Figures v. Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARQUISE FIGURES,

Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No.: MJM-24-2938

WARDEN S. BROWN,

Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Marquise Figures (“Figures”), an inmate at Federal Correctional Institution

(“FCI”) Cumberland in Cumberland, Maryland, filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that a disciplinary charge he incurred violated his Fifth

Amendment due process rights. ECF No. 1 at 6–7. In response to the Petition, Respondent seeks

dismissal due to Figures’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and, in the alternative,

because the petition is without merit. ECF No. 7. Figures has also filed a Motion for Injunction,

ECF No. 5, which is opposed by Respondent, ECF No. 6. Upon review of the submitted materials,

the Court finds that no hearing is necessary. See Rules 1(b), 8(a) Rules Governing § 2254 Cases

in the U.S. Dist. Cts.; Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, the Petition shall

be denied and dismissed, and Petition’s motion shall be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2023, Figures was found guilty by a Disciplinary Hearing Officer

(“DHO”) employed by the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to conduct administrative hearings on acts

of inmate misconduct referred by the Unit Disciplinary Committee (“UDC”). ECF No. 7-1 at 2, ¶

2 (Decl. J. Booher). In Figures’s case, the hearing was conducted by Joseph Booher, who is a Case

Manager at FCI-Cumberland and works as an alternate DHO. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2.

The incident that is the focus of this Petition is memorialized in Incident Report No.

3857763. ECF No. 7-1 at 3, ¶ 4. In that report, it is alleged by Counselor Cook that on November

13, 2023, at approximately 6:40 AM, while Cook was monitoring phone calls in the unit where

Figures was housed, Figures made a phone call to another man. Id. at ¶ 6(a). At the “12-minute

mark of the phone call the phone [went] silent as if someone clicks over to another phone call.”

Id. The male with whom Figures was talking returned to the other end of the line twenty-four

seconds later, at the 12:24 mark, and Figures began talking with a woman who had joined the

phone call. Id. An introduction of Figures as “my brother” occurred. Id. Cook states in the report

that “[b]y connecting to another phone line, Inmate Figures participates [sic] in a 3-way call which

is a direct violation of the BOP policies.” Id. Cook characterized this action as “circumventing the

phone monitoring system by participating in a 3-way call.” Id., see also ECF No. 7-1 at 9 (Incident

Report). Figures received a copy of the Incident Report the same day it issued. ECF No. 7-1 at 4,

¶ 7.

On November 28, 2023, Figures attended a hearing conducted by the UDC and stated that

he did not intend to place a three-way call. ECF No. 7-1 at 10; ECF No. 7-1 at 4, ¶ 8(a). He

explained he had just arrived at FCI-Cumberland on the preceding Monday and had never heard

that a three-way call was inappropriate at FCI-Schuylkill, where he was confined previously. Id.

The UDC referred the Incident Report to the DHO for further action due to the severity of the

charge. Id. at ¶ 8(b). Figures received notice of the Discipline Hearing before the DHO the same

day of the UDC hearing and signed a form acknowledging his receipt of the notice. Id. at ¶ 9.

On December 19, 2023, DHO Booher held the Discipline Hearing for Incident Report

3857763. ECF No. 7-1 at 4, ¶ 11. After reading Figures his rights and confirming he understood

them, Figures told Booher he had no documentary evidence to present, no witnesses to call, no

video evidence to present, and did not need the assistance of a staff representative at the hearing.

Id. at 5, ¶ 11(a)(i) – (iv), see also ECF No. 7-1 at 12, 14. DHO Booher read the Incident Report

aloud and asked Figures if the statement was true. ECF No. 7-1 at 5, ¶ 11(b). Figures responded

that he did not intend to make a three-way call and again explained that he had just arrived at FCI-

Cumberland from FCI-Schuylkill and had never heard that three-way calls were inappropriate

when he was confined there. Id.

DHO Booher considered the reporting officer’s description of the incident, the “TRU

System documentation showing the call placed,” and Figures’s statements at both the UDC and

DHO hearings. ECF No. 7-1 at 5, ¶ 11(b)-(c). DHO Booher found that Figures committed the

charged violation: Code 297, Use of the Telephone for Abuses Other than Criminal Activity. Id.;

see also ECF No. 7-1 at 16–19. DHO Booher explained that he gave greater weight to the written

account of the incident than he did to Figures’s claim that he did not intend to make a three-way

call or that he never heard that making such a call was inappropriate. Id. at 6, ¶ 11(d)((i). DHO

Booher noted that the inmate Admission and Orientation handbook, which all inmates receive

when they arrive at a new facility, clearly states that three-way calling is prohibited. Id. at ¶

11(d)(iv). The sanction imposed was the disallowance of 27 days of good conduct time and 90-

days loss of telephone privileges. Id. at ¶ 11(f).

DHO Booher’s January 7, 2024, written report was given to Figures two days later. ECF

No. 7-1 at 7, ¶ 12. He was advised of his right to appeal the decision within 20 days through the

BOP’s administrative remedy procedure. Id.

According to BOP records, which Figures has not disputed, he has attempted to file three

requests for administrative remedies challenging Incident Report 3857763. ECF No. 7-2 at 5, ¶

11; 14-16. His first request (Remedy ID No. 1189680-R1) was submitted to the Mid-Atlantic

Regional Office on February 7, 2024. Id. at 14. This request was rejected on February 9, 2024, as

untimely because Figures failed to submit an appeal within 20 calendar days of receipt of the DHO

report. Id.

