The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 176 Ohio St.3d 1.]
THE STATE EX REL. RENNER v. ATHENS COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS.
[Cite as State ex rel. Renner v. Athens Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2024-Ohio-356.]
Elections—Mandamus—Writ sought to compel board of elections to certify
relator’s name to primary-election ballot—Board of elections did not abuse
its discretion or act in disregard of applicable legal provisions in
invalidating relator’s declaration of candidacy and petition—Relator did
not correctly withdraw her candidacy under R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a)—
Relator’s attempt to file a second declaration of candidacy and petition was
prohibited under R.C. 3501.38(I)(1)—Writ denied.
(No. 2024-0078—Submitted January 30, 2024—Decided February 1, 2024.)
IN MANDAMUS.
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Per Curiam Opinion announcing the judgment of the court.
{¶ 1} In this expedited election case, relator, Amy Renner, seeks a writ of
mandamus compelling respondent, the Athens County Board of Elections, to certify
her name to the March 19, 2024 Democratic Party primary ballot as a candidate for
the seat on the Athens County Board of Commissioners commencing January 2,
2025. Alternatively, Renner seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the board to
examine and determine the validity of the signatures on her petition and thereafter
certify her name to the ballot. We deny the writ.
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} Renner is a resident and a qualified elector of Athens County, and she
is the current mayor of the village of Chauncey. She seeks to run in the Democratic
Party primary election as a candidate for the seat on the Athens County Board of
Commissioners commencing January 2, 2025. R.C. 3513.05 provides that “[e]ach
person desiring to become a candidate for a party nomination at a primary election
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* * * shall, not later than four p.m. of the ninetieth day before the day of the primary
election, file a declaration of candidacy and petition.” Renner was therefore
required to file her declaration of candidacy and petition with the board by 4:00
p.m. on December 20, 2023, which was 90 days before the March 19, 2024 primary
election. The Ohio Secretary of State has prescribed Form No. 2-G (“2-G form”)
as the form that meets the requirements of R.C. 3513.05 that a person making his
or her declaration of candidacy may file with the board of elections. This
declaration is made on the top half of the 2-G form, and qualified electors sign the
“petition for candidate” on the bottom half of the form.
{¶ 3} On December 15, 2023, Renner filed a 2-G form (“first petition”) with
the board, declaring, “I desire to be a candidate for nomination to the office of
County Commissioner in the County of Athens, Ohio as a member of the
Democratic Party for the: full term commencing 1/1/2025.”
{¶ 4} There are two seats on the Athens County Board of Commissioners
that are up for election in November 2024, but contrary to what Renner set forth on
her first petition, neither seat has a term that commences January 1, 2025. Rather,
a term for one of the seats commences January 2, 2025, and the other commences
January 3, 2025. See R.C. 305.01(B) (staggering the commencement dates for
county-commissioner terms).
{¶ 5} Renner attests that on December 18, 2023, the board’s director
informed her of the mistake on her first petition relating to the incorrect
commencement date. Renner then filed a document (“the withdrawal letter”) with
the board on December 18, asking it to “[p]lease withdraw [her] petitions filed on
12/15/23 for County Commissioner.” The board had not taken any formal action
on Renner’s first petition between the time that she filed it—December 15—and
the time that she attempted to withdraw it—December 18.
{¶ 6} On December 20, Renner filed a new 2-G form (“second petition”)
with the board, this time declaring, “I desire to be a candidate for nomination to the
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office of Athens County Commissioner in the County of Athens, Ohio as a member
of the Democratic Party for the: full term commencing 1-2-2025.”
{¶ 7} On December 27, the board held a regular meeting during which it
addressed Renner’s first petition, withdrawal letter, and second petition. At that
meeting, the board did not check the signatures on Renner’s first petition, because
it contained a “fatal error,” namely, Renner’s identifying the office she sought as
commencing on January 1, 2025. Also at that meeting, the board’s legal counsel
explained to the board his view that Renner’s attempt to withdraw her first petition
through her withdrawal letter and then submit a second petition was ineffectual
because she did not withdraw her candidacy; rather, Renner had only attempted to
withdraw her petition. In support of his position, the board’s counsel invoked R.C.
3501.38(I)(2)(a), which provides that “[n]o declaration of candidacy, nominating
petition, or other petition for the purpose of becoming a candidate may be
withdrawn after it is filed in a public office. Nothing in this division prohibits a
person from withdrawing as a candidate as otherwise provided by law.”
