 2025 WL

327310, at *10. First, Purvis presents evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that

Inmate Wong’s wedding ring and crucifix cannot be considered contraband. Purvis presents

the Lackawanna County Prison Employee Manual which states “[c]ontraband includes

intoxicants, alcohol, pocket knives, tobacco (within secure perimeter), drugs, weapons, and

any and all other objects which may jeopardize the security, safety or stability of the Prison,

or which are specifically prohibited.” (Doc. 43-4, at 598). Purvis further presents testimony

from former Lackawanna County Prison Deputy Warden William Shanley (“Shanley”)

stating that inmates are permitted to have crucifixes and wedding rings so long as they fit

within certain size requirements and don’t have sharp edges. (Doc. 43, at 15-16; Doc. 43-2, ¶

89; Doc. 43-4, at 423). Purvis also presents testimony from Shanley stating that items such as

wedding rings and crucifixes were commonly brought into the prison through reception. (Doc.

43, at 15-16; Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 89-90; Doc. 43-4, at 422-23). From this, a reasonable jury may

conclude that Lackawanna County’s accusations that Purvis received contraband lack

credibility.

Further, a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis acted properly when she learned that

Wong mailed her the wedding ring and crucifix. Purvis presents an email from Jason Cortese

(“Cortese”), a corrections counselor, to Purvis informing Purvis that Inmate Wong was

receiving a package and in response, Purvis stated “[s]ounds good, I’ll forward to the Captain.”

(Doc. 43, at 15; Doc. 43-2, ¶ 84; Doc. 43-4, at 592). Purvis provides her own testimony stating

18

that “the Captain” was the prison’s captain of security. (Doc. 43, at 15; Doc. 43-4, at 44).

Lackawanna County does not present any evidence that Purvis was engaged in an agreement

to smuggle contraband into the prison, and based on this email, a reasonable jury may infer

that Purvis acted properly by notifying prison security officials about the package.

Purvis further presents evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis

was not insubordinate during her interview about the package, but rather was hesitant to

answer questions without her lawyer present because she believed the investigation against

her was in retaliation for her complaints about discrimination. As discussed supra Section

III.A, Purvis presents evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that Cummings

attempted to meet with Lackawanna County human resources regarding Purvis’s accusations

of discrimination against prison officials, but this meeting never happened. (Doc. 43-2, ¶ 70-

73; Doc. 43-4, at 506, 522-24). Further, Purvis presents evidence from which a reasonable

jury may infer that Lackawanna County human resources allowed Warden Betti, whom

human resources knew Purvis accused of discrimination, to conduct a disciplinary interview

with Purvis. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 70, 72-73; Doc. 43-4, at 501, 506, 522-24). Purvis presents

handwritten notes from Amanda Chase (“Chase”), who was present during Warden Betti’s

disciplinary interview with Purvis, from the March 7, 2022, disciplinary interview which state

Purvis “[r]efuses to answer any questions. Wants an [attorney] present.” (Doc. 43-2, ¶ 74;

Doc. 43-4, at 561). Purvis presents her own testimony stating that she told Warden Betti she

was willing to comply with the investigation, but she wanted an attorney present because she

had accused Warden Betti and others of discrimination and believed the allegations against

her were false and targeted. (Doc. 43-4, at 45-46). From this a reasonable jury may conclude

that Purvis was not insubordinate but rather trying to protect herself from retaliation.

19

Finally, Purvis presents evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis

did not dishonestly deny all knowledge of the package. Purvis presents an email thread

between Chase and Warden Betti in which Chase states “Purvis did make mention of the

jewelry contained [during her investigatory interview]. Wedding [r]ing and chain. She stated

she knows nothing of a package addressed to her.” (Doc. 43-4, at 563). Purvis further presents

the initial email from Cortese informing Purvis about the package which does not state that

the package would be addressed to Purvis, but rather informs Purvis that “Wong in Alpha

wanted me to let you know that the package containing his crucifix and silicone wedding ring

should be arriving tomorrow, per the tracking information his family gave him.” (Doc. 43-4,

at 592). From this, a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis was not dishonest when discussing

the package, but rather was forthcoming about knowing its contents and earnest in stating

that she did not know the package was addressed to her personally.

Based on the evidence, a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding Lackawanna

County’s alleged non-discriminatory reasons for terminating Purvis because a reasonable jury

may conclude that Lackawanna County’s stated reasons for terminating Purvis lack

credibility and are thus pretextual. See Branch, 554 F. Supp. 3d at 659; see also Shealey, 2025

WL 327310, at *10. Lackawanna County argues that the Court should overlook this evidence

because the decision to terminate Purvis was not made by Warden Betti or anyone else Purvis

accused of discrimination, but rather, the Lackawanna County Prison Board, a neutral third

party. (Doc. 44, at 6-7). However, Purvis presents testimony from Granza, a human resources

manager, stating that human resources allowed Warden Betti to conduct the investigation

into Purvis despite knowing Purvis had accused him of discrimination. (Doc. 43-2, ¶¶ 72-73;

Doc. 43-4, at 5224). Purvis further presents testimony from Warden Betti stating that he was

20

the one who made the recommendation to the Lackawanna County Prison Board to

terminate Purvis. (Doc. 43-4, at 317). From this, a genuine dispute of material fact exists

regarding whether Purvis was terminated for non-discriminatory reasons because a

reasonable jury may infer that the Lackawanna County Prison Board relied on Warden Betti’s

investigation and recommendation to terminate Purvis when making its decision and could

have foreseen that retaliatory animus affected Warden Betti’s findings and recommendation.

See McKenna, 649 F.3d at 179; see also Mason, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 877. As such, Lackawanna

County’s motion for summary judgment on Purvis’s retaliation claims in Counts I and III is

DENIED. (Doc. 38)

C. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT THAT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON

PURVIS’S HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM.

Counts II and III allege that Lackawanna County violated Title VII and the PHRA by

subjecting Purvis to a hostile work environment.3 (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 47-58). Lackawanna County

avers that Purvis has failed to establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment

because there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis was subjected

to “severe or pervasive” gender and sexual orientation-based discrimination. (Doc. 40, at 8-

14). According to Lackawanna County, the alleged instances of Purvis being subjected to

inappropriate comments and investigations are too few and far between to constitute severe

or pervasive discrimination. (Doc. 40, at 8-14). Purvis avers that she has shown a genuine

dispute of material fact regarding whether she was subjected to severe or pervasive gender and

3 Counts II and III also assert general discrimination claims. (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 50, 57). As

noted by Purvis, Lackawanna County only addresses Purvis’s hostile work environment

claims in Counts II and III. (Doc. 43, at 17). Accordingly, the Court will only address Purvis’s

hostile work environment claims in Counts II and III.

21

sexual orientation discrimination because she has presented evidence from which a

reasonable jury may infer that she was regularly subjected highly offensive and sexual

comments and was subjected to fraudulent investigations. (Doc. 43, at 20-23).

Title VII and the PHRA both prohibit employers from creating a “hostile work

environment amounting to employment discrimination.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524

U.S. 775, 780 (1998); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see also Renna

v. PPL Elec. Utilities, Inc., 2019 PA Super 100, 207 A.3d 355, 368 (2019) (stating “[o]ne form

of discrimination is a hostile work environment, which is a cognizable claim under the

PHRA”). Courts consider Title VII and PHRA hostile work environment claims under the

same standard. See Burgess v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 642 F. App’x 152, 155 (3d Cir. 2016)

(nonprecedential). To survive a motion for summary judgment on a hostile work environment

claim, a plaintiff must present evidence from which a reasonable jury may conclude “(1) the

employee suffered intentional discrimination because of their sex; (2) the discrimination was

pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff; (4) the

discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position;

and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability.” Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods.

Corp., 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 426 (3d

Cir. 2001)).

Lackawanna County avers that Purvis has failed to meet the second element, pervasive

and regular discrimination. (Doc. 40, at 10-14). Under this requirement, “‘simple teasing,’

offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to

discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’” Faragher, 524 U.S. at

788 (citations omitted). However, if a plaintiff presents evidence that they were regularly

22

subjected to comments that are highly offensive to the plaintiff based on their race, sex, and/or

sexual orientation, or comments which are sexually explicit, a reasonable jury may infer that

the plaintiff experienced pervasive and regular discrimination. See Streater v. City of Camden

Fire Dep’t, 567 F. Supp. 2d 667, 669 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding a plaintiff established pervasive

and regular discrimination by presenting evidence that he was regularly subjected to racist

comments); see also Jacobsen v. Meron Med., LLC, No. CV 20-6357, 2022 WL 1567793, at *10

(E.D. Pa. May 18, 2022) (finding a plaintiff established pervasive and regular discrimination

by presenting evidence that the plaintiff was regularly subjected to sexist and sexually explicit

comments); see also Brooks v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., Inc., No. CV 21-1803, 2022 WL 1062981,

at *12 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2022) (finding a plaintiff established pervasive and regular

discrimination by presenting evidence that the plaintiff was regularly subjected to

homophobic slurs and comments and sexually explicit comments).

