The opinion
J-S22033-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL LAUSCH : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAN LING :
:
Appellant : No. 1694 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s):
12 20957
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 26, 2025
Appellant, Shan Ling, appeals from the Qualified Domestic Relations
Order (“QDRO”) entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. We
affirm.
This Court previously provided the relevant background of the parties,
as follows:
Husband [Michael Lausch] and Wife [Shan Ling] met in Shanghai
and were married there in 2000. . . . Husband and Wife
subsequently moved to the United States, where their daughter
was born in 2003. In 2004, Husband purchased a family residence
in his name in Berks County, Pennsylvania.
Husband and Wife separated in 2012, and Husband filed for
divorce that same year. The court appointed a divorce master,
who held hearings on October 16, 2017, March 16, 2018, and May
14, 2018.[] The master filed his report and recommendation on
August 28, 2018. Wife filed several exceptions. Both parties filed
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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briefs, and the matter was argued on December 9, 2020. In the
divorce decree entered May 21, 2021, the trial court sustained in
part and denied in part Wife's exceptions.
Lausch v. Ling, 276 A.3d 221 (non-precedential decision) (Pa. Super. filed
March 8, 2022) (affirming the lower court’s divorce decree incorporating, inter
alia, the equitable distribution of marital assets).
The present matter arose when Ms. Ling raised a discrete issue before
the trial court in her June 26, 2024, “Petition for Enforcement of the Marital
Transfer Order,” in which she alleged Mr. Lausch had not complied with the
order’s requirement that he transfer $465,164.57 from his Campbell Soup
Company-sponsored 401(k) retirement savings plan account to her Individual
Retirement Account. The lower court issued upon Mr. Lausch a rule to show
cause why it should not grant relief to Ms. Ling.
Through counsel, Mr. Lausch filed an answer explaining that, in 2021,
he was prepared to transfer the 401(k) funds pursuant to the court’s marital
transfer order, but, before he could do so, Ms. Ling filed an appeal to this
Court challenging the divorce decree with specific reference to the propriety
of the marital transfer order and the equitable distribution of marital property
incorporated therein. After this Court in Lausch rejected Ms. Ling’s equitable
distribution claims and affirmed the divorce decree, Ms. Ling exhausted her
appeal options, upon which counsel for Mr. Lausch mailed to Ms. Ling a written
correspondence dated July 23, 2023, asking for her account information to
enable completion of the transfer of funds pursuant to the lower court’s marital
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transfer order. Ms. Ling never responded to the request. N.T., 10/30/24, at
2-4.
At the October 30, 2024, hearing on Ms. Ling’s June 26, 2024, petition
to enforce the marital transfer order, she acknowledged that she did not wish
to sign the proposed QDRO authorizing the transfer of the agreed-upon
amount of $465,164.57 despite her attorney’s recommendation that she sign.
She attempted to relitigate issues of asset valuation and the adequacy of the
transfer amount that were either previously litigated and denied or never
raised during marital property distribution proceedings and, therefore, waived.
N.T. at 3-5. Ms. Ling also raised non-specific, undeveloped concerns that the
QDRO may not be of “professional” quality, and she otherwise raised
indiscernible issues regarding Social Security that the lower court was unable
to relate to the relevant issues before it. N.T. at 5.
The lower court advised Ms. Ling that it had the authority to accept the
property distribution scheme within the proposed QDRO without her approval.
Nevertheless, Ms. Ling pressed her objection to calculating the amount of her
401(k) share based on the 2017 value of Mr. Lausch’s 401(k) account instead
of on the present value (as of the October 30, 2024, hearing). N.T. at 8-9.
The lower court responded that use of the 2017 valuation was appropriate
because the parties had been separated since 2012, and it opined that, in any
event, Ms. Ling had waived this issue when she did not raise it during previous
lower court proceedings in which the 2021 marital transfer order incorporated
the 2017 401(k) valuation or in her subsequent appeal to the Superior Court
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addressing the fairness of the equitable distribution scheme. N.T. at 8-9. On
this point, the notes of testimony reflect the following:
Lower Court: Well, what we’re talking about is the issues that
you’re raising were issues that should have
been raised, or were raised and denied, during
the course of the hearings that took place before
the Equitable Distribution Master, and then
before me, and then before the [a]ppellate
[c]ourt.
