Kimberlin v. United States Department of Justice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

:

BRETT C. KIMBERLIN

:

v. : Civil Action No. DKC 24-2323

:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, et al. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brett C. Kimberlin (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against

three federal government agencies and five former federal

government officials (“Defendants”) challenging decisions made

regarding his parole over twenty-five years ago. Presently pending

and ready for resolution in this constitutional tort case are the

motion to dismiss filed by Defendants, (ECF No. 24), Plaintiff’s

two motions for an order to show cause, (ECF Nos. 15, 19),

Plaintiff’s motion for alternative service on former government

officials, (ECF No. 16), Plaintiff’s motion to seal, (ECF No. 31),

Defendants’ motion to strike, (ECF No. 35), and Plaintiff’s motion

for hearing on the motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 37). The issues

have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed

necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the

motion to dismiss will be granted in part, the motions to show

cause will be denied as moot, the motion for alternative service

will be denied as moot, the motion to seal will be granted, the

motion to strike will be granted, and the motion for hearing will

be denied.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The history of this case reaches all the way back to 1978,

when the acts for which Plaintiff Brett Kimberlin was later

convicted took place.1 (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). According to Defendants’

motion to dismiss, Carl and Sandra DeLong were seriously injured

by one of the eight bombs Plaintiff planted around Speedway,

Indiana in September 1978. (ECF No. 24-1, at 2-3). The DeLongs

sued Plaintiff for compensation for their injuries, and a court

ruled in favor of the DeLongs in 1983. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2-3).

Plaintiff was incarcerated following multiple convictions in 1980

and 1981, Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F.Supp.2d 487, 489-490 (D.Md.

1998), and was released on parole in 1994. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 5). At

the time of his release, Plaintiff had a book deal with Knopf Books

following the “great deal of media and political interest in

Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 6). While on parole, he “worked on the book,

a music project, and started a new business in international trade

with Ukraine.” (Id. ¶ 10). Mrs. DeLong, who still had an

outstanding judgment against Plaintiff, began trying to secure the

1 All facts are undisputed and taken from Plaintiff’s

complaint, unless otherwise noted.

2

money to satisfy the judgment, which Plaintiff alleged was

“corrupt.”2 (Id. ¶ 4). In 1996, Plaintiff applied for a mortgage.

He alleges he asked the mortgage company whether he had to list

the then-fourteen-year-old judgment on his application, but the

company advised him that he did not need to list it. (Id. ¶ 11).

Plaintiff alleges political maneuvering by many different

government figures, none of whom are named defendants in this

lawsuit, who were allegedly unhappy with Plaintiff’s book deal.

(Id. ¶¶ 12-13). As relevant to this litigation, Plaintiff alleges

that his parole status was changed because of the political

pressure, and that the Parole Commission subsequently decided to

enforce the civil judgment against him. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Ramsburg, his parole officer at the time,

dishonestly worked against him to gather information about his

finances and force him to pay Mrs. DeLong for her judgment. (Id.

¶¶ 18-19, 21, 24). Believing that Plaintiff would be receiving a

payment from his publishing company in early 1997, the Parole

Commission set a deadline for Plaintiff to pay a portion of the

judgment to Mrs. DeLong. (Id. ¶ 19). When the deadline came and

2 Defendants point out that the Indiana civil judgment in

favor of the DeLongs ultimately was affirmed by the Indiana Supreme

Court in 1994. (ECF No. 24-1, at 3 (citing Kimberlin v. DeLong,

637 N.E.2d 121, 128 (Ind. 1994))). See also, Kimberlin v. DeLong,

No. 24A-MI-1870, 2025 WL 2603049 (Ind.Ct.App., Sept. 9,

2025)(affirming denial of Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment.)

3

went without a payment, Defendant Ramsburg initiated parole

revocation charges: one for failure to pay the book proceeds to

satisfy the civil judgment, and one for not listing the civil

judgment on his mortgage application. (Id. ¶ 21).

