Haywood v. Fitchburg Public Schools

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

KRISTENE HAYWOOD, individually and

as next friend of KG, a minor,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 4:24-cv-40071-MRG

FITCHBURG PUBLIC SCHOOLS,

Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 14)

GUZMAN, J.

Kristene Haywood (“Haywood”) filed this lawsuit on behalf of herself and her minor

daughter, KG (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), against Defendant Fitchburg Public Schools (“FPS”)

alleging civil rights violations under federal and state law. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 14]. For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Haywood’s daughter, KG, a Black student, began kindergarten at Reingold Elementary

School (“Reingold” or “Reingold Elementary”) in Fitchburg, Massachusetts around September

2021. [ECF No. 13 (“Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 5, 13]. Prior to attending school, KG would wear her “hair

in braids with beads as an essential expression of her Black identity and heritage.” [Id. ¶ 12]. For

many Black women and girls, braided hairstyles, often ordained with beads, have long “serve[d]

as an outward expression of self-acceptance and self-love.” [Id. ¶ 9]. Yet, throughout American

history, Black women have frequently faced discrimination based on the way they choose to wear

their hair. [Id. ¶¶ 10-11]. KG’s mother, Kristene Haywood (“Haywood”), who is also Black, “takes

pride in Black culture and strives to pass that pride on to her children through teaching an

example.” [Id. ¶ 6]. Therefore, to both KG and her mother, KG’s hairstyle serves as a proud

expression of her Black identity.

On November 26, 2021, before returning to school after a period of quarantine from

exposure to a family member with COVID-19, KG asked her mother to take out her beads and

braids. [Id. ¶¶ 17-18]. KG informed her mother that her teacher, Julie Boutwell (“Boutwell”), who

is white, had told her that her braids were “distracting” and “loud.” [Id. ¶ 21]. It was later revealed

that the teacher made these comments to KG in front of the entire class. [Id. ¶ 26]. Haywood

promptly had a phone conversation with Boutwell to discuss these comments. [Id. ¶ 22]. During

that conversation, Boutwell stated that “she ‘didn’t mean it like that’ but that the beads were

‘distracting to [KG] and others.’” [Id. ¶ 24 (alterations in original)].

After an initial meeting with Justin Sparks, the Interim Principal of Reingold (“Principal

Sparks”), where he expressed that Boutwell was apologetic, Haywood had a follow-up meeting

that additionally included Boutwell and Eva Kelley, a School Choice Officer. [Id. ¶¶ 27-29]. In

the meeting Boutwell was apologetic, but made comments that “KG’s hair posed a supposed

‘safety’ issue” and threatened Haywood with a complaint of slander. [Id. ¶¶ 31-32]. During the

meeting, Kelley mentioned to Haywood that she would be willing to help KG transfer to a new

school. [Id. ¶ 34]. After the meeting, Principal Sparks “acknowledged in an email that KG had felt

like she did not belong at Reingold Elementary School and that he needed ‘to have further

conversations with this teacher and as a school community.’” [Id. ¶ 36].

Following the meeting, Haywood met with Superintendent Robert Jokela to “request[] that

Boutwell be required to undergo anti-bias training.” [Id. ¶ 37]. The Superintendent let Haywood

know that “anti-bias training plans were ‘in the works’ but might not happen until the following

school year.” [Id. ¶ 38]. From the conversation, Haywood got the impression that the

Superintendent was not taking her concerns seriously and felt like further conversations would be

“futile.” [Id. ¶¶ 38, 40].

During December of 2021, KG transferred to Crocker Elementary, but “continued to

exhibit signs of stress and trauma,” including an unwillingness to wear beads in her hair “out of

concern for how they will be viewed by teachers and classmates.” [Id. ¶¶ 41-45]. Additionally, KG

“continues to suffer from stress and anxiety every time she gets her hair done.” [Id. ¶ 46].

As a result of these events, Plaintiffs filed a complaint with this Court on May 8, 2024.

[ECF No. 1]. On September 24, 2024, Plaintiffs amended their complaint. [ECF No. 13]. FPS

responded on October 8, 2024, by filing the currently pending motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 14].

On October 22, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 16].

At the request of the Court, FPS filed a reply brief on July 16, 2025. [ECF No. 21]. The matter is

therefore ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A complaint “must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.’” Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir.

2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). But under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss an action arguing that it fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its

face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the “[f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the

assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555

(citations omitted). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations,

either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under

some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting

Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).

