The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES F. CLOWER, JR,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 2:20-cv-10257
Honorable F. Kay Behm
MIKE BROWN,
Respondent.
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OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
REINSTATE THE HABEAS PETITION [ECF No. 27]
Before the Court is Petitioner Charles F. Clower Jr.’s motion docketed as a
Motion to Reinstate the Habeas Petition.1 The Court previously dismissed
Petitioner’s habeas petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for failing to
comply with the conditions set forth in the Court’s order staying and
administratively closing the case. Petitioner now appears to challenge the
dismissal of his petition and requests that the Judge previously assigned to this case
recuse himself. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the motion.
1 Petitioner titled his document “Motion For District Judge Borman To Secure Himself And Step
Down As Residing Judge Due To Discrimination And Neglect Of Duty And Tampering With The
Defense Evidence And Before Stepping Down Reinstate The Defense Petition For Writ Of
Habeas Corpus Due To The Evidence Chief Judge Cox Presented To Judge Borman By The
Defense.” ECF No. 27, PageID.1467.
In his motion to reinstate the petition, Petitioner requests that District Judge
Paul D. Borman recuse himself because of discrimination and neglect of duty.
Petitioner argues that when dismissing his petition, Judge Borman ignored
undisputed facts and evidence. While Petitioner does not explicitly explain his
challenge to Judge Borman’s dismissal order, he claims that he was not required to
exhaust his state court remedies beyond the Michigan Supreme Court and argues
that the Court erred by failing to review his evidence, consider his actual
innocence, and find that the state court erred in his criminal and post-conviction
proceedings. ECF No. 27, PageID.1467.
First, to the extent Petitioner requests to recuse Judge Borman from this
case, his request is moot. This case has been reassigned to the undersigned.
Accordingly, the request for recusal is denied.
Second, because Petitioner appears to challenge the dismissal of his petition,
the Court will construe the motion as either being filed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). The Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to
relief under either rule.
Motions to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be granted
only if there is a clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening
change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice. GenCorp., Inc. v. Am.
Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). While Rule 59(e) permits a
court to alter or amend a judgment, it “‘may not be used to relitigate old matters, or
to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the
entry of judgment.’” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n. 5 (2008)
(citation omitted).
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or
applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
The residual clause in Rule 60(b)(6) affords relief “only in exceptional
circumstances” not otherwise addressed by the rule’s first five clauses. Tanner v.
Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 443 (6th Cir. 2015). Rule 60(b)(6) is properly invoked only
in “unusual and extreme situations where principles of equity mandate relief.” Id.
Like Rule 59(e), Rule 60(b) does not provide a vehicle to rehash arguments
previously made and rejected. Long v. Morgan, 56 F. App’x 257, 258 (6th Cir.
2003). The party seeking relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) bears the burden of
establishing the grounds for such relief by clear and convincing evidence. Info-
Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 448, 454 (6th Cir. 2008).
To the extent that Petitioner seeks relief under Rule 59(e), such relief is
unavailable because the motion was not timely filed. Rule 59(e) permits a party to
ask the Court to alter or amend its judgment within 28 days of entry of that
judgment. The judgment denying the petition was issued on June 7, 2024. The time
for filing a Rule 59(e) motion expired on July 5, 2024. Petitioner’s motion, filed on
March 14, 2025, is well beyond the 28-day period. The Court may not extend the
time for filing a Rule 59(e) motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) (“A court must not
extend the time to act under . . . [Rule 59(e).]”). For this reason, Petitioner is not
entitled to relief under Rule 59(e).
Petitioner is also not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b). The Court dismissed
the habeas petition because Petitioner failed to comply with several conditions of
the stay order. ECF No. 25, PageID.1463. Petitioner neither explains how the
Court’s decision resulted in a mistake, nor provides any other reason that may
justify relief under Rule 60(b)(2)-(6). Indeed, Petitioner does not discuss the basis
for the Court’s dismissal at all; rather, he claims that the Court failed to consider
his evidence and actual innocence. At most, Petitioner appears to be rehashing
arguments made in his habeas petition. Thus, he has not met his burden under Rule
60(b). Petitioner is not entitled to relief.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Motion to Reinstate the Petition, ECF
No. 27.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2025 s/F. Kay Behm
F. Kay Behm
United States District Judge