The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
MARK WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2440-CPT
FRANK BISIGNANO,
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,1
Defendant.
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O R D E R
Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 24). For the reasons discussed below, the Plaintiff’s motion is
granted.
I.
The Plaintiff initiated this action in October 2023 seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. (Doc. 1). In March 2024, at the Commissioner’s
1 Mr. Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Mr. Bisignano is substituted for the former Acting Commissioner, Mr.
Leland Dudek, as the Defendant in this suit.
request, the Court reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for
further proceedings before the Social Security Administration (SSA). (Docs. 16, 20).
The Clerk of Court entered Judgment for the Plaintiff the same day. (Doc. 21).
Roughly one month later, the Plaintiff sought and obtained $2,911.44 in attorney’s
fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). (Docs. 22, 23). As a result of the
subsequent proceedings on remand, the Plaintiff was granted past-due benefits.2 See
(Doc. 24-2).
By way of the instant motion, the Plaintiff now asks that the Court enter an
order pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) approving fees in the amount of $20,336 for the
services his attorney rendered in this lawsuit. (Doc. 24). According to the SSA, this
figure equates to twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits awarded, which is the
statutory fee limit for the legal work conducted on remand before a district court. See
42 U.S.C. § 406(b). This sum does not conflict with the Plaintiff’s fee contract with
his attorney, as that agreement provides for a contingency fee of twenty-five percent of
his past-due benefits. (Doc. 24-1). According to the Plaintiff, his lawyer is aware of
his obligation to reduce the contingency fee by the amount of the previous EAJA
award. (Doc. 24 at 8). The Commissioner neither supports nor opposes the Plaintiff’s
fee motion. Id.
2 The Notice of Award issued by the SSA does not reflect the total monetary sum awarded the Plaintiff.
See (Doc. 24-2).
II.
Section 406(b) governs the authorization of attorney’s fees in Social Security
actions where, as here, a district court remands the matter to the Commissioner for
further proceedings, and the Commissioner later grants a claimant past-due benefits.
See Bergen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1273, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Under such a scenario, a claimant may return to the district court—as the Plaintiff has
done here—and seek fees not exceeding twenty-five percent of the past-due benefits
awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 59 (2019).
The fee amount requested, however, must be reasonable. See Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 808 (2002); Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 601 F.3d 1268, 1271
(11th Cir. 2010). To ensure this is the case, section 406(b) mandates that a court
engage in an independent review of a counsel’s fee arrangement with his client.
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. As part of its oversight role, a court may direct that an
attorney supply “a record of the hours spent representing the claimant and a statement
of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.” Id. at 808.
A court may also require that the approved fee figure be offset by any previous fee
award or by any fees due to counsel under a contingency fee arrangement. Id.; Jackson,
601 F.3d at 1274.
In addition, an attorney who is successful in claiming fees under both the EAJA
and section 406(b) must refund “to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A lawyer
may do so either by deducting the earlier EAJA award from the subsequent
section 406(b) award or by refunding the smaller EAJA fee and accepting the
section 406(b) payment in full. Jackson, 601 F.3d at 1274.
Here, the Plaintiff’s sought-after fee figure of $20,336.00 is predicated upon
twelve hours of legal services his counsel, Michael Steinberg, furnished on this appeal.
(Doc. 24-3). This sum encompasses all the legal work Mr. Steinberg performed before
the Court and—as noted above—is consistent with the Plaintiff’s contingency fee
agreement, as the requested amount does not exceed twenty-five percent of the total
past-due benefits granted the Plaintiff. (Docs. 24-1, 24-2). In light of these facts, as
well as the nature and extent of the professional assistance provided, the positive
results achieved, and the Commissioner’s lack of opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion,
the Court finds that the proposed fee figure is reasonable. See Brown v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec. Admin., 2024 WL 4529664, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4529245 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2024); Ocasio v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4135793, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2024); White v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2012 WL 1900562, at *6 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, 2012 WL 1890558 (M.D. Fla. May 24, 2012).
III.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:
1. The Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees (Doc. 24) is granted, and the
Plaintiff shall be awarded fees in the sum of $20,336 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
2. Upon receipt of these monies, Plaintiff’s counsel shall promptly refund
to the Plaintiff the previously authorized EAJA fee award of $2,911.44.
3. This action shall be closed and shall remain closed.
SO ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, this 24th day of September 2025.
Cipla FF Dect.
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER P. TUITE
United States Magistrate Judge
Copies to:
Counsel of record