On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the

complaint are accepted as true, and the Court draws “all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing

Garita Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Ponce Fed. Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1992)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims (Counts II, III, and IV)

Section 1983 “is a vehicle through which individuals may sue certain persons for depriving

them of federally assured rights,” such as the First Amendment’s right to free speech (Count II) or

the Fourteenth Amendment’s rights to equal protection (Count III) and due process (Count IV).

Gagliardi, 513 F.3d at 306. In order to succeed on a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted under the color of state law, and that his or her conduct deprived plaintiff of rights

secured by the Constitution or by federal law. Id. (citing Rodriguez-Cirilo v. Garcia, 115 F.3d 50,

52 (1st Cir. 1997)).

A school district may be held liable under Section 1983 when a policy or custom is directly

“responsible for a deprivation of rights that is protected by the Constitution.” Monell v. Dep’t Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Liability cannot be imposed through a theory of vicarious

liability premised “solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with

a tortfeasor.” Id. at 691-92. However, a municipality can be held liable for the actions of their

employees based on a “failure to train” theory. See Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23

F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994) (explaining that “inadequate training of subordinates may be a basis

for a section 1983 claim against a superior officer”).

When a plaintiff brings a claim based on failure to train, the complaint must establish that

the lack of training amounted to a “city ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.” City

of Canton, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). In other words, a plaintiff must allege that the failure to train

was “the moving force behind the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Bordanaro v. McLeod, 871

F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir. 1989). To establish that a “policy” was the “moving force,” the complaint

must allege a “causal link between the municipality’s policy and the plaintiff’s injury and that

municipal decisionmakers knew or should have known [that the policy was inadequate but]

nonetheless exhibited deliberate indifference [as to its] unconstitutional effects.” Mazza v. City of

Boston, No. 24-10333-NMG, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80441, at *5 (D. Mass. Apr. 28, 2025)

(alterations in original) (quoting Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156).

“Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal

actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 61 (2011) (internal citations omitted); see City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“[A] deliberate

choice to follow a course of action is made among various alternatives.”). This requires a plaintiff

to demonstrate more than an “isolated instance of unconstitutional activity,” but rather, that there

was a “‘pattern of . . . constitutional violations’ similar to the defendant’s.” Mazza, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 80441, at *6 (quoting Aprileo v. Clapprood, No. 3:21-cv-30114-MGM, 2024 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 126426, at *9 (D. Mass. May 21, 2024)); see Connick, 563 U.S. at 62 (“A pattern of similar

constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate

deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train”); Santiago v. Bloise, 741 F. Supp. 2d 357,

363 (D. Mass. 2010) (“Evidence of this single event is insufficient support for the court to conclude

a policy of deliberate indifference.”).

Having established the applicable legal framework, the Court will now take each of

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims in turn.

I. Count II: Freedom of Expression

It has long been established that the First Amendment protects not only “pure speech,” but

also certain forms of “symbolic acts” that are viewed as “expression.” See Tinker v. Des Moines

Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (holding that a student’s decision to wear a

black armband to protest the Vietnam War was protected expression under the First Amendment).

Although many circuits have been divided on whether the right to wear one’s hair as one chooses

constitutes “expressive conduct” protected by the First Amendment, the First Circuit has held that

it does not. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970) (“We reject the notion that

plaintiff’s hair length is of a sufficiently communicative character to warrant the full protection of

the First Amendment.”); see Williams v. Hathaway, 400 F. Supp. 122, 126 (D. Mass. 1975)

(holding that while a hairstyle may reflect and individualistic choice, it is not inherently

“expressive or communicative” to warrant First Amendment protection).

Plaintiffs allege that Boutwell “violated the Plaintiffs’ rights to freedom of expression . . .

by requiring her to remove her beads and braids as a condition of attending school.” [Am. Compl.

¶ 68]. Because courts across the country are divided on whether hairstyle constitutes expressive

conduct, and in the absence of any new precedent from the First Circuit or this Court, we adhere

to the holding that a hairstyle does not qualify as “expressive conduct” protected by the First

Amendment. See Richards, 424 F.2d at 1283; Williams, 400 F. Supp. at 126. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were not violated when Boutwell asked KG to change her

hairstyle.1 As explained above, municipal liability under Section 1983 requires an underlying

constitutional violation. See Cox v. City of Boston, No. 22-11009-RGS, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

196207, at *14 (D. Mass. Oct. 29, 2024); Keller v. Town of Monson, No. 3:20-cv-30187-KAR,

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51282, at *23 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2024). Because Plaintiffs have failed to

plausibly allege a First Amendment violation, their Section 1983 claim necessarily fails.

However, assuming that Plaintiffs were able to establish an underlying constitutional

violation, their claim would for municipal liability under Section 1983 would still be deficient.