Around the same time, Plaintiff went through bankruptcy

proceedings, where former Assistant U.S. Attorney Fine

participated. (Id. ¶ 27). Ultimately, Plaintiff’s parole was

revoked, and he was incarcerated for several years. (Id. ¶ 40).3

3 The history of his convictions and parole proceedings were

recently recounted:

In 1979, Kimberlin was arrested after he tried

to procure counterfeit government documents—

including a presidential seal, military

driver’s license forms, and military license

plates. Federal officers eventually connected

him to eight bombings in Speedway, Indiana. He

was later convicted of several felonies,

including impersonating a federal official by

wearing a uniform representing the Department

of Defense. See 18 U.S.C. § 912. We affirmed

Kimberlin’s convictions and sentence on direct

appeal, see United States v. Kimberlin, 781

F.2d 1247, 1248 (7th Cir. 1985); United States

v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210, 252 (7th Cir.

1986), and collateral review, see United

States v. Kimberlin, 675 F.2d 866, 869 (7th

Cir. 1982). Kimberlin was paroled in 1994, but

his parole was revoked in 1997 for submitting

a fraudulent mortgage loan application and for

failure to pay a civil judgment to victims of

the bombings. See Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F.

Supp. 2d 487, 490-94 (D. Md. 1998), aff'd sub

nom. Kimberlin v. Bidwell, 166 F.3d 333 (4th

4

Plaintiff alleges that he was sexually assaulted by prison staff

while incarcerated. (Id. ¶ 42).

B. Procedural Background

On August 9, 2024, Plaintiff Brett Kimberlin filed a complaint

for damages and a declaratory judgment against eight Defendants:

the United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s

Office for the District of Maryland, and United States Parole

Commission (together, the “Agency Defendants”), as well as former

United States Attorney General Merrick Garland, former United

States Attorneys for the District of Maryland Erek Barron and Lynne

Battaglia, former Assistant United States Attorney Tamera Fine,

and former parole officer Renata Ramsburg (together, the

“Individual Defendants”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff brings seven

claims against the Defendants: Violation of First Amendment Rights

(Count I), Violation of Due Process Rights (Count II), Violation

of Cruel and Unusual Punishment (Count III), Conspiracy to Violate

Constitutional Rights (Count IV), Failure to Act, Intervene, and

Prevent, and Conspiracy to Coverup (Count V), Denial of Due Process

Cir. 1998). He completed his prison sentence

in 2001.

Kimberlin v. United States, No. 21-1691, 2022 WL 59399, at *1 (7th

Cir. Jan. 6, 2022)(affirming denial of coram nobis.)

5

by the Continued Coverup of Official Misconduct (Count VI), and

Sexual Assault and Abuse under Federal and State Law4 (Count VII).

On January 17, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for order to

show cause. (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff argues that the Defendants

should be ordered to show cause why he is allegedly being treated

differently “than other similarly situated Plaintiffs,” referring

to a December 17, 2024, settlement with individuals who had been

sexually abused by prison staff while incarcerated at a women’s

prison in California. (Id. at 1; see ECF No. 15-1). On January

21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion for alternative service,

requesting permission from the court to allow service via

alternative means for Defendants Battaglia and Ramsburg, as they

are no longer with their federal employers. (ECF No. 16). On

January 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second motion to show cause,

this time asking the court to require the government to address

two recent Executive Orders. (ECF No. 19).

On February 6, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and

opposition to the motions for alternative service and to show

cause. (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendants’

4 Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants

sexually assaulted him. Rather, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

“intentionally revoked Plaintiff’s parole on trumped up charges

and conspired to have him transferred to an unsafe prison where

they knew he would likely be subjected to sexual abuse and he was.

This caused him severe psychological trauma and PTSD which is

actionable under both federal and state law.” (ECF No. 1, at 25).

6

motion on March 21, 2025, (ECF No. 28), followed by a motion to

seal on March 31. (ECF No. 31). Defendants filed their reply to

the opposition on April 7, 2025. (ECF No. 32). A few days later,

on April 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a sur-response and supplement

to the motion for alternative service, (ECF No. 33), which

Defendants moved to strike on May 7, 2025. (ECF No. 35). Following

further briefing on the motion to strike, Plaintiff filed a motion

for hearing on Defendants’ motion to dismiss on July 21, 2025.

(ECF No. 37).

II. Analysis

The complaint asserts constitutional violations and tort

claims against two groups of Plaintiffs, defined above as the

Individual Defendants and the Agency Defendants. The Individual

Defendants are former government officials, who can be sued in

either their individual or official capacities (or both). The

complaint requests money damages (both compensatory and punitive)

along with a declaratory judgment on all counts.