Purvis has presented a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether she was subjected to

pervasive and regular discrimination. Lackawanna County argues that Purvis only testified

to eleven offensive and sexual comments during her deposition, some of which did not relate

to gender and sexual orientation, and eleven comments are insufficient to create a hostile

work environment claim. (Doc. 40, at 10). The Court is persuaded by Purvis’s

counterargument that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding how frequently

Purvis was subjected to offensive and sexual comments. (Doc. 43, at 22). While Purvis

testified to eleven specific offensive and sexual comments during her deposition, Purvis also

testified that male prison officials made offensive and sexual comments “constant[ly]” and

that some of her eleven specific examples were examples of recurring offensive and sexual

comments such as a recurring comment where MacGregor would refer to a female corrections

23

counselor as a “whore” and recurring comments where MacGregor would note the

attractiveness of Purvis’s sister and wife. (Doc. 43-4, at 13-14, 35). Based on Purvis’s

testimony, a reasonable jury may infer that Purvis was regularly subjected to offensive and

sexual comments and not just subjected to eleven instances of offensive and sexual comments.

See Streater, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 674-75 (finding a plaintiff’s testimony that he was regularly

subjected to racist comments created a question of fact regarding the frequency and

seriousness of his mistreatment); see also Brooks, Inc., 2022 WL 1062981, at *12 (finding a

plaintiff’s testimony that he was regularly subjected to homophobic slurs and comments and

sexually explicit comments created a question of fact regarding the frequency and seriousness

of his mistreatment).

While the Court finds that a reasonable jury may conclude that Purvis was regularly

subjected to offensive and sexual comments, the inquiry does not end there because a

reasonable jury must be able to conclude that the comments were sufficiently severe to create

a hostile work environment. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. The Court finds that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Purvis was regularly subjected to

sufficiently severe comments because Purvis has presented evidence from which a reasonable

jury may infer that she was regularly subjected to homophobic, sexist, and sexually explicit

comments. See Streater, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 669; see also Jacobsen, 2022 WL 1567793, at *10; see

also Brooks, 2022 WL 1062981, at *12. Purvis presents her own testimony in which she lists

examples of comments which were highly offensive to Purvis based on her gender and sexual

orientation and examples of sexually explicit comments such as a comment by Warden Betti

asking if Purvis was “the male or female” in her same-sex marriage, a comment by

MacGregor stating that Purvis’s sister-in-law’s vagina smelled bad, reoccurring comments by

24

MacGregor calling a woman a whore, reoccurring comments by MacGregor about Purvis’s

sister being ugly, and reoccurring comments by MacGregor about Purvis’s wife being “hot.”

(Doc. 43-4, 12-14). Purvis further presents evidence beyond her own testimony from which a

reasonable jury may infer that Purvis was regularly subjected to comments similar to her

examples. Purvis presents an email she sent MacGregor, who was the head of human

resources, complaining about Warden Betti making her uncomfortable. (Doc. 43-4, at 355-

56). Purvis also presents a text message thread between her and MacGregor in which

MacGregor calls a woman a whore and states that Purvis’s wife was attractive. (Doc. 43-4, at

394). Purvis has presented a genuine dispute of fact regarding whether she was subjected to a

hostile work environment because a reasonable jury may conclude that Purvis was regularly

subjected to comments which were offensive to Purvis based on her sexual orientation and

gender and regularly subjected to sexually explicit comments. See Streater, 567 F. Supp. 2d at

669; see also Jacobsen, 2022 WL 1567793, at *10; see also Brooks, 2022 WL 1062981, at *12.

Accordingly, summary judgment on Purvis’s hostile work environment claims in Counts II

and III is DENIED. (Doc. 38).

D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS WARRANTED REGARDING PURVIS’S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE

DAMAGES.

The amended complaint requests punitive damages for all Purvis’s claims. (Doc. 27,

at 12). Lackawanna County avers that it is entitled to summary judgment on Purvis’s claims

for punitive damages because punitive damages are not available against a county under Title

VII and the PHRA does not allow for punitive damages. (Doc. 40, at 15). Purvis concedes

that punitive damages are not permitted in this case. (Doc. 43, at 7). Accordingly,

25

Lackawanna County’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Purvis’s claims

for punitive damages. (Doc. 38).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lackawanna County’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 38). Lackawanna County’s motion is

GRANTED as to Purvis’s requests for punitive damages. (Doc. 38). Purvis’s requests for

punitive damages will be DISMISSED. (Doc. 27, at 12). Lackawanna County’s motion is

DENIED as to Counts I, II, and III. (Doc. 38).

An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: September 29, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge

26