Roland v. Wayne County Prison

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DANIEL WAYNE ROLAND, No. 4:25-CV-01307

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

WAYNE COUNTY PRISON, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SEPTEMBER 23, 2025

Plaintiff Daniel Wayne Roland filed the instant pro se civil rights lawsuit

under Section 1983,1 claiming that prison officials at Wayne County Prison

violated his constitutional rights. From the face Roland’s pleading, it appears that

he has already litigated identical claims in state court, and thus his federal lawsuit

would be barred by res judicata. The Court will therefore require Roland to show

cause why the instant complaint should not be dismissed on that basis.

I. BACKGROUND

Roland lodged the instant complaint in July 2025 while incarcerated at SCI

Phoenix, eventually paying the initial partial filing fee approximately one month

1 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional

wrongs committed by state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves

as a mechanism for vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ.

later.2 It appears that Roland is no longer incarcerated and resides in Lemoyne,

Pennsylvania.3

Roland alleges that, beginning in January 2024 and continuing through

March of that year, his constitutional rights were violated by various Wayne

County Prison officials. He first alleges that on two occasions in January, he was

issued misconducts for “minor” offenses and that his Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process rights were violated during the prison disciplinary process

for both misconducts.4 He further alleges that the conditions he endured during his

disciplinary segregation violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel

and unusual punishments.5 Finally, Roland claims that prison officials failed to

protect him from an inmate assault in March 2024, also in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, before transferring him to Luzerne County Prison.6

Roland sues the following eight defendants: Wayne County Prison, Wayne

County Prison Board, Warden Randall Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco,

Lieutenant Paul Soccodato, Sergeant Huffman, Acting Sergeant Jaycox, and

Correctional Officer Carney.7

2 See Doc. 1.

3 See Doc. 9.

4 Doc. 1 at 4-5.

5 Id. at 6-7.

6 Id. at 7-8.

7 Id. at 2-3.

Notably, Roland explicitly asserts that he “filed a lawsuit in the state courts

dealing with the same facts involved in this action” in August 2024.8 He recounts

that he sued Wayne County Prison, Wayne County Prison Board, Warden Randall

Williams, Deputy Warden John Masco, Lieutenant Dixon, and Correctional

Officer Carney in the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County, Pennsylvania, at

docket number 419-CV-2024.9 He further states that the case was dismissed on

November 1, 2024, based on Defendants’ preliminary objections in the nature of a

demurrer.10 He asserts that he sought “reconsideration” from the Commonwealth

Court of Pennsylvania, but to date has not received a decision from that court.11

Following review of the complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),12 it

appears that Roland has already attempted (unsuccessfully) to litigate the same

claims in state court, and therefore those claims are barred by claim preclusion.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,” pro se

prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or employees.13 One

basis for dismissal at the screening stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim

8 Id. at 12.

9 Id.

10 Id.

11 Id.

12 Although Roland is no longer incarcerated, when he filed his complaint, he was imprisoned at

SCI Phoenix. See Doc. 1 at 3. Thus, Section 1915A applies. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

upon which relief may be granted[.]”14 This language closely tracks Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to

screening a pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as

they utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).15

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.”16 The court must accept as true the factual

allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences from them in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff.17 In addition to the facts alleged on the face of

the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint,

matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to

a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these

documents.18

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct a

three-step inquiry.19 At step one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the]

14 Id. § 1915A(b)(1).

15 See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 & n.11 (3d Cir. 2002); O’Brien

v. U.S. Fed. Gov’t, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (nonprecedential);

cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

16 Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir.

1996).

17 Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).

18 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.

v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

19 Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted) (footnote omitted).

plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”20 Second, the court should distinguish well-

pleaded factual allegations—which must be taken as true—from mere legal

conclusions, which “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be

disregarded.21 Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”22

Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to

draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”23

Because Roland proceeds pro se, his pleadings are to be liberally construed

and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]”24

III. DISCUSSION

Claim preclusion requires “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit

involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on

the same cause of action.”25 These elements appear to be satisfied here.