Courts hold pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards

than a formal pleading drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

106 (1976)). The court has an obligation to construe pleadings of

self-represented litigants liberally. Id. The court is not

required, however, to “conjure up questions never squarely

7

presented to them,” or to recognize “obscure or extravagant claims

defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.” Beaudett v.

City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1985).

Defendants raise a number of arguments, beginning with

insufficient service of process on Defendants Battaglia, Fine and

Ramsburg, and proceeding to lack of subject matter jurisdiction

due to sovereign immunity, and failure to state a claim under the

Federal Tort Claims Act. Additional arguments are based on statute

of limitations, collateral estoppel, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994), and qualified immunity. As will be explained,

Plaintiff has indeed failed to serve some of the defendants

properly, but he will not be required to correct that deficiency.

His complaint fails to demonstrate subject matter jurisdiction

over some of his claims, and he fails to state a claim for others.

Accordingly, the entire complaint will be dismissed.

A. Motion to Strike

It is necessary first to resolve Defendants’ motion to strike,

(ECF No. 35), to determine the proper body of information to

consider on the merits of the dispositive motion to dismiss. See

Ground Zero Museum Workshop v. Wilson, 813 F.Supp.2d 678, 689

(D.Md. 2011). Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s “Sur-Response

and Supplement,” (ECF No. 33), which Plaintiff states supplements

his earlier reply, (ECF No. 28), regarding Defendants’ motion to

8

dismiss, his motions to show cause, and the motion for alternative

service. (ECF No. 33 at 1).

As Defendants point out, Local Rule 105.2(a) states “[u]nless

otherwise ordered by the [c]ourt, surreply memoranda are not

permitted to be filed.” (See ECF No. 35-1, at 2). Plaintiff did

not request leave to file a surreply or a supplement. Even if

Plaintiff had requested to file a surreply, “[a] motion for leave

to file a surreply may be denied when the matter addressed in the

reply is not new.” Marshall v. Capital View Mut. Homes, No. 12-

cv-3109-RWT, 2013 WL 3353752, *3 (D.Md. July 2, 2013) (citing

F.D.I.C. v. Cashion, 720 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Plaintiff’s surreply and supplement do not respond to any new

arguments. Rather, the surreply contains conclusory allegations

in line with what is included in Plaintiff’s complaint and

opposition to the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Defendants’

motion to strike will be granted.

B. Capacity of Individual Defendants

As a second threshold matter, this court must determine

whether Plaintiff has sued the Individual Defendants in their

individual or official capacities, or both. A suit against a

government official in his or her official capacity is

substantively the same as suing the agency for which the official

works. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (“As long as

9

the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to

respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than

name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”). Here,

Plaintiff has sued the agencies themselves and any claims against

the Individual Defendants in their official capacity would be

redundant.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

previously described the standard for making this determination

where the complaint is unclear:

[W]hen a plaintiff does not allege capacity

specifically, the court must examine the

nature of the plaintiff’s claims, the relief

sought, and the course of proceedings to

determine whether a state official is being

sued in a personal capacity. One factor

indicating that suit has been filed in such a

manner might be the plaintiff’s failure to

allege that the defendant acted in accordance

with a governmental policy or custom, or the

lack of indicia of such a policy or custom on

the face of the complaint. . . . Another

indication that suit has been brought against

a state actor personally may be a plaintiff’s

request for compensatory or punitive damages,

since such relief is unavailable in official

capacity suits. The nature of any defenses

raised in response to the complaint is an

additional relevant factor. [. . .]

Throughout, the underlying inquiry remains

whether the plaintiff’s intention to hold a

defendant personally liable can be ascertained

fairly.

Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation

modified).

10

Considering these factors, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s

claims are against the Individual Defendants in their individual

capacities. Plaintiff requests both compensatory and punitive

damages, (ECF No. 1 at 25), which are “unavailable in official

capacity suits.” Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61. Defendants argue against

extending the remedy created by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), to this context

in their motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 24-1, at 23), which Plaintiff

replies to in later briefing, (ECF No. 28, at 24). Bivens creates

a cause of action against a government official in their individual

capacity. Randall v. United States, 95 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir.

1996) (“Any remedy under Bivens is against federal officials

individually, not the federal government.”)

C. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(5)

Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed for

Defendants Battaglia, Fine, and Ramsburg because Plaintiff failed

to serve them properly. Rule 4(e) provides multiple avenues for

serving an individual within a judicial district of the United

States. Individuals can be personally served with a copy of the

summons and the complaint; alternatively, he or she can be served

by leaving a copy of the documents at their home with someone of

“suitable age and discretion” who lives there, or by delivering a

copy to an agent of the individual. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)(2). When

11

those avenues of service are unavailable, an individual may be

served by “following state law for serving a summons in an action

brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the

district court is located or where service is made.” Fed.R.Civ.P.

4(e)(1). Under Maryland law, “[w]hen proof is made by affidavit

that good faith efforts to serve the defendant. . .have not

succeeded. . .the court may order any other means of service that

it deems appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably

calculated to give actual notice.” Md. Rule 2-121(c).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5) governs motions to dismiss for

insufficient service. In a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(5),

the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the validity of

service under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4. O’Meara v. Waters, 464 F.Supp.2d

474, 476 (D.Md. 2006). “Generally, when service of process gives

the defendant actual notice of the pending action, the courts may

construe Rule 4 liberally to effectuate service and uphold the

jurisdiction of the court.” Id.

According to his motion for alternative service, Plaintiff

recognized the obligation under Rule 4 to serve at least two of

these defendants at her dwelling, or residence. Because he had

difficulty obtaining those addresses, he asked the United States

Attorney for assistance, but was rebuffed. (ECF No. 16, at 1).

Through his signed motion, Plaintiff now appears to be requesting

12

an order under Md. Rule 2-121(c) for an alternative avenue of

service. (ECF No. 16, at 1).

Because the entire complaint will be dismissed, it is not

necessary to resolve the disputes over service and both the motion

for alternative service and the motion to dismiss for failure to

serve will be denied as moot.

D. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Questions of subject matter

jurisdiction should be decided first, as they strike at the heart

of the court’s power to hear the case. NAACP v. U.S. Dep't of

Homeland Sec., 364 F.Supp.3d 568, 573 (D.Md. 2019). Plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

Demetres v. E. W. Constr., Inc., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015).

A motion to dismiss under 12(b)(1) may proceed in one of two ways:

“A defendant may either contend (1) that the

complaint fails to allege facts upon which

subject matter jurisdiction can be based; or

(2) that the jurisdictional facts alleged in

the complaint are untrue.” [Adams v. Bain,

697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982)]. The

court should grant the 12(b)(1) motion “only

if the material jurisdictional facts are not

in dispute and the moving party is entitled to

prevail as a matter of law.” Richmond,

[Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United

States,] 945 F.2d [765,] 768 [(4th Cir. 1991)].

When a defendant makes a facial challenge to

subject matter jurisdiction, as Defendants do

here, “the plaintiff, in effect, is afforded

the same procedural protection as he would

13

receive under a Rule 12(b)(6) consideration.”

Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. “In that situation,

the facts alleged in the complaint are taken

as true, and the motion must be denied if the

complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke

subject matter jurisdiction.” Kerns v. United

States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).

NAACP, 364 F.Supp.3d at 573. A dismissal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction must be without prejudice, as the court does

not have the power to adjudicate the case on the merits. Lancaster

v. Sec'y of Navy, 109 F.4th 283, 295 (4th Cir. 2024). In cases

where sovereign immunity is at issue, the party suing the United

States “‘bears the burden of pointing to . . . an unequivocal

waiver of immunity.’” Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304

(4th Cir. 1995).

“It is axiomatic that the United States cannot be sued without

its consent[.]” Lancaster, 109 F.4th at 292 (quoting Randall, 95

F.3d at 345). Sovereign immunity is “‘jurisdictional in nature’

and deprives courts of the power to hear suits against the United

States absent Congress’s express consent.” United States v.

Miller, 604 U.S. --, 145 S. Ct. 839, 849 (2025) (quoting FDIC v.

Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). The burden is on the plaintiff

to identify an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Williams,

50 F.3d at 304.

Plaintiff has not identified any waivers of sovereign

immunity that may apply to his claims against the Agency

14

Defendants. Plaintiff advances seven counts in his prayer for

relief: five constitutional violation claims (Counts I-IV, VI) and

two tort claims (Counts V, VII). The sole remedy for torts

committed by the federal government, “and its employees who commit

tortious acts in the course of their employment,” is the Federal

Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,

and Firearms, 807 F.Supp.2d 362, 369 (D.Md. 2011). The United

States “has not waived sovereign immunity for constitutional

violations,” which means the court lacks jurisdiction over those

claims as asserted against the Agency Defendants. Saunders v.

United States, 502 F.Supp.2d 493, 497 (E.D. Va. 2007); see also

Ross, 807 F.Supp.2d at 370. The avenue for holding federal

government officials liable for constitutional violations in their

personal capacity is a Bivens action. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.

“Construing the Complaint liberally to be against the United

States,” the tort claims are still barred by sovereign immunity.

Ross, 807 F.Supp.2d at 370. Plaintiff stumbles on a threshold

issue. As Defendants note, (ECF No. 24-1, at 20), no claim can be

brought under the FTCA unless it has first been presented to the

agency in writing. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see Est. of Van Emburgh

ex rel. Van Emburgh v. United States, 95 F.4th 795, 800-01 (4th

Cir. 2024). Defendants posit that Plaintiff has not done so, (ECF

No. 24-1, at 20-21), which Plaintiff does not deny. Additionally,

15

the time for Plaintiff to meet this requirement has passed; as

relevant here under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), any “tort claim against

the United States is barred unless it is presented in writing to

the appropriate federal agency within two years after it accrues.”

(ECF No. 24-1, at 21). The tort claims must be dismissed against

the Agency Defendants and Individual Defendants for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff also requested a declaratory judgment “finding that

[Defendants] violated Plaintiff’s rights as alleged in Counts I-

VII.” (ECF No. 1, at 25). Declaratory judgments against the

government also require a waiver of sovereign immunity, Goldstein

v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 205, 219 (4th Cir. 2004), and there has been

none alleged here.5 Plaintiff does not identify any source of law

underpinning his request for a declaratory judgment. Accordingly,

the court also dismisses Plaintiff’s request for a declaratory

judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

E. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “constitutes

an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by the

5 While the Defendants did not specifically argue that there

is no waiver of sovereign immunity for declaratory judgments in

their motion to dismiss, the court has an obligation to assure

itself of its jurisdiction in all cases. “Subject-matter

jurisdiction cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered

when fairly in doubt.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671.

16

plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law ‘to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.’” Bourgeois v.

Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F.Supp.3d 423, 434 (D.Md. 2014), as

corrected (Mar. 20, 2014). Under the pleading requirements of

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.”

In order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), a plaintiff

need not include “detailed factual

allegations.” [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. ]

Twombly, 550 U.S. [544,] 555 [(2007)]. But,

the rule demands more than bald accusations or

mere speculation. Id.; see Painter’s Mill

Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th

Cir. 2013). To satisfy the minimal

requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint

must set forth “enough factual matter (taken

as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of

action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of

those facts is improbable and . . . recovery

is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550

U.S.[, at 556]. In other words, the complaint

must contain facts sufficient to “state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; see

[Ashcroft v. ]Iqbal, 556 U.S. [662,] []684

[(2009)] []; Simmons v. United Mortg. and Loan

Inv., LLC, 634 F.3d 754, 768 (4th Cir.2011).

Id.

Plaintiff’s attempt to pursue claims against the Individual

Defendants in their personal capacity are also unavailing.

Plaintiff fails to plead any facts giving rise to liability for

Defendants former Attorney General Garland or former U.S.

17

Attorneys Barron or Battaglia. While Plaintiff provides more facts

for the remaining Individual Defendants, it is not proper to extend

Bivens into this context.

1. Failure to Plead Facts

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Garland, Barron, and

Battaglia in their personal capacity will be dismissed because the

complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to “‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.).

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has been clear that

Bivens actions cannot be brought against government officials for

the actions of their subordinates:

Government officials may not be held liable

for the unconstitutional conduct of their

subordinates under a theory of respondeat

superior. . . . Because vicarious liability is

inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the

Constitution.

Id. at 676.

