The opinion
UMNIIDTEDDL ES TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORFI FCLTO CROIDURAT
TAMPA DIVISION
Winifred Simpson,
Plaintiff,
v. CASE NO. 8:24-cv-02932-SDM-NHA
Stepp’s Towing Service, Inc.,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
ORDER
Alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act, as
well as interference and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act, Win-
ifred Simpson sues (Doc. 11) Stepp’s Towing Service, Inc. The defendant moves
(Doc. 18) under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
BACKGROUND1
Simpson, a black woman, worked for the defendant from October 2021 to De-
cember 2022 as a “Call Taker.” (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 15-17) Simpson suffered from an un-
specified “mental or physical impairment.” (Doc. 11 at ¶ 18) At some point, Simpson
1 Theis section assumes the veracity of Simpson’s “well-pleaded factual allegations” while
“eliminat[ing] any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions.” Am. Dental Ass'n v.
Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (U.S.,
2009)).
“inquired with Defendant about taking FMLA leave.” (Doc. 11 at ¶ 24) Simpson’s
manager “instructed . . . that she should not apply for FMLA leave and that Defend-
ant would not terminate her employment for missing work” as Simpson dealt with
her mental or physical impairment. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 25) Simpson ultimately did not ap-
ply for FMLA leave. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 26)
On at least one occasion, Simpson applied for a promotion but was denied.
(Doc. 11 at ¶ 28) Meanwhile, at some other time, at least one of her white colleagues
received a promotion. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 29) Also, at least one of her white colleagues was
“called into the manager’s office and asked if they were comfortable with their sched-
ule or if there was anything they wanted to change.” (Doc. 11 at ¶ 30) Simpson,
however, “was not afforded the ability to provide feedback or input on her sched-
ule.”2 (Doc. 11 at ¶ 31) In November 2022, Simpson complained to the defendant
about what she believed to be discrimination and disparate treatment on account of
her race. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 34)
That same month, Simpson applied for short-term disability leave to undergo
surgery for her condition.3 (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 35-36) Six weeks later, Simpson was termi-
nated. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 38) She now brings this lawsuit.
2 Simpson contradicts this in the very next paragraph, admitting that she “requested changes
to her schedule multiple times.” (Doc. 11 at ¶ 32)
3 Simpson fails confirm whether she was granted leave, whether she took the leave, or
whether she underwent the surgery.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Dismiss Standard
To survive a challenge by motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain suffi-
cient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. If a complaint
simply parrots the elements of a cause of action and is supported by mere conclusory
statements, it must be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Discrimination Under Title VII and the FRCA
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII or the FCRA,
the plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class defined by
race or gender; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she suffered an objectively seri-
ous adverse job action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than a similarly situated
person outside of her protected class. See Maynard v. Board of Regents of Div. of Univs. of
Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). Simpson’s case rests on the
allegations (1) that she did not receive a promotion for which she believes she was
qualified but similarly situated white colleagues with less experience and lesser quali-
fications were selected for the positions and (2) that she was not afforded the oppor-
tunity to provide feedback or input on her schedule but similarly situated white col-
leagues were given the opportunity to provide input on their schedules. (Doc. 11 at
¶¶ 28-32) Simpson fails to plead any facts to support how she was more qualified
than her white colleagues for these positions. Simpson also contradicts her alleged in-
ability to negotiate her work schedule by her admission that she requested schedule
changes. (Doc. 11 at ¶ 36)
Discrimination under the ADA
To state a claim for discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must establish
that she (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual capable of performing the es-
sential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was
intentionally subjected to discrimination because of the disability. Terrell v. USAIR,
132 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1998); Mont-Ros v. City of West Miami, 111 F.Supp.2d
1338, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Simpson has failed to plead facts sufficient to state any
of the elements of an ADA discrimination claim. Her amended complaint states only
that she was “a member of a protected class under the ADA” and that she “suffered
from a mental or physical impairment which substantially limited one or more of her
major life activities.” These word-for-word recitations of the ADA, unaccompanied
by any supporting facts, cannot establish that Simpson had a disability or that she
suffered discrimination as a result.
Retaliation under Title VII, the FRCA, the ADA, and the FMLA
To state a claim of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish (1) that she engaged
in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered adverse employment action, and (3) that
the protected activity caused the adverse employment action. Rainey v. Holder, 412
Fed. Appx. 235 (11th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff must show that “the decision-makers
were aware of the protected conduct and that the protected activity and the adverse
action were not wholly unrelated.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1376 (11th
Cir. 2008).
As regards Simpson’s retaliation claims under Title VII and the FRCA, she
has failed to allege a causal connection between any protected activity and adverse
employment action. She alleges that she engaged in protected activity by complain-
ing to the defendant about disparate treatment but later states that she was termi-
nated for missing too many work days that were used to treat her medical condition.
By Simpson’s admission, her termination was wholly unrelated to her race.
Likewise, Simpson has failed to establish the causal relation required for her
ADA and FMLA retaliation claims. Simpson alleges that the defendant informed her
that she was terminated for missing too many days of work for treatment of her con-
dition, which has not been established as a disability. Also, the plaintiff has failed to
allege facts relating to her notice of short-term leave, such as the duration of the pro-
posed leave or the prospect of time missed later.
FMLA Interference
To state a prima facie case for FMLA interference, an employee must allege
that (1) she was entitled to a benefit under the FMLA and (2) she was denied a bene-
fit to which he was entitled. Kruzig v. Pulte Home Corp., 602 F.3d 1231, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2010). The FMLA authorizes an eligible employee for twelve weeks of annual
unpaid leave for a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable to per-
form the functions of the position of such employee.” Hurlbert v. St. Mary's Health
Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). Simpson’s complaint, which,
among other deficiencies, parrots the language of the FMLA with the conclusory
statement that she suffered from such a “serious health condition,” fails to provide
the factual basis necessary to establish her standing under the FMLA.
CONCLUSION
The defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to all counts.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on September 24, 2025.
ALTA. WAAdgelen
STEVEND.MERRYDAY □□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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