Plaintiffs assert that FPS’ failure to train their teachers on protective hairstyles amounts to

“deliberate indifference to KG’s rights.” [ECF. No. 16 at 6-7]. This requires Plaintiffs to establish

a causal link between Boutwell’s actions towards KG and FPS’s deliberately indifferent failure to

adopt an adequate training policy. See Mazza, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80441, at *5; Connick, 563

U.S. at 61. The Amended Complaint fails to establish this causal link. Mazza, 2025 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 80441, at *5. Although Boutwell’s conduct may have been harmful, an isolated incident is

insufficient to support an inference that the failure to train rose to the level of an FPS “policy.” See

Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821 (1985) (recognizing that it is “difficult” to say “that

someone pursues a ‘policy’ of ‘inadequate training,’ unless evidence be adduced which proves that

the inadequacies resulted from conscious choice – that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately

chose a training program which would prove inadequate”); Argueta v. City of Revere, No. 09-

1 Further, to the extent that Plaintiffs are alleging a First Amendment claim on behalf of Haywood, the Amended

Complaint fails to allege any facts that would raise any plausible claim that Defendant violated her right to Freedom

of Expression. [See generally Am. Compl.]. Namely, the Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege a First

Amendment violation for either Haywood, individually, or as KG’s next of friend.

10268-RGS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71782, at *3-4 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2009) (dismissing

plaintiff’s failure to train claim on the ground that a single incident is insufficient to establish

deliberate indifference); Santiago, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (dismissing plaintiff’s failure to train

claim on the grounds that the complaint only alleges “facts about a specific incident[,]” which is

insufficient to support the inference that the alleged failure to train constituted an official municipal

policy). In the absence of a pattern of constitutional violations, a municipality’s failure to train its

employees does not amount to deliberate indifference. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.

Nor does the Amended Complaint establish that FPS was aware of the lack of an adequate

training policy and consciously disregarded the need to adopt one. See id. While Plaintiffs

reference FPS’s statements that anti-bias training were “in the works,” [Am. Compl. ¶ 38], which

suggests that such trainings were not yet in place, that assertion alone does not sufficiently establish

that the lack of training resulted from a deliberate choice by FPS. See Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at

823; Bordanaro, 871 F.2d at 1156 (holding that the unconstitutional behavior “must be so well

settled and widespread that the policymaking officials of the municipality can be said to have either

actual or constructive knowledge of it yet did nothing to end the practice”). In fact, the statement

that the trainings were forthcoming indicates that FPS was not consciously choosing to ignore or

forgo training. Without more, this acknowledgment does not support a plausible claim that FPS

acted with deliberate indifference.

Although what happened to KG was an unfortunate incident, this Court is mindful of

Justice White’s caution in City of Canton:

To adopt lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to

unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where a person

has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee, a §

1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city “could have done” to

prevent the unfortunate incident.

489 U.S. at 389 (quoting Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 823). Absent specific, well-pled facts

establishing deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim cannot proceed and

consequently, their First Amendment claim falls. Defendant’s motion to dismiss Count II must be

granted. 2

II. Count III: Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits a state from treating similarly situated persons

differently because of their classification in a particular group.” Mulero-Carrillo v. Román-

Hernández, 790 F.3d 99, 105-06 (1st Cir. 2015). A viable equal protection claim requires “proof

that (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that

such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent

to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a

person.” Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Rubinovitz v.

Rogato, 60 F.3d 906, 909-10 (1st Cir. 1995)). In the context of student harassment, the plaintiff

must demonstrate that school officials “treated [him] differently from others similarly situated,

either intentionally or with deliberate indifference.” Doe v. Town of Stoughton, No. 12-cv-10467-

PBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173030, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 2013). Accordingly, the plaintiff

“must identify his [or her] putative comparators,” Harron v. Town of Franklin, 660 F.3d 531, 537

(1st Cir. 2011), and “adduce competent evidence of purposeful discrimination.” Meléndez-García

v. Sánchez, 629 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Hayden v. Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 453 (1st

Cir. 1998)).

2 The Plaintiffs’ opposition brief notes an additional allegation that Defendant violated Section 1983 by acting with

deliberate indifference in their response to Boutwell’s complaints regarding the treatment of KG. [ECF No. 16 at 8].

However, because Plaintiff did not assert this claim in their Amended Complaint, [Am. Compl.], the Court will not

consider new claims raised for the first time in opposition filings. See Alt. Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2001) (“In ruling on a motion to dismiss . . . a court may not consider any documents

that are outside of the complaint . . . unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment.”).