{¶ 8} Counsel also observed that because Renner did not withdraw her
candidacy, her second petition constituted an attempt to alter, correct, or add to her
first petition, which is prohibited under R.C. 3501.38(I)(1). Counsel thus
recommended that the board disapprove Renner’s first petition because it contained
a “fatal error” and disapprove Renner’s second petition as a prohibited alteration,
correction, or addition to her first petition. A member of the board moved to follow
counsel’s recommendation to reject both of Renner’s petitions, and the motion
passed unanimously.
{¶ 9} On January 16, 2024, Renner brought this expedited election action
in mandamus against the board. Renner asks that this court issue a writ of
mandamus ordering the board to certify her name to the ballot as a Democratic
Party candidate for the office of Athens County Commissioner commencing
January 2, 2025, or, alternatively, ordering the board to determine the validity of
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the signatures on her second petition and thereafter certify her to the primary ballot.
As directed by this court’s expedited scheduling order, 172 Ohio St.3d 1494, 2024-
Ohio-153, 225 N.E.3d 998, the board answered Renner’s complaint, and the parties
filed their evidence and briefs.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Renner must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the requested relief,
(2) the board has a clear legal duty to provide it, and (3) she does not have an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Linnabary v.
Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13. Renner lacks
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law due to the proximity of the
election, and she therefore meets the third element. State ex rel. LaChapelle v.
Harkey, 173 Ohio St.3d 76, 2023-Ohio-2723, 227 N.E.3d 1164, ¶ 8. An analysis
under the first two elements requires us to determine “whether the board engaged
in fraud or corruption, abused its discretion, or acted in clear disregard of applicable
law. State ex rel. Brubaker v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Elections, 168 Ohio St.3d 211,
2022-Ohio-1087, 197 N.E.3d 548, ¶ 10. According to Renner, the board clearly
disregarded applicable law and abused its discretion by failing to certify her to the
ballot.
{¶ 11} The board determined that Renner’s first petition contained a “fatal
error.” And it further determined that it could not certify her to the ballot based on
her withdrawal letter and second petition, principally relying on R.C.
3501.38(I)(2)(a). As we now explain, Renner has not shown that the board abused
its discretion or acted in clear disregard of applicable law in making these
determinations.
A. Renner incorrectly characterizes her first petition as constituting a nullity
{¶ 12} Renner first argues that there should have been no impediment to the
board’s consideration of her second petition because, she says, her first petition was
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a nullity. Implicit in Renner’s argument is the notion that the board should have
ignored her first petition and proceeded straight to considering the validity of her
second petition. Had the board done so, the argument runs, there would have been
no need for it to have considered the first petition’s effect on the second petition.
Renner is mistaken.
{¶ 13} In support, Renner points to a line of decisions from this court that
have construed R.C. 3513.08 within the context of a specified class of judicial
elections. The first paragraph of the statute provides that “[e]ach person filing a
declaration of candidacy for nomination at a primary election as a candidate for
election to” specified judicial offices “shall, if two or more judges of the same court
are to be elected at any one election, designate the term of the office for election to
which he seeks such nomination by stating therein, if a full term, the date of the
commencement of such term.” Id. The second paragraph of R.C. 3513.08, which
Renner does not dispute applies to her under these circumstances, contains
language that is equivalent in all material respects to the class of judicial elections
to which the first paragraph of R.C. 3513.08 applies. It provides that “[e]ach person
filing a declaration of candidacy for nomination at a primary election as a candidate
for election to the office of county commissioner * * * shall, if two or more
commissioners of the same county are to be elected at any one election, designate
the term of the office for election to which he seeks the nomination by stating
therein, if a full term, the date of the commencement of the term.” Id.
{¶ 14} In enacting R.C. 3513.08, “the General Assembly recognized that
because of the staggered dates such information is necessary for an accurate
description of the office.” State ex rel. Hanna v. Milburn, 170 Ohio St. 9, 14, 161
N.E.2d 891 (1959). Thus, “[w]here a public office is of such a nature that in
accurately describing [the office] it is necessary to state not only the title but also
the time of its commencement, then failure to accurately state the date of
commencement of the term will invalidate a nominating petition.” Id.