Defendants correctly argue that Plaintiff does not allege

sufficient facts to state a claim against Defendants Garland,

Barron, or Battaglia. (ECF No. 24-1, at 33). The complaint

alleges a single fact about former Attorney General Garland: that

he did not respond to the letters the Plaintiff sent about this

18

case. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 46). The complaint only alleges two facts

about former U.S. Attorney Barron: he did not reply to Plaintiff’s

letters, and he did not respond when Plaintiff requested a personal

meeting. (Id.). Finally, the complaint alleges that former U.S.

Attorney Battaglia signed a letter written by Defendant former

Assistant U.S. Attorney Fine as part of the parole proceedings,

(Id. at ¶ 35), and did not reply to a later letter from Plaintiff,

(Id. at ¶ 46). As the Supreme Court clarified in Iqbal, Plaintiff

cannot assert supervisory liability against Defendants. Plainly,

the complaint does not provide facts sufficient to state any claim

against these three defendants. The motion to dismiss will be

granted with regard to Defendants Garland, Barron, and Battaglia

in their personal capacities.

2. Bivens Claims Are Unavailable Here

Plaintiff’s Bivens claim against Defendants Fine and Ramsburg

also fails. A Bivens claim allows an individual to bring an action

for money damages against federal government officials who

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights while acting under

“color of law.” Bulger v. Hurwitz, 62 F.4th 127, 135 (4th Cir.

2023) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 391 n.4, 396). “Bivens did not

abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity of the United States.

Any remedy under Bivens is against federal officials individually,

not the federal government.” Randall, 95 F.3d at 345. In

19

consideration of Congress’s role in creating causes of action, the

United States Supreme Court has chosen “to severely limit the reach

of Bivens by imposing a highly restrictive two-step analysis for

Bivens cases.” Bulger, 62 F.4th at 136-37.

First, a court must determine whether a claim

falls within the causes of action authorized

under the Supreme Court’s three Bivens cases

-- Bivens, Davis[ v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228

(1979)], and Carlson[v. Green, 446 U.S. 14

(1980)] -- or whether it “arises in a ‘new

context’ or involves a ‘new category of

defendants.’” Hernandez[ v. Mesa, 589 U.S.

93, 102 (2020)] [] (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp.

v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68[] (2001)). A

context is “new” when it is “different in a

meaningful way from previous Bivens cases

decided by [the] Court.” Ziglar[ v. Abbasi,

582 U.S. 120, 139 (2017)][].

If a court finds that a claim presents a

“new context” different from the three Bivens

cases, it must “proceed to the second step and

ask whether there are any special factors that

counsel hesitation about granting the

extension” of Bivens. Hernandez, 140 S. Ct.

at 743 (internal quotation marks and

alterations omitted). This “special factors”

inquiry must focus on “separation-of-powers

principles” and requires courts to ask whether

judicial intrusion into a given field is

appropriate. Id. (quoting Ziglar, [582 U.S.

at 135]).

Id. at 137. In recent years, the Supreme Court has strictly

limited what it would consider a new context or category of

defendants. See Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 491 (2022)

(recognizing that extending Bivens is “a disfavored judicial

activity,” and stating “if there are sound reasons to think

20

Congress might doubt the efficacy or necessity of a damages

remedy[,] the courts must refrain from creating [it].” (quoting

Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 135-137)).

Defendants correctly argue that Bivens is unavailable here.

Plaintiff’s allegations against the remaining Individual

Defendants – Defendants Fine and Ramsburg – all relate to their

work within their roles. Plaintiff alleges that both Defendants

sought to enforce a judgment against Plaintiff6 as part of their

jobs and used the legal process to enforce that judgment when

Plaintiff refused to pay.

This case is analogous to the situation in Bulger. There,

the estate of former federal inmate James “Whitey” Bulger filed

suit against individuals from the Bureau of Prisons, saying that

they failed to protect the inmate when they transferred him to a

facility that was known for violence. Bulger, 62 F.4th at 133.

The Fourth Circuit determined that extending Bivens into that

sphere was inappropriate. Id. at 142. Not only was it a new

6 Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that the judgment owed to Mrs.

DeLong is “corrupt.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40, 42, 48). This

is a legal conclusion, so the court is not obligated to assume the

truth as part of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

681 (“[T]he allegations are conclusory and not entitled to be

assumed true.”). As Defendants point out in their motion to

dismiss, the judgment has been approved by the Indiana Supreme

Court. (ECF No. 24-1, at 3 (citing Kimberlin v. DeLong, 637 N.E.2d

121, 128 (Ind. 1994))). See also, Kimberlin v. DeLong, No. 24A-

MI-1870, 2025 WL 2603049 (Ind.Ct.App., Sept. 9, 2025)(affirming

denial of Rule 60 motion for relief from judgment.)