[Ms. Ling]: I understand that. I want to wait to –
Lower Court: But your claims were denied. So, it’s over. You
can’t keep rehashing the same claims. This is
what you are entitled to. That’s what [counsel
for Mr. Lausch] is saying.
...
You can’t have a do-over. You can’t repeat it.
You already raised these issues, and they were
denied. It’s decided. It’s over.
N.T. at 9, 10-11.
The lower court took a brief recess to await the arrival of Ms. Ling’s
court-appointed interpreter. When the interpreter arrived, the lower court
reconvened and reiterated that all economic matters between the parties were
previously litigated before the trial court and reviewed, on appeal, by the
Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court order pertaining to the
distribution of the marital estate. At this stage, the lower court emphasized,
only the method by which Mr. Lausch would complete the transfer of
$465,164.57 from his 401(k) account to Ms. Ling’s IRA account remained at
issue. N.T. at 14. As such, it instructed that under the terms of the governing
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divorce decree, if the parties disputed over the method of distribution, then
Mr. Lausch held the option to choose between payment of cash or by QDRO.
N.T. at 14.
The lower court thus concluded that because the parties had failed to
agree on the method of distribution, Husband was to choose a method. It
observed:
What we have here is no agreement[,] [a]nd since there is a
dispute, the method of payment shall be Husband’s option. He
has chosen to use the QDRO. He has prepared the QDRO. I have
reviewed the QDRO, which appears to be in order, which he has
prepared and has paid for, and it’s for the correct amount. So, I
am signing the QDRO, and that will complete the matter for
today.”
N.T. at 14-15. This appeal followed.1
Initially, we note that Ms. Ling has failed to include in her pro se brief a
statement of questions presented. Pursuant to Rule 2116, “[n]o question will
be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is
fairly suggested thereby.” Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).
Although Rule 2116 states that this Court will not consider a question
that is not included in the statement of questions involved, this Court has held
that “such a defect may be overlooked where an appellant's brief suggests the
specific issue to be reviewed and appellant's failure does not impede our ability
to address the merits of the issue.” Werner v. Werner, 149 A.3d 338, 341
____________________________________________
1 On November 14, 2024, Ms. Ling timely filed her pro se appeal from the
lower court’s October 30, 2024, order accepting the QDRO as the method of
distributing to wife her agreed-upon marital share of $465,164.57 from Mr.
Lausch’s 401(k) plan account.
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(Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Bailey v. Storlazzi, 729 A.2d 1206, 1210 (Pa.
Super. 1999)) (cleaned up). See also Lausch, supra at *13. Ms. Ling raised
the issue of the lower court’s distribution of Mr. Lausch’s 401(k) plan during
the proceedings below, and the lower court addressed it and ruled against her.
Therefore, because the issue is readily ascertainable, Ms. Ling preserved it
below, and the trial court addressed it, the absence of a statement of
questions involved does not impede our review in this instance, such that we
decline to find this issue waived.
We begin with the following principles, which govern our review:
Our standard of review in assessing the propriety of a
marital property distribution is whether the trial court
abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or
failure to follow proper legal procedure. An abuse of
discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing
of clear and convincing evidence.
Busse v. Busse, 921 A.2d 1248, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless
the law has been overridden or misapplied or the
judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as
shown by the evidence in the certified record. In
determining the propriety of an equitable distribution
award, courts must consider the distribution scheme
as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case
against the objective of effectuating economic justice
between the parties and achieving a just
determination of their property rights.
Moreover, it is within the province of the trial court to
weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this
Court will not reverse those determinations so long as
they are supported by the evidence. We are also
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aware that a master's report and recommendation,
although only advisory, is to be given the fullest
consideration, particularly on the question of
credibility of witnesses, because the master has the
opportunity to observe and assess the behavior and
demeanor of the parties.
Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d 127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017) (cleaned
up).
Lausch at *2.