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{¶ 15} In State ex rel. Calhoun v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, 36 Ohio St.3d
164, 522 N.E.2d 49 (1988), a board of elections invoked R.C. 3513.08 in its
refusing to place a prospective judicial candidate on the primary ballot who had
failed to specify the date of the commencement of the full term of the office he
sought. This court denied the candidate’s request for a writ of mandamus to place
his name on the ballot, observing that the statute “ ‘specifically requires a primary
candidate to designate both the judicial office and the term for which he seeks
nomination, and makes provision for setting forth the full term * * * with dates
thereof. The requirements of that section are mandatory.’ ” (Emphasis added in
Calhoun.) Calhoun at 165, quoting State ex rel. McGinley v. Bliss, 149 Ohio St.
329, 331, 78 N.E.2d 715 (1948).
{¶ 16} In State ex rel. Clinard v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Elections, 51 Ohio St.3d
87, 554 N.E.2d 895 (1990), this court applied our reasoning in Calhoun to a factual
setting that is almost identical to the one featured here. There, a prospective judicial
candidate filed a declaration of candidacy and petitions to gain a place on the
primary ballot, but he mistakenly indicated that the term of the office he sought
began on January 1 rather than January 2. Relying on our interpretation of R.C.
3513.08 in Calhoun, this court observed that the candidate had a mandatory duty to
state in his declaration of candidacy the commencement of the term sought.
Clinard at 88. Because the candidate had not accurately set forth the
commencement date, we concluded that the board of elections had not disregarded
the law in invalidating his declaration of candidacy and petitions. Id.
{¶ 17} Based on the caselaw construing the first paragraph of the statute, it
follows that under the analogous second paragraph of R.C. 3513.08, Renner had a
mandatory duty to accurately state in her first petition the commencement date of
the term of the office she sought. Because she did not do so, her first petition was
invalid. Renner’s contrary argument that her petition was a nullity fails. The only
authority Renner cites in support of her position is a dissenting opinion in Thornton
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v. Salak, 112 Ohio St.3d 254, 2006-Ohio-6407, 858 N.E.2d 1187, in which the
author wrote that “the better reasoning is that an invalid petition is a nullity and
cannot and should not affect anything,” id. at ¶ 34 (McMonagle, J., dissenting). A
dissent does not command this court’s adherence.
{¶ 18} Therefore, we reject Renner’s argument that her first petition was a
nullity.
B. Renner’s contention that she did not seek multiple offices at the same election
fails to demonstrate that the board erred in rejecting her second petition
{¶ 19} Renner next argues that even if her first petition is not declared a
nullity, the board still erred because she did not seek multiple offices at the same
election. Renner bases this argument on R.C. 3513.052, even though the board did
not specifically invoke that statute in making its determination to not certify her
name to the ballot. Even so, Renner surmises that it is necessary to discuss R.C.
3513.052 because the “unstated conclusion underpinning [the board’s] counsel’s
advice seems to be that [Renner] is not permitted to file multiple candidate petitions
for the same election.” This argument, as we understand it, is a variation on her
“nullity” argument.
{¶ 20} In Renner’s view, because no office on the Athens County Board of
Commissioners commenced January 1, 2025, her first petition did not seek a county
“office” within the meaning of R.C. 3513.052. Therefore, she argues, the statute’s
“multiple-offices-candidacies prohibition,” State ex rel. Coble v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of
Elections, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282, ¶ 31, fn. 3, does
not apply to her.
{¶ 21} Renner relies on State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Jennings, 57 Ohio St. 415,
425, 49 N.E. 404 (1898), in which this court quoted High, A Treatise on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Section 625, for the proposition that an “ ‘office
* * * may be defined as a public position, to which a portion of the sovereignty of
the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches for the time being, and
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which is exercised for the benefit of the public.’ ” (Emphasis added.) But in
Jennings, we did not have before us the statutory scheme we face in this case, and
it therefore does not control.
{¶ 22} A more sound approach lies in the view that an “office” is simply a
“position of duty, trust, or authority, esp. one conferred by a governmental authority
for a public purpose <[as in] the office of attorney general>.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1254 (10th Ed.2014). This meaning of “office” squares with the way
the word is used in R.C. 3513.08’s second paragraph, which directs a person in
Renner’s shoes to “designate the term of the office for election” sought. (Emphasis
added.) Adopting Renner’s argument—that is, by construing “office” to
encompass a time period—would render meaningless the statute’s use of “term.”