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint fails to sufficiently allege an Equal Protection violation

because it does not adequately establish that KG and Haywood were treated differently than their

similarly situated peers. The Amended Complaint merely states that “FPS treated KG and her

mother differently from similarly situated students and their parents on the basis of race” without

providing any additional detail about how this treatment was in fact different than the treatment of

their “putative comparators.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 73]; Harron, 660 F.3d at 537. Plaintiffs’ statements

are simply recitations of the legal standard, and without further allegations showing that Plaintiffs

were in fact treated differently, their Equal Protection claim fails. Without an underlying

constitutional violation, Plaintiffs’ municipal liability claims necessary fail too. See Cox, 2024

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196207, at *14; Keller, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51282, at 23.3

III. Count IV: Procedural Due Process

In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs claim that they are willing to waive their procedural due

process claim, provided there is an avenue for relief under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, §§ 5, 16. [ECF

No. 16 at 10]. Because Section 5 does not expressly provide a mechanism for seeking

compensatory damages, Plaintiffs pursue such relief through Section 16. [Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60, 64].

However, Defendants argue that Section 16 does not provide Plaintiffs an avenue for relief because

they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. [ECF No. at 15].

The parties rely on Goodwin v. Lee Public Schools, 56 N.E.3d 777 (Mass. 2016) as

instructive on this question. [ECF No. 15 at 16; ECF No. 16 at 12-13]. There, the plaintiff brought

a claim alleging that a school violated Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 37H1/2 (“Section 37H1/2”), a

3 Even if Plaintiffs were able to establish an Equal Protection violation, their claim for municipal liability under

Section 1983 would still be deficient. For reasons discussed supra, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not

sufficiently establish a causal link between FPS’s failure to train and Boutwells treatment of KG. Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ claim Equal Protection claim is not sufficiently plead under Section 1983.

state law regulating school discipline. 56 N.E.3d at 783. Plaintiff additionally raised a tort under

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 16 (“Section 16”). Id. In light of both claims, the question facing the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was whether Section 16 provided an independent avenue

for relief, or whether the plaintiff was first required to exhaust her administrative remedies

provided under Section 37H1/2. Id. at 779. The court found in the affirmative of the former,

holding that “the tort recovery a student may seek under [Section] 16, provides a separate and

distinct remedy from that available under § 37H1/2.” Id. Accordingly “the plaintiff was not

obligated to exhaust the statute’s administrative remedies before pursuing a tort claim under

[Section] 16.” Id.

Defendants posit that Goodwin is inapplicable because it was clear that Section 37H1/2

had been violated and therefore there was no further need for the plaintiff to exhaust administrative

remedies before seeking a tort remedy under Section 16. [ECF No. 21 at 6-7]. However, their

position is entirely baseless and misinterprets the holding. The Supreme Judicial Court made clear

that Section 16 affords a “separate and distinct remedy[,]” independent of whether administrative

remedies under other statutes had been exhausted. 56 N.E.3d at 779. Accordingly, Plaintiffs here

may pursue a tort remedy under Section 16.

Nevertheless, in order to state a viable claim under Section 16, Plaintiffs must sufficiently

allege that KG was “refused admission to or excluded from the public school[] or from the

advantages, privileges and courses of study[.].” Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 76, § 16. For similar reasons

as discussed infra, the Amended Complaint fails to do so. KG was never asked to leave Reingold

Elementary, nor was she excluded from the school or its programs. [See generally Am. Compl.].

Instead, KG’s departure from Reingold Elementary was a direct result of a negotiated departure

between Haywood and the staff at the school. [See id. ¶¶ 34-36, 41]. Because Plaintiffs fail to

adequately allege that KG was unlawfully excluded under Section 16, the statute cannot provide a

remedy.

B. Count V: 42 U.S.C. § 2000d

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes that “[n]o person in the United States

shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied

the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. A school district can be held liable for “intentional

discrimination when it has been ‘deliberately indifferent’ to teacher or peer harassment of a

student.” Pollard v. Georgetown Sch. Dist., 132 F. Supp. 3d 208, 230 (D. Mass. 2015) (quoting

Zeno v. Pine Plains Cent. Sch. Dist., 702 F.3d 655, 665 (2d Cir. 2012)). To meet this standard, the

Plaintiff must show that: “(1) plaintiffs were “subject to ‘severe, pervasive, and objectively

offensive’ . . . harassment”; (2) the harassment “caused the plaintiff to be deprived of educational

opportunities or benefits”; (3) the school “knew of the harassment”; (4) the harassment occurred

“in [the school’s] programs and activities”; and (5) the school “was deliberately indifferent to the

harassment such that its response (or lack thereof) is clearly unreasonable in light of the known

circumstances.” StandWithUs Ctr. for Legal Just. v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 742 F. Supp. 3d 133,

141-42 (D. Mass. 2024) (quoting Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 72-73 (1st Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiffs fail to establish a Title VI violation because their Amended Complaint does not

adequately allege that harassment by Boutwell was sufficiently severe and pervasive.