On April 1, 2024, Figures resubmitted a request (Remedy ID No. 1189680-R2) for

administrative remedy to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office, again attempting to appeal the DHO

decision. ECF No. 7-2 at 5, ¶ 11(b); 15. On April 2, 2024, the request was rejected as untimely

with the notation that the staff memo Figures had attached in an attempt to explain the delay

pertained to two different remedy requests that had been rejected as untimely. Id. at 15.

On April 10, 2024, Figures appealed the rejection of Remedy 1189680-R2 to the BOP

Central Office. ECF No. 7-2 at 5, ¶ 11(c). The Central Office concurred with the Mid-Atlantic

Regional Office’s rationale for rejecting the remedy as untimely and denied the appeal on April

22, 2024. Id.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Section 2241 Petition

A 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition may be filed to contest the manner in which a sentence is

executed. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[A]ttacks on the

execution of a sentence are properly raised in a § 2241 petition.”); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164,

166 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence rather

than its validity. . .”). A showing that a prisoner is in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States may support issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991).

Although this Court’s power to entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2241 is broad, it “has long been established that the district court’s discretion to entertain

habeas petitions and exercise the power of the writ is not boundless.” Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d

525, 530 (4th Cir. 2010). “[P]rudential concerns, such as comity and the orderly administration of

criminal justice, may require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power.”

Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). Such is the case where there is a failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does not contain a statutory exhaustion requirement, courts

consistently require prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking habeas

review under § 2241. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484,

489–91 (1973) (requiring exhaustion in a § 2241 matter); Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 530–33

(4th Cir. 2010) (same); McClung v. Shearin, 90 F. App'x. 444, 445 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Federal

prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing § 2241 petitions.”); Miller v.

Clark, 958 F.2d 368, 1992 WL 48031, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table opinion) (“Federal

prisoners who wish to challenge the length of their confinement must first exhaust administrative

remedies.”); Henderson v. Warden, Edgefield Satellite Prison Camp, No. 2:09-cv-01599-RBH,

2009 WL 3317149, at *2 (D.S.C. Oct. 14, 2009) (“It is well settled that a federal prisoner is

required to exhaust his administrative remedies within the Bureau of Prisons before filing an action

pursuant to § 2241.”).

Figures is therefore required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his petition

in this Court. The BOP’s administrative remedy procedure provides that an inmate may appeal

the DHO’s discipline hearing decision to the Regional Director within 20 calendar days of the

written decision. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a), (d)(2). If the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional

Director’s response, he may appeal to the Central Office. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a). The inmate

must file this final appeal within 30 calendar days of the date the Regional Director signed the

response. See id. An inmate is not deemed to have exhausted his administrative remedies until he

has filed his complaint at all levels. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).

Under 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b) an extension of the time for filing the administrative remedy

“may be allowed” upon a showing of a “valid reason for delay.” The regulation defines “valid

reason” as “a situation which prevented the inmate from submitting the request within the

established time frame” and includes:

an extended period in-transit during which the inmate was separated

from documents needed to prepare the Request or Appeal; and

extended period of time during which the inmate was physically

incapable of preparing a Request or Appeal; an unusually long

period taken for informal resolution attempts; indication by an

inmate, verified by staff, that a response to the inmate’s request for

copies of dispositions requested under § 542.19 of this part was

delayed.

Id.

Exhaustion requires completion of “the administrative review process in accordance with

the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88, 93 (2006).

This requirement is one of “proper exhaustion of administrative remedies, which ‘means using all

steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on

the merits).’” Woodford 548 U.S. at 93 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th

Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original). Absent a valid reason for failing to meet the filing deadline

requirements, untimely filing of an appeal of the DHO’s decision does not suffice to exhaust

administrative remedies.

Figures did not comply with the time requirements for appealing the DHO’s decision and

did not present a valid reason for failing to do so. Failure to comply with those requirements

amounts to a failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Figures offers no explanation regarding

his failure to avail himself of the administrative remedy procedures, such as being prevented from

doing so by BOP staff. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-44 (2016) (describing three

circumstances where administrative remedies are unavailable and an inmate’s duty to exhaust

available remedies does not come into play). The Petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

B. Motion for Injunction

Figures’s Motion for an Injunction alleges conduct directed at other inmates and promises

to provide additional evidence about a particular Case Manager if the motion is granted so that

Figures will not suffer any retaliation. ECF No. 5. As a preliminary injunction temporarily affords

an extraordinary remedy prior to trial, the party seeking the preliminary injunction must

demonstrate: (1) by a “clear showing” that he is likely to succeed on the merits at trial; (2) he is

likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities

tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20-23 (2008); Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d

287, 292-93 (4th Cir. 2011). “All four requirements must be satisfied.” Cantley v. W. Virginia

Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth., 771 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (brackets omitted); see also

Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that Fourth Circuit’s prior test of

balancing the factors is no longer good law in light of Winter).

The allegations contained in Figures’s motion do not appear to relate to the matters raised

in this Petition. The single-page motion is so vague that it is difficult to discern what it is

referencing. The motion will be denied because it fails make a clear showing that Figures is likely

to succeed on the merits of the claim for relief asserted in this action.

III. CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be dismissed, and the Motion for Injunctive

Relief shall be denied. A separate Order will follow.

__9/24/25 ___ __________/S/___________________

Date Matthew J. Maddox

United States District Judge