See Rhodes v. New Philadelphia, 129 Ohio St.3d 304, 2011-Ohio-3279, 951 N.E.2d
782, ¶ 23 (“We must give effect to every term in a statute and avoid a construction
that would render any provision meaningless, inoperative, or superfluous”).
{¶ 23} The fact that R.C. 3513.08 also requires a declaration of candidacy
to specify the term of office does not signify that a failure to specify the term means
no “office” was sought. In the end, this argument, like Renner’s claim that her first
petition was a nullity, lacks merit. Moreover, it does not help Renner to overcome
the effect of R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a).
C. Renner’s withdrawal letter did not effect a valid withdrawal of her candidacy
{¶ 24} For her last argument, Renner asserts that even if this court were to
conclude that her first petition was not a nullity, she nevertheless made an effective
withdrawal of her candidacy. The crux of Renner’s argument is that the words she
used in her withdrawal letter were sufficient to withdraw her candidacy even though
the letter sought only to withdraw her “petitions.” For its part, the board argues
that the letter’s reference to “petitions” is not sufficient to effect a withdrawal of
her candidacy.
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{¶ 25} R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a) provides that “nothing in this division
prohibits a person from withdrawing as a candidate as otherwise provided by law.”
As noted, this is the statute the board relied on in reaching its decision that Renner’s
second petition was invalid. We conclude that the board did not abuse its discretion
or clearly disregard applicable law in applying the statute.
{¶ 26} Renner claims that the steps she took in this case to withdraw are
“on all fours” with those that this court considered in Coble, 130 Ohio St.3d 132,
2011-Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282. In that case, a prospective judicial candidate
filed his nominating petition with the board of elections but was informed by a
board employee that his petition was three valid signatures short of the statutory
requirement. Our opinion in Coble states that the candidate “withdrew his
candidacy,” id. at ¶ 4, but does not specify how. The candidate then filed a new
nominating petition for the same office and the same election and was told this time
by a board employee that his petition was acceptable. Thereafter, the board rejected
the candidate’s petition and refused to certify his name to the ballot.
{¶ 27} The candidate petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus ordering
the placement of his name on the ballot, and we granted his request. We observed
that under R.C. 3513.261, a board of elections could not accept a nominating
petition of a person seeking to be a candidate for a municipal office if that person
had already filed a petition to be a candidate for the municipal office at the same
election. Coble at ¶ 12-13. Because the candidate had filed a nominating petition
for the same municipal office for the same election, we concluded that absent an
applicable exception, R.C. 3513.261 would bar the second nominating petition.
Coble at ¶ 18. This court, however, identified an exception in R.C. 3513.052(G),
which provided that, R.C. 3513.261 notwithstanding, a board of elections could not
disqualify a person from being a candidate for office if that person “timely
withdraws” as a candidate. Coble at ¶ 21, citing R.C. 3513.052(G). We concluded
that because the candidate withdrew before the applicable filing deadline and timely
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submitted a subsequent nominating petition for the same office before the deadline,
the candidate had made a “timely withdraw[al]” as that phrase is defined under R.C.
3513.052(H). Coble at ¶ 27. In reaching that conclusion, we distinguished our
earlier decision in State ex rel. Canales-Flores v. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Elections, 108
Ohio St.3d 129, 2005-Ohio-5642, 841 N.E.2d 757, in which this court concluded
that R.C. 3513.052 would not protect a candidate who had filed a second
nominating petition for the same office at the same election after the first
nominating petition had been ruled invalid by a board of elections.
{¶ 28} Here, Renner says that she withdrew her candidacy when she filed
her letter with the board asking that it “withdraw [her] petitions filed on 12/15/23
for County Commissioner.” Because she then filed her second petition before the
December 20, 2023 filing deadline, she reasons that under Coble, she effected a
timely withdrawal.
{¶ 29} Coble, however, did not address the question Renner poses about the
sufficiency of an attempt to withdraw as a candidate, because we did not expressly
say what it was about the candidate’s paperwork that led us to conclude that he
“withdrew his candidacy,” Coble, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-Ohio-4550, 956
N.E.2d 282, at ¶ 4. Perhaps recognizing this, Renner invokes R.C.