Preliminarily, we observe Ms. Ling’s pro se brief is prolix, noncompliant
with the briefing requirements outlined in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and, at times, difficult to follow. Nevertheless, she presents the
crux of her argument most clearly at the outset, where she contends:
To help my child complete their college education and escape
financial hardship, I filed a petition, “Petition for Enforcement of
the Marital Asset Transfer Order” . . . with the Berks County Court
on June 26, 2024, requesting that the plaintiff transfer my marital
asset share of $465,164.5 [sic], as determined in the finalized
May 20, 2021 divorce judgment, in a form that allows it to be
rolled over into my Roth IRA. Additionally, I submitted court
evidence [] and an index table [] regarding the $600,000+ in
fraudulent misappropriation and judicial errors from the 2017
hearing, seeking a freeze on the plaintiff’s retirement funds—
including 401(k), pension, and Roth IRA accounts—totaling $1.5
million, until these judgments are rectified.
...
The May 2021 divorce judgment was based on the marital assets
assessed during the 2017 hearing. Apart from the $600,000+ in
misappropriated marital assets due to fraudulent judgment errors,
[Mr. Lausch’s counsel’s] proposal in 2023 to transfer marital
assets came six years after the hearing, during which [] litigation
[Mr. Lausch] had unlawfully retained the huge in [sic] appreciated
marital assets belonging to me.
...
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[The parties’] QDRO agreement is directly tied to the major
fraudulent misappropriation and judicial errors in the divorce case
Lausch v. Ling, Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 276 A.3d
221. The distortion of facts in the judgment led to prolonged
litigation and criminal charges. To ensure my rightful claim to my
share of the appreciated marital assets, I must overturn the QDRO
order that violates my legal rights. Therefore, it is necessary to
present evidence of the criminal fraud and abuse of discretion that
occurred in this divorce case.
Brief for Appellant at 1, 2.
The lower court opines that “[t]his most recent chapter in the long and
tortuous history of this case” presents nothing more than Ms. Ling’s untimely
attempt to revisit the lower court’s equitable distribution of marital property,
as she raises a substantive challenge that she could have raised years earlier.
We agree.
Specifically, this Court reviewed Ms. Ling’s previous challenge to the
lower court’s equitable distribution of marital assets, where she elected to
focus on the marital property transfer order’s denial of her request to increase
her distribution percentage to 80% in favor of establishing, instead, a 60-40
percentage split in Wife’s favor. Lausch, 276 A.3d 221 at *2. Ms. Ling argued
that the lower court’s equitable distribution order gave insufficient weight to
“Wife's mental illness, the disparity in earning capacities and retirement funds,
the disparity in opportunities to increase and acquire capital assets, Wife's not
being awarded alimony, Wife's not being able to receive Social Security
benefits through her employment, and Husband's dissipation of marital
assets[.]” Id. at 3 (citing Ms. Ling’s Brief, at 29).
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In the case sub judice, Ms. Ling relies on essentially identical arguments
to challenge the equitable distribution of Mr. Lausch’s 401(k) plan, as she
contends that the QDRO agreement is directly tied to the “major fraudulent
misappropriation and judicial errors in the divorce case Lausch v. Ling,
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 276 A.3d 221.” Thus, on this point, the
lower court discerns that Ms. Ling has waived this issue:
[Ms. Ling] previously raised these issues before [the lower court]
by filing exceptions from the Master’s Report regarding Plaintiff’s
410(k) plan with Campbell’s Soup Company and we resolved
those issues. She then appealed this case to the Superior Court
but did not raise issues regarding the value of [Mr. Lausch’s]
retirement income. Thus, any further complaints by [Ms. Ling] on
this matter are barred by law of the case doctrine.
The law of the case doctrine expresses the practice of courts
generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided. Bienert v.
Bienert, 168 A.3d 248 (Pa. Super. 2017). Under the law of the
case doctrine once a matter has been decided by a trial judge the
decision should remain undisturbed, unless the order is
appealable, and an appeal therefrom is successfully prosecuted.
Id.
Lower Court Opinion, 12/16/24, at 4.
The record reveals that the only aspect of the 401(k) distribution
remaining in the post-appeal procedural history of this matter was to
determine whether Ms. Ling would receive her agreed-upon share in cash or
by QDRO. When the parties disagreed on this purely ministerial detail, the
lower court appropriately referred to the governing divorce decree, which
provided that Mr. Lausch shall, in the event of a disagreement, select the
manner of distribution of Ms. Ling’s 401(k) share. As Ms. Ling offers no
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meaningful dispute regarding the manner of distribution, we deem her present
appeal unavailing.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/26/2025
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