“[H]arassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive . . . effectively bars the

victim’s access to educational opportunity of benefit.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526

U.S. 629, 633 (1999). In other words, a plaintiff must allege that the educational environment

became so inaccessible or intolerable that they were effectively compelled to withdraw. See, e.g.,

Brown v. Univ. of Mass. Amherst, No. 22-30068-FDS, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36537, at *18 (D.

Mass. Mar. 6, 2023) (finding severe and pervasive harassment where “plaintiff withdrew from a

course” because the idea of interacting with the harasser “was too much to handle”); Doe v. Town

of Stoughton, No. 12-10467-PBS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167334, at *5-6 (D. Mass. Nov. 25,

2013) (alleged harassment led to suicide attempts and intensive outpatient care that “contributed

to severe physical and mental health issues, causing her to withdraw from school”).

In the instant case, Haywood was not in any way compelled to withdraw KG from Reingold

because of the incident with Boutwell. Instead, the school and Haywood worked together to

arrange a transfer. The idea of leaving Reingold was first raised by Eva Kelley, a School Choice

Officer, who offered to assist Haywood in helping “KG transfer to a new school if Haywood

wanted her to.” [Am. Compl. ¶ 34 (emphasis added)]. Haywood subsequently met with Principal

Sparks to discuss KG’s transfer to Crocker Elementary School. [Id. ¶ 35]. While later that day

Principal Sparks acknowledged in an email that “KG had felt like she did not belong at Reingold

Elementary School,” [id. ¶ 36], the Amended Complaint is otherwise devoid of any allegations

indicating that these feelings were, as an initial matter, caused by the incident with Boutwell and,

if so, whether the incident contributed to an environment that was so offensive as to compel her

transfer. Without more, the facts in the Amended Complaint suggest that KG left Reingold

Elementary under a negotiated departure, not one compelled by harassment so severe and

pervasive that it rendered educational access unattainable.

However, even if this Court were to accept that the harassment barred KG from educational

opportunities, a single incident of this nature, though objectively offensive, does not rise to the

level of severity and pervasiveness requires to establish a hostile environment under Title VI. [See

generally Am. Compl.]; see StandWithUs Ctr. for Legal Just., 742 F. Supp. 3d at 141-42; Pollard,

132 F. Supp. 3d at 230-31 (holding that “snide [stereotypical] comments” directed at a Jewish

student, were “objectively offensive,” they did “not meet the high standard of severity of

pervasiveness” required by law); see also Atkins v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., No. C04-5779RBL,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49094, at *7 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2005) (holding that an isolated

derogatory remark by a teacher, followed by an apology, was insufficient to support a Title VI

claim); HB v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11-cv-5881-CS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

141252, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012) (finding that a single instance of derogatory name calling

directed at a Puerto Rican student did not rise to the level of severity and pervasiveness required

to support a claim under Title VI). Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges only one instance

in which Boutwell directed offensive comments at KG. [Am. Compl. ¶ 20]. While Boutwell’s

remark may have been “objectively offensive,” a single incident of this nature does not rise to the

high threshold of being severe and pervasive. Therefore, Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d and must be dismissed.

C. State Claims (Counts I and VI)

Having determined that Counts II, III, IV, and V fail, and “given that the [Plaintiffs’] basis

for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction was the purported presence of a federal question[,]” the

Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts I (discrimination in public school

claim) and VI (negligent infliction of emotional distress), which are purely state law claims. Ryan

v. UMass Mem’l Health, 728 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221 (D. Mass. 2024) (collecting cases). “[P]endent

jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right[.]” United Mine Workers of Am. v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (citations omitted). As such, if claims arising under the

Constitution or federal law are dismissed before trial, any remaining state claims should be

dismissed too as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties. See id. At such an

early stage in the litigation, the equities do not weigh in favor of the Court retaining jurisdiction.

With pretrial discovery or trial preparation yet to occur, the parties have invested relatively little

time or resources into the suit. See Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Ins. of P.R., Inc., 748 F.3d 387, 392

(1st Cir. 2014). The Court accordingly declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims and dismisses them without prejudice to Plaintiffs filing suit in state

court. See Grispino v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 358 F.3d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs

may alternatively refile the claims in this Court as part of a second amended complaint if the facts

warrant raising federal claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, [ECF No. 14], is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2025

/s/ Margaret R. Guzman

Margaret R. Guzman

United States District Judge