3513.052(H)(2)’s definition of “timely withdraws.” As defined, “timely
withdraws” means “[w]ithdrawing as a candidate before the applicable deadline for
filing a declaration of candidacy * * * for which the person is seeking to become a
candidate at the same election.” R.C. 3513.052(H)(2)(a).
{¶ 30} In urging us to conclude that her withdrawal letter constituted a valid
method for withdrawing her candidacy, Renner observes that the statute does not
mandate the use of any particular language for withdrawing as a candidate, and, she
adds, there apparently is no form for doing so. Further, she invokes Secretary of
State Directive 2023-34, Section 14.07, which provides that “a withdrawal of
candidacy must be made in writing and filed with the election officials with whom
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the declaration of candidacy * * * was filed.”1 Renner points out that this directive
contains no specific directions concerning what must be in the “writing” to
effectuate a withdrawal of candidacy.
{¶ 31} Renner thus argues that in the absence of further guidance, drawing
a distinction between the act of withdrawing a petition (which her withdrawal letter
expressly conveyed) and one’s candidacy (which her withdrawal letter did not
expressly convey) is illogical because, she says, the withdrawal of either the
petition or candidacy necessarily terminates the other. Renner’s declaration of
candidacy and petition were on the same instrument, i.e., a 2-G form. And so, she
says, a person’s request to withdraw a petition suffices to withdraw the person’s
candidacy.
{¶ 32} However, as the board points out, R.C. 3513.30(B) provides that a
withdrawal of a person’s candidacy before the primary election “shall be effected
and the statement of withdrawal shall be filed in accordance with the procedures
prescribed in division (D).” In turn, R.C. 3513.30(D) provides that the “withdrawal
may be effected by the filing of a written statement by such candidate announcing
the candidate’s withdrawal and requesting that the candidate’s name not be printed
on the ballots.” Here, the withdrawal letter that Renner filed with the board did not
announce the withdrawal of her candidacy and did not request that her name not be
printed on the ballots. In failing to meet these requirements, it follows that Renner
has not shown that she “effected” a valid withdrawal of her candidacy under R.C.
3513.30(B).
{¶ 33} In response, Renner does not dispute that R.C. 3513.30(B) applies to
her but she denies that she was required to follow all of R.C. 3513.30(D)’s
requirements. She says that division (D) focuses on those who have been certified
1. See Ohio Secretary of State, Directives, Advisories, Memo & Tie Votes, available at
https://www.ohiosos.gov/elections/elections-officials/rules/ (accessed Jan. 31, 2024).
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to appear on the ballot because it speaks to those who have been “nominated in a
primary election,” R.C. 3513.30(D). She then reasons that because her name has
not appeared on the ballot, she was not required to request that her name not be
printed on the ballot.
{¶ 34} To begin, that argument would not cure Renner’s failure to file a
written statement announcing her withdrawal as a candidate. In any event,
Renner’s ballot-focused argument falters. R.C. 3513.30(B) provides that a person
who desires to withdraw shall follow “the procedures” of R.C. 3513.30(D)
(emphasis added), not “some” of those procedures. Adopting Renner’s argument
would require us to insert words the General Assembly did not prescribe. See State
ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107,
¶ 30 (courts cannot delete words from or insert words into a statute).
{¶ 35} In summary, Renner’s arguments do not show that she correctly
withdrew her candidacy as “otherwise provided by law,” R.C. 3501.38(I)(2)(a), or
that she is entitled to the benefit of our decision in Coble, 130 Ohio St.3d 132, 2011-
Ohio-4550, 956 N.E.2d 282. Nor does Renner advance any meaningful analysis
against the board’s determination that in the absence of a valid withdrawal, her
second petition was a forbidden attempt to “alter[], correct[], or add[]” to her first
petition, see R.C. 3501.38(I)(1). Given all this, we conclude that the board did not
clearly disregard applicable law or abuse its discretion in rejecting both of Renner’s
petitions.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 36} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the writ. Because Renner has
not shown that the board of elections clearly disregarded applicable law or abused
its discretion, we need not reach the board’s argument that Renner’s action is barred
by laches.
Writ denied.
KENNEDY, C.J., and DONNELLY and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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FISCHER, DEWINE, and DETERS, JJ., concur in judgment only.
BRUNNER, J., not participating.
_________________
Brunner Quinn, and Patrick M. Quinn, for relator.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecuting Attorney, and N. Zachary
West, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
_________________
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