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context, but special factors counseled against extending the

remedy in that context. Id. The Fourth Circuit also discussed

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). “In Farmer, an inmate

brought a Bivens suit pursuant to the Eighth Amendment against

prison officials for allegedly failing to protect the inmate from

a violent beating and rape, even though the officials knew that

the prison had a ‘violent environment’ and the inmate was

‘particularly vulnerable to sexual attack.’” Bulger, 62 F.4th at

138. While the appellant in Farmer was pursuing a Bivens action,

the Supreme Court made no ruling on the Bivens aspect and has never

listed Farmer as one of its Bivens cases. Id. at 138-39.

Like the plaintiff in Bulger, Plaintiff is seeking to hold

government officials responsible for doing their jobs: making

administrative decisions about parole eligibility, special

conditions, and re-incarceration. The court notes that Plaintiff

is not asserting that any of the Defendants assaulted him; rather,

he argues that the Defendants’ administrative actions resulted in

him being assaulted. Like the plaintiff in Bulger, he is seeking

to hold government officials accountable for what happened to him

after he returned to prison. This situation does not resemble any

of the three instances where the Supreme Court has approved a

Bivens claim, and thus must be dismissed.

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F. Motion to Seal

“It is well settled that the public and press have a qualified

right of access to judicial documents and records filed in civil

and criminal proceedings.” Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265

(4th Cir. 2014). The Public Citizen court further explained that:

When presented with a motion to seal, the law

in this Circuit requires a judicial officer to

comply with the following procedural

requirements: (1) provide public notice of

the sealing request and a reasonable

opportunity for the public to voice objections

to the motion; (2) consider less drastic

alternatives to closure; and (3) if it

determines that full access is not necessary,

it must state its reasons—with specific

findings—supporting closure and its

rejections of less drastic alternatives.

Id. at 272 (citing In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 234–35 (4th

Cir. 1984)); see also Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302

(4th Cir. 2000). Local Rule 105.11 requires the party seeking

sealing to provide “(a) proposed reasons supported by specific

factual representations to justify the sealing and (b) an

explanation why alternatives to sealing would not provide

sufficient protection.”

Plaintiff filed a motion to seal, (ECF No. 31), seeking to

seal his in camera filing in support of his reply to Defendants’

motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 29). Defendants did not oppose the

motion to seal. In his motion, Plaintiff alleges that the in

camera filing contains “private, sensitive, personal, and prurient

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information that is not in the public interest regarding matters

involving Plaintiff when he was a minor.” (ECF No. 31, at 1).

This court agrees that the Plaintiff’s privacy interest outweighs

any potential public interest. The information in this filing is

provided as background information about the Plaintiff’s past,

(ECF No. 28, at 12), and does not contain any allegations against

any defendants. Plaintiff’s actual reply to the motion to dismiss

remains public, and he only seeks to seal the in camera portion.

The motion to seal will be granted.

G. Motions for Hearing, Show Cause

The court has determined that no hearing is necessary, as the

papers provide all information needed to decide the claim.7 The

motion for hearing, (ECF No. 37), will be denied. Because the

matter is being dismissed, the motions to show cause, (ECF Nos.

15, 19), will be denied as moot.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will

be granted. All claims against the Agency Defendants and the tort

claims against the Individual Defendants will be dismissed without

7 Finally, the court notes Defendants’ argument that the

statute of limitations has long run out on Plaintiff’s claims,

(ECF No. 24-1, at 23-24), and Plaintiff has attempted to litigate

the parole revocation multiple times over the last two decades.

(Id. at 10). It is not necessary to resolve any of the additional

arguments presented by Defendants.

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prejudice, and the constitutional claims against the Individual

Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s motions to show cause will be denied as moot,

Plaintiff’s motion to seal will be granted, Defendants’ motion to

strike will be granted, and Plaintiff’s motion for hearing will be

denied. The motions concerning service of process will be denied

as moot. A separate order will follow.

/s/

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW

United States District Judge

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