Roland alleges that his state-court lawsuit was dismissed on preliminary

objections in the nature of a demurrer.26 Such a dismissal is akin to dismissal for

20 Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in original)).

21 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

22 Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

23 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

24 Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

25 Beasley v. Howard, 14 F.4th 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

26 See Doc. 1 at 12; PA. R. CIV. P. 1028(a)(4) (preliminary objection on the ground of “legal

insufficiency of pleading (demurrer)”).

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)27 and constitutes a final judgment on the merits.28 Roland

alleges that he appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. However,

according to the publicly available docket, that appeal was quashed in April 2025

because Roland had improperly appealed the dismissal of his motion for

reconsideration rather than a final appealable order (such as the trial court’s

November 1, 2024 dismissal of his lawsuit).29

Roland’s state-court lawsuit also targeted many of the same Wayne County

entities and officials. Although his earlier lawsuit did not include defendants Paul

Soccodato, Sergeant Huffman, or Acting Sergeant Jaycox, that discrepancy is

likely immaterial. Any identical claim that was previously adjudicated on the

merits and which is later reasserted against closely related new defendants (here,

27 See Arena v. McShane, 150 F. App’x 165, 167-68 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (“A

Pennsylvania demurrer is nearly identical to the federal 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim.” (citing Huntley v. City of Johnstown, No. CIV.A. 03-59J, 2004 WL 627157,

at *8 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2004) (“[C]omment d of § 27 [of the Restatement (Second) of

Judgments] clearly provides that a matter is actually litigated on motions to dismiss for failure

to state a claim, which is in the nature of a demurrer in state court.”); In re Luongo, 823 A.2d

942, 961 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (“A demurrer is a preliminary objection that the pleading fails

to set forth a cause of action upon which relief can be granted under any theory of law.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Holtz, 707 A.2d 569, 570 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1998) (describing 12(b)(6) motion as “[s]imilar to a demurrer under Pennsylvania’s rules”))).

28 See Fairbank’s Cap. Corp. v. Milligan, 234 F. App’x 21, 23 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that

“dismissal ‘with prejudice’ is treated as an adjudication of the merits and thus has preclusive

effect” (citing Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972))).

29 See Roland v. Wayne Cnty. Prison, No. 422 CD 2025 (Pa. Commw. Ct.).

Soccodato, Huffman, and Jaycox) is likely barred by nonmutual claim preclusion

and application of Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950).30

Finally, as Roland himself admits, his state-court lawsuit concerned “the

same facts involved in this action.”31 It is therefore likely that Roland raised the

same causes of action in his state-court proceeding.

Accordingly, it appears that Roland’s duplicative federal lawsuit likely

meets the elements for claim preclusion and is barred by res judicata. If so,

dismissal of the instant civil action would therefore be appropriate under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1) as frivolous and malicious32 in addition to failing to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.

Nevertheless, to err on the side of caution, the Court will provide Roland an

opportunity to show cause as to why his federal lawsuit should not be dismissed as

barred by claim preclusion. If Roland believes that claim preclusion does not

30 See Gambocz, 468 F.2d at 840-42 (concluding that second lawsuit asserting identical cause of

action but adding several new but closely related defendants was barred by res judicata and

Bruszewski doctrine); Bruszewski, 181 F.2d at 422; see also 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,

ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4464.1, at

702 (3d ed. 2017) (concluding that one “cogent argument in favor of nonmutual claim

preclusion is that the party to be precluded should have joined his new adversary in the original

litigation”).

31 Doc. 1 at 12.

32 See Washington v. Gilmore, 825 F. App’x 58, 60 n.2 (3d Cir. 2020) (nonprecedential) (citing

Higgins v. Carpenter, 258 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Cato v. United States,

70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995); Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 994-95 (5th Cir.

1993)); McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Repetitious litigation

of virtually identical causes of action may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or

malicious.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

apply to his federal lawsuit, he should address the elements stated herein and

explain why his federal lawsuit is not precluded as previously litigated during his

state-court proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court will require Roland to show cause as to

why his complaint should not be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), as it appears from the face of his complaint that he has

already litigated the same claims in state court. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge